
Rook vR 1^ 



MILITxlRY HISTORY 



OF 



ULYSSES S. GRANT 



FROM APRIL, 1801, TO APRIL, 1865. 



BY 

ADAM BADEAU, 

BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMS' 

LATE MILITARY SECRETAKT.AND AIDE-DE-CAMP 

TO THE OENEKAL-IN-CHIEF. 

Polchrum est benefacere reipublicae,— Sallust. 



VOLUME L 



D. APPLETONi 

1, 3, and 






^D STREET. 



M 



EvTEREP, accortling to Act of Congress, in the year 1867, by 

ADAM BADEAU, 

Id the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of the United States for the District 

of Columbia. 

By TraBsfsf 
JA 12 »^*» 



PREFACE TO VOLUME I. 



The fact that I became a member of General 
Grant's personal staff, before he assumed command 
of the armies of the United States, and tliat I have 
since remained witli him, is tlie voucher that I oifer 
for the correctness of tliis history. I have not meant 
to state one fact, unless it came under my own per- 
sonal observation, or has been told me by the gen- 
eral of the aiTQv, or one of his important officers, 
or unless I tnow it from official papers. When I 
deviate from this rule, I make the deviation known. 

The coiTespondence, telegraphic and written, of 
the headquarters of the armies, is accessible to me. 
I have also been allowed to examine all papers 
under the control of the War Department ; and, as 
many of the rebel archives are now in the posses- 
sion of the government, I have seen the original 
reports made by the rebel generals, of every l)attle 
but two, which I have attempted to describe. 

\ ^ -^ & 



IV PREFACE. 

Those two are Corinth and luka, at neither of 
wliich General Grant was present in person. The 
orio-inal rebel field returns have also been closely 
examined by me. No statement of rebel movements 
or stren<-'t]i is made in this volume, unless taken 
from these sources ; or, if otherwise, the source is 
named. 

Generals Sherman, Shei'idan, Ord, and Wilson, 
and the officers of General Grant's staff, as well as 
Admiral Porter, have afforded me much valuable 
information, and given me all the assistance in 
tlieir power, that I have desired. The Honorable 
Edwin M Stanton has also furnished me with in- 
formation which I could not otherwise have ob- 
tained. 

The present volume brings my narrative down 
to the period when General Grant was made Lieuten- 
ant-General, and assumed command of all the nation- 
al armies. It refers to scenes and events, many of 
which I did not personally witness, as I first reported 
to him, in person, in February, 1864 His private as 
Well a^ official correspondence, and daily conversa- 
tion for years with himself and the officers who ac- 
companied him in his earlier campaigns, are my prin- 
cipal autliority. I have his permission now to make 
known whatever I have learned from these various 
sources. 

My opinions, however, have not been submitted 
to General Grant. For them I alone am responsible. 
But, those opinions are based exclusively on the facts 



PREFACE. V 

presented to the reader, and, unless supported by 
the evidence I offer, must fall to the ground. 

I have striven to avoid unnecessary personality, 
but the occasional danger of this fault has been an 
insignificant consideration, when compared with the 
importance of historical truth. In matters of so 
much importance as those of which I write, there 
should be no secrecy, when the emergency which 
demanded secrecy is past . 

Washington, 18G7. 



CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. 



Introduction, .... ... I 

CHAPTER I. 

Birth and parentage of Grant — His name — West Point — His army IHl — The 
Mexican War — He marries — Leaves the army — Enters the leather trade — 
Galena — Grant drills a company — Takes it to Springfield — Organizes volunteer 
troops — Visits Cincinnati to see McClellan — Becomes colonel of Twenty-first 
Illinois regiment — Marches it to Missouri — Is made brigadier-general of vol- 
unteers — Takes command of District of Southeast Missouri — Seizes Padu- 
cah — Sends a force to drive rebels into Arkansas — Makes a demonstration 
upon Belmont — Demonstration converted into an attack — Battle of Belmont 
— Grant's success — Enemy reenforccd — Grant cuts his way out — Results of 
Belmont, ......... 7 

CHAPTER II. 

Rebel strategic line from Columbus to Bowling Green — Halleck in command of 
Department of the Missouri — Gunboats at the West — Demonstration in favor 
of BucU — Smith reports capture of Fort Henry feasible — Grant visits St. 
Louis to suggest the operation — Movement against Fort Henry sanctioned by 
Halleck — Attack by the fleet — Disposition of Grant's forces — Fall of Fort 
Henry — Grant proposes capture of Fort Donelson — Halleck directs strength- 
ening of Fort Henry — March to the Cumberland — Position and strength of 
Fort Donelson — The siege — Unsuccessful attack py the fleet — Assault by 
rebels on 15th of February — Counter-assault of national forces — Scene at 
Floyd's headquarters on night of 15th — Escape of Floyd and Pillow — Buck- 

1 ner proposes surrender — The capitulation — Buckner's headquarters — Hal- 
leck's dispatches after the victory — Results of capture of Fort Donelson, 22 

CHAPTER III. 

Grant and Sherman — Beginning of their friendship — Grant goes to Nashville — 
Is relieved from command by Halleck — Smith placed in charge of expedi- 
tion up the Tennessee — Grant supplies Smith from Fort Henry — Grant rein- 



Vni C0NTE2fTS. 

stated in command — Removes his headquarters to Savanna — Buell ordered 
to reenforce him — Buell's delay — Skirmishing at Pittsburg Landing — Battlo 
of Shiloh — Furious attack of rebels — National forces prepared — Grant ar- 
rives on the field — Sherman's line breaks — Sherman's skill and personal 
gallantry — Terrible fighting all over the field — National troops everywhere 
forced back — Grant's anxiety for Nelson and Lewis Wallace's support — 
Those commanders repeatedly ordered up, but do not arrive — Capture of 
Prentiss — Buell's arrival in person — His conversation with Grant — Last at- 
tack of rebels repulsed — Grant at Sherman's front — Situation at close of 
Sunday — Arrival of Buell's army in the night — Also of Lewis Wallace — At- 
tack by Grant on Monday — Rebels everywhere repulsed — Grant leads a regi- 
ment — Rebels ask permission to bury their dead — Results of battle of Shi 
loh — Reflections, . , . . • • . 67 

CHAPTER IV. 

Incorrect reports of battle of Shiloh — Halleck assumes command in the field 
— Disagreeable position of Grant — Siege of Corinth — Evacuation of Cor- 
inth by rebels — Ineffectual operations of Halleck — Halleck made general- 
in-chief — ^He offers command of Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Allen 
— Allen dechnes it — Grant then placed agam in command — Military situation 
in September, 1SG2 — Grant's force depleted — Enemy threatening — Price 
seizes luka — Grant's preparations to fight — Orders to Rosecrans and Ord — 
Battle of luka — Rosecrans neglects Grant's orders — Rebels escape in conse- 
quence — Grant's headquarters at Jackson — Rebels threaten Corinth — Strat- 
egy of Grant — Battle of Corinth — Rebels drive Rosecrans into Corinth — 
Final victory of Rosecrans — Enemy struck in flank by Ord — Rosecrans docs 
not follow up his success, although repeatedly ordered by Grant to pursue 
— He finally obeys — Pursuit inefi'ectual — Return of Rosecrans — Results of 
luka and Corinth — Rosecrans relieved and promoted — Relations of Grant 
with other officers — Reflections — Grant suggests movement against Vicks- 
burg, ........ 99 

CHAPTER V. 

Military importance of Mississippi river — Grant proposes movement into inte- 
rior, against Yicksburg — Campaign begun — McClernand endeavors to obtain 
command of an expedition against Yicksburg — Grant moves to Holly Springs 
— Enemy retreats — Rebels desert their fortifications on the Tallahatchie — Co- 
operative movement from Helena — Grant advances to Oxford — Sherman sent 
to Memphis — McClernand assigned to command of river expedition by the 
President — Sherman moves by river against Yicksburg — Grant's communi- 
cations cut and Holly Springs captured — Grant lives off the country — Re- 
opens his communications — Sherman's assault on Yicksburg — Repulse of 
Sherman — McClernand takes command of river expedition — Capture of Ar- 
kansas Post — Grant falls back to Memphis — Extraordinary behavior of Mc- 
Clernand — Grant takes command of river expedition — Protest of McCler- 
nand, . . . • . 122 



CONTENTS. IX 



CHAPTER VI 



Character of Mississippi vallej' — Position and strength of Vicksburg — Grant's 
force on taking command of expedition — Problem of the campaign — The 
Vicksburg canal — Continuous labor for months — Rise in river — Failure of 
canal — Lake Providence scheme — Difficulties of this route — Abandonment of 
the plan — Alarm and subsequent derision of rebels — The Yazoo pass — Cir- 
cuitous route — Obstructions by rebels — Pass finally cleared — Troops enter 
the pass — Rebel fort at Greenwood — Naval attack unsuccessful — Reijnforce- 
ments ordered into the pass — Route found impractical)le— Steele's bayou ex- 
pedition — Remarkable natural difiBcuhies — Sherman and Admiral Porter pro- 
ceed to Deer creek — Porter gets into danger — Shermaa rescues the fleet — 
Further and irremovable obstructions — Return of both expeditions to Milli 
ken's bend — Concentration of Grant's forces — Impatience of the country and 
government — Efforts to remove Grant — Grant's new plan — Opposition of 
Sherman and other of Grant's subordinates — Grant inflexible — Movement of 
Thirteenth corps to New Carthage — Difficulties of route — Trouble with Mc- 
Clemand — Grierson's raid — Running of Vicksburg batteries — Cooperation of 
Admiral Porter — Attack on Grand Gulf— Failure to silence batteries — Fur- 
ther marches of troops — Running of batteries at Grand Gulf— Crossing of 
Mississippi river by Grant's advance — Demonstration by Sherman against 
Haine's bluff— Grant's confidence of success, . . . .156 



CHAPTER VII. 

Preliminary orders for campaign — Passage of Mississippi river — Movement 
to high land — Battle-field of Port Gibson— McClemand meets the enemy- 
Battle of Port Gibson— Grant comes on the field in person — Arrival of 
McPherson's command— Success on the right — ilcPherson's charge— De- 
feat of rebels— Pursuit until dark — Rebels retreat beyond Port Gibson 
—Pursuit to Big Black river— Bridges burnt by rebels and rebuilt by 
Grant — Evacuation of Grand Gulf— New plan of campaign — Reasons for 
change — Dispatches from Banks — New plan not divulged to Halleck — Efforts 
to bring up troops and supplies — Demonstrations towards Vicksburg — In- 
structions to Hurlbut— McPherson advances — Sherman arrives — Correspond- 
ence with Sherman — Army moves — Position of troops — Grant's habit in 
planning campaigns — Grant's force at outset of campaign— Headquarters ai 
Cayuga — More dispatches from Banks — Final dispatches to Halleck — McPher- 
son ordered to Raymond — Battle of Raymond — Capture of Raymond- 
Enemy retreat to Jackson — Pemberton deceived by Grant's manoeuvres — 
Advance of Sherman and McPherson— Pursuit of rebels towards Jack- 
son — Johnston's arrival at Jackson — Pemberton ordered to attack Grants 
rear McPherson arrives at Clinton — Battle of Jackson — Position of Mc- 
Pherson and Sherman — Charge of Crocker's division— Capture of Jackson- 
Retreat of Johnston towards Canton— Destruction of railroad and stores- 
Frustration of Johnston's plans— Pemberton again ordered to join Johnston 
—Grant intercepts Johnston's dispatches— Moves at once towards Bolton- 
Grant converges while rebels diverge— Pemberton moves to cut Grant's com- 



X CONTENTS. 

munications — Receives Johnston's orders and reverses his column — Battle 
field of Champion's hill — McClemand's advance — Grant's arrival — Hovey'a 
attack — Battle of Champion's hill — Hovey's success — Enemy masses on 
Hovey — Grant reenforces Hovey — McClernand repeatedly ordered up, but 
does not arrive — McPherson outflanks the enemy — Rebels finally driven from 
the field — McClernand arrives when the battle is over — Reasons for McCler- 
nand's delay insufficient — Pursuit of the rebels — Rout of the enemy com- 
plete — Loring cut off — Losses on both sides — Hill of Death — Grant gets in 
advance of column — Johnston loses a day — Sherman ordered to Bridgeport 
with pontoon train — McClernand comes up with enemy at Black river bridge 
— Battle-field of Black river bridge — Gallant charge of Lawler — DemoraUza- 
tion of rebels — Firing of bridge — Capture of prisoners and cannon — Rapid 
reconstruction of bridges — Passage of Black river by entire army — Pursuit 
of the rebels to Yicksburg — Sherman strikes Walnut hills — Investment o^" 
Vicksburg — Evacuation of Haine's bluff — Results of campaign — Rebel move- 
ments during campaign — Reflections — Comparison with Italian campaign in 
1796, . , . . , . . . .203 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Land defences of Vicksburg — Johnston orders Pemberton to evacuate — Pem- 
berton determines to hold out — Position of Grant's army on 19th of May — 
Partial and unsuccessful assault — Rebels recover their spirit — National 
troops rested and supplies brought up — Orders for a general assault on the 
22d — Reasons for this assault — Mortar bombardment — Heavy cannonade on 
land front — Sherman assaults with Blair and Steele's divisions — Troops reach 
the parapet, but are repelled — Ransom's assault — Difficult nature of the 
ground — Failure of McPherson's attempt — McClemand's assault determined 
and gallant, but completely repelled — Distmguished bravery of individuals — 
Failure of assault all along the line — McClemand's dispatches — Grant's re- 
plies — Renewal of the assault — Second failure — Grant's position during the 
assault — Renewed dispatches from McClernand — Reenforcemcnts sent to 
McClernand — Death of Boomer — Results of tlie assault— Comparison with 
assaults in European wars, ...... 296 

CHAPTER IX. 

Preparations for the siege— Grant orders troops from Memphis— Ilalleck sends 
reiJnforccments from the East and West — Lack of siege material — Scarcity 
of engineer officers— First ground broken 23d of May — Engineer operations 
— Ingenuity of officers and men — Enemy's defence — Sorties — Wood's ap- 
proach — Loss of the Cincinnati — Tuttle's approach— Blair's approach— Ran- 
som's approach — Logan's approach — A. J. Smith's approach — Carr's approach 
— Hovey's approach — Lauman's approach — Herron's approach — Menacing 
attitude of Johnston — Correspondence with Banks— Osterhaus sent to the 
Big Black— Blair sent to the Yazoo— Mower and Kimball sent to Mechanics- 
burg— Attack on Milliken's bend— Arrival of Herron and Parke— Completion 
of investment- Fortification of Haine's bluff— Corps of observation— Line 



CONTENTS XI 

of counter vallation — Pembcrton prepares for escape — McClcrnand relieved 
— Condition of garrison — Sufferings of inhabitants — Mine of Jane 25th 
— Hardships of national troops — Persistency of Grant — Final assault fixed 
for July 6th — Pemberton proposes surrender — Terms of capitulation — Inter- 
view between commanders — Surrender of Yicksburg — Treatment of prison- 
ers — Pemberton's headquarters — Garrison paroled and marched out of 
Vicksburg — Fall of Port Hudson— Opening of Mississippi river— Sherman 
sent against Johnston — Johnston retreats to Jackson — Sherman besieges 
Jackson — Johnston evacuates — Destruction of railroads — Return of Sherman 
— Results of entire campaign — Congratulations of the President and general- 
in-chief— Grant made major-general in regular army — Joy of the country — 
Dismay of rebels, . . . . . • .331 



C HAPTER X. 

Grant recommends Sherman and McPherson for promotion — Characteristics of 
American soldiers — Army of the Tennessee — Organization of negro troops- 
Trade with the conquered regions — Grant urges movement against Mobile — 
Hallcck disapproves — Grant's army broken up — Condition of troops — Feel- 
in^ of citizens — Thirteenth corps sent to Banks — Grant visits New Orleans — 
Thrown from his horse — Reenforcements ordered to Rosecrans — A corps sent 
to Rosecrans— Grant ordered to Cairo— Meets the Secretary of War — Pro- 
ceeds to Louisville — Placed in command of Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi, .....-••• 402 



CHAPTER XI, 

Natural features of Chattanooga — Strategical importance — Relations to East 
Tennessee — Chickamauga campaign — Defeat of Rosecrans — Retreat into 
Chattanooga — Abandonment of Lookout mountain — Investment of Chatta- 
nooga — Sufferings of Army of the Cumberland — Hooker sent west to support 
Rosecrans — Burnside's movement into East Tennessee — DiflBculties of sup- 
ply- — Grant starts foi Chattanooga — Directions to his three armies — Arrival 
at Chattanooga — Thomas's magnanimity — Lookout valley — Brown's ferry- 
Plan of operations to recover Lookout valley — Seizure of Brown's ferry — 
March of Hooker from Bridgeport — Battle of Wauhatchie — Repulse of reb- 
els^Lookout valley secured — Communication reopened — Elation of soldiers 
— Still great difficulties in supply — Sherman's march from Memphis — Long 
lines of communication — Sherman's magnanimity — Grant hurries Sherman — 
Alarming situation of Burnside — Anxiety of government — Grant's calmness 
— Longstreet moves against Buraside — Grant's counter-plan — Dispatches of 
Grant to Halleck and Burnside — Thomas ordered to attack Bragg — Thomas 
not read}' — Movement postponed till Sherman's arrival — Great anxiety about 
Burnside — Road from Nashville to Decatur opened— Supplies ordered to 
Burnside by Cumberland river — Difficulties of Sherman's route — Critical 
condition of Grant's armies — Extent of his operations— Halleck still anxious 
about Burnside — Grant impresses on Burnside necessity of holding out — 



XU CONTENTS. 

Confidence of Burnside — Arrival of Sherman at Bridgeport — Reconnois- 
sance by Grant, Sherman, and Thomas — Orders issued for battle of Chatta- 
nooga, ...... . . 426 



CHAPTER XII. 

Reconnoissances — Orders for battle of Chattanooga — Anxiety of government 
for Burnside — Difficulties and delays of Slierman — Battle-field of Chatta- 
nooga — Movement of Granger and Palmer — Capture of Orchard knoU — Ad- 
vance of Thomas's line — Preparations for bridging the Tennessee — Arrival 
of Sherman at North Chickamaaga — Seizure of mouth of South Chicka- 
mauga — Laying of pontoon bridge — Crossing of Sherman's army — Arrival 
of Howard — Sherman moves on Missionary hills — Seizes first heights— In- 
trenches — Position of rebels on Lookout mountain — Position of Hooker — 
Difl5culty of ascent — Seizure of base — Ascent of mountain — Battle on moun- 
tain — Capture of mountain — Thomas connects with Hooker — Grant's dis- 
patches on night of 24th — Rebels evacuate Lookout point — Position ot 
troops on 25th — Shei-man's battle-ground — Sherman's assaults — Bragg re- 
enforces against Sherman — Weakening of rebel centre — Assault on rebel 
centre — Thomas's troops scale Missionary ridge — Rebel centre pierced — 
Missionary ridge carried — Rout of rebels — Large capture of men and guns — 
Hooker turns rebel left — Further captures — Rebel flight to Chickamauga — 
Sheridan's pursuit to Mission mills — Rebels withdraw from front of Sherman 
— Grant pushes out on 2Gth — Demoralization of rebels — Pursuit to Ringgold 
— Battle-field of Ringgold — Rebel resistance — Final retreat of rebels — Pur- 
suit discontinued — Destruction of railroads and stores — Return of Thomas's 
command to Chattanooga — Sherman ordered to the Hiawassee — Summary of 
losses and gains — Character of battle of Chattanooga — Results, 478 



CHAPTER XIII. 

Enoxville still in danger — Granger sent to Burnside — Granger moves reluctantly 
— Sherman sent to Burnside — Sherman moves with vigor — Burnside falls 
back before Longstreet — Battle at Campbell's station — Retreat to Knoxville 
— Defences of Knoxville — Siege of Knoxville — Aid from loyal Tennesseans — 
Longstreet determines to assault — Strength and position of Fort Sanders — 
Assault of Fort Sanders — Repulse of Longstreet — Approach of Slierman — 
Raising of siege — Retreat of Longstreet — Burnside sends Sherman back to 
Hiawassee — Parke's pursuit of Longstreet — Burnside relieved by Foster — 
Results of entire campaign — Congratulations of President — Thanks of Con- 
gress — Miscalculation of Burnside — Battle of Bean's station — Success of 
Longstreet — Longstreet winters in Tennessee — Disappointment of Grant — 
— Grant proposes movement against Mobile — Bragg relieved by Hardee — 
Furloughing of veterans — Grant's visit to Knoxville — Impossibility of win- 
ter campaign — Germ of Meridian raid — Distribution of forces for winter — 
Sherman sent to Viclssburg — Grant's plan for ensuing pear — Mobile and At- 



C0NTEI4TS. XI 11 

lanta ot'jective and intermediate points — Sooy Smith's orders — Sherman's 
march from Vicksburg — Seizure of Meridian — Destruction of railroad — Fail- 
ure of Smith to cooperate — Shemian returns to Vicksburg — Smith retreats 
to Memphis — Results of Meridian raid — Cooperation of Thomas — Johnston 
in command of rebel army — Movements in East Tennessee — Grant ordered 
to Washington, . . . . , . . .531 



CHAPTER XIV. 

Military situation early in 1SG4 — Political situation — Need of one real head to 
the army — Grant made lieutenant-general — His predecessors in that grade — 
Action of the government — Grant's quiescence — Instructions to Sherman — 
Private correspondence between Gnint and Sherman — Dispatches from Hal- 
leck — Journey to Washington — Arrival — Presentation of commission — 
Speeches of President and of Grant, ..... 565 



Affkndix, . . ... IJ79 



INTRODUCTION. 



The original thirteen states that composed the 
American Union Lad "grown in the course of eighty 
years to thirty-four ; the territory, whieli had at first 
been limited to a narrow strip along the Atlantic 
coast, had spread to the Pacific ocean, and embraced 
a region as wide as the mightiest empires of the Old 
World ; from the chain of great lakes on the north, to 
the Gulf of Mexico on the south, the republic stretched 
out a thousand miles across. Tliis land abounded in 
untold agricultural and mineral wealth ; commerce 
enriched the portions bordering on the sea, manufac- 
tures thrived ; the taxes were inconsiderable, and a 
national debt almost unknown, and a deo:ree of ma- 
terial prosperity was attained entirely without pre- 
cedent. Education was more widely diffused than in 
any countiy since the invention of letters, the influ- 
ence of religion was universally acknowledged, the 
rich and the poor were equal before the law, and 
every male citizen had a share in the government. 
The nation was powerful abroad as well as prosperous 
at home ; the title of American citizen was a passport 
that secured protection in every foreign land ; peace 



2 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

had smiled on the territory of the Union for more 
than half a century, and a generation had grown up 
unused to war. The future of this people was even 
more brilliant in promise than the present in fraition. 
Made up, indeed, of different populations, with various 
characters, and of separate origin, yet with so much 
unity of interest and homogeneity of feeling ; allied by 
so many memories of the past, and so many aspira- 
tions for the future ; with the numerous peculiarities 
of passion, and condition, and race, apparently so har- 
moniously adjusted, it seemed as if no serious disaster 
could ever occur to mar its greatness or interfere with 
its prosperity. 

But questions of a subtle political character arose, 
about which the Northern and Southern states dif 
fared widely and antagonistically. The institution 
of African slavery existed at the South, but had been 
abolished at the North ; and the destiny of four mil- 
lions of slaves, as well as the extension of slavery 
itself, was violently discussed. The independent 
rights of the states, and the supremacy of the general 
government, were asserted and denied by turns ; poli- 
ticians, for personal or party reasons, promoted the 
discord and exaggerated the antagonisms; and, after 
years of controversy, the quaiTel was referred to the 
decision of the polls. A presidential election ensued, 
which resulted in the elevation of a Northerner to 
power, who had received no electoral vote from any 
Southern state, and Avho was pledged to resist, by all 
lawfnl means, the extension of slavery. lie was also 
pledged to allow no interference with the institution, 
where it already existed ; but his success was looked 
upon by the South as the inauguration of a direct 
attack upon slavery, and became the signal for an 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 3 

attempt to destroy tliat Union wbicli the South liad 
done as much to establish and defend as the North. 
Eleven Southern states claimed the right to secede 
from what they called the federal alliance; but the 
Northern states maintained that the bond of union 
was indissoluble, and that secession was rebellion ; 
and each party was ready to fight for the maintenance 
of its views. 

The Southerners began the war, without waiting 
for any overt act from the North : they not only as- 
sumed to secede, and set up a government for them- 
selves, which they called a Confederacy, but they 
seized the national forts and arsenals within their 
territory ; and at Fort Sumter, in South Carolina, 
before resistance was offei^ed, they fired on the national 
flag and compelled the sui'render of the fort. This 
circumstance united the North. Hitherto, there had 
been many Northerners who thought that the South 
had grievances, and who were anxious to redress 
them ; many, who were willing to compromise all the 
questions at issue, save only that of union ; and some, 
who were even willing to allow the Southern states 
to depart in peace. But the gun fired at Sumter put 
an end to all such sentiments ; the government at 
once determined to maintain its authority, and the 
people unanimously seconded the government ; or, 
rather, the people determined, and the government 
executed their will. 

The standing army of the United States, at this 
time, numbered fifteen thousand, four hundred and 
thirty- three men ; or ten regiments of infantry, four 
of artillery, and five of cavalry. It was officered by 
Southerners as well as Northerners; men educated 
by the national government, at the national schools, 



4 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 

and sworn to support the national authority ; out of 
one thousand and seventy-four officers, two hundred 
and seventy were of Southern birth, embracing a fair 
share of the talent and distinction of the army. Two 
hundred and two of these espoused the Southern 
cause. When it became apparent that war was inev- 
itable, they resigned their commissions, and offered 
their swords to their own section, holding the au- 
thority of a state paramount to that of the Union.'"* 
They were followed into secession by fifty others from 
Northern or border states, most of whom had mar- 
ried Southern wives or acquired Southern property. 

This defection of course greatly disorganized the 
small force at the disposal of the government. But 
even had these officers remained firm in their alle- 
giance, the military power of the United States at 
this time was insio-nificant. The President therefore 
at once issued a proclamation, declaring the existence 
of an armed rebellion, and calling for seventy-five 
thousand volunteer troops to suppress it. They came 
instantly, from every quarter of the North, more than 
he called for. But the proclamation had an equally 
remarkable effect upon the people of the South. 
Many of these had been bitterly opposed to disu- 
nion, although all concurred in deprecating any inter- 
ference by the North or by the general government, 
with the peculiar institution of the South ; but when 
President Lincoln announced his intention of coer- 
cing the states which attempted to secede, the una- 
nimity of the South in resistance became a parallel 
to that of the North in restraining:. Advantao-e of 
this was taken at once by the Southern leaders, many 

* One hundred and eighty resigned; tweuty-two were dismissed, or 
dropped from the rolls. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 5 

of whom had long been preparing for the very emer- 
gency which now occurred; armies were organized 
with extraordinary diligence and energy by the self- 
styled Confederate government, and the American 
civil war began. 

From the intestine nature of the struggle and the 
geographical formation of the continent, the principal 
theatre of the w^ar, it was evident, must lie in the 
states bordering on both sections. The belt of ter- 
ritoiy reaching from the Atlantic westward, and 
comprising Maryland and Virginia east of the Alle- 
ghanies, and Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri west 
of those mountains, constitutes this border region, 
and was the stasre on which the first acts of the 
drama were performed. The Potomac and the James, 
at the east ; the Ohio, the Tennessee, the Cumberland, 
and the Mississippi, at the west, are the great streams, 
the control of which, and of the populations and re- 
gions that lie in their valleys, is indispensable to a 
mastery of the continent. The Ohio flows westward 
from Pennsylvania to Missouri, a thousand miles ; the 
prolific States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois lie along 
its northern bank, while Virginia and Kentucky form 
the southern shore ; it was the natural line of demar- 
cation at the west between the slave states and the 
free, the boundary between disaffection and loyalty. 
The Tennessee and Cumberland, rising in the recesses 
of the Alleghany mountains, flow southward into^the 
state of Tennessee, and then run west for hundreds 
of miles, the larger river making a vsdde detour into 
Alabama and INIississippi ; when, turning to the north 
again, they traverse Kentucky side by side, and 
empty into the Ohio, near the point where that still 
greater stream becomes itself a tributary, and pours 



6 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

the waters of its liundred affluents into the Missis- 
sippi. The Mississippi, recipient and greatest of 
them all, divides the continent for four thousand 
miles; bounds ten different states, and enriches all 
the region between the Kocky and the Alleghany 
mountains. 

In these regions, and for the mastery of these riv- 
ers and states, the earliest battles of Ulysses S. 
Grant were fought ; from this field, he was taken to 
command the national armies. It will be my en- 
deavor to show — first, why he was selected to com- 
mand those armies, and afterwards how he performed 
the task. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 



CHAPTER I. 

Birth and parentage of Grant— His name— West Point— His army lile— Tlie 
Mexican War — He marries — Leaves tlie army — Enters tlie Icatlier trade — 
Galena — Grant drills a company — Takes it to Springfield— Organizes volunteer 
troops — Visits Cincinnati to see McClellan — Becomes colonel of the Twenty- 
first Illinois regiment — Marches it to Missouri — Is made brigadier-general of 
volunteers — Takes command of the District of Southeast Missouri — Seizes 
Taducah — Sends a force to drive rebels into Arkansas — Makes a demonstra- 
tion upon Belmont — The demonstration converted into an attack — Battle of 
Belmont — Grant's success — Enemy reenforced — Grant cuts bis way out- 
Results of Belmont. 

HiEA3i Ulysses Geant was born on tlie 2 7 tit of 
April, 1822, at Point Pleasant, Clermont county, 
Ohio. His father was of Scotch descent, and a dealer 
in leather. Ulysses was the eldest of six children. 
He entered the Military Academy at West Point at 
the age of seventeen, the congressman who procured 
his appointment giving his name by mistake as 
Ulysses S. Grant. Simpson was the maiden name of 
his mother, and was also borne by one of his younger 
brothers : this doubtless occasioned the error. Young 
Grant applied to the authorities at West Point and 
to the Secretary of War, to have the blunder cor- 
rected, but the request was unnoticed ; his comrades 
at once adopted the initials U. S. in his behalf, and 
christened him Uncle Sam, a nickname that he never 



3 MILITAEY HISTORT OF 

lost in the army; and wlien lie graduated in 1843, 
twentj^-first in a class of thirty-nine, his commission 
of brevet second lieutenant and his diploma, both 
styled him Ulysses S. Grant, by which name he has 
since been known. 

His regiment was the Fourth infontry ; he re- 
mained in the army eleven years, was engaged in 
every battle of the Mexican War, except Buena Vista, 
receiving two brevets for gallantry, and was after- 
wards stationed at various posts on the Canada fron- 
tier, and finally in California and Oregon. In 1848, 
he married Julia T. Dent, eldest daughter of Fred- 
erick Dent, a merchant of St. Louis ; and in 1854, 
having reached the grade of captain, he resigned his 
commission in the army, and removed to Gravois, 
near St. Louis, where he owned and worked a farm. 
Afterwards, in 1860, he entered the leather trade, 
with his father and brother, at Galena, Illinois. 

Thus, when the civil war broke out, Grant was a 
private citizen, earning his bread in an insignificant 
inland town. Lie was of simple habits and tastes, 
without influence, and unambitious. Having never 
been brought in contact with men of eminence, he 
had no personal knowledge of great affairs. He had 
never commanded more than a company of soldiers, 
and althou2;li he had served under both Scott and 
Taylor, it was as a subaltern,* and without any 
opportunity of intercourse with those commanders. 
He had never voted for a President but once ; he 
knew no politicians, for his acquaintance was limited 

* In 18G4, General Scott told me that lie thought be recollected a 
young officer named Grant, who behaved gallantly in the Mexican War; 
and General Robert E. Lee said to Grant at Appomattox Court House, 
that he remembered their having met before. Grant must have been a 
brevet second lieutenant at the time, and Lee a staff-officer of Scott. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 9 

to army officers and Western traders ; evea in the 
town where lie lived, lie Lad not met the member of 
Congress who represented the district for nine succes- 
sive years, and wlio afterwards became one of his most 
intimate personal friends. Of his four children, the 
eldest was eleven years old. He lived in a little 
house at the top of one of the picturesque hills on 
w^hich Galena is built, and w^ent daily to the ware- 
house of his father and brother, w^here leather was 
sold by the wholesale and retail. He was thirty-nine 
years of age, before his countrymen became acquainted 
with his name. 

Foi-t Sumter fell on the 13th of April, 1861, and 
the President's call for troops w^as made on the 15th. 
On the 19th, Grant was drilling a company of volun- 
teers at Galena, and four days afterwards went with 
it to Springfield, the capital of Illinois. From there, 
he Avrote to the adjutant-general of the army, offer- 
ing his services to the government, in any capacity in 
which he could be of use. The letter was not deemed 
of sufficient importance to preserve: it stated that 
Grant had received a military education at the pub- 
lic expense, and now that the country was in danger, 
he thought it his duty to place at the disposal of the 
authorities, whatever skill or experience he had ac- 
quired. He received no reply; but remaining at 
Springfield, his military knowledge made him of ser- 
vice in the organization of the volunteer troops of the 
state ; and at the end of five weeks, the governor, 
Honorable Richard Yates, offered him the Twenty-' 
first regiment of Illinois infimtry. 

Before receiving his colonelcy. Grant went to Cin- 
cinnati to visit Mnjor-General JMcClellan, then in 
command of Ohio volunteers. The two had known 



10 3IILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

eacli other in tlie old army, and althougli Grant Lad 
no intention of making any application, lie still lioped 
that McClellan might ofter him a place on his staff. 
He went twice to headquarters, but did not find 
McClellan there, and returned to Illinois, witliout 
mentioning his aspirations to any one. 

Early in June, he took command of his regiment, 
and marched at once to Missouri, reporting to Briga- 
dier-General Pope, by whom he was stationed at 
Mexico, about fifty miles north of the Missouri river. 

On the Tth of August, he was commissioned by 
the President, brigadier-general of volunteers, to date 
from May 17th, his first knowledge or suspicion of 
this rank coming to him from the newspapers of the 
day. He had been unanimously recommended for 
the promotion by the members of Congress from Illi- 
nois, no one of whom had been his personal acquaint- 
ance.* 

During the war, the entire country was divided 
by the United States authorities, into military depart- 
ments, whose boundaries and organization were re- 
peatedly changed. The state of Illinois, and the 
states and territories west of the IMississippi river, 
and east of the Rocky mountains, constituted at thi^ 
time the Western Department, of which Major- 
General Fremont was in command. On the 8th of 
August, Fremont transferred Grant to L'onton, Mis- 
souri, and a fortnight afterwards to Jefferson City, in 
the same state. At both these places, he was occu- 
pied in watching the movements of partisan forces. 
On the 1st of September, by direction of Fremont, 

* The Honorable Eliliu B. Wasliburne, of Galena, who had never 
spoken to Grant until after the fall of Fort Sumter, suggested the 
nomluation. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 11 

he assumed command of the District of Southeast 
Missouri, and on the 4th, made his headquarters at 
Cairo, at the mouth of the Ohio. Tlie district in- 
cluded not only the region from Avhich it takes its 
name, Lut the southern part of Illinois, and so much 
of western Kentucky and Tennessee as miglit fall into 
the possession of national forces; it comprised the 
junction of the four great rivers, Tennessee, Cumber- 
land, Ohio, and Mississippi. 

Grant's first act was the seizure of Paducah, at the 
mouth of the Tennessee. The governor of Kentucky 
was at this time insisting that the state should main- 
tain a position of armed neutrality, and all Kentuck- 
ians who sympathized with the rebels, took the same 
ground. This neutrality had never been recognized 
by the United States authorities, but was first vio- 
lated by General Polk, the rebel commander in that 
region. He seized Columbus and Hickman, on the 
Mississippi, and thi'eatened Paducah, w^ithiu three 
days after Grant assumed his new command. All 
these places were of military importance, and Padu- 
cah completely commands the navigation of both the 
Tennessee and the Ohio. Fremont had previously 
ordered a movement in Missouri, which Grant was to 
superintend, and had directed the construction of 
Fort Holt on the Kentucky shore ; but on the 2d of 
September, Grant arrived at Cairo, and on the 5th, 
heard of the advance of Polk, which had occurred 
the day before. He at once notified his commanding 
officer, as well as the Kentucky legislature at Frank- 
fort, and later in the same day, having received addi- 
tional information, he telegraphed to Fremont at 
St. Louis : " I am getting ready to go to Paducah. 
Will start at six and a half o'clock." Still later on 



12 JIILITAEy HISTOEY OF 

the 5tli, lie wrote : " I am now nearly ready for Pa- 
ducah, should not telegram arrive preventing the 
movement." 

Getting no reply, he started at ten and a half 
o'clock that night, with two regiments and a light 
battery ; he also took two gunboats, the naval force 
in that neighborhood being under his control. He 
was delayed at Mound City, by an accident to one of 
his transports, but arrived at Paducah at half-past 
eight on the morning of the 6th. The city was seized 
without a gun being fired, Brigadier-General Tilgh- 
man and his staff, of the rebel army, with a company 
of recruits, hurryiug ont of the town by the railroad, 
south, while Grant was getting ashore. A force of 
thirty-eight hundred rebels was reported to be six- 
teen miles off, and rebel flags and stores were found 
in the town ; but this movement saved Paducah and 
the control of the Ohio river. Grant stayed in town 
only until noon, when, leaving a sufficient garrison, 
he returned to Cairo, where he received Fremont's 
permission to take Paducah " if he felt strong enough." 
The next day, Brigadier-General C. F. Smith was put 
in command of the place, with orders to report direct 
to Fremont, at St. Louis, and Grant was rebuked for 
corresponding with the legislature ; * but that body 
at once passed resolutions favorable to the Union, 

" * Heasquabters 'Western Department, (. 
St. Louis, Sepietnber 6, IStil, ' 

Brigadier- General U. S. Grant, Cairo, Illinois : 

I am directed by Major-General Fremont to inform you that brigade 
and other commanders arc not to correspond with state or other high 
authorities, in matters pertaining to any branch of the pubUc service, 
cither in initiating such correspondence or replying thereto. 

All such subjects are to be submitted to the major-general com- 
manding the department, for his information and action. " 



ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 13 

and the political position of the state was secured: 
no more was heard of the neutrality of Kentucky. 
The seizure of Paducah w\as violently criticised by 
those whom it disappointed, and furnished an illus- 
tration of traits destined afterwards peculiarly to 
characterize the generalship of Grant. 

For t^vo months afterwards, Grant was occupied 
in holding the country at the junction of the great 
rivers, near wdiich his headquarters were established, 
and in organizing and disciplining his forces, which 
by the 1st of November, were increased to nearly 
twenty thousand men. He was kept strictly subor- 
dinate by Fremont, and allowed to make no move- 
ment of importance by that commander ; Smithland, 
however, at the mouth of the Cumberland, was occu- 
pied by C. F. Smith without opposition, a few weeks 
after Paducah. Several times Grant suggested the 
feasibility of capturing Columbus, an important posi- 
tion on the east bank of the Mississippi, about twenty 
miles below Cairo ; and, on the 10th of September, 
he even asked permission to make the attempt : " If 
it was discretionary with me, with a little addition 
to my present force, I would take Columbus." No 
notice was taken of this application. Belmont, on 
the west bank, was a small post, fortified only by a 
rude sort of abatis, and lying directly under the guns 
of Columbus. The rebels were constantly crossing 
troops between these points, and in time made Co- 
lumbus one of the strongest works on the Mississippi 
river, and one of their great depots of men and sup- 
plies. It of course completely barred the navigation 
of the stream, and was a constant menace to every 
point in Grant's command. 

On the 1st of November, Fremont ordered Grant 



14 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

to make demonstrations on botli sides of the Missis- 
sippi, in tlie direction of Norfolk, Charleston, and 
Blandville, points a few miles north of Coliunhus 
and Belmont. He was not, however, to attack the 
enemy. On the 2d, Fremont informed him that three 
thousand rebels were on the St. Francis river, in 
Missonri, about fifty miles southwest of Cairo, and 
ordered him to send a force to assist in driving them 
into Arkansas. Grant accordingly sent Colonel 
Oglesby, on the night of the 3d, with four regiments 
(three thousand men), from Commerce, Missouri, 
towards Indian Ford, on the St. Francis river. On 
the 5th, however, Fremont telegraphed him that 
Polk, who commanded at Columbus, was sending re- 
enforcements to Price, in southwest Missouri, by way 
of the Mississippi and White rivers. Fremont had 
a force at that time confronting Price, and it was of 
vital importance to him that these reenforcements 
should cease. Grant was accordingly directed to 
make at once the demonstration towards Columbus 
which had been previously ordered. He immediately 
instructed Oglesby to turn his column in the direc- 
tion of 'New Madrid, on the Mississippi, below Bel- 
mont, and sent him an additional regiment. General 
C. F. Smith, commanding at Paducah, was also re- 
quested to move out from that place towards the rear 
of Columbus, and " to keep the enemy from throw- 
ing over the river much more force than they now 
have there ; " Grant informing him that " the princi- 
pal point to gain, is to prevent the enemy from send- 
ing a force to fall in the rear of those now sent out 
from this command." Two other and smaller dem- 
onstrations for the same purpose, were ordered at the 
same time, from Bird's Point and Fort Holt, near 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 15 

Cairo, tLe commanders being instructed to return the 
day after moving out. 

On the evening of the 6th, Grant started down 
the river in person, with thirty-one hundred and four- 
teen men on transports, and under convoy of two 
gunboats. Tlie force included a section of artillery, 
two squadrons of cavalry, and five regiments of in- 
fantry, to some of whom arms had been issued for 
the first time only two days before. Grant had but 
one general officer in his command, McClernand, who 
at that time had never heard a hostile shot ; Logan, 
who afterwards became so distinguished, also accom- 
panied him, but as a colonel. Grant proceeded nine 
miles, and made a feint of landing at a point on the 
Kentucky shore, where he lay till daybreak, with a 
view to distract the enemy, and, in conjunction with 
Smith's demonstrations, to give the idea that an attack 
on Columbus was contemplated. 

At two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, he re- 
ceived intelligence that the rebels had been crossing 
troops from Columbus to Belmont, the day before, 
Avith the purpose of cutting ojff Oglesby. He at once 
determined to convert the demonstration against Bel- 
mont into an attack, as it w-as now necessary to be 
prompt in preventing any further effort of the rebels 
either to reenforce Price or to interrui:)t Oglesby. He 
still, however, had no intention of remaining at Bel- 
mont, which is on low ground, and could not have 
been held an hour under the guns at Columbus. His 
idea was simply to destroy the camps, capture or dis- 
perse the enemy, and get away himself before the 
rebel garrison could be reenforced. 

At six o'clock, the transports moved down the 
river, and the troops were debarked at Hunter's 



16 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

Point, on the Missouri side, just out of range of tlie 
Columbus batteries. They marched direct towards 
Belmont, about three miles off. Here, in an open 
space, protected by fallen forest timber, the rebels 
had pitched their camp. Grant moved by a flank, for 
about a mile, then drew his troops up in line, and 
ordered forward the whole force as skirmishers. On 
the road, he met with serious opposition, and by nine 
o'clock, his entire command was hotly engaged, except 
one battalion held in reserve near the landinsf, as a 
guard to the transports; the gunboats, although wood- 
en, occasionally engaged the batteries at Columbus, 
many of which had a plunging fire ; this action, howev- 
er, was without result. The country on the Belmont 
side was partially wooded, and cut up with sloughs 
and swamps, and the rebels took advantage of these 
difficulties. There was heavy fighting for nearly four 
hours ; during all this time Grant was with the skir- 
mish line ; his own liorse was shot under him, McCler- 
nand lost three borses, and every colonel set an ex- 
ample of gallantry to his command. Stimulated by 
this behavior, the green soldiers fought like veterans, 
and finally drove the rebels foot by foot, througli 
sloughs and fields, and from tree to tree, to the river 
])ank, charged through the abatis, took several hun- 
dred prisoners, captured all the artillery, and broke 
up the camp. 

They became, however, at once disorganized by 
their victory, and instead of pursuing the enemy, as 
he huddled and crouched under the river bank, set 
about plundering, while their colonels, equally raw, 
shouted and made stump speeches for the Union. 
Grant, meanwhile, had observed the rebel transports 
crossing the river from Columbus, and crowded with 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 17 

troops on tlieir triple decks. He was anxious to get 
back to his own steamers before these reenforcements 
could arrive, and strove to re-form Lis men, Tjut in 
vain ; tliey behaved like so many schoolboys, until, 
finally, to stop the plundering, he ordered his staff 
officers to set the camps on fire. This drew 
the attention of the artillerists at Columbus, who 
speedily opened on the national troops, when, per- 
ceiving the necessity of discipline, the men returned 
to the ranks, and the march to the transports began. 
Meanwhile, the defeated rebels, finding no notice was 
taken of them, had re-formed under the bank, and in 
the woods on the point of land just above Belmont ; 
three fresh reo:iments from Columbus had also arrived, 
and the combined force, passing along under the 
bank, interposed between Grant and his transports. 
It was instantly cried : " We are surrounded ! " and 
at first some confusion prevailed. An officer of 
Grant's staff, lately from civil life, rode up, a little 
flustered, with the intelligence. " Well," said Grant, 
" //* tliat is so, tve must cut our icay out as we cut our 
way in^ The men were brave enough, but it had 
not occurred to them before, that being surrounded, 
there was any thing to do but suiTender. Grant, 
however, remarked: " IF^ liave iddpped them once, 
and I till nh we can do it again;'''' and as soon as the 
troops found that their leader meant to fight, the con- 
fusion was past ; they promptly charged and dispersed 
the rebel line, which made but a faint resistance, not 
half so vigorous as that of the morning, and disap- 
peared a second time over the banks. 

It was necessary, however, to lose no time, for 
reenforcements were still crossing the river in large 
numbers. Grant pushed on to the landing, and 
2 



18 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 

getting most of liis force aboard, sent a detacliment 
to gather up tlie wounded. He was occupied thus 
for an hour, without disturbance, but owing to the 
inexperience of his officers, not one of whom was a 
professional soldier, he had nearly every thing to do 
in person, and was obliged to superintend the execu- 
tion of his own orders. The main body was nearly 
embarked, when he rode back with a single staff 
officer, to withdraw the battalion he had posted 
in the morning, as a guard to the transports, and 
which he supposed still covered the men who were 
bringing in wounded. But the reserves were as raw 
as the rest of the troops, and when the others were 
drawn in, they too had thought proper to retire. With- 
out any orders, and without reporting their action, 
they had returned to the transports, not in alarm, for 
their position was protected by the gunboats, but 
simply out of ignorance and inexperience. 

Grant was therefore completely outside of his own 
troops. At this moment, he rode up on a knoll, and 
discovered immediately in his front, the whole rebel 
force, now greatly augmented, and advancing upon 
him in line of battle. The enemy had formed a third 
time, nearly parallel to the bank, and was extending 
his own left so as to cut off the national transports, 
by getting to tlieir rear, higher up the river. The bend 
in the stream just here, makes a peninsula of the Mis- 
souri shore, and rendered this manoeuvre easy to exe- 
cute. The rebel line was in a corn-field, not fifty 
yards from Grant, and already firing on his trans- 
ports. He sat still for a moment to observe the 
situation, and presented an easy mark to the rebel 
rifles ; but the morning had been damp and chilly, 
and he "wore a private's overcoat, and was not recog- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 19 

nized for an officer. He saw at once tliat it \va^ im- 
possible to save the parties who were still out in 
search of the wounded, and completely cut off; so he 
turned his horse, riding back to the transports 
slowly, in order not to attract a fire. Getting nearer, 
however, he put spui'S to his horse, and galloped hard 
to the bank, the animal sliding over the brink on his 
haunches. The rebel fire was now hot, and the 
transj^orts were about pushing off, leaving Grant 
ashore ; he however rode rapidly up, and a plank 
was put out for him, over which he trotted his horse 
aboard, under a heavy musketry fire. The convoy of 
gunboats then opened on the rebel ranks, which had 
by this time approached within fifty or sixty yards. 
Grape and canister were poured into them with good 
effect, mowing the men down in swaths.* The 
enemy fortunately fired too high, and a storm of 
shot passed over the hurricane deck, but wounded 
only three men, and killed none. By five o'clock, 
the last transport was out of range, officers and men 
equally elated with the idea of having gained a vic- 
tory. 

The next day, under a flag of truce, Grant met an 
old West Point comrade, who had become a rebel, 
and was serving on Polk's staff. Grant mentioned 
having ridden out and met the rebel line. " Was 
that you ? " said the other ; " we saw you, and Gen- 
eral Polk called to some of his troops : ' There, men, 
is a Yankee, if you want to try your aim ; ' " but all 

* " After nearly all the troops had reembarked, and wore about 
ready to start, a sudden attack was made upon the transport vessels 
by an apparently large reenforcement of rebels. Our boats being in 
good position, we opened fire with our grape and canister, and five- 
second shells, and completely routed them, we learn, with great 
slaughter." — Bepart of Lieutenant Walker, commanding naval f<rrce. 



20 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

were intent on hitting tlie transports tlieu, and nobody 
fired at Grant. 

At Belmont, Grant lost four hundred and eiglity- 
five men in killed, wounded, and missing ; one hun- 
dred and twenty-five of his wounded fell into the 
hands of the rebels ; he carried oft' one hundred and 
seventy-five prisoners and two guns, and spiked four 
other pieces : three of these last were left behind, 
because drawn by hand, and the other had an ineffi- 
cient team. About seven thousand rebels were en- 
gaged, and Polk sustained a loss of six hundred and 
forty-two men. By their own showing, the rebels 
had twice as many troops as Grant, and lost one- 
third more.* If any reinforcements were to be sent 
to Price, they were by this operation detained, and 
the movement of Oglesby was entu*ely protected. 
The enemy also remained concentrated thereafter at 
Columbus, lest another and more serious attack 
should follow. 

This battle confirmed Grant in the belief on which 
he always afterwards acted, that when neither party 
is well disciplined, there is nothing to gain in the 
matter of discipline, by delay. The enemy organizes 

* Pillow reported tliat, at the beginning of the figlit, he had five 
regiments on the ground, but that these were greatly reduced by sick- 
ness, and, in consequence, numbered only twenty-five hundred men. 
Besides these, he had a battery of artillery aud a squadron of cavalry. 
Polk reported rcenforcing Pillow with five more i-egimeuts, whose num- 
bers are not said to have been reduced by sickness. This entii-e force, at 
that period of the war, could hardly have been less than seven thousand 
men. The rebel reports greatly overestimate Grant's strength and exag- 
gerate his loss. Otherwise they difi"er but in one essential point from the 
statements in the text. They all declare that Grunt's troojjs broke aud 
fled to the transports in great disorder, and were hctly pursued. The 
captured guns and the prisoners carried oflf by Grant, aud the fact that 
men were sent back to gather up his wounded, disprove these assertions. 
The hot pursuit was after the national troops had got aboard. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 21 

and improves as rapidly as yourself, and all tlie ad- 
vantages of prompt movement are lost. 

The strategic results accomplislied by Belmont 
mio-ht perhaps have been attained, had the oiiginal 
design been carried out, and only a demonstration 
made ; but the troops, who had volunteered "vvith the 
idea of active campaigning, were getting restive during 
the long delay at Cairo. When they found that they 
were really starting out, the blood of officers and men 
was up; had they been taken back then without 
a fio-ht, their confidence in themselves and in their 
commander, would have been impaii-ed. Grant no- 
ticed this, and even if he had not received the infor- 
mation on which his attack was based, would never- 
theless have made the assault. The influence of the 
fight upon the troops engaged was of the happiest 
sort. It gave them a confidence and a fortitude 
which they never lost, and long afterwards the " Bel- 
mont men " were known as among the stanchest 
soldiers in the army of the Tennessee. 

The country, however, knowing none of the ob. 
jects of the movement, and seeing only the fact that 
troops had advanced and then retired, regarded the 
affair as a disaster, while the enemy, of course, her. 
aided it for a rebel victory. Long after, many who 
looked upon Grant as one of the greatest of soldiers, 
declared that he should be forgiven for Belmont, and 
remained ignorant, not only that he accomplished 
more than he was sent to do, but that the very traits 
which contributed most materially to his later suc- 
cesses, were displayed as signally at Belmont as on 
any occasion during the war.* 

* See Appendix for Grant's instructions and various papers relating 
to the Belmont affair. 



22 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 



CHAPTEE II. 

Eebel strategic line from Columbus to Bowling Green — Halleck in command of 
Department of the Missouri — Gunboats at the West — Demonstration in favor 
of Bucll— Smith reports capture of Fort Henry feasible— Grant visits St, 
Louis to suggest the operation — Movement against Fort Henry sanctioned by 
Halleck — Attack by the fleet — Disposition of Grant's forces— Fall of Fort 
Henry— Grant proposes capture of Fort Donelson — Halleck directs strength- 
ening of Fort Henry — March to the Cumberland — Position and strength of 
Fort Donelson — The siege — Unsuccessful attack by the fleet — Assault by the 
rebels on the 15th of February — Counter-assault of national forces — Scene 
at Floyd's headquarters on the night of the 15th— Escape of Floyd and Pil- 
low — Buckner proposes surrender — The tapitulation — Buckner's headquar- 
ters — Halleck's dispatches after the victory— Ecsults of the capture of Fort 
Donelson. 

Shortly after the battle of Belmont, tlie rebels 
established a strong and well-selected line, reaching 
from the Mississippi to the Big Barren river, in mid- 
dle Kentucky. On their extreme left was Columbus, 
where, they soon collected one hundred and forty 
guns,* and a force sufficient to cover Memphis, and 
hold the great Western river ; on the right was Bowl- 
ing Green, at tlie junction of the Louisville and Kash- 
ville, and the Memphis and Ohio railroads, and the 
northernmost point then held by the rebels west of 
the Alleghany mountains ; at this place, one of their 
largest and best-appointed armies was concentrated, 

* See Polk's reuort of evacuation of Columbus. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 23 

threatening noi-theru Kentucky and protecting Nash- 
ville and middle Tennessee. At the centre of this 
important strategic line, the Tennessee and Cumber- 
land rivers formed the natural avenues into all the 
disputed territory north of the cotton states. About 
fifty miles from the Ohio, and near the boundary be- 
tween Kentucky and Tennessee, these two great 
streams approach within twelve miles of each other, 
and here, at a bend in each river, the reljels had 
erected their strongholds. Fort Heniy, on the Ten- 
nessee, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, com- 
pletely commanded the navigation, and stood like 
great barred gateways against any advance of the 
national armies. Their sites had been selected with 
care ; they had been elaborately fortified, and large 
garrisons were stationed to defend them. They cov- 
ered the great railroad line of communication from 
east to west, through the border states, and their pos- 
session determined the fate of Kentucky and Tennes- 
see ; for Nashville and Memphis were not fortified, 
and Bowlino; Green and Columbus would both be 
turned, whenever the national arms subdued these 
forts. 

The battle of Belmont was fouQ-ht on the 7th of 
November, and on the 9th, Major-General Henry AV. 
Halleck, superseding Fremont, took command of the 
new Department of the Missouri, including Arkan- 
sas and the portion of Kentucky west of the Cum- 
berland. The Department of the Ohio, consisting 
of that part of Kentucky east of the Cuml)erland, 
and the state of Tennessee, as well as certain portions 
of the loyal states, was assigned to Brigadier-General 
Don Carlos Buell, with headquarters at Louis^Hllle. 

In all the operations at the West, during the first 



24 JULITAEY HISTORY OF 

two years of the war, tlie naval forces bore a conspic- 
uous part. A new species of gunboat was impro 
vised for inland navigation, out of tlie river steamers 
in use before tlie rebellion, and whose occupation had 
of course been interrupted by the breaking out of 
hostilities. Many of these steamers were sheathed 
with iron, and rendered in a great degree impervious 
to the hea\dest rebel artillery. Other vessels, built 
especially for this service, were speedily added to the 
Western fleet, all of them of the lightest possible 
draught, as the rise and fall in all the Western rivers 
frequently leaves only a few feet of water in the 
channels. Thus strangely constructed, and armored 
as completely as a knight of the middle ages, manned 
in general by inland crews, who skilfully piloted them 
through the shallow but familiar streams, and com- 
manded by officers of the national navy, these irreg- 
ular flotillas were of great importance. They con- 
voyed transports carrying troops and stores ; they 
drove out guerillas from the river banks, and made 
the landing of forces practicable; they covered many 
important movements of troops "on shore, which oth- 
erwise would have been impossible ; they steamed up 
rivers and penetrated regions that fancied themselves 
secure against invasion ; they shared direct assaults 
on fortified places, and sometimes secured a victory 
that could not have been won without their aid. 
The novelty of their appearance added to the terror 
they inspired, and these iron-clad monsters, rushing 
rapidly along the interior, and sweeping the level 
shores for miles with their heavy guns, were for a 
long while more dreaded by the rebels, even than 
their achievements warranted. In order to secure a 
more effectual cooperation with the army, this gun- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 2) 

boat force at the West, was placed under General 
Halleck's orders. 

Halleck confirmed Grant in tlie command to wliicli 
Fremont liad assigned liim, but changed its designa- 
tion to the District of Cairo, and placed Paducah 
also within liis jurisdiction. lie kept Grant organ- 
izing and disciplining his troops for nearly two 
months, allowino; no forward movement in all that 
time. But in the early part of January, 1862, in 
pursuance of orders from McClellan, then general-in- 
chief, Halleck sent directions to Grant, and the latter 
at once moved a force of six thousand men under 
McClernand, from Cairo and Bird's Point, towards 
Mayfield and Murray, in west Kentucky ; he also 
sent C. F. Smith, with two brigades from Paducah, in 
the same direction, threatening Columbus and the 
rebel line between that place and Bowling Green. 
These movements were made in favor of certain op- 
erations of Buell in the Department of the Cumber- 
land. " The object," said Halleck, " is to prevent re- 
enforcements being sent to Buckner," who was then 
in command at or near Bowlins; Green.*^ Halleck 
ordered the movement on the 6th, but, on the 10th, 
he telegraphed directions for its delay ; Grant, how- 
ever, had abeady started, and the expedition was not 
recalled. 

The troops were out for more than a week, and suf 
fered greatly from cold and the effects of a violent 
storm of rain and snow. There Avas no fighting, but 
the object of the demonstration was accomplished, for 

* Sec Appendix for McClellan and Halleck's instructions for this 
raoyement, in full. They demonstrate very clearly the object of the 
expedition, and that it had no connection -n-hatever -with any ulterior 
operations. 



26 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

during its continuance, rebel reenforcements were de- 
tained at Columbus, Nashville was tkreatened, and 
Brigadier-General George H. Thomas, one of Buell'a 
subordinates, fougbt and won the battle of Mill 
Spring, in east Kentucky. 

Smith, on his return, reported that the capture of 
Fort Henry was feasible : " Two guns would make 
short work of the fort." Grant received this report 
on the 2 2d of January, and forwarded it at once to 
Halleck ; the same day he obtained permission to 
visit St. Louis, the headquarters of the department. 
He had asked this leave as early as the 6th of the 
month, before the I'ecent demonstration had been 
ordered, and again on the 20th, before Smith's report 
was made. On the 23d, he started for St. Louis. 
The express object of his visit was to j^rocure Hal- 
leek's permission to take Forts Henry and Donelson ; 
but M'hen he attempted to broach the subject, Hal- 
leck silenced him so quickly and sharply, that Grant 
said no more on the matter, and went back to Cairo, 
with the idea that his commander thought him guilty 
of proj)osing a great military blunder."^' 

* On the Gth of January, McClcllan wrote to Buell : " Halleck, 
from liis own accounts, will not soon be in condition to sujDport prop- 
erly a movement up the Cumberland ; " and again on the 13th : " Hal- 
leck is not yet in condition to afford you the support you need, when 
you undertake the movement on Bowling Green." 

January Gth, jMcClellan wrote to Buell: "My own general plans for 
the prosecution of the war, make the speedy occujjation of east Tennessee 
and its lines of railway, matters of absolute necessity. Bowling Green 
and Nashville are in that connection of very secondary importance, at 
the present moment." Again, January 13th : " It seems absolutely 
necessary to make the advance on eastern Tennessee at once. I in- 
cline to this as a first stej), for many reasons." It is evident from 
these extracts, that on the 13th of January, neither McClellan nor Hal- 
leck intended, or at any rate was ready for, the movement up the Ten- 
nessee. Doubtless the propriety of the campaign was ai:)parent to all 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 27 

Ou tlie 28tli of Januaiy, however, tlie idea Leiiig 
still prominent in liis mind, Grant telegraplied to St. 
Louis : " With permission, I will take and hold Fort 
Henry on the Tennessee, and establish and hold a large 
camp there ; " and on the next day, he wrote : " In 
view of the large force now concentrating in this dis- 
trict, and the present feasibility of the plan, I would 
respectfully suggest the propriety of subduing Fort 
Henry, near the Kentucky and Tennessee line, and 
holding the position. If this is not done soon, there 
is but little doubt that tlie defences on both the Ten- 
nessee and Cumberland rivers will be materially 
strengthened. From Fort Henry, it will be easy to 
operate either on the Cumberland (only twelve miles 
distant), Memphis, or Columbus. It will, besides^ 
have a moral eifect upon our troops to advance 
thence towards the rebel states. The advantao-es of 
this move are as perceptible to the general command- 
ing as to myself, therefore further statements are 
unnecessary." 

Commodore Foote, commanding the naval force 
in this region, also wrote to Ilalleck on the 28th, 
recommeudino; the movement,'^' and on the 30th of 
January, that officer gave the desired permission, and 
sent detailed instnictions.f These arrived on the 1st 
of February, and on the 2d, Grant started from Cairo, 

soldiers, but nobody ever ordered or suggested it to Grant, excei^t C. 
F. Smith, in bis report. 

• Caiko, January 23, 1S63. 

Major-Oeneral H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Mo. : 

Commanding General Grant and myself are of opinion tbat Fort 
Henry, on the Tennessee river, can be carried with four iron-clad gun- 
boats and troops to permanently occupy. Ilave we your authority to 
■ move for that purpose when ready ? 

A. II. Foote, Flag-Officer. 
+ See Appendix for Ilalleck's instructions in full. 



28 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

witli seventeen thousand men on transports. Foote 
accompanied Mm with seven gunboats, and on the 
4th, the debarkation began, at Bailey's ferry, on the 
east bank, three miles below Fort Henry. 

McClernand commanded Grant's advance, and had 
selected a point for the landing, about eight miles be- 
low the fort ; he even had his troops ashore at this 
place, but Grant made a reconnoissance in person on 
one of the gunboats, steaming up under the guns of 
the fort, in order to draw their fire. In this he suc- 
ceeded, for a shot passed through the steamer ; and 
having: thus ascertained the rano;e of the rebel bat- 
teries, he reembarked his troops, and brought them 
up to Bailey's ferry, just out of reach of fire. 

The rebels had erected works on both sides of 
the river, and had a garrison in and around the two 
forts, of nearly twenty-eight hundred men,* under 
command of Brio-adier-General Tilo:hman. The main 
fortification was on the eastern bank ; it was a strong 
field-work, with bastioned front, defended by seven- 
teen heavy guns, twelve of which bore on the river; f 
embrasures also had been formed, by placing sand- 
bags on the parapets, between the guns ; on the land 
front there was an intrenched camp, and still outside 
of this, an extended line of rifle-pits, located on com- 
manding ground. The outworks covered the Dover 
road, by which alone communication could be had 
with Fort Donelson and the rest of the so-called Con- 
federacy. The heights on the west side completely 
command Fort Hemy, but the works on that bank 

* Two thousand seven hundred and thirty -four. — TilgTimari's He- 
port. 

t See report of Colonel Gilmer, rebel engineer. General Tilghman's 
report says eleven guns ; but the engineer is of course the more reliable 
authority in a matter of this sort. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 29 

were iinfiDislied. As soon as Grant's movements be- 
came known to the rebels, skilful and diligent prepa- 
rations were made to resist him ; new lines of iufantiy 
cover were establislied, and additions to tlie fortifica- 
tions on both sides of the river, commenced. Tilghman 
at once ordered up reenforcements from Danville and 
the mouth of Sandy river, as well as reserves from 
Fort Donelson ; these last being directed to remain at 
the Furnace, half way to Fort Henry, on the Dover 
road. 

The country was at this time almost entirely un 
der w^ater, from the overflow of the Tennessee, the fort 
itself being completely surrounded ; and the move- 
ments of both rebel and national troops were very 
much impeded. The rain, too, fell in torrents on the 
night of the 5th, and Grant having an insufficiency 
of transports, his steamers were obliged to return to 
Cairo, to bring up a part of his command. He did 
not, tlierefore, get his whole force ashore until eleven 
o'clock on the night of the 5th. The original plan 
was to invest Fort Heiman on the west bank simul- 
taneously wdth Fort Henry, and not only prevent 
further reenforcements, but all chance of the escape 
of either gamson. The rebels, however, perceived 
the impossibility of holding both works against such 
a force as had been brought from Cairo, and on the 
5th, before Grant had completed his landing, they 
evacuated Fort Heiman. Ignorant of this withdrawal, 
Grant, the same night, ordered two brigades, under 
General C. F. Smith, to seize the heights on the west- 
ern bank in the morning. The remainder of the na- 
tional forces, under McClernand, were to move at 
eleven on the Cth, to the rear of Fort Henry, to 
''take position on the roads to Fort Donelson and 



30 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

Dover," wliere they could intercept either reenforce- 
raents or fugitives, and " to hold themselves in readi- 
ness to charge and take the work by storm, promptly 
on the receipt of orders." * 

Dispatches from Halleck. and coiToborating in- 
formation received on the ground, that the rebels 
were rapidly reenforcing, made it imperatively neces- 
sary, in Grant's opinion, for the fort to be carried on 
the 6th; otherwise he would have delayed another 
day, to make the investment complete. His forces 
were not up from Cairo in sufficient numbers to set 
an earlier hour for the march : the orders Avere made 
at ten o'clock at night, when the whole command had 
not arrived, and McClernand was informed in writins", 
that " success might dej)end very greatly upon the 
celerity " of his operations. 

Promptly at eleven o'clock, on the 6th, the march 
began; the gunboats moved at the same hour, and 
shortly before noon attacked the water-batteries, at a 
distance of six hundred yards. After a severe and 
rapid fire of an hour and a half, every gun was si- 
lenced by the naval force, no vessel receiving serious 
damage, except the Essex; she was struck in the 
boiler by a shot which disabled her, killing and 
wounding twenty-nine men by scalding. Her com- 
manding officer, Porter, was among the wounded. 
Nineteen soldiers were also injured on the same ship, 
several of whom afterwards died. 

The fort surrendered at discretion. Tilghman 
was captured, with his staff, and sixty men who 
had been retained to work the heavy guns in the 
fort. The rest of the garrison had been stationed at 
the outworks, about two miles off, to avoid the fire 

* See Appendix for Grant's field order of the 5tb. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. .31 

of tlie gunboats ; and before the figlit began, Tilgli- 
man sent them orders to retreat upon Fort Donelson, 
which they obeyed. 

Grant's advance arrived in the rear of the place 
about half an hour after the surrender, when the fort 
and the prisoners were turned over to the army, but 
the main rebel force had escaped. Pursuit was at 
once made by the cavalry towards the Cumberland, 
but the rebels had already got too far for this to 
avail, and the troops were recalled. Two guns were 
found, abandoned by the rebels in their retreat, and 
thirty-eight prisoners were taken, probably straggler:^. 

Neitlier Grant nor Foote had anticipated so rapid 
a reduction of the fort, but if they had foreseen the 
event, the movement of the national forces could not 
have been hastened. There were eight miles to 
march ; roads had to be cut through the woods, on 
account of the ovei*flow, and several streams to be 
bridged, the rains having rendered them too deep to 
ford. During the delay of an hour or two thus oc- 
casioned, the garrison had time to escape.* But even 
had the attack been deferred another day, in order 
first to complete the investment, the result would not 
have been chan2:ed: for Tilarhnian had no idea of 
holding the place longer than to enable his main force 
to get away.f He posted his troops on the outer 

* " Tlie plan of the attack, so far as tlie army reaching the rear of 
the fort, to make a demonstration simultaneous with the navy, was 
frustrated by the excessively muddy roads and the high stage of water, 
preventing the arrival of our troops until some time after I liad taken 
possession of the fort." — FooWs Report. 

t "My infantry, artillery, and cavalry removed of necessity, to 
avoid the fire of the gunboats, to the outworks, could not meet the 
enemy there. My only chance was to delay the enemy every moment 
possible, and retire the command, now outside the main work, towards 
Fort Donelson, resolving to suffer as little loss as possible, I retained 



32 MILITAEY inSTOET OF 

line, where tliey could start for the Cumberland at a 
moment's notice, and they did start, before the fate 
of the place was determined. After this, he fought 
only for time. The defence, though short, was gal- 
lant and soldierly. Tilghman staid mth his guns to 
the last, and even worked one himself, Avhen the en- 
durance of his men bes^an to fail. His casualties 
were five killed and sixteen wounded. Foote lost 
two men killed and thirty-seven wounded, besides 
the nineteen soldiers already mentioned. The Cin- 
cinnati was struck thii-ty-one times, and the Essex 
fifteen; the other two armored boats received, one 
six, the other seven shots.* 

Grant at once telegraphed to Halleck : " Fort 
Henry is ours. The gunboats silenced the batteries 
before the investment was completed. *•»■»* 

only the heavy artillery company to fight the guns, and gave the order 
to commence the movement at once. * * * 

" The enemy, ignorant of any movement of my main body, but 
kno'W'ing that they could not engage them behind an intrenched 
camp, until after the fort was reduced and the gunljoats retired, with- 
out being themselves exposed to the fire of the latter, took a position 
north of the forks of the Dover road, in a dense wood (my order being 
to retreat by way of Stewart road), to await the result. At 11 A. m. 
the flotilla assumed their line of battle. I had no hope of being able, 
successfully, to defend the fort against such overwhelming odds, both 
in point of numbers and in calibre of guns. My object was to save 
the main body by delaying matters as long as possible, and to this end 
I bent every eS"oi-t. * * * 

"I ordered Colonel Heiman to join his command, and keep up the 
retreat in good order, whilst I would fight the guns as long as one was 
left, and sacrifice myself to save the main body of my troops." — Tihjli- 
manh Report. 

The report of Colonel Heiman, who commanded the rebel troops 
that escaped, is to the same efl'ect. 

* I have availed myself very fully in this chapter, of the rebel reports 
of the battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donclson. Whatever statement 
I make of the rebel strength or movements is taken from these sources, 
unless otherwise stated. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 88 

I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on tLe 8th, and 
return to Fort Henry." This was the tirst mention 
of Fort Donelson, whether in conversation or dis- 
])atches, between the two commanders. Ilalleck 
made no reply, but notified Buell on the 7th, " Gen- 
eral Grant expects to take Fort Donelson, at Dover, 
to-morrow." "' 

On the 7th, Grant's cavalry penetrated to within a 
mile of Fort Donelson, and all the rebel pickets were 
driven in, but no definite information was obtained 
of the numbers of the enemy. It was ascertained, 
however, that the force from Fort Henry had joined 
the garrison on the Cumberland, and Grant informed 
Halleck : " If any reenforcemeuts were on the way for 
this place, no doubt they have gone or ^vill go there 
also." On the same day, in pursuance of his intention 
to take Fort Donelson on the 8th, all the infantry 
and cavalry on the east bank of the Tennessee were 
notified to be prej^ared to move at an early hour on 
the 8th, with two days' rations intheir haversacks, 
and " without encumbranceaJj^S^^^^^t^^^mpas- 
sable state of the roads,'!^aH'lSant, '^fls^^^^iu 
impracticable to move th* bag^^g^ Qld arli^ile^y.". , 

But the heavy rains, ^kian uiuisiialiy hi^S'^ge 
of water in the Tennesse^'^^^^9(|j^Q^jl^^^«mtry, 
that he was prevented from actin^'^W^isrv^eiy for sev- 
eral days. " At present," he wrote, " we are perfectly 
locked in." " The banks are higher at the water's 
edge than further back, leaving a wide margin of 
low land to bridge over, before anything can be done 

* Halleck congratulated Foote in tliese words : " I bave this mo- 
ment received the official report of your capture of Fort Henry, and 
hasten to congratulate you and your command for your brilliant suc- 

CC&J." 

3 



34 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

inland." On the Stli, lie wrote : " I contemplated 
taking Foi-t Donelson to-day with infantry and cav- 
aliy alone ; but all my troops may be kept busily 
engaged in saving what we now have from the rap- 
idly rising water." During this delay, every exer- 
tion was made to secure reinforcements. These were 
brou2:ht from Bu ell's command, and from that of 
Major-General Hunter, in Kansas. Halleck also sent 
Brigadier-General Cullum, his chief of staff, to Cairo, 
to superintend the transportation of troops to the 
front, and to do whatever should be necessary to 
facilitate Grant's movements. 

General Halleck, however, indicated to Grant no 
wish that the latter should advance. His orders 
were solely of a defensive character. On the 8th, he 
telegraphed: "If possible, destroj'- the bridges at 
Clarksville. Shovels and picks will be sent you to 
strengthen Fort Henry. The guns should be trans- 
ferred and arranged so as to resist an attack by land. 
The redan on south bank should be arransred for 
same ol)ject. Some of the gunboats from Fort Holt 
will be sent up. Beenforcements will reach you 
daily. Hold on to Fort Henry at all hazards. Im- 
press slaves, if necessary, to strengthen your position 
as rapidly as j)ossible. It is of vital importance to 
strengthen your position as ra])idly as possible." On 
the 10th, he continued in the same strain : " If possible, 
destroy the bridges at Clarksville. Bun any risk to ac- 
complish this. Strengthen land side of Fort Henry, 
and transfer guns to resist a land attack. Picks and 
shovels are sent. Large reenforcements will soon join 
you." 

Grant, however, did not wait for the reenforce 
ments, and on the 10th, while Halleck was writing 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 35 

jibout picks and shovels, lie informed Foote tliat he 
was only delaying for the return of the gunboats, 
which, after the fall of Fort Henry, had gone up the 
Tennessee as far as Florence, Alabama. " I have been 
waiting very patiently for the return of the gunboats 
under Commodore Phelps to go around on the Cum- 
berland, whilst I marched my land forces across, to 
make a simultaneous attack upon Fort Donelson. I 
feel that there should be no delay in this matter, and 
yet I do not feel justified in going, without some of 
your gunboats to cooperate. Can you not send two 
boats from Cairo immediately up the Cumberland ? " 
To expedite matters, he offered Foote any steamers 
that might be at Cairo, to tow the fleet ; and, " should 
you be deficient in men, an artillery company can be 
temporarily detached to serve on the gunboats." 
" Start as soon as you like," he said ; " I will be ready 
to cooperate at any moment." News had now come 
in that the rebels were reenforcing Fort Donelson, in 
anticipation of an attack, and this promptness which 
Grant urged, was a matter of vital importance. If he 
delayed in order to strengthen Fort Henry " on the 
land side," and" to " arrange the redan," Fort Donelson 
might never be taken. On the 11th, Foote, with his 
fleet, started by the Ohio and Cumberland rivers. 
Six regiments of troops (all the reinforcements which 
had yet arrived) were sent by the same route without 
being debarked. They were to follow the gunboats 
up the Cumberland, to effect a landing below Fort 
Donelson, and as near the fort as practicable, to estab- 
lish a base for supplies in the new campaign, and to be 
in readiness to cooperate with the force that should 
go across by land. 

On the 11th, troops under McClernand moved out 



36 MILITAEY mSTOEY OF 

tliree or four miles on the two roads leading to Fort 
Donelson, and early on the morning of the 12tli, the 
main column, fifteen thousand strong, marched from 
Fort Henry, leaving a gamson of twenty-five hundi'ed 
men ; eight light batteries accompanied the exj^edi- 
tion. Neither tents nor baggage was taken ; there were 
but few wagons, and no rations save those in haver- 
sacks, all supplies having been ordered direct from 
Cairo to the Cumberland. Brio-ade and rea'imental 
commanders, however, were instructed to see that all 
their men were supplied with forty rounds of am- 
munition in their cartrido;e-boxes. The foremost 
brigade was ordered to move by the telegraph road, 
directly upon Fort Donelson, halting for further or- 
ders at a distance of two miles from the fort. The 
other brigades were to move by the Dover road, halt- 
ing at the same distance, and form a continuous line 
with the other wing. In order to cut off all retreat 
by the Cumberland, one brigade was ordered to be 
thrown into Dover, about two miles south of Donel- 
son. The strength of the enemy was so variously re- 
ported, that it was impossible to give exact details for 
the attack, but Grant promised : " The necessary or- 
ders will be given on the field." * The distance be- 
tween the two forts was only twelve miles, and soon 
after mid-day. Grant's little army appeared in front 
of the rebel lines. No obstacle was opposed to the 
march, although nothing would have been easier than 
to prepare obstructions. 

Donelson was one of the strongest works then 
established in the entii*e theatre of war; it was sit- 
uated on the west bank of the Cumberland, north of 
the to^vn of Dover, on a peculiarly rugged and in- 

* See Appendix for Grant's field order in full. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT '6*1 

accessible series of hills, some of tliem rising abruptly 
over a hundred feet ; every advantage had been taken 
of the character of the ground; the country was 
densely wooded, but the timber had l)een felled far 
out in advnnce of the breastworks, the smaller trees 
chopped till they stood about breast-high, and the 
limbs left attached to the stumps, forming an un- 
usually difficult abatis. Two streams set back from 
the Cumberland, whose waters were now high, and 
these streams formed the right and left defences of 
the rebel line, which extended nearly three miles, and 
was strongly intrenched. At intervals inside, were 
secondary lines and detached works, commanding the 
outer intrenchments, which were more than two miles 
from the river, and covered the town of Dover. The 
slashinjT was continued between the rifle-pits and the 
main fortification; streamlets, gullies, and ravmes 
added to the strength of the place, and light batteries 
were posted on commanding heights, as well as along 
the advanced line. 

The main fort itself was built on a precipitous 
height, or rather range, cloven by a deep gorge open- 
ing to the south ; it was about three-quarters of a 
mile from the breastworks, and overlooked both the 
river and the interior. It covered a hundred acres 
of ground, and was defended by fifteen heavy guns 
and two carronades. Water batteries, admirably lo- 
cated to control the river navigation, were sunken on 
the hillsides towards the Cumberland, and the entire 
amount of rebel ai-tillery, including the light bat- 
teries, was sixty-five pieces. The garrison numbered, 
as nearly as can be ascertained, twenty-one thousand 
men * a great part of whom had been recently thrown 

* Sec note to page 51 for my authority for this estimate. 



38 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

into tlie works, from Bowling Green and Cumberland 
City ; for the rebels appreciated the imjDoi-tance of 
the position as fully as the national commander, and 
strained every nerve to retain it.'^ As soon as Foi-t 
Henry fell, they began to enlarge and strengthen the 
fortifications at Donelson, working day and night to 
be ready for the attack which they foresaw was at 
hand ; reenforcements were poured in, and Buckner, 
Pillow, and Floyd w^ere successively sent to com- 
mand, each ranking his predecessor, who remained to 
serve under the new superior. 

About noon of the 12th, the rebel pickets were 
met by Grant's advance, and rapidly driven in ; and 
the fortifications were from this time gradually ap- 
proached and surrounded, with occasional skirmish- 
ing. The first line was formed in open fields oppo- 
site the enemy's centre. Grant threw up no intrench- 
ments, for at this period of the war the science of 
earthworks had not been brouo-ht to such a deo-ree 
of perfection as was afterwards attained. " As yet," 
he said, " I have had no batteries thrown up, hoping 
with the aid of the gunboats to obviate the neces- 
sity." His left that night rested at a point on Hick- 
man creek, and the line ran around ^vell towards 
Dover on the right ; on account of the overflow, it 
did not, however, quite extend to the river on either 
side, but Donelson was practically invested. The 
advance to the right had to be made with extreme 
caution, for the ground was very much broken, with- 
out roads, and covered with an almost impenetrable 
growth of small oak. On the left, however, Grant 

* Pollard, a rebel historian, says, the rebel generals held a conference, 

and decided to fight for Nashville, at Donelson, and accordingly sent 
thither every thing they could spare fi'om Bowling Green. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 39 

was able to communicate by tlie creek, ^vitli Lis trans- 
Y)OTis and gunboats, while tlie enemy was completely 
out off from escape in that direction. When tlie siege 
began, General C. F. Smith had the left, and McCler- 
nand the right, of the national line. Grant's head- 
quarters were in the rear of Smith's division, on the 
Fort Henry road. There ^vere l)ut three professional 
soldiers in the entire command — Grant himself. Smith, 
and Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, of Grant's staff.* 

The 13 th was occupied in selecting and still fur- 
ther reconnoitring the ground, and getting into po- 
sition; owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats and 
of the reenforcements sent by water, no attack was 
made, but the investment was extended on both 
flanks of the enemy, and drawn closer to his works. 
Skirmishers were thrown out actively in front, and 
several smart fights occurred, but with no result of 
importance. They were in no case intended for real 
assaults, but simply as attempts to discover the force 
and jiosition of the enemy, and to establish the na- 
tional line. An attempt was made by McClernand 
to capture a battery commanding the ridge road on 
which Grant moved, but this was without orders, 
and unsuccessful, though gallantly made ; three regi- 
ments were engaged in the affair. On the first t^\-o 
days, Grant lost al)out three hundred men, in killed 
and wounded. The enemy, notwithstanding his 
great superiority in numbers, made no effort to mo- 
lest Grant, allowing him to continue the investment 
at his leisure, a blunder almost equal to that of op- 
posing no obstacle to the march from Fort Henry. 

By the night of the 13th, Grant Avas established 

* McPherson was at this time really on nalleck's staff, but detailed 
as chief engineer for Grant dui'ing this campaign. 



10 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 

on a line of lieiglits, in general parallel with the 
enemy's outworks, and extending for a distance of 
over three miles. Various spaces and elevations 
afforded positions for artillery, and from these he 
annoyed the enemy, but they were not of such a com- 
manding character as to enable him to achieve de- 
cided results. 

At sunset on this day no reenforcements of im- 
portance had yet arrived, and the gunboats were not 
in sight. That night the weather became intensely 
cold, the thermometer falling to ten degrees above 
zero (Fahrenheit), and the troops, who were mostly 
raw, and not yet inured to the hardships of war, suf- 
fered extremely in consequence. They were obliged 
to bivouac in line of battle, and "with arms in their 
hands, for they lay within point-blank musket-range 
of the enemy's breastworks. The rebel pickets were 
out in strong force, and no fires could be built ; many 
of the men had thrown away their blankets on the 
march; they had insufficient rations, having been 
careless of what they brought in their haversacks, and 
the new supplies had not arrived. There were no 
tents, and towards morning a drivins: storm of snow 
and hail set in. Not a few of the soldiers on both 
sides were frozen. An incessant firing was kept up 
by the rebel pickets, and the groans of the wounded, 
who lay shivering between the two armies, and call- 
ing for help and water, were heard all night through 
the storm. The force of the enemy at this time was 
largely superior to Grant's, and that commander sent 
across to Fort Henry for the garrison which had been 
left there. 

Before daylight of Friday, the 14th, however, 
Commodore Foote came up the rivei-, and the troops 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 41 

from Fort Henry -were landed, their advance having 
arrived in the night. These, commanded by Briga- 
dier-General Lewis Wallace, were at once put into 
line. Grant added to them the other reenforcements, 
now coming np the river, and gave them the centre, 
between Smith and McClemand ; but one brigade 
(jVIc Arthur's) of Smitli's division was moved to the 
extreme right of the line. This day Grant, who had 
received no word from Halleck, except orders to fortify 
Fort Heniy, sent back a dispatch to his chief, dated : 
" In the field, near Fort Donelson. We will soon want 
ammunition for our ten and twenty-pound Parrott 
guns. Already require it for the twenty-four pound 
howitzers. I have directed my ordnance officer to 
keep a constant watch upon the supply of ammuni- 
tion, and to take steps in time to avoid a deficiency." 
General CiiUum replied from Cairo : " The ammuni- 
tion you want is not bere, and scarcely any ordnance," 
Cullum, however, ^vrote encouragingly, " You are on 
the great strategic line ; " and prophesied speedy suc- 
cess. Durino; the whole of the 14th, a ramblina: and 
irregular fire of sharpshooters was kept up, varied 
with occasional discharges of artillery; the rebel 
shells and round shot fell at times thickly within the 
national lines, but the casualties Avere few. This 
day, Grant ordered Colonel Webster, of his staff, to 
make a reconnoissance, with a view to sending a force 
above the town of Dover, to occupy the river bank. 

At three o'clock on Friday, six gunboats, four of 
which were iron-clad, attacked the fort at a distance 
of four hundred yards. The elevation of the rebel 
batteries was at least thirty feet, and gave them a 
fine command of the river. Traverses secured them 
a<2rainst an enfiladine: fire, and the task of attacking: 



42 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

tliem in front, was both dangerous and difficult. One 
vessel alone received fifty-nine shots, and the others 
about half that number each. The crash of heavy 
iron falling on the metal armor, produced an unusual 
and ringing sound, never heard in battle before. The 
wheel of one iron-clad and the tiller of another, were 
shot away, rendering the two boats unmanageable, 
and they drifted do^^'n the stream. The two other ar- 
mored V' essels were o-reatlv damasked between mnd and 
water; and, during the attack, a rifled gun burst aboard 
of one of them. The commodore was wounded, 
fifty-four men were killed or wounded ; and, after an 
engagement of an hour and a half, Foote was obliged 
to withdraw, the enemy pouring a hot fire from all 
the water batteries, while the fleet could reply with 
only twelve guns. The gunboats were so disabled as 
to be unfit to take any part of imi^oi^tance in the suc- 
ceeding operations. Had this attack been successful, 
Grant was to have assaulted on the land side ; but as 
it failed, he remained in his lines. That day he 
wrote : " Appearances now are that we shall have a 
protracted siege here. -^ * * I fear the result of an 
attempt to carry the place by storm with new troops. 
I feel great confidence, however, of ultimately re- 
ducing the place." 

Another night of intense cold, and a furious storm 
of sleet and snow came on, and the suflerings of the 
night before were renewed. At two a. m. of the 
15th, Grant was sent for by the wounded commo- 
dore,* who could not get ashore ; and before daylight 

* Flao-Ship St. Locis, February 14, 1S62. 

General Grant, commanding United States Forces: 

Dear Gekeral : Will you do me the favor to come on board at 
your earliest conveuicncc, as I am disabled from walking by a contu- 



ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 43 

lie went aboarel the flag-slilp, wliere Foote declared 
that the condition of his fleet compelled him to put 
back at once to Cairo, for repairs. He ui'ged Grant 
to remain as quiet as possible, until the gunboats 
could return and assist him, either by a new bom- 
bardment, or in a j^rotracted siege. But Grant's 
reenforcements had by this time begun to come in 
heavily, and on the night of the 14th, his army 
amounted to twenty-two thousand men. The rebels 
had observed this increase of his strength, and felt 
that his lines were being drawn closer around them 
each hour; they determined not to wait fur the com- 
pletion of the investment. 

Accordingly, at early dawn on the morning of Sat- 
urday, the 15th, massing heavily on their own left, 
they came out of their works and made a fierce as- 
sault on the right of the national line, where it did 
not quite extend to the river. Grant had been 
aboard the flag-ship but a short time, when McxVr- 
thur's brigade, which held the extreme right, was at- 
tacked ; all of McClernand's division, on Mci\j-thur's 
left, was also soon ens-ao-ed. Tlie men fouofht stub- 
bornly, and maintained the unequal struggle for hours, 
but McArthur was finally obliged to give way with 
heavy loss, and McClernand's command showed signs 
of wavering. It held on, however, till Lewis Wallace 
came up to the support from the centre, and made 
the rebels pay dear fur what they had gained. 
McClernand's men had not retreated until their am- 
munition gave out, and then passing through the 
ranks of the fresher troops, they halted within range 

eion, and cannot possibly get to see you about tbc disposition of tlicso 
vessels, all of which are more or less disabled. 

A. S. FooTE, Flig-Ojjicer. 



44 3IILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

of the enemy's miisketr}", to refill tlieir cartridge- 
boxes. They liad been obliged, however, to leave a 
batteiy in the hands of the rebels. The assault was 
renewed upon Lewis Wallace with gi'eat vigor, and 
he too was compelled to fall bade, though slowly and 
fio-htincr hard ; and after several hours of incessant 
combat, with both artillery and infantry, he was 
able to check the rebel advance , but not until the 
whole right wing had been pushed back upon his 
division, and very nearly turned.* The behavior of 
the troops in both IMcClernand and Lewis ^Yallace'3 
command was all that could l^e desired. They only 
gave way when their cartridge-boxes were emptv, 
and after long hours of fighting that extorted unwill- 
ing praise from their foes.f 

Grant was returning to his headquarters from the 
flag-ship, at about nine o'clock, when he met an aide 
galloping up to inform him of the assault. This was 
the first information he had of the battle : he next 
met C. F. Smith, who had not yet been engaged, and 
learning from him the position of affiiirs on the right, 
at once directed him to hold himself in readiness to 
assault the rebel risrht with his whole command. 
Riding on, he soon reached the point where the hard- 
est fighting had occurred. The rebels had failed to 
make their way through the national lines, and were 
doggedly retiring. Still, the national troops were 
very much disordered ; most of them had never been 
in battle before, and not a few were yet unfamiliar 

* All the rebel reports explain the intention in the assault to have 
been to destroy Grant's right wing, rolling it back on his left, and to 
open a Tvay for themselves to Nashville. Pillow says : " We had 
fought the battle to open the way for our army, and to relieve us from 
his investment." 

t See rebel reports, passim. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 45 

^vitll the use of their muskets. The giving out of the 
ammunition in the cai-tiidge-boxes, and the unusually 
heavy loss in field officers, had created great confusion 
in the ranks. There was no pursuit, and the battle 
was merely lulled, not ended. The men, like all raw 
troops, imagined the enemy to be in overwhelming 
force, and reported that the rebels had come out with 
knapsacks and haversacks, as if they meant to stay 
out, and fight for several days. Grant at once in- 
quired : " Are the haversacks filled ? " Some pris- 
oners were examined, and the haversacks found to 
contain three days' rations. " Then they mean to cut 
their Avay out ; they have no idea of staying here to 
fight us ; " and looking at his own disordered men, 
not yet recovered from the shock of battle. Grant 
exclaimed: "Whichever party first attacks now, 
will whip, and the rebels will have to be very quick, 
if they beat me." 

Putting spurs to his horse, he rode at once to the 
left, where the troops, not having been engaged, were 
still fresh, and ordered an immediate assault. As 
they rode, the general and his staff reassured the men 
with the news that the rebels were getting desperate, 
and that the attack of the morning was an attempt 
to cut their way out, not an ordinary and confident 
assault. xVs soon as the troops caught this idea, they 
took new courage. Scattered, until now, in knots all 
over the field, they at once re-foi-med, and went tow- 
ards the front. At this time. Grant sent a request 
to Foote, to have all the gunboats make their ap- 
pearance to the enemy. "A terrible conflict," he 
said, " ensued in my absence, which has demoralized 
a ],)ortion of my command, and I think the enemy is 
much more so. If the gunboats do not appear, it 



46 MIUTARY HISTOEY OF 

will reassure the enemy, and still further demoralize 
our troops. I must order a charge to save appear- 
ances. I do not expect the gunboats to go into 
action." Two of the fleet, accordingly, ran up the 
river, and threw a few shells at Ions; rano-e. ^VfcCler- 
nand and Lewis Wallace were informed of Smith's 
orders to assault, and directed to hold themselves in 
readiness to renew the battle in their front, the mo- 
ment Smith beo-an his attack. To McClernand, the 
order was, " to push his column to the river if possi- 
ble, otherwise to remain in statu quo, maintaining his 
present position." 

Smitk^s assaulting column was formed of Lau- 
man's brigade, the Second Iowa infantry having the 
lead. Smith formed the regiment in two lines, with a 
front of five companies each, thirty paces apart. He 
told the men what they had to do, and took his posi- 
tion between these two lines. The attack was made 
Avith great vigor and success. The ground was bro- 
ken and diflScult, impeded with underbrush, as well 
as extremely exposed ; but Smith, at the head of his 
troops, charged directly on the rebel works. The ene- 
my, having massed on his o^ti left, earlier in the day, 
for the morning's assault, could not get reenforcements 
around, in time to repel the national column, which 
earned the rebel lines at the point of the bayonet, and 
forced its way under a galling fire and up a steep hill, 
inside the intrenchments, thus securing the key to Fort 
Donelson. McClernand and Lewis Wallace, on the 
right and centre, supported Smith by attacks on their 
immediate front. The troops of tliese two officers, 
although so hotly engaged earlier in the day, were 
still able to act vigorously in the afternoon. They 
found the enemy in position near his works, and, after 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4.1 

a short and spirited contest, drove liini into tliem, ob- 
taining possession of the ground and the guns that 
had heen wruno* from themselves in the mornini;^. 
They thus did important service, detaining a large 
rebel force in their own front, and subtracting from 
the enemy's strength at the key-point of the tight. 
Night came on before the battle was decided, but 
Smith maintained his position inside the rebel works, 
and a half an hour more of daylight would have suf 
ficed to carry the fort.* Grant perceived this, and 
declared that the rebels were fighting only for dark- 
ness.f 

Grant slept in a negro hut that night, and Smith, 
with his troops, on the frozen ground they had won ; 
while inside the fort occurred one of the most remark- 
able scenes of the war. Floyd summoned his highest 
officers, to consult them about the propriety of a sur- 
render. The opinion was greatly in favor of such a 
course ; Buckner, whose troops were opposite Smith's, 
and certain to be attacked at dawn, asserting that he 
could not hold out half an hour after the fight l)egan. 
Floyd then announced his determination to desert the 
troops who had fought under him so well ; he declared, 
however, that he had doubts of the military propriety 
of this conduct, and asked the addce of his inferiors, 
most of whom intimated very plainly their disappro- 
bation of his recreancy. Buckner told him every man 
must judge for himself in such matters; but Pillow 

* See Buckner's report. 

t " Having carried the advanced works on the enemy's right, and 
effected a lodgment in his intrenchmcnts, -we had secured a key to his 
position ; we had obtained a front having about as great an elevation 
as any portion of his works, and where we could plant our artillery to 
silence his, and enfilade a portion of his defences, at the same time 
making -use of his rifle-pits to cover our men:'— ifcPherson'a Jiej^ort. 



48 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 

declared that lie would follow Floyd's example, as 
"there were no two men in the Confederacy the 
Yankees would rather capture than themselves." Ac- 
cordingly, Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, 
and he in his turn transferred it to Buckner. The 
last-named general was a soldier, by education and 
feeling, and did not consider it consonant with his 
military honor to avoid the fate reserved for his 
troops ; Lut Floyd and Pillow confessed in so many 
words, that "personal reasons controlled them." 

Buckner at once sent a bugler and note to Grant, 
asking terms. In the interim before receiving a re- 
ply, he allowed Floyd to escape across the river, with 
as many troojDS as could get aboard of two steamers 
lying at the wharf. The men crowded to the shore 
in the cold and darkness, and in great confusion, fill- 
ing the steamers to their utmost capacity, those who 
remained cursins; and hissinof the officers who were 
leaving them to their fate. In all about three thou- 
sand were ferried off on the transports ; finally, at 
daybreak, one of Buckner's staff announced that the 
capitulation had been concluded, and no more de- 
partui'es could be allowed, and Floyd pushed off.* 
Pillow escaped on a hand-flat, and Colonel Forrest, 
commanding the cavalry, took his own men and about 
two hundred more, and with these waded the stream 
on the south side of the fort ; the water was too deep 

* " Such was the ■want of all order and disciphne by tLis time on 
shore, that a wild rush was made at the boat, which the cai:)taiu said 
would swamp her unless he pushed oflf immediately. This was done, 
and about sunrise the boat on wbich I was, the other having gone, left 
the shore, and steered up the river. By this precise mode I effected 
my escape, and after leaving the wharf, the Department will be pleased 
to hear, that I encountered no dangers whatever from the enemy."— 
Floyd's Sxq^2^Umentary Jiq)ort. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 49 

for infantry, and intensely cold ; many of the fugi- 
tives were frozen in crossing, but most of them found 
their way to Nashville * f 

Grant was preparing to storm the intrench ment-^, 
when Buckner's messenger arrived, and the white flag 
was hoisted on Foi-t Donelson. The rebel commander 
proposed an armistice till twelve o'clock, and the ap- 
pointment of commissioners to settle tenns of capitu- 
lation, " in consideration of all the circumstances gov- 
erning the present situation of affairs at this station ; " 
but Grant replied : " No terms except unconditional 
and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose 
to move immediately upon your works." Whereupon 
Buckner made haste to answer : " The disposition of 
forces under my command, incident to an unexpected 
chano-e of commanders, and the overwhelming force 
under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the 
brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday, to 
accept the ungenerous and uuchivalrous terms which 
you propose." J 

Grant mounted his horse, and rode direct to 
Buckner's headquarters. He told that general that 

* The rebel official reports set forth these proceedings very fully, 
and the opinion entertained by the junior officers, of Floyd and Pil- 
low's behavior is clearly expressed. After their flight, these individ- 
uals were called upon by their superiors for explanations, which were 
pronounced unsatisfactory ; a decision in which history will concur. 
See Appendix for a message of 3Ir. Jefferson Davis to the rebel Con- 
gress, on this subject. 

t " It is unbecoming in soldiers to criticise the conduct of superiors, 
but, when, after rejecting the connsels of juniors, t\\e condition of af- 
fairs is placed beyond the power of human nature to retrieve, the se- 
nior endeavors to escape responsibility by throwing the same upon the 
fanner, comment is unnecessary." — Report of Major Brown, Twentieth 
Mississippi. (The italics are his own.) 

I See Appendix for Grant and Buckner's correspondence in 
fulL 

4 



50 julitary history of 

he had no desire to humiliate his prisoners, but would 
allow the officers to retain their side-arms. Horses 
and all public property must be given up, but the 
officers and men might keep their personal baggage. 
Grant and Buckner had been schoolmates at the 
West Point Academy, and comrades afterwards, and 
they breakfasted together at Buckner's quarters. 
The latter acknowledged that it had been the inten- 
tion of the rebel commanders to cut their way out, 
the day before, but that Grant's operations had foiled 
them. In the course of the conversation, he alluded 
to Grant's, inferior force at the beginning of the siege, 
and remarked : " If I had been in command, you 
wouldn't have reached Fort Donelson so easily : " to 
which Grant replied : " If you had been in command, 
I should have waited for reenforcements, and marched 
from Fort Henry in greater strength ; but I knew 
that Pillow would not come out of his works to fight, 
and told my staff so, though I believed he would 
fight behind his works." * 

Sixty-five guns, seventeen thousand six hundred 
small-arms, and nearly fifteen thousand troops, fell 
into the hands of the victor. On the morning of the 
16th, as Grant was writing his report, aboard one of 
the transports, Buckner entered his cabin, and the 
former inquired how many troops had been surren- 
dered. Buckner declared he could not exactly tell, 
for his men had been deserting the fort all night, af- 
ter it became known that a surrender would occur, 
and no restraint had been placed on any who chose 
to leave, until the capitulation had actually been 
proj)osed. " You will not find," he said, " fewer than 

* Pillow was iu command of Fort Donelson until the 13th, the 
day after the siege began. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 51 

twelve tliousand men, nor I tLink more tlian fifteen 
thousand." 

A few days afterwards, as the rel^cl prisoners were 
leaving for the !North, on transports, it was announced 
that General Buckner's steamer was ready. Ilis own 
brigade of troops was aboard, and he invited Grant 
to go with him and look at his soldiers, of whom he 
was proud. Grant went with him, and the rebel 
prisoners crowded around their captor, curiously but 
respectfully. Buckner spoke to them, and told them 
that General Grant had behaved with kindness and 
magnanimity, and bade them remember this, if ever 
the fortune of war allowed them to show him, or any 
of his soldiers, the same treatment which they now 
received. 

On the last day of the fight. Grant had twenty- 
seven thousand men, whom he could have put into 
battle ; some few reiriments of these were not en- 
gaged. Other reenforcements arrived on the 16th, 
after the surrender, swelling his number still further. 
Of artillery, he had but the eight light batteries which 
started with him from Fort Henry, not near so many 
guns as he captured. His entire losses during the siege 
were two thousand and forty-one, in killed, wounded, 
and missing ; of these, four hundred and twenty-five 
were killed. No exact account of the rebel loss, other 
than in captures, can be given ; but rations were 
issued at Cairo, to fourteen thousand six hundred and 
twenty-three prisoners, captured at Fort Donelson; 
and Grant estimated that at least twenty-five hundred 
rebels were killed or wounded during the siege.* 

* There were rations issued at Cairo, to fourteen thousand six hun- 
dred and twenty-three prisoners, captured at Fort Donelson. Buck- 
ner, in his report, estimates that three thousand rebels got away with 



52 MTLITAET HISTOEY OF 

Ou tlie IGth, the day of the suiTeuder, General 
Halleck's chief of staff cautioned Grant "not to be too 
rash," and Halleck's first dispatch after the fall of 
Fort Donelson was in these words : " Don't let gun- 
boats go higher up than Clarksville. Even then, they 
must limit their operations to the destruction of the 
bridge and railroad, and return immediately to Cairo, 
leaving one at Fort Donelson. Mortar-boats to be 
sent back to Cairo as soon as possible." Halleck's 
whole share in the desis-n or execution of this 
campaign, was confined to forwarding reenforce- 
ments, a duty which he performed with vigor and 
alacrity.* 

The rebels, in official reports, again and again de- 
clared, that it was the assault on their right, ordered 
at the crisis of the battle, when both sides were so 
nearly exhausted, which turned the scale, and j^re- 
vented them from cutting their way through the 

Floyd ; and Pillow also says that several thousand infontry escaped 
during the night of the 15th. According to Forrest's account, two 
hundred got away with him besides his own cavahy, making at the 
least one thousand with Forrest. Pillow reckons the rebel losses dur- 
ing the siege at two thousand, which is doubtless an under estimate, 
as the successful jiarty lost two thousand one hundred and forty, and 
the heavy fighting was all done outside of the works, where the robela 
could have had no advantage of cover. The calculation is therefore 
simple : 



Captured, 


. 14,623 




Escaped with Floyd, 


3,000 




Escaped with Forrest, 


. 1,000 


(A low estimate.) 


Killed and wounded, . 


3,300 


(At least.) 



Total rebel force at beginning 

of siege, . . . 21,123 

* It has been alleged that General Halleck planned the Donelson 
campaign, and is entitled to the credit of its conception ; but it is only 
just to say that I never heard that General Halleck himself put forth 
any such claim. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 53 

national lines.* General Cullum, Ilalleck's chief of 
staff, wrote to Grant on the 20tli: "I received with 
the highest gratification your reports and letters from 
Fort Donelson, so gallantly captured under your bril- 
liant leadership. I, in common with the whole coun- 
try, warmly congratulate you upon this remarkable 
achievement." Halleck, however, who was at St. 
Louis throughout the siege, and received all his re- 
ports of the campaign and capture, through General 
Cullum, or direct from Grant, wrote no congratula- 
tions to the victor.f On the contrar}', on the 19th of 
February, three days after the fall of Fort Donelson, 
he telegraphed to AYashington : " Smith, by his cool- 
ness and bravery at Fort Donelson, when the battle 
was asrainst us, turned the tide and carried the 
enemy's outworks. Make him a major-general. You 
can't get a better one. Honor him for this victory, 
and the whole country will applaud." J 

On the morning of the surrender, when General 
Buckner congratulated Smith on the gallant charge 
which had carried the works the night before, the 
old hero replied : " Yes, it was well done, considering 

* Floyd, Pillovr, and Buckner, as well as their subordinates, agree 
in this. 

t He sent, however, the following dispatch to General Hunter, at 
Fort Leavenworth : " To you, more than any other man out of this 
department, are we indebted for our success at Fort Donelson. In my 
strait for troops to reenforce General Grant, I applied to you. You 
responded nol'ly, placing your forces at my disposition. This enabled 
us to win the victory. Keceivc my most heart-felt thanks." 

t On the 20th of February, the day after this dispatch was sent, 
Halleck telegraphed to McClellan : " I must have command of the ar- 
mies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden op- 
portunity. Lay this before the President and Secretary of War. May 
I resume (assume ?) the command ? Answer quick." 

Compare these remarks about " hesitation and delay " with Halleck's 
dispatch to Grant, of two days before, "limiting operations." p 53 



54 MTLITAEY HISTOEY OF 

the smallness of the force that did it. Ko cono-ratu- 
lations are due me. I simply obeyed orders." * 

Neither did the government agree with Halleck, 
that Smith should receive the honors of this victory. 
The Secretary of War at once recommended Grant 
for a major-generalcy of volunteers, and the President 
nominated him the same day. The Senate was in 
session, and confirmed the nomination instantly, and 
" the whole country applauded." f This was on the 
19th of February, the day that Halleck recommended 
C. F. Smith for the same grade. Mr. Stanton, who 
had recently assumed the portfolio of the Secretary 
of War, wrote a letter for print which was published 
on the 20th of February, and in which the following 
passage occurs : " We may well rejoice at the recent 
victories, for they teach us that battles are to be 
won now, and by us, in the same and only manner 
that they were ever won by any people, or in any 
age, since the days of Joshua — by boldly pursuing 
and striking the foe. What, under the blessing of 
Providence, I conceive to be the true organization 
of victory and military combination to end this wai", 
was declared in a few words, by General Grant's mes- 
sage to General Buckner: 'I propose to move im- 
mediately on your works.' " This was the beginning 
of a support bestowed by the Secretary of War on the 
Western general, which was never intermitted, while 
the need of that support remained. 

The consequences of the capture of Foi-t Donelsou 

* See speech of Brevet Major-General Ra^vlins, chief of staff to 
General Grant, before the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, No- 
vember loth, 18G6. This speech Las afforded me much assistance. 
Its record of dates is especially invaluable. 

t Grant immediately recommended Smith for a major-generalcy, 
for his behavior during the campaign. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 55 

were greatly superior to any good fortune whicli Lad 
at that time befallen tlie national arms, and were 
Lardly surpassed, in a purely military point of view, 
by tlie result of any operations of the war. The 
great rebel line being penetrated at the centre, its ex- 
tremities were both turned, while the reo-ion behind 
was uncovered. The whole of Kentucky and Ten- 
nessee at once fell into the possession of the national 
forces; the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers were 
opened to national vessels for hundreds of miles; 
Nashville, the capital of Tennessee, and a place of 
immense strategic importance, fell; Bowling Green 
had become untenable as soon as Donelson was at- 
tacked, and was abandoned on the lith, the day be- 
fore the rebel works on the Cumberland were carried ; 
while Columbus, at the other end of the line, was 
evacuated early in March, thus leaving the Missis- 
sippi free from the rebel flag, from St. Louis to Ar- 
kansas. 

The country was unacquainted at this time with 
the principles of military science ; and as city after 
city fell, and stronghold after stronghold was aban- 
doned, all legitimate consequences of the capture of 
Fort Donelson, the national amazement and gratifica- 
tion knew no bounds. The effect on the spirits of the 
soldiers and of the people, was indeed quite equal to 
the purely military results. This was the first success 
of any importance since the beginning of the war. 
An inferior force had marched boldly up to a strongly 
fortified post, and for three days besieged an army 
larger than itself; then, after being reenforced, it had 
not only defeated the enemy in the open field, con- 
verting what had nearly been disaster into brilliant 
victory, but compelled the unconditional surrender 



56 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

of one of the largest garrisons ever captured in war. 
These were considerations which naturally enouo-h 
elated and cheered the country, and absolutely in- 
spired the army, depressed before by long delays and 
defeats on many fields. The gratitude felt towards 
Grant was commensurate with the success. He 
stepped at once into a national fame. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 5V 



CHAPTEK III. 

Grant and Sherman — Beginning of their fiicndship — Grant goes to Nashville — • 
Is relieved from command by Halleck — Smith placed in charge of expedi- 
tion up the Tennessee — Grant supplies Smith from Fort Henry — Grant rein- 
stated in command — Removes his headquarters to Savanna — Buell ordered 
to reenforce him — Buell's delay — Skirmishing at Pittsburg Landing — The 
Battle of Shiloh — Furious attack of the rebels — The national forces pre- 
pared — Grant arrives on the field — Sherman's line breaks — Sherman's skill 
and personal gallantry — Terrible fighting all over the field — The national 
troops everywhere forced back — Grant's anxiety for Nelson and Lewis Wal- 
lace's support — Those commanders repeatedly ordered up, but do not arrive — 
Capture of Prentiss— Buell's arrival in person — His conversation with Grant 
— The last attack of the rebels repulsed — Grant at Sherman's front— The sit- 
uation at close of Sunday — Arrival of Buell's army in the night — Also of 
Lewis Wallace— Attack by Grant on Monday — The rebels everywhere re- 
pulsed — Grant leads a regiment — Rebels ask permission to bury their dead — 
Results of the battle of Shiloh— Reflections. 

OiT the 15tli of February, Grant was assigned to 
the new military district of West Tennessee, with 
" limits not defined." '* and Brisradier-General William 
T. Sherman to the command of the District of Cairo. 
Sherman had been at West Point with Grant, but 
graduated three years earlier, and they had not since 

* HEADQTTAKTERa, DlSTRTCT OF WeST Te.VSESSEE, 1 

FoKT D0XEL8OS, February 1", 1602. f 

General Orders, No. 1. 

By virtue of directions from headquarters, Department of the Mis- 
souri, dated February 15, 18G2, the undersigned has been assigned to 
the command of the new mihtary district of West Tennessee. Limits 
not defined. 

(Signed) U. S. Gra>-t, Major- General Commanding. 



58 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

been intimate ; tlieir first official intercourse occurred 
during the siege of Fort Donelson, when Sherman 
forwarded troops and supplies to Grant with extraor- 
dinary dispatch. Sherman was the senior, but, on the 
13th of February, he wrote : " I will do every thing 
in my power to hurry forward your reenforcements 
and supplies ; and if I could be of service myself, 
would gladly come, without making any question of 
rank with you or General Smith." After the fall of 
Fort Donelson, Sherman congratulated Grant warmly 
on his success, and Grant replied : " I feel under many 
obligations to you for the kind terms of your letter, 
and hope that should an opportunity occur, you will 
earn for yourself that promotion which you are kind 
enough to say belongs to me. I care nothing for pro- 
motion so long as our arms are successful, and no po- 
litical appointments are made." 

This was the beginning of a friendship destined 
thereafter never to flag, to stand the test of apparent 
rivalry and public censure, to remain firm under 
trials such as few friendship's were ever subjected to, 
to become warmer as often as it was souo;ht to be in- 
terrupted, and in hours of extraordinary anxiety and 
responsibility and care, to afford a solace and a sup- 
port that were never lacking when the need arose. 

On the 21st of February, General C. F. Smith, by 
Grant's direction, took possession of Clarksville, about 
fifty miles above Fort Donelson, and Grant wrote to 
Cullum announcing the fact, and proposing the cap- 
ture of Nashville, but said, " I am ready for any move 
the general commanding may suggest." On the Slth, 
he reported that Smith was at Clarksville, with four 
small regiments, and added: "I do not purpose send- 
ing more, until I know the pleasure of General Halleck 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 50 

on tlie subject." On tlie 25tli, lie said : " I wrote you 
that General Nelson's division (of Buell's army), liad 
been sent to Nashville ; since then, I have learned that 
the head of General Buell's column had arrived, on 
Monday evening. The rebels have fallen back to 
Chattanooo-a, instead of to Murfreesboro, as stated in a 
former letter. I shall go to Nashville immediately 
after the arrival of the next mail, should there be no 
orders to j^revent it. I am getting anxious to know 
what the next move is going to be." He went to Nash- 
ville, accordingly, on the 27th. His object was to con- 
sult with Buell about the disposition of their troops, 
the jurisdiction of the two commands having become 
somewhat confused during the recent movements. 
On the 28th, he wrote: "I have just returned from 
Nashville this morning. My impression is, from all I 
can learn, the enemy have fallen back to Decatur or 
Chattanooga. I have informed General Cullum that 
General Buell ordered General Smith from Clarks- 
ville, to join him at Nashville." On the 1st of March: 
" I have informed the general commanding the de- 
partment, generally through his chief of staff, every 
day since leaving Cairo, of my wants, what infonna- 
tion was obtained of the enemy," etc. The same dis- 
patch contained a detailed declaration of the needs of 
the command, for the information of General Halleck. 
Up to this time, no hint of dissatisfaction had been 
received by Grant. 

The same day Halleck, with his usual caution, 
wrote : " It will be better to retreat than to risk a 
general battle. Avoid any general engagement with 
strone forces." He then crave detailed instructions 
to move the whole command from the Cumberland 
back to the Tennessee, wdth a view to an expedition 



60 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 

up the latter river to Eastport, and even to Corinth, 
Mississippi.* Grant received these instructions on 
the 2d, and on the 4th, the army was in motion for 
the Tennessee, and he himself was as^ain at Fort 
Henry. On the 3d of March, without a syllable of 
previous explanation or intimation to Grant, Halleck 
sent the following dispatch to the general-in-chief, at 
Washington. "I have had no communication with 
General Grant for more than a week. He left his 
command without my authority, and went to Nash- 
ville. His army seems to be as much demoralized by 
the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Po- 
tomac by the defeat of Bull Eun. It is hard to cen- 
sure a successful general immediately after a victoiy, 
but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no re- 
turns, no reports, no infoimation of any kind from 
him. Satisfied with his victoiy, he sits down and 
enjoys it, without any regard to the future. I am 
worn out and tired by this neglect and inefficiency. 
C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the 
emergency." The next day, having probably received 
authority from Washington, he telegraphed to Grant : 
" You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in com- 
mand of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort 
Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report 
strength and position of your command ? " 

Grant replied on the 5th: "Your dispatch of 
yesterday is just received. Troops will be sent under 
command of Major-Genei-al Smith, as directed. T 
had prepared a different plan, intending General 
Smith to command the forces which should oo to 
Pai'is and Humboldt, while I would command the 

* Sec Appendix for Halleck's instructions in full for this expe- 
dition. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 61 

expedition upon Eastpoi-t, CorintL, and Jackson, in 
person. . . I am not aware of ever having disobeyed 
any order from yonr headquarters — certainly never 
intended sucli a tiling. I liave reported almost daily 
the condition of my command, and reported every 
position occupied. . . In conclusion, I will say that 
you may rely on my carrying out your instructions in 
every particular to the best of my ability." 

On the 6th, Ilalleck telegraphed to Grant: 
*' General IMcClellan directs that you report to me 
daily the number and position of the forces under 
your command. Your neglect of repeated orders to 
report the strength of your command, has created 
great dissatisfaction, and seriously interfered with 
military plans. Your going to Nashville without 
authority, and when your presence with your troops 
was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very 
serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I 
was advised to arrest you on your return." 

On the 6th, Grant again telegraphed : " Your dis- 
patch of yesterday just received. I did all I could to 
get you returns of the strength of my command. 
Every move I made was reported daily to your chief 
of staff, who must have failed to keep you properly 
posted. I have done my very best to obey orders, 
and to cany out the interests of the service. If my 
course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. I do 
not wish in any way to impede the success of our 
arms. I have averaged writing more than once a day 
since leaving Cairo, to keep you informed of my posi- 
tion, and it is no fault of mine if you have not re- 
ceived my letters. My going to Nashville was strictly 
intended for the good of the service, and not to 
gratify any desire of my own. 



62 JIILITARY HISTORY OF 

" Believing sincerely that I must have enemies be- 
tween you and myself, wlio are trying to impair my 
usefulness, I respectfully ask to be relieved from 
further duty in the department." 

After another rebuke from Ilalleck, of exactly the 
same tenor, Grant replied, on the 9th : " You had a 
better chance of knowing my strength, whilst my 
command was suri'ounding Fort Donelson, than I bad. 
Troops were reporting daily by your order, and Avere 
immediately assigned to brigades. There were no 
orders received from you till tbe 28tli of February, to 
make out returns ; and I made eveiy effort to get 
them in as early as possible. I renew my application 
to be relieved from duty." On the 11th, Grant wrote 
again to Halleck : " There is suck a disposition to find 
fault with me, that I again ask to be relieved from 
further duty, until I can be placed right in the esti- 
mation of tkose hio-lier in authoritv." Other censures 
were administered for alleged marauding allowed by 
Grant, in answer to which he said : " I refer you to 
my orders to suppress marauding, as the only reply 
necessary." He had arrested officers for violation of 
these orders, and sent them to St. Louis to report to 
Halleck, more than a week previous. 

On tbe 18th, Halleck replied : "You cannot be re- 
lieved from your command. There is no good reason 
for it. I am certain tkat all which the authorities at 
Washington ask, is that you enforce discipline, and 

punisb the disorderly Instead of relieving 

you, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the 
field, to assume the immediate command, and lead it 
on to new victories." Grant replied on the next day : 
" After your letter, enclosing copy of an anonymous 
letter, upon which severe censure was based, I felt as 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 63 

tliougli it would be impossible for me to serve longer 
without a coni-t of inqiiir3\ Your telegram, of yes- 
terday, liowever, places such a different phase upon 
my j^osition, that I will again assume command, and 
give every effort to the success of our cause. Under 
the worst circumstances, I would do the same." 

A few days later, Halleck transmitted to Grant 
copies of the following correspondence : 

HEADQUAnTERS OF THE ArXTT, AdJUTANT-GeNEHAl's OfFICE, ) 

Washington, March 10, 1862. ) 

Major-General H. W. IIalleck, U. S. A., 

Commanding Department of the Mississippi, St. Louis : 

"It has been reported, that soon after the battle 
of Fort Donelson, Brigadier-General Grant left his 
command without leave. By direction of the Presi- 
dent, the Secretaiy of War directs you to ascertain, 
and report, whether General Grant left his command 
at any time without proper authority, and if so, for 
how long ; whether he has made to you proper re- 
ports and returns of liis forces ; whether he has com- 
mitted any acts which were unauthorized, or not in 
accordance with military subordination or propriety, 
and if so, what. 

L. Thomas, Acljutant-Geneml. 

Headquarters, Department of the Mississippi, ) 
St. Louis, March 15, 1862. j' 

Brigadier-General L. Thomas, 

Adjutant-Gencralof the Army, Washing'.on : 

In accordance with your instructions of the 10th 
instant, I report that General Grant and several 
officers of high rank in his command, immediately 
after the battle of Fort Donelson, went to i^ashville, 
without my authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, 
however, from investigation, that General Grant did 



64 ]iIILITAEy HISTOEY OF 

this from good intentions, and from a desii'e to sub- 
serve the public interests. Kot being advised of 
General Buell's movements, and learninsr that 
General Buell had ordered Smith's di\asion of his 
(Grant's) command to N'ashville, he deemed it his 
duty to go there in person. During the absence of 
General Grant, and a part of his general officers, nu- 
merous irregularities are said to have occurred at 
Fort Donelson. These were in vioLation of the orders 
issued by General Grant before leaving, and probably 
under the circumstances, were unavoidable. General 
Grant has made the proper explanations, and has 
been directed to resume his command in the field ; as 
he acted from a praiseworthy although mistaken zeal 
for the public service in going to Nashville, and leav- 
ing his command, I respectfully recommend that no 
further notice be taken of it. There never has been 
any want of military subordination on the part of 
General Grant, and his failure to make retui-ns of his 
forces has been explained as resulting partly from 
the failure of colonels of regiments to rej^ort to him 
on their arrival, and partly from an interruption of 
telegi-aphic communication. All these irregularities 
have now been remedied. 

H. W. Halleck, Major- General. 

General Halleck, however, neglected to furnish 
General Grant with a copy of the telegram of March 
3d to Washington, and Grant replied to Halleck, on 
the 24th of March : " I most fully appreciate your 
justness. General, in the part you have taken, and 
you may rely upon me to the utmost of my capacity 
for carrying out all your orders." In the same letter 
he remarked : "I do not feel that I have neo-lected a 



ULYSSES S. GRAIS^T. 65 

single duty ; " and on tlie 31st of tlie month, Ilalleck 
informed him : " General McClellan directed me to 
place General Smith in command of the expedition, 
until you were ordered to join it." * 

It will be remembered that the limits of Grant's 
command had never been defined, and it was thus for 
overstepping the unknown boundaries of his district, 
while in the legitimate discharge of his duties, that 
on Ilalleck's report, the general-in-chief advised that 
officer to place Grant in an-est. Smith took com- 
mand of the expedition, and while the captor of Don- 
elson remained in disgrace at Fort Henry, the troops 
were pushed forward as far as Eastport on the Ten- 
nessee. Grant, however, made every effort to secure 
the success of the expedition, and on turning over the 
command to Smith, congratulated him on his " richly 
deserved promotion : " " Ko one " he said, " can feel 
more pleasure than myself." On the 9th of March, 
he wrote : " Any thing you may require, send back 
transports for, and if within my power you shall have 
it." On the 11th, referring to reenforcements that 
were daily expected : *' General Halleck telegraphs 
me . . . when they arrive, I may take the general 
direction. I think it exceedingly doubtful whether 
I shall accept; certainly not until the object of the 
expedition is accomplished." Smith replied : " I wrote 
you yesterday, to say how glad I was to find, from 
your letter of the 11th, that you were to resume 
your old conmiand, from which you were so uncer- 

* General Halleck's telegram of the 3d of ^larch was not left on file 
in the War Department, but was obtamecl by me after long research and 
repeated efforts. I have not, however, been able to find General McClel- 
lun's reply. The Honorable Edwin 'M. Stanton assured me that he never 
heard that General Ilalleck had been authorized to place Grant in arrest 



Q6 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

emoniously, and, as I tliink, so unjustly strickeu 
down." * 

Halleck, meanwhile, continued his cautions to 
Grant. On the 13th, he telegraphed : '' Don't bring on 
any general engagement at Paris. If the enemy appear 
in force, our troops must fall back." And on the 16th : 
" As the enemy is evidently in strong force, my instruc- 
tions not to advance, so as to brino; on a o-eneral en- 
gagement, must be strictly obeyed. General Smith 
must hold his position without exposing himself by 
detachments, till we can strongly reenforce him." The 
operations, however, were without result, and Smith 
returned to Pittsburg Landing, on the western bank 
of the Tennessee. It had been expected, that after 
cutting the railroad near Eastport or Corinth, he 
would establish himself at Savanna, a point about 
nine miles lower down than Pittsburg: Landinsr, and 
on the opposite side of the river; he, however, se- 
lected the spot where the battle of Shiloh afterwards 
occuiTed. 

The object of the concentration of troo])s at these 
places, was to secure positions which would command 
the navigation of the Tennessee, and, at the same 
time, form bases for operations in northern Alabama 
and Mississippi; Corinth, especially, where the two 

* The relations between Grant and Smith were of a peculiar char- 
acter. When Smith was commandant at the !Aiilitary Academy, Grant 
was there as a cadet ; he often told me of the awe he felt for his old 
commander, and how difficult it was at first to give hun an order. 
Smith, however, perceived this, and with great delicacy said to his 
chief: " I am now a subordinate, and I know a soldier's duty. I hojie 
you will feel no awkwardness about our new relations." Grant never 
had a more subordinate officer, nor one more gallant, despite his age. 
But Smith was sixty years old, and the exposure he underwent at 
Fort Donelson produced an illness, which proved fatal before the next 
summer. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 67 

great railroads meet, that traverse the South, and con- 
nect the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi with the 
eastern paii; of the region then in rebellion, was a 
position of the first strategic importance, sure to be 
obstinately defended by the rebels, and the objective 
point of any operations of the national commanders. 
It was the key to the whole railroad system of com- 
munication between the great states of Tennessee 
and Mississippi, and, consequently, to the possession 
of Tennessee itself, covering Memphis and the Missis- 
sippi river from the national aimies. Pittsburg 
Landino- is nineteen miles from Corinth. 

The Tennessee, at this time, flooded all its shores, 
except the two or three bluffs where landings had 
been established (Savanna, Hamburg, Crump's, and 
Pittsburg), so that no foothold could be obtained at 
anv point on the river near Corinth, except at these 
localities. The obvious advantage which the west 
bank of the river presented was, that a rapid move- 
ment could at any time be made from this base, with- 
out the need of pontoons or transports for crossing 
the troops ; of course, the same situation was pro- 
portionately exposed to attack, but Smith was a good 
soldier, and his selection of the site of Pittsburg 
Landing, has been approved, under the light of all 
succeedinor circumstances, bv both Grant and Sher- 
man. 

On the 13th of March, Grant was relieved from 
his dissrrace: and on the l7th, he removed his head- 
quarters to Savanna, and wrote to Sherman from that 
place : " I have just arrived, and although sick for the 
last two weeks, begin to feel better at the thought of 
being again with the troops." The attention of the 
rebels in this part of the country had now become 



68 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

concentrated upon Grant's forces, wliicli threatened 
to obtain jDOSsession of the entire Southwest, unless 
speedily opposed. Troops in great numbers were 
accordingly hurried to Corinth, and the enemy was 
evidently preparing in his turn to assume the offen- 
sive. To counteract this. General Buell's command, 
was included in that of Halleck, and Buell himself, 
with five divisions, numbering nearly forty thousand 
men, was ordered from Nashville, to the support of 
Grant. And there was imminent need of such sup- 
port. 

The movements of Buell, however, were seldom 
expeditious. As early as the 16th of March, Hal- 
leck had informed Grant : " General Buell is march- 
ing in this direction ; " and on the 20th, " Buell is 
at Columbia, and will move on Waynesboro with 
three divisions." On the 19th, Grant wrote to Buell: 
"There is every reason to suppose that the rebels 
have a large force at Corinth, and many at other 
points on the road towards Decatur." On the 26th, 
he informed Halleck: "My scouts are just in with a 
letter from General Buell. The three divisions com- 
ing this way are yet on east side of Duck river, de- 
tained bridge-building." On the 2Tth: "I have no 
news yet of any portion of General Buell's command 
being this side of Columbia." On the 31st: "Two 
soldiers from the head of McCook's command (of 
Buell's army), came in this evening. Some of this 
command crossed Duck river on the 29th, and estab- 
lished guards eight miles out that night." On the 
same day (the aist), he sent word to McCook : " I 
have been looking for your column anxiously for 
several days." On the 3d of April, he was finally 
able to inform Halleck that " a dispatch from the 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 69 

telegraphic operator is just in. He states tliat Gen- 
era! Nelson " (commanding BiielVs foremost division), 
" is in sight. The advance will arrive prol^ably on 
Saturday^" (April 5th). The distance Buell had to 
march from Columljia, was ninety miles ; it took him 
from the 19th of March to the Gth of April, seventeen 
days ; he was delayed, bridge-building, and by bad 
roads, and he had no knowledge that Grant was in 
any extraordinary danger, or had any immediate in- 
tention of attacking the enemy. His usual delibera- 
tion was not more liable to criticism at this crisis, 
than upon all other occasions. 

When Grant reassumed immediate command, the 
rebels were in force at Corinth, their strensfth va- 
riously estimated, sometimes as high as a hundred 
thousand men ; this, however, was an exaggeration. 
Grant's army consisted of five divisions, under Major- 
Generals MeClernand and C. F. Smith, and Brigadier- 
Generals Le\Nds Wallace, Sherman, and Hurlbut. 
The last two w^xa, at Pittsburs; Landinir, and Le^^-is 
Wallace at Crump's Landing, on the left bank of the 
rivei-, about five miles below ; while MeClernand and 
Smith, with about half of the entire command, were 
in camp at Savanna, or on transports near that land- 
ing. The Tennessee river thus separated the two 
portions of the army. Within an hour after his 
arrival. Grant issued orders for the concentration of 
the whole force, sending Smith and McClemand's 
divisions as fast as boats could caiTy them, up to 
Pittsburg. Lewis Wallace was considered to be 
within sujDporting distance, at Crump's Landing, on 
the same side of the river as the bulk of the com- 
mand, and he was therefore left to guard the Purdy 
road. McClei'nand was detained a day or two, by 



70 MILITARY inSTOEY OF 

lack of transpoiiiatioii, and Grant himself remained at 
Savanna, to superintend tlie organization of troops 
constantly arriving from Missouri, and because from 
there he could communicate more readily with Buell, 
whose deliberate movements had not yet brought 
him within supporting distance of the Army of the 
Tennessee. But although his headquarters were thus 
retained at Savanna, Grant visited the forces at Pitts- 
burg Landing daily. 

Brigadier- General Prentiss was ordered to report 
to Grant at this time, and another division was or- 
ganized for him, out of the new troops constantly 
arriving. Six regiments were thus assigned, and sent 
at once to join the main army, at Pittsburg. But a 
question of rank was raised at the front, by McCler- 
nand, who claimed command in the absence of Grant. 
The latter was unwilling to trust McClernaud with 
this responsibility ; and as the relative -rank of the 
division generals was unsettled, he determined to 
move his own headquarters to Pittsburg, and obviate 
the difficulty by assuming command in person.* He 
had made his arrangements to this effect, when a mes- 
sage was brought him from Buell, dated the 4th of 
April, requesting Grant to remain at Savanna, on the 
5th, as he would arrive there on that day. " I shall 
be in Savanna myself to-morrow, with perhaps two 
divisions," said Buell ; " can I meet you there ? " 

* March 2T, 1SC2. 

" I visited tlie different divisions at Pittsburg to-day 

ISIews having arrived of the promotion of General McClernand to the 
rank of major-general, -witliout the date of promotion of either him or 
General Smith being known, makes it necessary for me to move my 
headquarters from this place to Pittsburg. I will not go up, however, 
until something further is heard from General Buell's command, and 
until full directions arc given for their transfer to this place." — Grant 
to JIalleck, 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. ( 1 

Grant replied on tlie 5tli: "Your dispatch just re- 
ceived. I will be here to meet you to-morrow. The 
enemy, at and near Corinth, are probaldy from sixty 
to eighty thousand." Buell, however, did not arrive 
till the 6th, or if otherwise, did not make it known 
to his superior, and Grant remained to meet him.* 

Halleck's instructions to Grant had continued 
very positive, not to bring on a general engagement 
until Buell should arrive; and several expeditions, 
some suggested by Halleck, and others by Grant, 
wtjre countermanded or forbidden by the former, lest 
a battle should be provoked. In accordance with 
tliese directions, Grant remained strictly on the de- 
f(3nsive, although he did not concui' with the views 
of his superior. On the 23d of March, he wrote to 
Smith : " Cany out your idea of occupying, and par- 
ticularly, fortifying. Pea Eidge. I do not hear one 
word from St. Louis. I am clearly of the opinion 
that the enemy are gathering strength at Corinth, 
quite as rapidly as we are here, and, the sooner we 
attack, the easier Avill be the task of taking the 
place. If Kuggles is in command, it would assuredly 
be a good time to attack." 

There was skirmishing daily after the 2d of April, 
and on the 4th, the enemy felt Sherman's front in 
force, but nothing serious came of it, and the opinion 
of that commander was decided that no probability 
of an immediate enojafj-ement existed. Grant rode 
out on the day after, to Sherman's lines, and con- 
curred with him in this judgment. They were both 
mistaken, fur the *skirmish was the reconnoissance 

* General Buell's official report states that he amved at Savanna 
on the 5th, but Grant was not notified of this, and consequently had 
no suspicion of the fact. 



72 3IILITAB,Y HISTORY OF 

of the enemy, preliminary to the battle of Shiloli. 
This affair, however, awoke attention, and put both 
officers and men on the alert.* As Grant was riding 
back from tLe front to Pittsburg Landing, after dark 
on the 4th, the night l)eing rainy, his horse slipped 
in crossing a log, and fell on his rider, who received 
in consequence a severe contusion. Tliis lamed him 
for over a week, and also occasioned him acute pain 
for several days.f 

The same day, Lewis "Wallace reported eight regi- 
ments of rebel infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry 
at Purdy, and an equal if not larger force at Bethel, 
four miles further from the river. Grant, accordino-ly, 
notified W. H. L. Wallace (in command of Smith's 
division), to hold himself in readiness to move his 
entire command to the support of Lewis Wallace. 
"Should you find danger of this sort, reenforce him 
at once with your entire division." To Sherman he 
wrote: " Liformation, just received, would indicate 
that the enemy are sending a force to Purdy, and, it 
may be, with a view to attack General Wallace at 
Crump's Landing. I have directed W. H. L. Wal- 
lace, commanding Second division temj^orarily, to reen- 
force General L. Wallace, in case of an attack, with 
his entire division, although I look for nothing of the 
kind ; but it is best to be prepared. I should advise, 
therefore, that you advise your advance guards to 
keep a sharp lookout for any movement in that direc- 
tion, and, should such a thing be attempted, give all 
the support of your division, and General Hurlbut's, 

* Tliore were several prisoners taken, v,\w threatened that '' the 
Yankees would catch hell soon." 

t This circumstance probably originated the newspaper report that 
Grant was drunk and thrown from his horse at the battle of Shiloh. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 73 

if Tiecessaiy. I will return to Pittsburg Landing 
at an early Jiour to-moiTow, and ride out to your 
camp." 

On Saturday, April /jth, the enemy's cavalry was 
again verv bold, coniinG; well down to Sherman's 
front. This day, the head of Nelson's column ariived 
at Savanna, and Nelson himself reported to Grant, 
wlio in person directed him to march his command to 
a position south of Savanna, and about live miles 
from the point opposite Pittsburg Landing ; there, he 
was to hold himself in readiness to reenforce the 
army on the left bank, in case of need. The order 
was obeyed, and Grant having made all his prepara- 
tions for removing his headquarters to Pittsburg on 
the morrow, remained to meet Buell, as that officer 
had desired. 

The battle-field of Shiloh is a thickly- wooded and 
broken countiy, interspersed with patches of cultiva- 
tion, and reaching back from the bluffs at Pittsburg 
Landing, from two and a half to three miles. Snake 
creek on the north, and Lick creek on the south, run 
almost at right angles with the Tennessee, and empty 
into it aljout three miles a2:)art. These were the right 
and left defences of the national line, and between 
them the battle was fought. Owl creek, a small stream 
running north, and nearly parallel with the Tennes- 
see, empties into Snake creek, about three miles from 
the river, and covered part of the right front of the 
national army. All these streams were flooded. The 
line faced mainly to the south and southwest ; and 
the enemy, coming from Corinth, was thus compelled 
to attack almost whollv in front. Shenuan was 
posted on the right, in advance of the rest of the 
army, and near a log cha])el, kno\\Ti as Shiloh meet- 



76 mLITAET HISTOEY OF 

Grant stopped at Crump's Landing, to see Lems 
Wallace, and notified Mm in person of tlie undoubted 
fact, wliicli had not yet been officially reported, that 
a general engagement had begun, and that Wallace 
must hold himself in readiness to march to the sup- 
port of the main army at Pittsburg, or if the attack 
there should prove a feint, to defend himself against 
a probable movement upon him, from the direction 
of Purdy, his situation being isolated, and somewhat 
exposed. Wallace replied, that he would be in read- 
iness for any orders which he might receive. This 
interview took jjlace on the transport. Grant then 
hurried on to the landino; at Pittsburs:, arrivino; there 
at about eight o'clock. He rode at once to the front. 
The rebel onset had begun in force, and with tre- 
mendous vigor. Prentiss was first attacked, and then 
Sherman ; but Prentiss having been warned, had 
doubled his grand guards the night before, and 
pushed out his pickets a mile and a half; he formed 
his division in advance of its camps, and there it re- 
ceived the first assault.* Sherman, too, having been 
skirmishing since the 4th, w^as promptly under arms ; 
and the other division commanders, admonished by 
the movements of the last few days, had their horses 
saddled, and were break:^asting early to be ready in 
case of an attack.f They at once put their com- 

* See Prentiss's report and rebel reports. 

t " It was well known the enemy were approaching our lines, and 
there had been more or less skirmishing for three days preceding the 
battle. The consequence was our breakfasts were ordered at an early 
hour, and our horses saddled to be ready in case of an attack." — Ee- 
port of Major- General McPherson, dated Lal-e Providence, La., March 
26, 1803. 

McPherson at this time was on Grant's staff; he was at W. H. L. 
Wallace's headquarters on the night of the 5th, and on the morning of 
the 6th. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 77 

mands into line. Tlie entire national force on the 
ground at the time of the assault, was thirty-three 
thousand efteetive men. Lewis Wallace had about 
live thousand more, at Crump's landing, making 
Grant's whole force between fifty and sixty regiments. 
Grant estimated the enemy's strength at sixty- 
five thousand men, or one hundred and sixty- 
two regiments and ])attalions. Beauregard after- 
wards reported it at forty thousand, three hundred 
and fifty-five.* The troops, though so furiously at- 
tacked, as yet held their original ground. Word was 
instantly sent to Nelson and Le\v^is Wallace, of the 
state of aiiairs, and imperative orders given them to 
advance at once, and with all speed. To Nelson, the 
order was in writing : " You will hurry up youi' com- 
mand as fast as possible. The boats will be in readi- 
ness to transport all troops of your command across 
the river. All looks well, but it is necessary for you 
to push forward as fast as possible." A staff oflicer 
was dispatched to General Wallace, with verbal 
dii'ections for him to march by the nearest road 
parallel to the river. 

The engagement soon spread along the whole 
line, from Sherman's right to the brigade of Stuart 
on the extreme left. Prentiss's division being raw^ 
was driven at once from its first position, but took a 
new line inside its camps. Sherman's troops were 
also new, and soon gave way; but McClernand 
promptly moved up a poi'tion of his division to sup- 
port Sherman's wavering left. Ilurlbut, too, was 
marched forward to the support of Prentiss ; and W, 

* Grant's estimate Avas made up from the reports of spies, deserters, 
and prisoners, who, without exception, set the figures as high as sixty 
cr seventy thousand. 



78 



MILITARY HISTORY OF 



H. I^. Wallace was taken out of position in the rear 
of Sherman, and moved to the support of the centre 
and left of the line, where the assault was most de- 
termined. Lewis Wallace was directed to come up 
and connect with Sherman's right, hut never came ; 
and ai'ter several hours of as desperate fighting as was 
ever seen on the American continent, the national 
troops were slowly pushed back from point to point, 
the distance of one entire mile. Early in the battle, 
part of Sherman's left brigade broke entirely, and fled 
to the rear, in great confusion ; but the rest of his 
command stood firm ; and he swung what was now 
his left, around to the rear, movino: on his ri^ht as a 
pivot, so that his new line stood almost at right 
angles with its original direction ; and; as the remain- 
der of the whole line was forced back, Sherman con- 
nected with McClernand on the left, leaving his own 
right far advanced, beyond any other portion of the 
national front. The enemy was never able to get 
around this flank, but it was eventually withdrawn ; 
still maintaining, however, its relative position to 
other parts of the command, and always covering the 
important crossing of Snake creek bridge. 

The men who behaved badly were on Sherman's 
left and Prentiss's right ; most of them were entirely 
raw, and not a few came on the field without car- 
tridges. Prentiss's division had only been organized 
since the 26th of March, eleven days; and none of it 
had ever been in battle before. It was Shennan 
and Prentiss's divisions which were most advanced, 
and their breaking so easily, gave the enemy a con- 
fidence early in the day, which inspired him for after- 
efforts. Some of the regimental commanders were 
cowards; and one colonel marched his regiment de- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 79 

liberately off the field ; but, in otlier instances, gallant 
officers were unable to re-form their yielding battal- 
ions. These created a panic, which extended to as 
many as six thousand or eight thousand men, who 
fled, not retreated, to the landing, a distance of be- 
tween two and three miles. Sherman's efforts to 
restrain them were unceasing but unavailing ; he was 
repeatedly wounded, yet remained at the front. His 
exertions, however, were not confined to exhibitions 
of gallantry ; his eminent qualities as a general, were 
never more conspicuous than in this battle. He, in 
reality, commanded McClernand's division, as well as 
his own ; for McClernand, who possessed both energy 
and cournire, was a novice at soldierins:, and ^vith 
great good sense, sought and followed the advice of 
the man who was his junior in rank, but his superior in 
all military knowledge and experience ; and Sherman, 
without stopping for any considerations of jealousy or 
pique, advised McClernand constantly and efficiently. 
At ten A. M., when the battle was raging fiercest, 
Grant was at Sherman's front, and commended him 
for so stubbornly opposing the enemy. When Sher- 
man asked for cartridges. Grant replied that he had 
anticipated this want, and given orders accordingly. 
It was well that this precaution had been taken so 
soon ; for everywhere on the line, the cartridges gave 
out early in this furious fight, and amid the confusion 
and heat of battle, the division generals could organ- 
ize no means of supplying their commands ; but all 
day long, a train of wagons was passing from the 
landing to the front, carrying ammunition over the 
narrow and ci-o^vded road.* 

* Colonel Pride, of General Grant's staff, organized this important 
train, and forced a way for it along the single narrow road that leads 



80 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

At intervals all day, Grant was engaged in send- 
ing deserters back to their commands, and in forming 
new lines out of tliose wLo had straggled too far to 
rejoin their own regiments. This furnished a species 
of reenforcement badly enough needed at the front: 
the only use made of cavalry during the battle was 
in urging stragglers back into the fight. Grant was 
on every part of the field in person, constantly under 
fire, and making unwearied exertions to maintain his 
position, until Nelson and Lewis Wallace should get 
up, but the national forces were slowly losing ground 
each hour. In no place, had the line been pierced, 
but in no place, had its original position of the morn- 
ing been retained. The rebels were stunned and re- 
tarded, here and there, and the battle raged zigzag 
for a while, j^arts of the line being held with more 
tenacity than others, brigades here, giving way, and 
there, holding the enemy's advance. Still, if only 
Nelson and Lewis Wallace would come up, the day 
might even yet be saved. Messengers were again 
sent to these delinquent commanders, but although 
Nelson had been ordered to march at seven in the 
morning, he did not start till half-past one, p. m.,* 
while the sound of the enemy's cannon was constant 
in his ears ; a reason for this delay has never been 
assigned. Lewis Wallace, one of Grant's own divi- 
sion commanders, was equally remiss ; but he, who 
had been a month on the ground, excused himself by 
stating that he had taken the wrong: road, marchins: 
towards Purdy instead of to Pittsburg ; yet, his troops 
had helped build the bridge over Snake creek, for 

to tlie landing, swarming, as it was, with fugitives and wounded men, 
and choked up with artillery and the mass of material that accumu- 
lates in the rear of every battle-field. 
* See Nelson and Buell's reports. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 81 

just siicli emergencies as had now occurred. He 
was, however, set right by Captain (afterwards Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel) Eowley and Colonel (afterwards Ma- 
jor-Geueral) McPhersou, both at the time on General 
Grant's staff; they put him in the right direction at 
one o'clock, and it took him till seven that night, to 
march five miles in the direction of battle, though 
tlie cannonading was heard at Kashville, a hundred 
miles away."* 

During the morning. Grant sent the following 
order to General Wood, another of Buell's division 
commanders, who, he learned, had arrived at Sa- 
vanna : " You will move your command with the ut- 
most dispatch to the river at this point, where steam- 
boats will be in readiness to transport you to Pitts- 
burg;" and still later, another dispatch was sent: 
" Commanding officer, advance forces, Buell's army, 
near Pittsburg : The attack on my forces has been 
veiy spirited from early this morning. The appear- 
ance of fresh troops in the field now, would have a 
powerful effect, both by inspiring our men and dis- 
heartening the enemy. If you will get upon the 
field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of 
the river, it will be more to our advantage, and possi- 
bly save the day to us. The rebel forces are estimated 
at over one hundred thousand men. ]\[y headquarters 
will be in the log building on the top of the hill, 

* In a letter on this subject to the War Department, dated April 
13, 18G3, General Grant says : " Had General Wallace been relieved 
from duty in the morning, and the same orders communicated to Brig- 
adier-General Morgan L. Smith, who would have been his successor, I 
do not doubt but the division would have been on the field of battle and 
in the engagement by one o'clock of that eventful 6th of April. There 
is no estimating the difference this might have made in our casualties." 
When Wallace was finally set right, he absolutely countermarched his 
entire column, instead of facing it about. 
6 



82 MILITAEr HISTORY OF 

where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide 
you to your place on the field." 

Midway in the afternoon, General Buell arrived 
in person. He had reached Savanna with another 
division, and finding Grant had left, and a \dolent 
battle was raging, came on at once to the front, in ad- 
vance of his troops. Buell was the junior of Grant, 
but had hitherto enjoyed a more iniportant com- 
mand ; his directions did not make him subordinate 
to Grant, except in the actual presence of the enemy. 
He probably felt somewhat chagrined at being 
obliged to receive orders from one whom he had 
previously regarded as an inferior ; his manner was 
cold and formal, but he spared no exertions to carry 
out Grant's directions, and displayed commendable 
alacrity and earaestness for success. All around the 
Landing, lay the cravens who had s^varmed in from 
the front, as many do in nearly every battle ; these, 
however, were not stragglers nor laggards, but the 
panic-stricken mob, who had fled from that danger 
which so many of their fellows seemed to court. As 
the two generals were conversing at the Landing, 
Grant explained the situation of affairs, then appar- 
ently at the worst ; and Buell inquired : " What 
preparations have you made for retreating, General ? " 
His remark may not have been concluded, for Grant 
interrupted him at once, exclaiming : " / liavenH de- 
spaired of xDliipiying them yetP Buell, perhaps, was 
no more despondent than Grant, but, at that moment, 
his own forces were a long way off, and his mind nat- 
urally turned to considerations of a defensive sort, 
while Grant's characteristic mode of defence was the 
offensive. Buell then busied himself with hurrying 
up his own army. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 83 

Ilurlbut's command, on tlie left, was repeated!)'' 
compelled to ftill back, but raked the rebels well, 
eacli time when they charged. On Ilurlbiit's right, 
W. H. L. Wallace made a gallant stand, repelling 
four separate assaults, but was finally forced to give 
ground. These two divisions, for a while, stood be- 
tween the whole army and destruction. All portions 
of the line were not constantly engaged, but there 
was no time, from seven in the morning until dark, 
without heavy firing in some quarters of the field. 
The fierceness of the fight knew little variety; no 
splendid tactical science was displayed, but a grim 
determination on each side to stand up to the last ; 
the rebels steadily driving in the national front, till, by 
four or five o'clock, the left was within half a mile of 
the Landing. But only in one instance, was the line 
really pierced during all the eventful day. Hurlbut 
and W. H. L. Wallace, being forced to give way, con- 
nected on their outer flanks with the other portions 
of the command; but Prentiss, whose division lay 
between theii's, was more stubborn, and, although the 
line had retreated on each side of him, refused to 
yield his ground. His obstinacy was not good gen- 
eralship, for he was thus left exposed, his two flanks 
in the air; and the enemy quickly seeing this, sur- 
rounded him ; he was taken prisoner himself, along 
with four regiments. The men had behaved excel- 
lently all day, and their misfortune reflects no dis- 
credit on their gallantry. This happened at about 
four o'clock in the afternoon. 

A little later, a desperate attack was made on the 
national left, now crowded back to cover the Landing; 
the enemy had earned point after point, and ridge 
after rido-e, had reached the river and crossed Lick 



84 MLLITAKY HISTORY OF 

creek, aud the ravine formed tlie last defence; but, 
driven to bay, tlie national troops here offered a su- 
perb resistance, and though the enemy ffung his lines 
again and again upon the barrier, again and again 
they broke, like the sea when it strikes the shore. 
Had the national soldiers given way now, all would 
have been lost ; but, with their backs to the river, 
and no cover but the gunboats, discouraged doubtless 
with the ill success of the day, but grim and resolute 
still, they made here an unconquerable stand. The 
rebels, flushed with their triumpli, and maddened at 
the sight of their expected j^rey, at times almost 
leaped the ravine, but their fury was all in vain ; the 
assault was finally repulsed, and the disappointed 
column withdrew, shattered and torn, from the fruit- 
less straggle, like a wounded tiger, whose last fierce 
onslaught has failed. 

A battery of artiller}-, well posted by Colonel 
Webster, of Grant's staff, did good service at this 
juncture, and the gunboats also were of importance, 
as they had been for some time 2:)revious, in checking 
the advance of the enemy on the extreme left. Both 
sides were no^v crippled and both fatigued, the ex- 
traordinary efforts of the day telling hard on either 
army. The rebel commander had fallen, and been 
succeeded by Beauregard; "VY. H. L. AVallace had 
been mortally wounded, on the national side ; Sher- 
man was slightly wounded ; Grant had been struck, 
but not hurt, and at least ten thousand men in each 
army were eitlier killed or wounded. It was nearly 
five o'clock, when the head of Nelson's column crossed 
the river; but, after once starting his troops, this com- 
mander was prompt in marching them, and the men 
themselves were eager to get into battle and assist 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 85 

tlieir hard-pushed comrades. Two of Nelson's regi- 
ments were put in position by Grant, on the extreme 
left ; and as a final spasmodic attack was made by the 
rebels, these regiments fired two or tliree volleys, and 
lost three men, but it was too late then to affect the 
fortunes of the day. The exhaustion consequent upon 
their earlier efforts told upon the rebels, as well as 
upon the national troops, and no heavy fighting 
occurred after the arrival of Buell's advance.* 

AVhen it was apparent that the battle was waning, 
Grant was at Sherman's front, and gave orders to re- 
new the attack on the morrow. He considered that 
the strength of the enemy ^vas nearly spent, and, 
witli his usual tactics, determined in consequence to 
be the first to assault. I have often heard him de- 
clare, that there comes a time, in every hard-fought 
battle, when both armies are nearly or quite ex- 
hausted, and it seems impossible for either to do 
more ; this he believed the turning-point ; whichever 
after first renews the fight, is sure to a /in. He could 
not urge his jaded troops that night into any further 
assault, but his resolution was unshaken, and al- 
though Buell's advance was not yet across the river, 
he gave positive orders to take the initiative in the 
morning. To Sherman, he told the story of the 
Donelson battle ; how, at a certain period, he saw that 
either side was ready to give way, if the other showed 
a bold front ; and he determined, in consequence, to 
do that very thing — to advance at once on the enemy ; 
when, as he had foreseen, the enemy surrendered. At 
four p. M., on the 6th of April, he thought the ap- 
pearances the same.f 

* See Appendix for extracts from reports of Buell'3 subordinatea, 
corroboratory of tliis statement. 

t See Appendix for letter of General Sherman. 



8G MILTTAEY HISTORY OF 

AMit'ii night closed in, Grant's line was in j3art 
perpendicular to the river ; Lis left protected by the 
ravine at the Landing, and Lis rigLt covering Snake 
creek bridge, ])y wLich it was still Loped that Lewis 
Wallace might arrive. All tLe camps originally oc- 
cupied by the national troops were in tLe Lands of 
the enemy, but tLe rebel advance Lad been cLecked 
at every point. TLe division organization was, Low- 
ever, greatly broken up. SLennan Lad lost tLou- 
sands by deseiiion and straggling ; Prentiss Lad been 
(•aj)tured, witli twenty -two Lundred men; wliile W. 
II. L. Wallace's command was nearly destroyed, by 
casualties and tLe loss of its cLief. TLe line, as con- 
stituted on Sunday nigLt, was simply a mass of brave 
men, determined to Lold tLeir own against tLe ene- 
my ; those who fought, fougLt wherever tLey found 
a commander. TLe rebel line was equally confused,* 
the battle Laving become one wLere brilliant manceu- 
vres were impossible. It was tlie personal qualities 
of oflicers and men on botL sides tLat told, for sol- 
dierly traits are of more impoiiance tlian tactical skill, 
even in commanding officers, wLen ten tLousand men 
on a side are strajT^iJclinir. 

In the niglit, the whole of Nelson's column, and 
nearly all of McCook and Crittenden's divisions, of 
Ikn-H's army, were ferried across the river, and put in 
j)()sition on the L'ft of the line, relieving tLe sLat- 
tered battalions tLat Lad bonie tLe brunt of Sun- 
day ; this was a reiiuforcement of at least twenty thou- 

• " Such was the nature of tlic fxround over which -we had fought, 
and the heavy resistance it had uut, that the commands of the whole 
aruiy were vcrj- much shattered. In a dark and stormy night com- 
manders found it impossible to find and assemble their troops ; each 
body or fragment bivouacking where night overtook them.''— Bragg'a 
JirjHfrt. 



ULYSSES S. GRAin'. 87 

sand troops ; they were commanded next day by 
Buell, wlio received ]iis orders from General Grant. 
All night long, the gunboats dropped shells inside 
the rebel lines, and the woods caught fire ; no attempt 
could be made to care for the wounded, who lay on 
the blazing battle-field, a mile away, and in possession 
of the enemy ; only a merciful storm of rain allayed 
the anguish of those whom no human help could 
reach, and relieved them from the danger of being 
burned alive. The troops slept on their arms, be- 
neath the tempest, but the labor of re-fonuing some 
commands, and ])Osting those newly arrived, contin- 
ued all night. Grant visited each division com- 
mander, including Nelson, after dark, directing the 
new position of each, and repeating in person his or- 
ders for an advance at early dawn. lie told each to 
" attack with a heavy skii'mish line, as soon as it was 
light enough to see, and then to follow up with his 
entire command, leaving no reserves." Before mid- 
night, he returned to the Landing, and lay on the 
ground, with his head against the stump of a tree, 
where he got thoroughly drenched by the storm, but 
slept soundly, confident of victory on the morrow. 

The violent rain rendered the s-round extremelv 
unfavorable for the movements of Monday, but early 
on the mornino; of the 7th, the attack was made bv 
Grant, along his entire front, now newly composed. 
W. H. L. Wallace and Prentiss's divisions, having 
been so much broken up by the events of Sunday, 
what was left of them was divided amons; the other 
commanders of the Army of the Tennessee. Lewis 
Wallace, too, was put in line on the second day, on 
the extreme right, where he should have been, eigh- 
teen hours before. Sherman, MeClernand, and Hurl 



88 JflLITAEY HISTOPwY OF 

but were posted next, from right to left ; and ^McCook, 
Crittenden, and Nelson's diN^isions of Buell's army, in 
the same order, had the left of tlie new national line. 
The l)attle began on Grant's left and centre, Nel- 
son first striking the enemy, and the great accession to 
tlie national strength told at once. The rebels had 
not known of Buell's arrival,* but nevertheless had 
not ventui'ed to attack ; Beauregard could bring only- 
twenty thousand men into action on Monday,f and 
these Ijecame disheartened at the discovery of the 
national reenforcements ; they were fatigued, too, 
with tlie tremendous exertions of the day before. 
Still they fought well ; the odds ^vere turned, but 
they displayed nearly the same desperate obstinacy 
which had been so marked a trait of many of the 
national troops of yesterday. Ground was lost and 
won several times, and the rebel and national dead 
lay side by side; but the enemy was pushed steadily 
back, till eveiy inch that had been lost on Sunday 

♦ " I accordingly established ray headquarters at the church of 
Sliiloli, in the enemy's encanipmeuts, with Major-Genoral Bragg . 
hopiii'j, from news received by a special dispatch, that delays had been 
encountered hj General Buell in his march from Columbia, and that his 
main force, therefore, could not reach the field of battle, in time to save 
Qenenil Grant's scattered fugitive forces from capture or destruction 
on the following day. . . About six o'clock on the morning of the 
7th of April, however, a hot fire of musketry and artillery opened 
from the eni-my's quarters on our advanced line, assured us of the junc- 
tion of his forces.'''' — Beauregard' a lieport. 

t " Our troops, exhausted by days of incessant fatigue, and want 
of rest, and ranks thinned by Mhd, wounded, and stragglers, amounting 
in the tehoU to nearly half our force, fought bravely, but with the want 
of that animation and spirit which characterized them the precedino- 
tliiy." — Itragg'a lieport. 

Every statement made in this chapter in regard to the force of the 
relwls, or such of their dispositions as were not from their vers' nature 
apparent to the national commanders, is taken from the reports of either 
IJeauregju-d or Bragg. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 89 

was rcgamed. Lewis Wallace's men fought well, 
on the extreme right, relieving themselves from any 
responsibility for the laggard movements of the pre- 
ceding da}'. Sherman renewed the fight for Shiloli 
church, where Beauregard had slept on Sunday night, 
and the camps and trophies won from the national 
troops, were all reclaimed. Buell was constantly and 
conspicuously engaged, and handled his troops with 
<rreat abilitv, as he always did in the presence of the 
enemy ; his forces behaved in every way worthy of 
theii* great reputation as disciplined soldiers. There 
was but little straggling anywhere on Monday. Still, 
with tlie exception of one or two severe struggles, 
the fighting of April 7tli was light, when compared 
with that of Sunday. 

As the day wore on, the national victory became 
more decisive ; the enemy was repulsed more vigor- 
ously, and his retreat became less orderly, altliougli 
it was not at any time converted into a rout. By 
two o'clock, however, the repulse was general, and 
before night, Beauregard had withdra^vn nearly five 
miles beyond the front which Grant had maintained 
previous to the battle of Sunday.* 

Near the close of the day, Grant met the First Ohio 
regiment marching towards the northern part of the 
field, and immediately in front of a position which it 
was important to take at that particular juncture; 
another regiment to tlie left was fiL:htinf>: hard, but 
about to yield — had, in fact, given way. Grant saw 

* " Brigadier-General Breckenridge "was left with his command as a 
rear guard, to hold the ground we had occupied the night preceding 
the first battle, just in front of the intersection of the Pittsburg and 
Hamburg roads, about four miles from the former place, while the rest 
of the aimj passed in the rear.'''' — BeauregarcVa Report. 



90 MILITAKY niSTOEY OF 

the emergency, and instantly lialted the passing force 
on the brow of a hill, the enemy lying in a wood at 
its Lase ; he changed the direction of the First Ohio, 
and himself ordered it to charge, in support of the 
yielding battalion. The men recognized their leader, 
and obeyed with enthusiasm, and Grant rode along 
witli them in the line of battle, as much exposed as 
any private in the ranks. The retreating troops on 
the left took courage at this sight; they stopped 
their baekward movement, closed up their wavering 
ranks with cheers, and the two regiments swept the 
enemy at once from the coveted spot, thus capturing 
one of the last important positions in the battle of 
Shiloh. 

Gi'ant rode along in the piece of woods, towards 
the left, where he met Generals McCook and Critten- 
<h 11. The day was far spent, the rebels effectually 
repulsed, and still retreating. Grant was anxious to 
])ress their broken legions further, and so told the 
two division commanders of BueU's araiy. But those 
officers at once protested. It must be their forces 
which should pursue, for the men who had been disor- 
ganized so greatly, as Sunday's iight would have dis- 
organized the finest soldiers, were in no condition 
to follow, even in the elation of victory. But McCook 
and Crittenden declared that their troops, also, were 
exliaustcd ; they had marched, if they had not fought, 
the «lay before, and the two generals assured their 
commander that the weariness of his reenforcements 
allowed no pursuit. A heavy rain Avas falling; it 
was diftieult to follow in the darkness and wet, and 
the army, fatigued with its exertions, went into camp. 
Two brigades of Wood's division, of the Army of the 
Oliio, AN lii.h had just arrived, and a portion of Sher- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. ' 91 

man's command, were sent out to ascertain the direc- 
tion of Beauregard's retreat, wliicli did not cease till 
the rebels got back to Corinth ; but the pursuit was 
short and desultory, and the weary hosts, that had 
been engaged in battle more than twenty hours, 
rested from their labors. The national army encamped 
on substantially the same ground it had occupied be- 
fore the fight. 

The rebels, in this encounter, had intended to 
overwhelm Grant before the arrival of Buell's re- 
enforcements, and their calculations were well made. 
Only the tremendous obstinacy and determination 
with which they were opposed on that first terrible 
day, frustrated their hopes. As it was, they gained 
nothing but defeat for their enterprise. They wasted 
thousands of lives, and gave the prestige of victory 
to their opponents, retreating to Corinth along the 
same roads they had marched out on, not one week 
before, and leaving their dead to be bui'ied by their 
enemy. Beauregard made application to Grant, on 
the 8th, for permission to bury his own dead, but 
Grant had already performed that duty for his fallen 
foes.* 

Grant's loss, including that in Buell's aiTny, was 
twelve thousand two hundred and seventeen ; of these 
seventeen hundred were killed, seven thousand four* 
hundred and ninety-five wounded, and three thousand 
and twenty-two missing.f Two thousand one hun- 
dred and sixty-seven of the losses were in the Army 
of the Ohio. Beauregard reported a total loss of ten 

* See Appendix for correspondence between Grant and Beauregard. 

t In consequence of the loss or destruction of their rolls, no com- 
plete report could be prepared of the losses in McClemand and Pren- 
tiss's divisions. The above is as nearly exact as can now be furnished. 
The other statements are as officially reported to Grant at the time. 



92 MIUTAKY niSTOEY OF 

thousand six liimdred and ninety-nine:* seventeen 
hundred and twenty-eiglit killed, eight thousand and 
twelve Avounded, and nine hundred and fifty-seven 
miasing. 

Grant had not anticipated the attack of the rebels 
on Sunday; on the contrary, he had fully intended 
to move against them, as soon as Buell should appear; 
for although Halleck had cautioned him repeatedly 
against biinging on a genera] engagement until he 
was strong enough to beat the enemy, he had also 
told Grant to go on and "win new victories," when 
reenforcements should ariive. On this Grant meant 
to act, and so informed his subordinates. The delay 
of Buell, although not absolutf.dy inexcusable, was 
undoubtedly greater than any necessity existed for. 
A dozen commanders in the national army would have 
built bridges, and moved their force with double the 
rapidity and enei'gy that Buell displayed, especially 
with troojis who knew so well how to march, and 
were so eager to get into battle, as the Army of the 
Oliio. But Buell, in his whole career, never got rid 
(»f liis excessive deliberation. His ordinary charac- 
tcri.stic« are sufiicient exjdanation of his tardiness in 
this instance, without attributing it to any unwillino;- 
ness to serve imder one who had hitherto been his 
junior, 

Tlii-re can be no doubt, however, of the immense 
advantage that l^iieirs arrival, when it did occur, af- 
f-'r(lc<l to Grant; no doubt that Grant looked long 
and anxiously for Buell's advance, on that memorable 

• Grant's estimate of Beaurofrard's loss was much larger. The bu- 
rial parties ostiniated Beaiirefranrs dead at four thousand, which, ac- 
rordinjr to tlic usual calculation, would make his entire casualties, at 
least, twenty thousand; but this authority is not sufficiently reliable. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 93 

Gtli of April; nor is it now possible to say wLat 
result might have followed, had Biiell still longer 
delayed. But this much is certain : the rebels were 
repelled in their last attack, on Sunday, without any 
assistance from Buell that turned the scale. They did 
not attack, on Monday, although they were ignorant 
of Buell's arrival ; while Grant gave his orders to re- 
new the fight, before he was aware that the long- 
looked-for reenforcements Jiad come. 

A part of the Army of tlie Tennessee undoubtedly 
misbehaved at Shiloh ; this, however, occurred only 
in Sherman and Prentiss's divisions, where the 
troops were entii'ely raw. These commands were the 
most advanced, and received the first shock of the 
assault. It probably would have been better had the 
older troojDS been put in* the advance. Still, Sher- 
man's presence at the key-point of the fight, almost 
compensated for the conduct of his men. Ko other 
division commander in Grant's army was a profes- 
.sional soldier, and upon no other did Grant so rely as 
upon Sherman. The aiTQy took tone from them 
both, and the ignominy of a part only rendered more 
conspicuous the gallantry and determination of those 
who remained firm.* 

The battle, however, decided little, except the 
fighting qualities of both combatants. It was the 
fiercest fight of the war, west of the Alleghanies, and, 
in proportion to the numbers engaged, equalled any 
contest during the rebellion. I have heard Sherman 

* It is probable that the straggling on the rebel side Mas quite as 
great. Beauregard states in his report, that his strength was forty 
thousand on Sunday, and gives a loss of ten thousand on both days. 
But he declares that, on Monday, he could put only twenty thousand 
men into line. This leaves fifteen thousand, at least, for deserters and 
stragglers on that day, unless he lost many more than he reported. 



94 MILITARY IIISTOET OF 

say that lie never saw such terrible fighting after- 
Avarcls, and Grant compared Shiloh only with the 
Wilderness. The ground remained in the hands of 
Grant, and, with the reenforceraents that Buell 
l>rought, tlie national army was doubtless in vastly 
better condition than the rebels, after the battle. But 
Halleck arrived on the 9th, and at once took com- 
mand of all the national forces, and he restrained any 
advance except behind breastworks ; so that, what- 
ever immediate results might have been reaped from 
the repulse of Beauregard, were lost. The moral ef- 
fect of the fight was also impaired by this course. In 
the battle, each party was forced to respect the fight- 
\n<y qualities of the other; the Northerners recognized 
the impetuous vigor and splendid enthusiasm of the 
rebels, and the latter found all the tenacity and de- 
termination of the Kortli in those who opposed them. 
Tliis mutual respect remained, but the bad effect of 
Ilalleck's pf»licy was, that it caused in the army a de- 
pression which should have 1)een known only to the 
defeated, while it gave to the country an idea that 
tiie army had suffered an overthrow. But, whatever 
injury the s])irit of the troops sustained, was the re- 
sult of the distrust manifested by Halleck, and not 
of the victory of Shiloh. 

Until this battle. Grant had supposed, as nearly 
every one else did at the North, that one or two vic- 
tories f<>r the Union a\««u1(1 induce the South to re- 
tuin to its allegiance; but, when the rebels recovered 
so soon from the crushing defeat of Donelson to make 
the prodigious effort of Shiloh ; when even the loss of 
Nashville, and Bowling Green, and Columbus, and 
n«'arly all of Kentucky and Tennessee, appeared not 
to lessen their cnercrv or overcome their determina- 



ULYSSES S. GRATH'. 95 

tioD, be became certain tbat tbe contest was to be 
prolonged and intense, beyond any thing tbat bad yet 
been seen. Tliis belief developed bis peculiar views 
of tbe manner in wbicb tbe war sbould be earned on. 
He tbouofbt then, and remained firm in tbe conviction 
ever afterwards, tbat it was not extended territory, nor 
capital cities, nor fortified places, tbat sbould be tbe 
prime object of any commander's strategy ; for it bad 
been proven tbat all tbese could be dispensed witb 
by beroic and determined foes ; but tbat armies and 
men must become tbe points of attack; tbat tbese 
sbould be pursued wberever tbey moved, regardless, 
comparatively, of positions and forts ; tbat tbe armies 
must not only be defeated, but destroyed ; and tbat, 
tberefore, tbe policy of merely outwitting or out- 
manoeuvring tbe enemy, or forcing tbe evacuation of 
strongholds and tbe abandonment of territory, and 
allowing bim tbus to concentrate bis real force, was 
unwise ; tbat every eftbrt sbould be made to find and 
fio-bt tbe rebel armies as-ain and a^-ain, and tbat onlv 
wben those armies were either subdued or annihi- 
lated, would the rebellion end. Upon this idea be 
thereafter acted, so far as be had control. He did 
not underrate the value of places, but be was always 
willino; to sacrifice them for annies. He did not de- 
predate the value of life, but be thought that even 
life sbould be freely spent, if so tbe great object of 
tbe war could be attained. He believed, indeed, that 
life rapidly expended in a vigorous campaign, would 
prove an econoni}' of life in the end. 

This war, too, was fought witb a degree of deter- 
mination and unanimity on the part of the rebels, 
rarely shown in tbe history of the world. They 
themselves rendered necessary tbe terrible nature of 



96 MILITAET niSTOKT OF 

the bloAvs wliicli alone could overcome tliem. They 
ivtused to yield l^ecause tliey had lost tlieir fortresses, 
or because they liad abandoned their cities, or even 
because one army Avas surrendered and, here and there, 
other armies were repelled. There was no course 
left, if the rebellion was to be suppressed, but to an- 
nihilate its strength, and root out the resources that 
supplied tliat strength. 

From this time, therefore. Grant gave up the idea 
of saving the resources and sparing the property of 
the South ; the South had made the war avowedly 
one of tlie people, and the people being a party must 
suft'er, until the people as well as the soldiers were 
conquered, llencefurth, he gave his subordinates 
orders to live upon the resources of the country with- 
out stint, whenever their necessities compelled ; and 
he abandoned all desire to protect the institution of 
slavery, although he himself had been a slaveholder, 
and had no sympathy ^^^th the merely political idea 
of abolition. Whatever opposed the effort to main- 
tain the unity of the country, must be destroyed. 

Until tliese views were adopted and carried out 
firmly and persistently, in every part of the theatre 
of WAY, the country was not saved. AVhatever per- 
manent successes were anywhere achieved, were 
achieved by acting on these principles.* 

* It has lieen repcatcilly asserted that Grant was surprised at 
Shiloh, but the evidence to the contrary is incontrovertible. The 
l)rtliminnry fighting of the 3d and 4th of April, necessarily put di 
vision and anny commanders on the alert. The movemenrs re- 
j)orted by Lewis Wallace, on the 4th, had a similar ellVct. Sherman 
bad been skirmishing for several days; Prentiss had doubled his i)ick- 
et« the day before, and had a reconnoissance of a regiment out, at three 
o'clock on the morning of the Gth ; he received the earliest assault 
outside of his camj)s. W. II. I^. Wallace also breakfasted early and 
had his horses saddled, " to bo ready in case of an attack." These are 



tJLYSSES S. GKANT. 97 

not tlie indications of a camp that is surprised. Yet Prentiss, who 
fought till four o'clock in the afternoon, is said to have been captured 
at daylight and in his bed. Grant's dispatches of March 28th, 30th, 
and 31st, as well as those of the 4th and 5th of April, all furnish proof 
that he was intently watching the enemy. The fall that lamed him 
on the 4th, was got in rctuniing from the front, whither he had gone 
to investigate the rumor of an attack, after Sherman's fight. On the 5th, 
he sent three dispatches to Ilalleck, reporting the skirmish of the day 
before, and with one of them enclosed the following note to himself 
from Sherman : " April 5th. I have no doubt that nothing will occur 
to-day more than some picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the 
worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be 
drawn out far unless with certainty of advantage, and I do not appre- 
hend any thing like an attack upon our position." Grant remarked to 
Ilalleck on the same date : " Our outposts had been attacked by the 
enemy, apparently in considerable force. I immediately went up, but 
found all quiet. ... I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack 
(general one) being made upon us, lut will le prepared should such a 
thing take placed 

Private soldiers and inferior officers, very probably, could not read 
the signs that told so plainly to their commanders the necessity of 
readiness ; such may, veiy likely, have been suri)rised at what occurred ; 
but Grant and his division generals, although of course they could not 
know at what hour or place the rebels might choose to assault, nor 
indeed that they certainly would assault at all, although they did not 
really expect an attack, yet knew the propinquity of a great army, 
and, so far as could be, were prepared to receive it — except in the mat- 
ter of defensive intrenchments. Up to this time the Western troops 
had not availed themselves of the spade iu war ; but after Shiloh, both 
generals and men, severely taught, resorted to the old Roman tactics, 
and never failed to intrench themselves after every day's march. Some, 
indeed, already over-cautious, were schooled into absolute timidity; 
and in their anxiety to become secure against the enemy, forgot that 
the first object in war is not safety to one's self, but destruction to the 
foe. Those who wish to be entirely safe, should stay at home. 

In connection with this question of surprise, it is curious to note 
that Beauregard not only does not claim to have surprised Grant, but 
says in his oflicial report : " At five A. M., on the 6th inst., a reconnoi- 
tring party of the enemy having become engaged uith the advanced piclete, 
the commander of the forces " (A. S. Johnston) " gave orders to begin 
the movement." Bragg, also, thought the rebels were attacked on 
Sunday, for speaking of the first day's fight, he says : " The enemy did 
not give us time to discuss the question of attack, for soon, after dawn 
he commenced a rapid musketry fire on our pickets." 

Again : "The enemy was encountered ix force at the encampments 
1 



98 jnXITART HISTORY OF 

of Im advanced positions.'^ And still again : " In about one mile, we 
encountered him in strong force along almost the entire line. His latter- 
ies vere posted on eminences, with strong infantry supports." Now, Bragg 
was in front of Sherman and McClemand, and it is Sherman who is 
said to have been surprised. (See Appendix for Grant's correspond- 
ence with Halleck, on the 5th, entire.) 



[JLYSSES S. GRANT. 99 



CHAPTER IV. 

Incorrect reports of the battle of Shiloh— Halleck assumes command in the 
field — Disagreeable position of Grant — Siege of Corinth— Evacuation of Cor- 
inth by the rebels — Incfifectual operations of Halleck — Ilalleck made Gen- 
eral-in-Chief— He offers command of Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Allen 
— Allen declines it — Grant 'then placed again in command — Military situation 
in September, 18G2 — Grant's force depleted — Enemy threatening — Price 
seizes luka — Grant's preparations to fight — Orders to Rosecrans and Ord — 
Battle of luka — Rosecrans neglects Grant's orders — Rebels escape in conse- 
quence — Grant's headquarters at Jackson — Rebels threaten Corinth — Strat- 
egy of Grant — Battle of Corinth — Rebels drive Rosecrans into Corinth — 
Final victory of Rosecrans — Enemy struck in flank by Ord — Rosecrans does 
not follow up his success, although repeatedly ordered by Grant to pursue — 
He finally obeys — Pursuit ineffectual — Return of Rosecrans — Results of luka 
and Corinth — Rosecrans relieved and promoted — Relations of Grant with 
other officers — Reflections— Grant suggests movement against Vicksburg. 

The results of tlie battle of Shiloh were not all 
militar}^ Incorrect accounts were circulated through- 
out the North ; those who had seen only what oc- 
curred at the rear, misrepresented the actions at the 
front ; others, who were in a single part of the field, 
attempted to give accurate descriptions of the whole, 
which they had no oppoi-tunities of knowing. Gen- 
eral Buell and some of his officers, arriving late and 
seeing only the fugitives at the Landing, thought and 
said that the entire Army of the Tennessee was over- 
whelmed and disgraced ; and for a long while the 

LOFC. 



100 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

country was ignorant wlietLer or not a great disaster 
liad occurred. Rumor^ Avere industriously sj)read 
that Sherman had been surprised, tliat Prentiss was 
captured early in the morning, and in his shirt ; that 
Grant was drunk, and that Buell was purposely dila- 
tory. The country believed many of these rumors, 
and in the West especially, the outcry was fierce. 
The newspapers took up the theme; congressmen 
and politicians, some of them doubtless with pure 
intentions, and believing that they were seeking the 
best interests of the country, beset the President to 
relieve Grant entirely from command, and the fame 
that arose from Donelson was obscured by the un- 
merited odium of Shiloh. 

Even Grant's military superiors seemed affected 
by the clamor. General Halleck, removing bis head- 
quarters to the field, superseded Grant, who was left 
second in command, it is true, but was quite ig- 
nored in all the operations of the next two months. 
The army was reenforced and divided into three 
corps, the right, left, and centre, of which Thomas, 
Pope, and Buell were placed in immediate command, 
while McClernand had the reserve. Grant still os- 
tensibly commanded the District of West Tennessee, 
including his old army, which, however, was broken 
up into the right wing and reserve, and was therefore 
du-ectly under Th(^mas and McClernand. Although 
tlie corps commanders were his subordinates, orders 
were constantly sent direct to them without Grant's 
being made acquainted with their contents, and 
movements were even executed by his own troops 
without liis knowledge. In the army his situation 
w as universally regarded as one of disgrace.'^ This 

♦ I juinca tbe army before Corinth, in May, 18G3, as aide-de-camp 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 101 

was by very far tlie most disagreeable period in his 
entire career. 

The national aiiny moved slowly up towards 
Corinth from the battle-field of Shiloh, after Ilalleck 
arrived, making no advance except when protected by 
intrenchments. This ^vas greatly to the dissatisfac- 
tion of both officers and men, to whom such opera- 
tions were new, and seemed to savor of timidity. But 
Hallcck had derived a lesson from the assaults of 
Shiloh, and the outcry in consequence; he was de- 
termined not to be attacked unawares, and collected 
his forces from every quarter of his immense depart- 
ment, concentrating a hundred and twenty thousand 
bayonets ; " yet it took him six weeks to advance less 
than fifteen miles, the enemy in all that while making 
no offensive movement; on the contraiy, the rebels 
constructed defences still more elaborate than those 
behind which Halleck advanced. Beauregard's 
strength was estimated at seventy thousand ; he him- 
self reported it at forty-seven thousand, and the offi- 
cers and men of the national army w^ere anxious to 
avail themselves of their vast superiority in numbers. 
They believed, correctly, as was afterwards proved, 
that Beauregard was moving his troops from Corinth 
wdth a view to divide, and not to concentrate them. 
Grant shared this belief, and expressed it. Late in 
May, he was at Halleck's headquarters, when the 
probability of an evacuation of Corinth was discussed, 
and then made the only suggestion he ventured to 
offer during the siege. He recommended that an at- 
tack should be made on the extreme right of the 

to a division commfindcr, and at once noticed the general impressior 
among officers that Grant was under a cloud. 

* See field returns of Halleck's forces at Corinth. 



102 iinjTAEY HISTORY OF 

national line, west of \V. T. Sherman's division. 
The enemy's defences in front of this point, he 
deemed defective, and urged an assault with a view 
of turning the rebel line, and then moving to the 
left and sweeping the entire field. But Halleck 
scouted the idea, intimating that Grant's opinions 
need not be expressed until they were called for. In 
accordance with this intimation, Grant did not again 
obtrude them. 

On the 30th of May, Halleck announced to his 
command : " There is every indication that the enemy 
will attack our left this morning," * and the largest 
anuy ever assembled west of the Alleghanies, was ac- 
cordingly drawn out in line of battle, awaiting an as- 
sault. But the rebels had already sli|)ped out of 
Corinth, on the southern road, leaving wooden guns f 
and barren defences to impose as long as possible on 
theu" enemy. Early in the day, however, the naked- 
ness of the woi'ks and the silence of the batteries 
were discovered, and the national forces marched un- 
molested into the town. Beaureirard's movement had 
begun several days before ; his orders for the evacua- 
tion were dated the 20th of i\[ay, and his plans for 
the retre^it, picked up among the wrecks of his camps, 
disclosed the fact that he had been striving to elude 
Halleck since the 9th of the same month.J Soon 

♦ " Thcrt' is every indication that the enemy will attack our left 
this mominjr, as troops have been moving in that direction for some 
time. It will be well to make ijroparaliou to send as many of the re- 
scrvi's as can be spared of the ri-rht wing in that direction, as soon as 
an attack is made in force. At any rate be prepared for an order to 
that clVect." 

t I saw many wooden guns in the works at Corinth, when Beaure- 
gard abandoned the place. 

I On one of the first days of June, 18G'2, a paper was forwarded by 
Brigadier-General Speed S. Fry, a brigade commander, to his immc- 



ULYSSES 8. GKANT. 103 

after entering tLe works, Grant rode to the rebel left, 
and satisfied himself beyond all doubt, that had an 
assault on Sliennan's front been ordered, a good 
general could have demolished the rebel army. This 
was by fai- the weakest point of Beauregard's line, 
and in exactly the position to be susceptible to such 
an attack as Grant had recommended, in vain. 

A great battle, which had been expected as the 
result of the collection of two vast armies at an im- 
portant strategic point, was thus avoided — a battle 
which, if fought, could not have failed to prove fatal 
to the rebels. The enemy, however, abandoned the 
object of the campaign without the hazard of a fight, 
not choosing to risk the position and the army too. 
Sliiloh had, indeed, been fought for the salvation of 
Corinth — fought and lost by the rebels, two months 
l^efore, and the march of the national army from 
Pittsburg, was nothing more nor less than the pursuit 
of the rebel forces, beaten and demoralized during 
the second day's fight at Shiloli. The enemy, how- 

diate superior, Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman, commanding a di- 
vision in the Army of the Tennessee. General Sherman the same day 
sent it by me, to General Pope's headquarters in the field. It read as 
follows : 
" (Confidential.) 

" Headquakters, Corinth, 3fay 9, 1862. 

" Generax: In case we have to retire from this position, your army 
will follow the best road in the direction of Kossuth, via the Female 
College ; and when about two or three miles from that town, a part of 
yoiur forces, say a corps, will move to Danville, and another corps will 
move on the road to Kossuth, until it meets the one to Rienzi, when it 
will move on to the latter place. Dejjots of provisions, etc., have been 
made at Okolona and Columbus. 

" One of your divisions or corps can continue to Ripley, thence to 
Oxford, and thence to Grenada, for the protection of that depot. 

" , General Commanding. 

'• To General B. Bragg, Commanding Army of the Uississijjii. (For 

the informatioa of Major- General Van Doru.) " 



104 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

ever, being unmolested in Lis retreat, had rallied in a 
concentrated manner at Corinth, and in an order agree- 
able to the best rules of the art. He was followed 
by an army very materially reenforced after the vic- 
tory of Aj)ril 7th. All the time was taken that a 
new and unexplored country required, to develop its 
facilities for successful combat ; every precaution was 
observed, to avoid the evil results of any suddenly 
offensive movement which the rebels might at any 
moment be inspired to make; miles and miles of in- 
trenchments were successively thrown up and occu- 
pied ; roads were cut in every conceivable direction, 
to facilitate the combined movements in the attack 
of a lari>:e armv, or to secure a safe retreat in case of 
reverse. 

In the mean while, the enemy surrounded his 
point of defence with an immense show of intrench- 
ments and foi-tifications, and vaunted his readiness to 
receive combat at any moment; when, in fact, his 
parade of battenes, artillery, and magazines was little 
more than counterfeit, and his immense lines of earth- 
work remained as a mockery to his ability and his 
industry, unless the alternative is accepted that he 
never intended to defend them ; for the moment he 
discovered Halleck ready to strike, he resumed his 
retreat, more demoralized than when he commenced 
it. The plan of his Avithdrawal seemed expressly 
calculated to facilitate the national forces in a success- 
ful ])ursuit: the roads were in admirable condition, 
and the country al)0unded in water; the troops were 
as anxious now to follow as they had been to fio-ht 
during the siege. But the demoralized condition of 
the rebels, mid the sej^aration of their retreatino- 
forces, seemed not to be comprehended. The reports 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 105 

of deserters and prisoners, daily coming inside the na- 
tional lines, were apparently set at naught ; * nothing 
but a vast offensive power seemed to loom up before 
the magnified vision of the commander of this grand 
army ; and an attack from the rebels was apparently 
the one thing apprehended by Halleck, from the time 
he set out from Pittsburg up to the final point of the 
pursuit, f 

To cap the climax, Pope and Buell were succes- 
sively sent out after tlie enemy. Buell was the rank- 
ing officer, and eventually took command. He formed 
a solid defensive line of battle, seventy thousand 
strong, reaching across the country from the vicinity 
of Booneville towards Blackland, at a moment when 

* In a report of the operations of Lis division during the siege of 
Corinth, Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman speaks thus of a reconnois- 
sance in force made by his command on the loth of May : " The result 
of this reconnoissance was reported to your headquarters " [those of 
Major-General Thomas, commanding right wing], "together with the 
information obtained from the prisoners, among which was the impor- 
tant fact that the rebel commander had issued orders the day before, 
that all baggage of the troops, except what could be carried in knap- 
sacks, was to be immediately sent by the Mobile and Ohio railroad to 
Okolona." 

A private note from General Sherman, of October 18, 1866, states: 
" My report is not sufficiently strong in the case of the information 
obtained in my reconnoissance on the 15th of May. All the men 
who were taken equally declared that General Beauregard had issued 
an order the day before, for all property at Corinth, except the con- 
tents of the knapsacks and a certain amount of provisions, to be sent 
down to Okolona. A wiitten report was made to me of this fact, and 
the prisoners were sent forward to confirm the statement." 

t Many of the points in the criticism of this camjiaign were sug- 
gested to me at the time by a report of Brigadier-General T. W. Sher- 
man, on whose staff I was then serving in Halleck's army. The report 
was forwarded through the regular channel, but returned to its author, 
with a rebuke for indulging in criticism of his commanding officer. 
If the rebuke was just, the criticism is equally so, and proves that from 
various points of view the same conclusion was reached, in regard to 
this campaign. 



IOC MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

it was obvious to liis entire command that tlie bulk 
of the enemy's force liad passed on, leaving a river 
beliind, protected by an insignificant rear-guard. The 
seventy thousand remained two days, awaiting an as- 
sault from the retreating twenty thousand, and then, 
as it was discovered that the enemy had again es- 
caped, the command w^as ordered back to Corinth, 
having marched out about thirty miles. During all 
these operations, Grant had been left in camp. 

The ineffectual pursuit was terminated by the 
10th of June, and Buell was then sent towards Chat- 
tanooga, the great strategic point in East Tennessee. 
Grant retained command of the District of West 
Tennessee, and made his headquarters at Memphis, 
which had fallen into the hands of the national forces, 
on the 6th of June, as the result of a fierce naval 
fight on the Mississippi river. At about the same 
time, Beauregard was relieved by Bragg, who soon 
afterwards started with a large force for Chattanooga, 
to intercept Buell. 

And thus the great and tangible success, which 
was thrown so directly in General Halleck's path 
that it seemed impossible for any one even to avoid 
a victory, was allowed, nay, compelled, in his un- 
skilful gi'asp, to dissolve away, like a shadow in the 
hands of him who stretches out to embrace what is 
not. Even after the rebels had eluded him at 
Corinth, it ^vas possible, with Halleck's immense pre- 
])onderance of force, to follow up and destroy the re- 
treating enemy; and wlien this opportunity was also 
lost, by his subordinate and counterpart, the army 
tliftt liad been concentrated with so much care and 
hibor, was still available for a concentrated campaio-n. 
Vicksburg was within reach, and comparatively de- 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 107 

fenceless ; a force miglit easily have been sent direct 
to its rear, and found no enemy of importance on tlie 
road ; and the long expenditure of time and Llood, 
the weary months spent in the amj^hibious siege, the 
unsuccessful assaults, might all have been saved. If 
Chattanooga was deemed the more important ob- 
jective, Halleck had forces at his control sufficient 
to secure its possession, besides retaining eveiy rood 
he had abeady acquired. He might have sent with 
Buell, men enough to place the seizure of that key 
to Eastern Tennessee beyond a doubt, and so have 
prevented the disasters both of Buell and Eose- 
crans's Chattanooga campaigns, and forestalled those 
other events, which, nearly two years later, made 
Grant, Halleck's own successor in supreme command. 

But the great army was broken up, without having 
achieved any thing besides the occupation of a single 
town, which was indeed a strategic and important 
point ; but none of the positive strategic advantages 
which its possession promised, were obtained. For a 
while, Halleck interrupted the rebel communications, 
and warded off attacks on his own rear ; but Corinth, 
having once been acquired, never afterwards pre- 
sented a single offensive advantage, which the general 
who captured it suggested or procured. 

In July, Pope was ordered to Virginia, and on the 
17th of that month, Halleck was assigned to the com- 
mand of all the armies, superseding McClellan. He 
repaired at once to Washington, and Grant was 
dii-ected to establish his headquai-ters at Corinth. 
Grant's jurisdiction was not, however, enlarged by 
the promotion of Halleck : on the contrary, the new 
general-in-chief first offered the command of the Army 
of the Tennessee to Colonel Kobert Allen, a quarter- 



108 MTLITAKY HISTORY OF 

master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to 
remain under Grant.* He was, however, left some- 
what more independent than while Halleck had been 
immediately present in the field. 

Four diHsions of his army (including Thomas's 
command), were within the next two months ordered 
to Buell, who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, 
unwieldy snake, from Eastport to Decatur, and from 
Decatur towards Chattanooga. This subtraction put 
Grant entirely on the defensive. He had possession 
of Corinthjf the strategic point, but was obliged to 
hold the railroads from that place and Bolivar, north 
to Columbus, which last, on account of the low water 
in the Tennessee, he had made his base of supplies. 
His task was a difficult one, in the face of an enemy 
nearly his equal in numbers, and who, having no fear 
of Grant's advance, was able to concentrate his own 
forces so as to threaten either of three important 
points, Corinth, Bolivar, or Jackson, in Tennessee. 

* A letter from General Allen, dated July 9tli, 18GG, says : " I had 
joined General Halleck a short time subsequent to the fall of Corinth, 
nnd was attached to his immediate command, when he received his 
appointment of general-in-chief, with orders to repair at once toTVash- 
injfton. Shortly after he came to my tent. . . . After a somewhat 
protracted conversation he turned to me and said : ' Now what can I 
doforyoM?' I replied that I did not know that he could do any 
thing. « Yes,' he rejoined, ' I can give you command of this army.' I 
replied : ' I have not rank.' ' That,' said he, ' can easily be obtained.' 
I do not rcmcmlier exactly what my reply was to this, but it was to 
the effect that I doulttcd the expediency of such a measure, identified 
as I was with the enormous business and expenditures of the quarter- 
muster's department, from which it was almost impracticable to relieve 
me at that time. Other reasons were mentioned, and he did not press 
the subject. It is true that I was congratulated on the prospect of 
Bucccedinp to the command, before I had mentioned the sulrject of this 
interview." 

f The n?ai)«)f Operations in Kentucky and Tennessee illustrates this 
position. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 109 

Mempliis was safe enougli under Sherman, but Grant 
had to keep open his communication with that officer, 
by way of Columbus and the Mississippi. I have 
heard him describe his situation at this time, as quite 
as difficult and annoying as any that he held during 
the war. This w^as, indeed, the only period during 
the war, when he was for any length of time obliged 
to act on the defensive. 

Jackson, in Tennessee, is at the junction of the 
Mississippi Central and the Mobile and Ohio rail- 
roads, and forms the apex of an irregular triangle, of 
which Corinth may be considered another angle, 
.while Bolivar, to the west, is the third. After leav- 
ing a sufficient force for the defence of Memphis, 
Grant concentrated at these three points, as many of 
his troops as he could spare from guarding the rivers 
and railroads in his command. He remained himself 
eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the 
enemy, w^ho, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, 
harassed and threatened him continually. During 
this time, he directed the strengthening and remodel- 
ling of the fortifications of Corinth, w^hich, although 
incomplete towards the west and north, were yet too 
extensive for defence by any but an enormous garri- 
son. New works, closer to the town, were accord- 
ingly erected, under the supervision of Captain 
Prime, Grant's engineer officer, Major-General Ord 
beino- in command of the troops. Events rendered 
these works of great importance before many weeks 
had passed. 

The attention of the country was, at this period, 
turaed almost exclusively and with painful interest, 
to operations further east. In Virginia, McClellan 
and Pope were superseding each other and losing 



110 iriLITAEY HISTOEY OF 

"battles and campaigns by turns, under Halleck's su- 
preme command ; while in Tennessee, Bragg, wlio 
had outmarched and outmanoeuvred Buell, reaching 
Chattanooga first, though starting last, Tvas now ra- 
cing with the same rival for Louisville and the Ohio. 
The North was thus threatened with invasion in Ma- 
ryland and in Ohio at the same time. Every man 
that it was thought possible to take from Grant, had 
been sent to Buell, and the former was left to shift 
for himself, almost without troops, and (fortunately 
for the country), almost without orders. 

Van Dorn at last deteiinined to move part of his 
force (under Price), east of Grant, apparently with a. 
view to crossinof the Tennessee, and reenforciua; Brafrs: 
in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified Halleck 
of the probability of such a movement, and of his 
intention to prevent it, and was immediately warned 
by his chief to leave nothing undone to avert the 
catastrophe. Grant's dispatches at this time bear 
witness to the constant anxiety the rebels occasioned 
liim, and to the necessity for a sleepless and stub- 
born vigilance. On the 0th of September, he said : 
" Should the enemy come, I will be as ready as possi- 
ble with the means at hand. I do not believe that a 
force can be brought against us at present that can- 
not be successfully resisted," 

On the irJth, Price advanced from the south and 
seized luka, twenty-one miles east of Corinth ; Colo- 
nel ^Iiirphy, who was in command, making no re- 
sistance, but evacuating the place on the approach 
of tlie enemy. Grant telegraphed to Halleck on the 
l.')th : " If I can, I will attack Price before he crosses 
liear creek. If he can be beaten there, it will pre- 
vent the design either to go north, or to unite forces 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. Ill 

and attack here." Grant liad called in his forces 
some days before to the vicinity of Corinth, had re- 
peatedly cautioned all his commanders to hold their 
troops in readiness, and when the enemy's cavalry 
moved towards luka, and cut the railroad and tele- 
graph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven 
miles to the westward, Grant began his operations. 
Pj'ice was at luka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the 
southwest, threatening Corinth. Grant's object was 
to destroy Price, before the two could concentrate, 
and then to get back to Corinth and protect it against 
Van Dorn. 

He accordingly ordered Brigadier-General Rose- 
crans, whose troops were posted south of Corinth, to 
move by way of Rienzi, along the south side of the 
Memphis and Charleston railroad, and attack luka 
from that direction ; while Mnjor-General Ord, with 
a force brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jack- 
son, was to push towards Burnsville, and from 
there take roads on the north side of the raiboad, 
attacking luka fi*om that quarter. Ord had eight 
thousand men, and Eosecrans reported nine thou- 
sand, a greater force combined than Price had, ac- 
cordins: to Grant's estimate. Eosecrans suo:gested 
that his force should move northward fi-om its east- 
ern march in two columns, one on the Jacinto, the 
other on the Fulton road, in order to occupy Price's 
only line of retreat. To this Grant assented, and 
remained himself at Burnsville, where he could di- 
rect both wings of his army. He also kept Ord's 
troops at Burnsville as long as possible, with a train 
of empty cars, ready to hurry them back to Corinth, 
in case Van Dom should attack that place, where all 
the national supplies and munitions were stored. 



112 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

On the IStli of September, Ord was puslied for- 
ward to witLiu four miles of luka, where lie found 
tlie enemy in force, on the north side of the town ; 
and the same day, Rosecrans reported to Grant his 
readiness " to move up as close as we can to-night. . . 
Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the at- 
tack and draw their attention that way, while I move 
in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing hea^^ly 
on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left, cut- 
ting off their retreat eastward. I proj)ose to move 
in ten minutes for Jacinto." Grant ordered him to 
advance rapidly, and " let us do to-moiTOW all we 
can ; it may be necessary to fall back the day follow- 
insr." The fallins: back was in the event of Van 
Dorn's attacking Corinth. This dispatch was dated 
fifteen minutes before seven p. m. ; but, after midnight, 
Rosecrans sent word that he had been detained, and 
was still twenty miles fi-om luka, and could not " be 
in," before one or two o'clock the next afternoon, the 
roads being in bad condition and the country thickly 
wooded. Tliis greatly disappointed Grant, who had 
expected to fight on the morrow, early, and had sup- 
posed Rosecrans to be by this time far on his Avay to 
Ink;i. lie consequently directed Ord, who was quite 
readv to brino; on an eno-ai^ement in an hour's time, 
not to attack from the north imtil Rosecrans arrived, 
or until lie should hear firinc: to the south. Rose- 
crans was notified, by his return messenger, of this 
change in Ord's instructions; but owing to the density 
uf the forests and the difiicultv of crossinir the small 
streams and bottoms, all communication between 
Grant and Rosecrans was cii'cuitous and delayed. 

By half-past four, on the afternoon of the 19th, 
Rosecrans, making a forced march, had arrived within 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 113 

two miles of Iiika, moving only on the Jacinto or 
western road. A little north of Barnet's, the rebels 
were posted in force, and, unexpectedly to Eosecrans, 
they attacked the head of his marching column, dri- 
vino; it in, and checkinc: his advance. The front was 
naiTow, interrupted by ravines, and covered with a 
dense undergrowth ; the enemy's position, on a hill, 
commanded the road by which the national forces 
were moving, and Rosecrans, not being able to de- 
velop his troops, lost a battery of artillery, the only 
one he got into action, besides seven hundi-ed and 
thii-ty-six men in killed and wounded. The fighting 
was heav}', though confined almost entirely to Ham- 
ilton's division. Rosecrans, however, held his own 
until dark ; but at ten and a half that night, he sent 
word to Grant, who was still at Burnsville, that it 
would be necessary to " attack in the morning and 
in force." " Push in on to them," he said, " until we 
can have time to do something." * 

Owing to the difficulties in communication. Grant 
did not receive this dispatch until thirty-five minutes 
past eight, on the morning of the 20th, but the same 
moment he sent word to Ord, to attack as soon 
as possible, saying : " Unless you can create a di- 
version in Rosecrans's favor, he may find his hands 
full." The wind had blown heavily to the south 

♦ " IlEADljrARTERS AkMT OF THK MISSISSIPPI, TWO MILES | 

soniH OF luKA, September 19, 1S02 — 10>^ p. u. ) 

'' Major- General U. S. Grant : 

"General — We met the enemy iu force just above tliis point. 
The engagement lasted several hours. We have lost two or three 
pieees of artillery. Firing was very heavy. You must attack in the 
morning and in force. The ground is horrid, unknown to us, and no 
room for development. Couldn't use our artillery at all ; fired but few 
shots. Push in on to them until we can have time to do something. 
We will try to get a position on our right which will take luka. 

" W. S. Rosecrans, Brigadier- General^ 
8 



1]4 JCTLITAEY HISTORY OF 

and east the clay before, and no sound of the filing 
had reached Ord ; during the night, however, he 
had got word of the battle fi-om negroes, and so 
pushed on towards the town, in the morning, in ad- 
vance of Grant's order. Soon afterwards, Grant 
himself learned that the enemy was in full retreat ; 
had in fact left luka during the night, on the Fulton 
road, which it had been expressly arranged that 
Ilosecrans was to occupy with Hamilton's division. 
Getting up late, however, he had failed to do this, 
and the rebels discovering how nearly they were sur- 
rounded by the concentration of Grant's forces, held 
Ilosecrans in check on one road and escaped by night 
on the other, taking with them eveiy thing except 
their wounded, and the artillery they had captured 
the day before. When Grant arrived at luka, at nine 
o'clock A. M., the pursuit was not yet begun. He at 
once gave orders to follow, but the enemy had al- 
ready got so far that it was found impossible now 
to overtake him. This of course defeated Grant's 
})lan of capturino; or destroying Price's entire force. 
The Fulton road was the only avenue left open to 
the rebels, and had it also been closed, the result 
would have been complete. But if Price had in- 
t('n(l(Ml to make his way across the Tennessee, or to 
liold his own until Van Dorn could come up, and then 
make a simultaneous attack on Corinth, he was foiled.* 

* Since the close of the war, Colonel Thompson, late of the rebel 
iimiy, has stated to General Ord, his brother-in-law, that the movement 
of Itosecrans on a tiin<,'le road, his strength and the condition of his 
force, and the fact that the Fulton road, south, was left open, were be- 
trayed to Price, on the afternoon of the light, by Dr. Burton, a rebel 
assistant surgeon of Claiborne's regiment. This doctor informed Colo- 
nel Thompson that he had secured the confidence of Rosecrans, and 
liccn employed by him as a scout and spy ; had remained with him on 
the Iflth, until he saw the mute i)ursued by Rosecrans towards luka, 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 115 

Rosecrans reported the rebel loss at luka at four- 
teen hundred and thirty-eight.* 

By the battle of luka, the enemy was simply 
checked in his plans, not seriously crippled in his 
force. Price moved around by a circuitous route 
and joined Van Dorn, and the same state of affairs 
continued, which had annoyed Grant for so many 
weeks. He put Rosecrans in command at Corinth, 
and Ord at Bolivar, and on the 23d of September, 
removed his o^\ti headquarters to Jackson, fi'om 
which point he could communicate more readily with 
all points of his district, including Memphis and 
Cairo. The rebels were in force at La Grange and 
Ripley, and threatened both Bolivar and Corinth, 
and Grant was oblio^ed to be in readiness at either 
place. Troops were still being detached fi"om his 
command, notwithstanding these emergencies, and, 
on the 1st of October, he telegraphed to Washing- 
ton : " My position is precarious, but I hope to get 
out of it all right." 

At last, it was rendered certain, by the removal 
of Price's cavalry from La Grange to Ripley, that Cor- 
inth was to be the place of attack. Grant there- 
upon directed Rosecrans to call in his forces, and sent 
Brigadier-General McPherson to his support from 
Jackson, with a brigade of troops hastily got to- 
gether. The enemy evidently intended to attack on 
the northern side of the town, facing east and south, 
and cutting: off Rosecrans from all reenforcements ; 

and the condition of liis column. He then left the national army, and 
hurried into town to give the information to Price. That general at once 
withdrew all his force from Ord's front, and attacked and held Rose- 
crans, coming up from the south on one road, while the rebels evacuated 
the town, passing within a mile and a half of Rosecrans, on the other. 
* I have seen no rebel official statement of Price's loss. 



JIG MILITARY HISTORY OF 

SO Grant liurried Ord and Hurlbut by way of Poca- 
hontas from Bolivar, forty-four miles away, to be 
ready to strike Van Dorn in flank or rear, as lie ad- 
vanced, and at least to create a diversion, if tliey 
could not get into the town. 

On tlie 2d of October tlie rebel array, under Van 
Dorn, Price, Lovell, Yillepigue, and Rust, appeared 
in front of Corintk. Tkere was some preliminary 
skii-misking on tkat day, and, on tke 3d, tke flgktiug 
besan in earnest. Rosecrans bad about nineteen 
tkousand men, and tke enemy kad collected tkii'ty- 
eigkt tkousand* for tkis important movement, wkick 
was to determine tke possession of nortkern Missis- 
sippi and West Tennessee. Rosecrans pusked out 
about five miles, towards Ckewalla, Grant kaving 
ordered kim to attack, if opportunity offered ; but tke 
enemy began tke figkt, and, on tke afternoon of tke 
3d, tke battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rose- 
crans was diiven back to kis defences on tke noi*tk 
side of Corintk, and it was now found kow impor- 
tant was tke labor bestowed on tkese fortifications, by 
Grant's order, a montk previous. Tke enemy was 
ckecked until morning; but, early on tke 4tk, tke 
wkole rebel army, flusked witk tke success of tke day 
before, assaulted tke works. Tke figkting was fierce ; 
tke rebels ckaro-inGf almost into tke town, wken an 
unexpected fire from tke foi-ts di'ove tkem back in 
confusion. Again and again, tkey advanced to tke 
works, but each time were received witk a determi- 
nation ecpial to tkeir own. Once, tke national troops 
came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied 

* Rosecrans states the enemy's force to have been tliirty-cight thou- 
sand "by their own accounts." I am unable to say how he Icarued 
this. 



ULYSSES S. GRAKT. 117 

them in person, and the rebels were finally repulsed 
before noon, with a loss admitted by themselves to 
be double that of Rosecrans.* 

The national loss was three hundred and fifteen 
killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, and 
two hundred and thirty-two prisoners and missing. 
Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at fourteen hun- 
dred and tAventy-three, and took two thousand two 
hundred and twenty-five prisoners, representing sixty- 
nine regiments and thii'teen light batteries; many of 
the prisoners were wounded. The disparity in losses 
was doubtless occasioned by the fact that a portion 
of the national troops fought behind intrenched bat- 
teries. 

McPherson arrived from Jackson during the fight, 
coming up in the rear of the enemy ; and, being una- 
ble to get to the support of the garrison in any other 
way, made a brilliant march around the rebel flank, 
brino-ins: in his brig-ade, at the close of the battle, on 
the right of Rosecrans. His presence, then, was too 
late to have more than a moral efi'ect, but the enemy 
knew of his approach, and had also encountered the 
advance of Hurlbut's column, the day before. The 
knowledge of these reenforcements, however, seemed 
only to stimulate Van Dorn to a more desperate ef- 
fort. The repulse was complete, by eleven o'clock in 
the morning, but unfortunately was not followed up 
by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels, however, 
started off in haste and disorder immediately after 
the fight ; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were 

* In Van Dorn and Lovell's commands alone, the rebels lost five 
thousand four hundred and twenty-eight men; of whom more than 
three thousand were killed or wounded. I can find no return of Price's 
loss ; and no complete rebel report of the battles of luka or Corinth is in 
possession of the government. 



118 3IILITABY mSTOEY OF 

struck iu flank, as Grant Lad planned, hj Huiibut 
and Ord, and tlie disaster was rendered final. 

This occurred early on tlie morning of the otli, at 
the crossing of the Hatch ie river, about ten miles 
I'ruui Corinth. The retreatino- force fell in with Ord's 
column, four thousand strong, just beyond Davis's 
bridge. The rebel advance got across the river with- 
out resistance, but was speedily diiven back, and with 
loss ; a battery of artillery and several hundred men 
were captured, and the advance was dispersed or 
drowned. Ord pushed on in pursuit, passed over 
the bridge, and met the whole of Van Dorn's column, 
on the other side ; but, thousrh not strons^ enous-h to 
attack the entii-e rebel army even in retreat, Ord held 
the crossing, and obliged the enemy, who had no 
time to spare, to make a detoui* of six or seven miles, 
before he could reach another brida'e. Ord was se- 
riously wounded in the fight, and the command then 
devolved on Ilurlbut, who did not attempt a pursuit. 

Grant had notified Rosecrans, in advance, of the 
movement of Ilurlbut and Ord, and, anticipating the 
victory at Corinth, had directed that commander to 
j)ush on instantly after his success, if necessary, even 
to Bolivar ; for, if Ord's little force encountered the 
whole rebel army, the danger would be great, unless 
Kosecrans followed up rajiidly. But the troops were 
fatigued ]>y two days' fight, and Rosecrans contented 
himself with liding over the field to announce in 
person his victory. At noon of the 4th, he gave di- 
rections to ]-est tliat (lay, and move in pursuit on the 
morrow.* AMien he rei)orted his action to Grant, 

♦ " I roilc all over our lima anuounciiijr the result of the fight in per- 
son, and notilied our victorious troops that after two days' fightin'^, 
two almost sleepless nights of preparation, movements, and march, I 





-r 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 119 

the latter, greatly disappointed at tlie delay, again 
issued peremptory orders to pusli on at once after 
the enemy. 

Rosecrans started out on the morninir of the 
5th, but was misinformed or misled, and took the 
road towards Chewalla, instead of that further south, 
by which the enemy had moved. After marching 
about eight miles out of the w^ay, he discovered his 
blunder, and tui-ned his column towards the Hatchie. 
Meanwhile, the tight with Ord for the crossing had 
occurred, and the rebels had been driven six miles 
away, to a second bridge higher up the stream. This 
bridge, at Crum's mills, was narrow and long, and 
stretched over a wide and swampy bottom, impassa- 
ble for troops. It, in fact, formed a defile, along 
which the entire rebel army was obliged to march. 
Had Eosecrans moved promptly the day before, he 
would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either 
as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass 
this defile. In either event, the destruction of the 
rebels must have been complete; but the national 
forces arrived at the Hatchie, just as the rear-guard 
of the enemy had crossed. Rosecrans, from here, sent 
word again to Grant of the condition of aftairs, and 
Grant decided that the favorable oj^portunity had 
been lost; Rosecrans, however, now urged that he 
should be peiTnitted to advance, but Grant declined 
to allow it. He considered that Van Dorn had got 
too much of a start to leave any well-founded hope 
of overtaking him, especially as heavy rains had set 
in, rendering the roads almost impassable. The 

wished them to replenish their cartridge-boxes, haversacks, and stom- 
achs, take early sleep, and start in pursuit by daylight." — Itosecrans'i 
Report. 



120 MILITARY HISTOKT OF 

troops were without supplies, and, at that time, the 
secret of living from an enemy's country had not 
been learned. Rosecrans was therefore recalled, 
having marched out from Corinth about thirty miles, 
but not cauglit up with the enemy.* 

In both the battles of luka and Corinth, Grant 
directed the movements, until the troops arrived in 
the actual presence of the enemy, although in the 
fonner, he was about eight miles from the field, and 
in the latter, nearly forty. As has been shown, he 
was not always obeyed. 

These t^vo fights relieved the command of West 
Tennessee from all immediate danger, and recalled 
the attention of the country and the government to 
this portion of the theatre of war. The disasters at 
the East were in a measure retrieved, by the Western 
successes, and the public feeling was improved. 
Grant, however, did not receive the credit which was 
his due for conceiving and directing the movements ; 
but Rosecrans was made a major-general of volun- 
teers, and ordered to the command of the Army of 
the Cumberland. This chano;e, thoug^h not suirsrested 
T)y Grant, gave him great relief, as the subordinate 
had disappointed the expectations of his superior. 

The truth is, that Grant's extreme simplicity of 
behavior and directness of expression imposed on 

* An intcTcopttd letter from a spy of Van Dorn, a young A\oman 
named Biuton, residing in Corintli, was written before tlie reconstruction 
of the fortifications in September. This communication described the 
weakness of the northwest front, and declared, what was then true, 
that the principal works were too far out for defence, and that the 
troops were all on the southern side. The letter was copied, and f»)r- 
warded by General Ord to its original destination, and groat pains were 
taken thereafter to prevent the transmission of further information. 
The rebel attack, on the front indicated by !Miss IJurton, su^-gests that 
Van Dorn may have acted on her reports, to his own destruction. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 121 

\rarioiis officers, both above and below him. Thoy 
thought him a good, j^lain man, who had blundered 
into one or two successes, and, who, therefore, could 
not be immediately removed; but they deemed it 
unnecessary to regard his judgment, or to count upon 
his ability. His superiors made their plans inva- 
riably without consulting him, and his subordinates 
sometimes sought to carry out their own campaigns, 
in opposition or indifference to his orders, not doubt- 
ing, that, with their superior intelligence, they could 
conceive and execute triumphs w^hich would excuse 
or even vindicate their course. It is impossible to 
understand the early history of the war, without 
taking it into account, that neither the government 
nor its important commanders gave Grant credit for 
intellectual ability or military genius. 

His other qualities were also rated low. Because 
he was patient, some thought it impossible to pro- 
voke him ; and because of his calmness, it was sup- 
posed that he was stolid. In battle, or in campaign- 
ing, he did not seem to care or consider so much 
what the enemy was doing as what he himself meant 
to do ; and this trait, to enthusiastic and even bril- 
liant soldiers, appeared inexplicable. A great com- 
mander, it was imagined, should be nervous, excitable, 
inspiring his men and captivating his officers; calling 
private soldiers -by their names, making eloquent ad- 
dresses in the field, and waving his di-awn sword in 
battle. Great commanders had done all these thino-s, 
and won; and many men, who could do all these 
things, fancied themselves therefore great command- 
ers. Others imagined wisdom to consist in science 
alone; they sought success in learned and elaborate 
plans, requiring months to develop when the enemy 



122 MILITAEY inSTOKY OF 

was immediately before tliem; tliey manoeuvred 
■when it was tlie time to figlit ; tliey intrenched when 
they should have attacked, and studied their books 
when the field should have been their only problem. 

Grant was like none of these. If he possessed ac- 
quirements, he apj^eared unconscious of them; he 
made no allusion to the schools, and never hesitated 
to transgress their rules, when the occasion seemed 
to him to demand it. So, he neither won men's hearts 
by blandishments, nor affected theii- imaginations by 
brilliancy of behavior; nor did he seem profound, 
to those who are impressed only by a display of 
learning. All these things should be appreciated by 
those who seek to understand his character or career. 

In the latter part of October, reenforcements hav- 
ing been sent him from the Northwest, he suggested 
to HaUeck a movement into the interior of Missis- 
sippi, with a view to the capture of Vicksburg. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. \2^ 



CHAPTEK V. 

Military importance of the Mississippi river — Grant proposes movement into inte- 
rior, against Yicksburg — Campaign begun — McClernand endeavors to obtain 
command of an expedition against Vicksburg — Grant moves to Holly Springs 
— Enemy retreats — Rebels desert their fortifications on the Tallahatchie — Co- 
operative movement from Helena — Grant advances to Oxford — Sherman sent 
to Memphis — McClernand assigned to command of river expedition by the 
President — Sherman moves by river against Vicksburg — Grant's communi- 
cations cut and Holly Springs captured — Grant lives oflf the country — Re- 
opens his communications — Sherman's assault on Vicksburg — Repulse of 
Sherman — McClernand takes command of river expedition — Capture of Ar- 
kansas Post — Grant falls back to Memphis — Extraordinary behavior of Mc- 
Clernand — Grant takes command of river expedition — Protest of McClernand. 

The transcendent importance of tlie Mississippi 
river tad been manifest from the be<>:inniuo; of the 
war, to both belligerents. Fei-tiliziug an area of 
thirteen hundred thousand square miles, or six times 
as large as the empii-e of France, receiving the waters 
of fifty-seven large, navigable streams, washing the 
shores of ten different states, to one of which it gives 
its name, forming at once the boundary and the con- 
necting link between territory both free and slave, 
the natural outlet through which the products of the 
Northwest find their way to the sea — in a word, the 
gi'andest water-course on either continent — its posses- 
sion was by far the most magnificent prize for which 



124 JIILITABT niSTOEY OF 

tlie nation and tlie rebels were contending. It com- 
pletely divides tlie great region that formed the bat- 
tle-ground of the rebellion, and was indispensable 
alike to the political or military success of the enter- 
prise. Without it, the so-called Confederacy was cut 
in twain; with it, the rebellious states were allied by 
a bond that must be broken, or the North was crip- 
l)led almost to its ruin. 

During the progress of the war, the Mississippi 
acquired additional importance ; it afforded the 
rebels, Ijlockaded by sea, and shut in by a cordon of 
armies on the north, their only constant medium of 
communication with the outside world (across their 
southwestern frontier) ; and, more important still, the 
only avenue by which supplies of cattle for their im- 
mense armies, could be obtained. Texas is the only 
]ieefgrowing country of the entire Southwest, and 
had thus far proved to the rebels an inexhaustible 
resource; from no other portion of the attempted 
Confederacy, could supj^lies of such consequence be 
l)rocured. This tangible and practical advantage 
-would be entirely lost, when the control of the Mis- 
sissippi river was gone; and no consideration had 
greater weight with the rebel leaders than this, in 
the long and gallant defence they made for their 
main artery of supply. 

Accordingly, the insurgents early seized the most 
important positions along the river, and, with a keen 
ni)i)reciation of their natural advantages, fortified 
('(•himbus, Fort Pillow, Island Number Ten, Vicks- 
l»urg, and later, Port Hudson. The first three of 
these places had follen, in the spring of 1862 ; but 
\'icksburg, situated at a remarkalde bend in the 
river, and on one of the few bluffs that mark its 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 125 

course, was rendered one of the strongest fortified 
places in America. In June, 1862, after tlie capture 
of New Orleans, a combined expedition moved up tlie 
river, under Commodore Farragut and Brigadier- 
General Thomas^ Williams, wlio found no difficulty in 
making tlieir way as far as Vicksburg, five hundred and 
tliii*ty miles from tbe sea ; tbere, kow^ever, tkey were 
ckecked. A bombardment by tke naval force proving 
ineftectual, part of tke fleet ran by tke batteries. Tke 
troops did not attack tke town, but were occupied 
for several weeks opposite Vicksburg in cutting a 
canal across tke peninsula, formed by tke bend in tke 
stream. It was koped by tkis canal to divert tke 
waters of tke Mississippi from tkeir ordinary ckannel, 
and leave the town several miles inland. Tke attempt 
was unsuccessful ; and tke troops and seamen suffering 
greatly from keat and tke diseases incident to tke 
climate, tke expedition returned to New Orleans. 
Since tken, tke rebels kad strengtkened tke fortifica- 
tions of tke place, botk on tke land and water sides, 
until tkey finally came to believe tkat Vicksburg 
was impregnable ; and so indeed it proved, to every 
actual assault. 

Wken General Halleck was ordered to Waskins;- 
ton, in July, 18G2, to assume command of all tke 
armies, lie told Grant tkat ke would prefer to remain 
in tke Department of the Mississippi; that ke kad 
been working on a definite plan ever since ke kad 
commanded tke department ; tkat all he kad done kad 
been in pursuance of tkis plan, and if permitted, ke 
would return to fulfil it. AMiat the jjlau was ke did 
not disclose. Until after tke battles of luka • and 
Corintk, Grant was too constantly on tke defen- 
sive, to undertake any movement of an aggressive 



126 inLITAEY HISTORY OF 

character. Those battles occuiTed in September and 
October; and, on the 25th of the latter month, he as 
sumed command of the Department of the Tennessee, 
which included Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, 
northern Mississippi, and the portions of Kentucky 
and Tennessee west of the Tennessee river. 

The next day he wrote to Halleck : " You never 
have suggested to me any plan of operations in this 

department As situated now, with no more 

troops, I can do nothing but defend my positions, 
and I do not feel at liberty to abandon any of them, 
without first consulting you." He then proposed the 
al)andonment of Corinth, the destruction of all the 
raih'oads branching out from that place, the reopen- 
ing of the road from Humboldt to Memphis, and the 
concentration of the troops from Corinth and Bolivar, 
and " with small reenforcements at Memphis, I think 
I would be able to move do^vn tlie Mississippi Cen- 
tral road, and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg." 
Tliis was the first mention, in the correspondence of 
tlie two commanders, of the place destined afterwards 
to become so renowned. Grant continued: "I am 
ready, however, to do with all my might whatever 
you may direct, without criticism." 

Tlie plan here proposed implied relying exclu- 
sively on tlie Mississippi, and the railroads leading 
oast from that river, for all communication and sup- 
]>lif-s. It involved, also, the abandonment of lines 
and ])laces that liad been carried and maintained 
only by a lavish expenditure of time, and labor, and 
livt<. Jiut General Halleck's strategy was always 
l>a<«(l on a great appreciation of the value of places, 
while Grant, as has been seen, made armies rather 
than places the objects of his camjmigns. The minds 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 127 

of the two soldiers were differently constituted ; they 
looked at most military matters witli different eyes. 
Ilalleck set so high a value on wliat had already been 
obtained, especially after sacrifice, that he seemed un- 
Avilling to risk the actual prize for the sake of securing 
another. Grant believed that, in war, what is woii is 
only a fidcrum on which to rest the lever for another 
effort. One was essentially a defensive, the other an 
offensive general ; one always prepared for defeat, 
the other always expected to win. So, the day after 
Grant's suggestion of an advance, Halleck telegraphed : 
" Be prepared to concentrate your troops in case of 
an attack," 

This caution, however, was not in reply to Grant's 
letter ; and receiving no answer, the latter announced 
from Jackson, on the 2d of November: "I have com- 
menced a movement on Grand Junction, with three 
divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will 
leave here to-morrow and take command in person. 
If found practicable, I will go to Holly Springs, and, 
may be, Grenada, completing railroad and telegraph 
as I go." Holly Sj)rings is on the Mississij^pi Cen- 
tral railroad, twenty-five miles from Grand Junction, 
and about half way to the Tallahatchie river. The 
distance to Grenada fi*om Grand Junction is one 
hundred miles. General Pemberton, having super- 
seded Van Dorn, who remained to serve under him, 
was at this time in command of the forces opposed to 
Grant, and had fortified strongly on the Tallahatchie, 
his advance, however, reaching as far north as La 
Grange and Grand Junction. When Ilalleck re- 
ceived word that Grant had absolutely started south, 
he telegraphed: "I approve of your plan of advan- 
cing upon the enemy as soon as you are strong 



128 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

euougli for that purpose;" Lut lie did not authorize 
tlie abandonment of any of Grant's positions, and tlie 
latter was therefore obliged to hold them all. 

On the 4th of Xovember, he had seized La Grange 
and Grand Junction, and announced : " My moving 
force will be about thirty thousand men." McPherson 
commanded his right wing, and C. S. Hamilton the 
left, while Sherman moved out from Memphis to 
attract attention in that direction. Grant's head- 
C[uartei's were with the main body. On the 8th, he 
informed Sherman that he estimated the rebels at 
thirty thousand, and felt "strong enougli to handle 
that number without gloves ; " so tlie demonstration 
from Memphis was countermanded. 

At this time, Major-General McClernand, who had 
been a subordinate of Grant since the battle of Bel- 
mont, was at Washington, making every effort to 
obtain an independent command in the AVest. He 
had been a politician, and a member of Congress 
from Illinois, as well as an old acquaintance and legal 
associate of the President ; he was a man of moderate 
ability, of energy and courage, but ignorant of the 
meaning of military subordination. Ambitious and 
vain, he expected to step at once to the highest 
positions in the army, without the knowledge or ex- 
I)erience Avliich alone could fit him for important 
commjind. He had political and j^ersonal influence, 
however, and made ample use of it. Having served 
at Belmont, Donelson, and Shiloh, he declared he was 
tired of furnishing l)raius for the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, and 80 claimed the command, wliich he an- 
nounced, and very possibly believed, was his right. 
His claims were supported by not a few individuals 
of consideration at the West; the President favored, 



TJLYSSES S. GRANT. 129 

and McClernand was promised, if not that he should 
supersede Grant, at least that he should be allowed 
to raise troops for an inde2:)endent expedition, whose 
object was the opening of the Mississippi river and 
tlie capture of Yicksbui-g. He made his plans, and 
suljmitted them to the President, who approved, and 
directed McClernand to lay them before the general- 
in-chief* 

But Halleck was a soldier purely, and had not a 
particle of sympathy with the personal or political 
schemes of the ambitious aspirants M^ho swarmed into 
Washington from every quarter of the North ; he was 
solely and sincerely anxious for military results, and 
refused to consider McClernand's plan. He told that 
general that he had not time to waste on such mat- 
ters, and if he had the time he had not the inclination. 
So he fought the whole scheme as long and as hard 
as he could. At this time, too, General Halleck had 
more consideration with the government than a year 
later, after his long series of defeats had occurred ; he 
was therefore better able to carry out his own views. 
The President, however, was the warm friend of 
McClernand, and was accustomed to dictate in purely 
military matters as often as in civil ones. It must 
be said, that the civilians, who controlled military 
movements, had at this time no warrant for sup- 
posing that, even in military matters, their judgments 
were not as reliable as those of any soldiers who had 
been prominent. The generals who had enjoyed 
almost arbitrary power had failed ; and it is not sur- 
prising that members of the govei'ument, \\ho were in 
a great measure responsible in the eyes of the country 

* These assertions of fact are all based on statements capable of 
verification, but not exclusively derived from official sources. 
9 



130 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

for whatever occnrred, took it upon themselves to de- 
cide questions which, for auglit that had been proven, 
tliey were as capable of deciding as any officer of the 
army. So the President indorsed McClernand, and 
the Secretary of War tohl him to go out West and get 
his troops together. 

Grant as yet kne\v nothing of all this, except from 
the gossip of the newspapers ; but, on the 5th of No- 
vember, Halleck asked, evidently referring to the river 
expedition : " Had not troops sent to reenforce you 
better go to Memphis hereafter ? I hope to give you, 
twenty thousand additional men in a few days." 
About the same time, he also informed Grant : " I 
liope for an active campaign on the Mississippi, this 
fall ; a large force will ascend the river from New 
Orleans." On the 9th, Grant telegraphed : " Reen- 
forcements are arriving very slowly. If they do not 
come in more rapidly, I will attack as I am." On the 
1 0th, he got more restive, and inquired : " Am I to 
understand that I lie here still, while an expedition 
is fitted out from Memphis, or do you want me to 
])u^<ll as far south as possible ? x\m I to have Sher- 
man suljject to my orders, or is he and his force re- 
served for some special service?" Halleck replied 
promptly: "You liave command of all troops sent 
to yinir department, and have permission to figlit the 
enemy when you please." This was on the 12th, and 
on the 13th, Grant's cavalry entered Holly Springs, 
driving the enemy south of the Tallahatchie. On the 
14th, he informed Sherman: "I have now complete 
control of my department," and accordingly ordered 
him to " move with two divisions of twelve full reiri- 
ments each, and, if possible, with three divisions, to 
Oxfoidj or the Tallahatchie, as soon as possible. I 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 131 

am now ready to move from here (La Grange), any 
day, and only await your movements." Sherman 
was to notify Grant when he couhl march, and to 
which of the places mentioned, and Grant promised 
to move so that they might arrive simultaneously. 
" I am exceedingly anxious," said Grant, " to do some- 
thing before the roads get bad, and before the enemy 
can intrench and reenforce." He was evidently not 
aware of the rebel worhs on the Tallahatchie. The 
campaign now contemplated, was in pursuance of 
Grant's original plan to advance along the Mississippi 
Central railroad, until, by getting near enough to 
threaten Vicksburg, he should compel the evacuation 
of that place. A cooperative movement, by troops 
from Helena, in Arkansas, which Halleck ordered, 
was intended to cut the railroad in Pemberton's rear 
and threaten Grenada. 

On the 23d, Halleck again broached the subject 

of the river expedition, doubtless urged on by the 

President, who was beset by McClernand's political 

friends, and who, in fact, Avas frequently unable to 

withstand political or personal solicitations. Kow, 

although Halleck fully agreed with Grant and every 

other soldier, as to the impropriety of intrusting a 

man like McClernand with important commands, he 

-svas, of course, obliged to be subordinate ; and, when 

directed by his superiors, inquu-ed of Grant how 

many men he had in his department, and what force 

could be sent down the river to Vicksburg. Grant 

replied that he had in all seventy-two thousand men, 

of whom eighteen thousand were at [Memphis, and 

sixteen thousand of these could be spared for the 

river expedition. He announced, on the 24th, that 

he had sriven his orders for the advance of his entire 



132 JULITAKY mSTOEY OF 

force, including Slierman; had written to Steele, in 
Arkansas, to threaten Grenada; and had asked Ad- 
miral Poi-ter, commanding the Mississippi squadron, 
to send hoats to cooperate at the mouth of the 
Yazoo. " Must I countermand the orders for this 
move ? " The reply was : " Proposed move approved. 
Do not go too far." Apparently, Halleck and Grant 
both strove to expedite the movement, so that, if pos- 
sible, it might get too far advanced to be recalled. 
Nothing in war is more painful, than the spectacle of 
soldierly men obliged to give up movements that 
they know to be for the best interests of the country, 
and cooperate in others planned by ignorant minds, 
and committed to unskilful hands. Yet, their sol- 
dierly principles and instincts compelled them to 
cooperate heartily. So far, however, the soldiers had 
it their own way. 

On the 29th, Grant's cavalry crossed the Talla- 
hatchie, and his headquarters were at Holly Springs ; 
Sherman, too, was up, and would cross the Talla- 
hatchie, at Wyatt. Grant telegraphed : " Our troops 
wDl be in Abbeville " (on the Tallahatchie) " to- 
moiTOw, or a battle will be fought." 

Meanwhile the movement of troops fi*om Helena 
was made, under Generals Hovey and Washburne. 
Tliey marched across from the Mississippi, to cut the 
railroad in Pemberton's rear, and accomplished that 
object; but the damage done was slight and readily 
repaii-ed, and the operation had but little effect upon 
tlie campaign, unless, indeed, it hastened the evacua- 
tion of the rel)el woiks on the Tallahatchie. For on 
tlie 1st of Decem])er, the enemy deserted his fortifi- 
cations on that river, a\ liiih were too stronsf to have 
been stormed : Grant was making preparations to 



ULYSSES S. GRAIST. 133 

flank them, when the evacuation occurred. Pursuit 
was made to Oxford : there was no fighting other 
than skirmisliing ; but deha^'s were indispensable, as 
supplies for the entire army were brought along a 
single line of railroad, which had to be repaired and 
reconstructed as the troops advanced. The country 
roads, too, were in bad condition, and rendered rapid 
marches impossible. But on the 3d, Grant informed 
Admiral Porter : " Our move has been successful, so 
far as compelling the evacuation of the Mississippi 
Central road as far as Grenada." Shortly after, he 
reported taking twelve hundred prisoners. 

Grant, however, had already begun to think that 
the difficulty of supplying his army would be too 
great to overcome, and on the same day that he wrote 
to Porter, he asked Halleck, from Abbeville : " How 
far south would you like me to go ? Would it not 
be well to hold the enemy south of the Yallabusha" 
(the next important stream south of the Tallahatchie), 
" and move a force from Helena and Memphis on 
Vicksburg ? With my present force it would not be 
prudent to go beyond Grenada, and attempt to hold 
present line of communication." On the 5th, he was 
at Oxford, twenty-eight miles beyond Holly Springs, 
with his cavalry at Coffeeville, only eighteen miles 
from Grenada. This whole advance was made with- 
out serious fighting, as the enemy fell back rapidly 
before any show of pursuit. On the 5th, he again 
suggested to Halleck : " If the Helena troops were 
at my command, I think it would be practicable to 
send Sherman to take them and the Memphis forces 
south of the mouth of Yazoo river, and thus secure 
Vicksburg and the state of Mississippi." * 

* I beg the careful attention of the reader to the above extract, 



134 AULITABY HISTOE 

The plan here sketched, and wliicn was eventually 
adopted, had a double chance of success. Either 
Sherman, going down the Mississippi to the moutli 
of the Yazoo, could present a new base for Grant, 
from which the latter could supply himself, when he 
also struck the Yazoo, in tlie interior ; or, if this should 
be found impracticable or less desirable, Grant could 
hold the main body of the enemy at, or near Grenada, 
confronting him, while Sherman might step in and 
take Yicksburg. By this strategy, Grant assumed 
wliat seemed the more ungrateful part of the under- 
taking, leaving the prize of the campaign to be se- 
cured by his subordinate. The same peculiarity was 
also conspicuous in some of Ms later programmes, but 
in each instance. Fortune overruled his arrangements 
and brought about her own conclusions, apparently 
resolved to dispose of her own favors. 

On the 5th of the month, in reply to Grant's sug- 
gestions, Ilalleck directed him not to attempt to hold 
the country south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 
twenty-five thousand troops at Memphis, by the 20th, 
fur the Yicksburg expedition. On the 7th, Grant 
answered that he would send two divisions to Mem- 
phis in a few days, and asked : " Do you want me to 
connnand the expedition to Yicksburg, or shall I 
send Sliernum ?" To w^liich Ilalleck replied : " You 
may move your ti'oops as you may deem best to 
acconi])li>li the great object in view. . . . Ask 
Poi-ter to c()6])erate. Telegi'ai)h what are your pres- 
ent i)laiis;' Gi-aiit answered at once, on the Sth : 

an.l to all that is quotoil iii reference to Sherman's movement and 
<; rant's ])romiscd cooperation. There has been a misunderstand- 
ing of this matter by some writers, which I shall endeavor to 
rectify. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 135 

" General Slierman uill coin m and the expedition 
down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about 
forty thousand men, will laud at Yicksburg, up the 
Yazoo if practicable, and cut the Mississippi Central 
road, and the road running east from Vicksburg, 
where they cross the Black river. I will cooperate 
from here, my movements depending on tliose of the 
enemy. With the large cavaliy force at my com- 
mand, I will be able to have them show themselves 
at diiferent points on the Tallaliatchie and Yalla- 
busha, and where an opportunity occurs, make a real 
attack. " After cutting the two roads, General Sher 
man's movements, to secure the end desired, will ne. 
cessarily be left to his judgment. I wdll occupy this 
road to Coifeeville." 

Written instructions conformalde to the above 
dispatch were on the same day given to Sherman;'"' 

* "IIeadquarteks Thirteenth Army Corps, Department of the) 
Tennessee, Oxford, Mississippi, December 8, 1S62. ' 

"■ Major-Generaiy\ . T. Sherman, commanding llight Wing: 

" YouAvill proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis, Ten- 
nessee, taking with jou one division of your present command. On 
your arrival at Memphis, you will assume command of all the troops 
there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of the 
Mississippi river, and organize them into brigades and divisions in 
your own army. As soon as possible move with them down the river 
to the vicinity of Vicksburg, and, with the cooperation of the gunboat 
fleet under command of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction 
of that jjlace, in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment 
may dictate. 

" The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary 
to take, will be left entirely with yourself. The quartermaster at St. 
Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for thirty thousand 
men ; should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will 
be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may 
come into the post of Memphis. 

" On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with Ad- 
miral Porter, and ai-range with him for his cooperation. 

" Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you 



136 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

and Grant Laving "been authorized, in compliance 
with liis i-eqnest, to assume command of all the troops 
then in Mississippi, belonging to the Department of 
Arkansas, directed them to report to Sherman, whom 
he dispatched on the 8th, to Memphis. Porter was 
infoiTned of the plan, and was requested to cooperate. 
Sherman was instructed to move with all celerity, 
and informed, that " I will hold the troops here in 
readiness to cooperate wdth you in such manner as 
tlie movements of the enemy may make necessaiy." 
This was the extent of Grant's promise of coopera- 
tion. It was, however, understood in conversation, 
that in case Pembei-ton retreated, Grant would fol- 
low him up, between the Yazoo and the Big Black 
rivers, to the Mississippi. 

Grant was still anxious lest McClernand should 
obtain the command of the river expedition, and 
therefore had hurried Sherman to Memphis, on the 
very day that he received the authority, so that, if 
possible, the latter might start before McClernand 
could arrive. Ilalleck, too, sent tlie permission to 
Grant to dispatch Sherman, without that delibera- 
tion which he sometimes displayed ; but on tlie 9th, 
he ti'legraphed : "The President may insist upon 
sending a separate commander. K not, assign such 
officer as you deem best. Sherman w'ould be my 
fhoic-e as the chief under you." IS'othing could be 
more genuine than the support which in this and 

will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. Itcill Tiold 
tJie forces here in n'tidiness to cooperate with yov. in such manner as the 
movements of the enemy may male 7iecessary. 

"Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient offi- 
cer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the sieo-e "'uns 
and whatever cavalry may be there. 

"U. S. Grant, Major- General^ 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 137 

nearly every other matter, Grant received from his 
chief, after Halleck once assumed command of all the 
armies. If any jealousy or unkindness had once 
been apparent in Halleck's behavior to his subordi- 
nate, neither was displayed again under relations of 
extraordinary delicacy and difficulty. And, at this 
time. Grant had not begun to regain his position in 
the public esteem. 

On the 14th, Grant informed Sherman, who was 
still at Memphis, that " it would be well if you could 
have two or three small boats suitable for navigating 
the Yazoo. It may become necessary for me to look 
to that base for supplies, before we get through." 
On the 18th, came at last the unwelcome word from 
Washington: "It is the wish of the President that 
General McClernand's corps shall constitute a part of 
the river expedition, and that he shall have the im- 
mediate command under your direction." The first 
part of this dispatch was an order to divide all the 
troops in Grant's command, including those from 
Arkansas, into four corps. 

And thus a political general was foisted on Hal- 
leck and his subordinate ; the influences brought to 
bear on the President were too strong for the soldiers. 
There was of course nothing to do but obey; and 
Grant wrote on tlie same day to McClernand, who 
was at Springfield, Illiuois : " I have been directed 
this moment, by telegraph from the general-in-chief 
of the army, to divide the forces of this department 
into four army corps, one of which is to be com 
manded by yourself, and that to form a part of the 
expedition on Vicksburg. I have drafted the order, 
and will forward it to you as soon as printed. . . . 
Written and verbal instructions have been given to 



J 38 3IILITAEY HISTORY OF 

General Sherman, wLicli Avill he turned over to you 
on your aiTival at Memphis." 

On the 20th, however, the enem}'s cavaby, under 
Van Dorn, made a dash into Holly Springs, twenty- 
eight miles in Grant's rear, and captured the garrison, 
with all its stores. Forrest, another rebel raider, at 
the same time pushed his cavalry into "West Tennes- 
see, and cut the railroad to Columbus, at several 
points between that place and Jackson. This com- 
pletely severed Grant's only line of communication 
with the North, and even with most parts of his own 
command. It was a catastrophe which he had fore- 
seen as possible, and had striven hard to avert. He 
had received timely notice of the advance of Forrest, 
and taken every precaution to meet it. General Sul- 
livan, who commanded at Jackson, was reenforced 
lapidly, and directed to move out towards the enemy. 
All of the available cavalry of the Array of the Ten- 
nessee was also sent after the raiders, and all command- 
ers between Oxford and Bolivar were notified of the 
rebel movements, and directed to hold their respec- 
tive posts "at all hazards." Men and commanders 
everywhere did their duty, except at Holly Springs ; 
and the enemy was repulsed at Coldwater, Davis 
Mills, Bolivar, and Middleburg; but Holly Springs 
was captured ^\•hile the troops were in their beds. 
The conunanding officer of the post. Colonel Murphy, 
of the Eighth Wisconsin volunteers, had taken no 
ste])s to ])rotecfc the place, not notifying a single officer 
of the connr.and, of the approaching danger, although 
lie himself had received early warning from Grant, 
'i'he troops were blameless, for the first intimation they 
had of an attack, was when they found themselves 
sui-rounded ; and notwithstanding the surprise, many 



ULYSSES 8. GKANT. 139 

of tliem behaved admirably, refusing to be paroled, 
and after making their escape from the enemy, attack- 
ino; him without reofard to their relative strencjth. 
Colonel Murpliy was dismissed the service for his 
conduct on this occasion. He was the same officer 
who had abandoned luka to Pj'ice so readily. Fifteen 
hundred prisoners were taken, and four hundred 
thousand dollars' worth of property was reported de- 
stroyed. The enemy estimated the loss of property 
at four millions. The actual damage probably 
amounted to a million of dollars. 

Holly Springs, Grant had made a secondaiy base 
of supplies, and the destniction of the ordnance, sub- 
sistence, and quartermasters' stores there, was a serious 
though temporary annoyance. The railroad, how- 
ever, Avas not seriously damaged between La Grange 
and Oxford, except at Holly Springs, and the enemy 
had possession of that place only long enough to 
complete the destruction of the stores ; but the cut- 
tins; of the line between Jackson and Columbus at 
once demonstrated what Grant had foretold, the impos- 
sibility of maintaining so long a line of supply through 
hostile territory. He commenced the next day to 
fall back north of the Tallahatchie, and at the same 
time expressed a wish to Halleck, to send two divi 
sions to Memphis, and join the river expedition with 
them in person. Since Sherman was not to command 
it, he was anxious to do so himself, especially as he 
knew its difficulties would now be enhanced by his 
own inability to advance, or even to remain on his 
present line. The promptness with which he came to 
this conclusion ^sas not inspired by any apprehension 
of the force in his front, for he telegraphed the same 
day : " The enemy are falling back from Grenada." 



140 JIILITAEY mSTORY OF 

General Grant Las told me, when discussing this 
campaign, that had he known then, what he soon 
afterwards learned — the possibility of subsisting an 
army of thirty thousand men without supplies, other 
than those drawn from an enemy's country — he could, 
at that time, have pushed on to the rear of Vicksburg, 
and probably have succeeded in capturing the place. 
But no experience of former wars, nor of the war of 
the rebellion, warranted him in supposing that he 
could feed his army exclusively fiom the countiy. 
The rainy season was setting in, when the roads 
^vould naturally very much impede his progress, of 
course increasing the difficulty of subsistence, and he 
determined at once to return. 

He was, however, obliged from sheer necessity to 
subsist on what he could find. For over a week, he 
had no communication whatever with the North, and 
for two weeks, no supplies. But the countiy was 
found to be abundantly stocked. Every thing for 
the subsistence of man or beast, for fifteen miles east 
and west of the railroad, from Coffeeville to La Grange, 
was appropriated to the use of the army. The fiimi- 
lies of the farmers suft'ered, but the soldiers were fed; 
and the lesson was taught which Grant afterwards 
applied in the rear of Vicksburg, and which Sher- 
man, having seen the application, practised on a still 
lai-irer scale, in the marches throu2:h Geor2:ia and the 
C arolinas — the lesson that an army may live, though 
its comnuinications are desti'oyed. 

It was a sorry tlay for the rebels when they burnt 
Holly Spiings, and broke up Grant's communications 
with Columl)Us; not only sorry in those grander 
results to which allusion lias been made, but in the 
more immediate effects, extending only to the people 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 141 

of nortliem Mississippi. The women came with 
smiling faces to Grant's headquarters, to see how he 
bore the loss of Holly Springs. They asked him 
civilly, but exultingly, what he would do, now that 
his soldiers had nothinsj to eat. But their exultation 
and smiles were of short continuance, when the quiet 
general informed them that his soldiers would find 
plenty in theii' barns and storehouses. They looked 
aghast at this, and exclaimed : " You would not take 
from non-combatants!" But a commander's first 
necessity is to provide for his troops ; so the country 
was st]*ipped bare, and the army was supplied. 

Althouofh the soldiers found all that was neces- 
sary, Grant was anxious until he discovered the suc- 
cess of the experiment. It was one hitherto untried, 
and, while uncertain as to its results, he moved his 
army back to La Grange, abandoning the campaign, 
which had been pressed to a distance of fifty or sixty 
miles. On the 23d of December, the headquarters 
were again at Holly Spiings. Forrest was sjieedily 
chased out of West Tennessee, but the damage he had 
done could not be so readily repaired. 

Various reasons had induced Grant to select this 
line of operations against Vicksburg, rather than that 
of the Mississippi river. First of all, was a desire to 
fight Pemberton. He appreciated fully the impor- 
tance of Vicksburs^, and. was anxious enousrh to se- 
cure its possession ; but, as has already been shown, 
•he was always more anxious to destroy rebel armies 
than to capture rebel cities, believing that, if the 
armies were destroyed, the cities were sure to fall. 
So, if Pemberton had by any possibility got around 
towai'ds Columbus, Grant would undoubtedly have 
moved in that direction, and let Vicksburg alone. 



142 SHLITAEY HISTORY OF 

until be had beaten the enemy in the field. When 
he started from La Grange, he indeed meant and 
hoped to threaten Vicksburg, but liis prime object 
was the defeat of PemV)erton. As soon as he dis- 
covered that Pemberton would not fight, on the very 
day that the national troops got inside the rebel 
works on the Tallahatchie, and found the enemy 
afain di>^appearing, Grant suggested the movement 
direct against Vicksburg ; determined to secure the 
destruction of the rebel force, whether it remained in 
tlie interior of Mississippi, confronting him, or was 
luirricd to Vicksburg to reenforce the garrison tliere. 
There were, however, other, although secondary 
considerations, which confirmed his judgment in this 
matter, if they did not assist in determining it. 
Taking the river route earlier, would have left all the 
state of Mississippi free to the rebels, who could at 
any time have attacked his communications on that 
line, cutting him off more effectually and permanent- 
ly than they did at Holly Springs ; while Mem2:)liis 
itself would have been Avithin reach of Bragg, by 
a rapidly executed movement. By moving towards 
Grenada, however, Grant covered Memphis and the 
country already acquired, besides threatening the 
region on both sides of his line of march. These ad- 
vantages recommended this route to accomplished 
soldiers, even after the disaster at Holly Springs ; and 
I have heard men of high militaiy reputation main- 
tain, since the capture of Vicksburg, that Grant 
should liave persevered in his original plan of cam- 
l»aigii. He, however, had no idea of remaining in 
the interior, or of returning to it, after this date, al- 
though strongly urged to such a course, by some of 
liis most capable and trusted ofticers. He considered 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 143 

tliat, l)y llie destruction of tlie Mississippi Central 
road and its bridges, and tlie devastation of tlie re- 
sources of tlie country, lie had sufficiently protected 
himself against attacks of any importance upon his new 
line; and the event proved that the rebels were too 
Inisy defending themselves, to take any initiative again, 
during the long campaign and siege that followed. 

McClernand's assumption of the command of the 
river expedition was delayed by the break in com- 
munication. Grant could not transmit the orders he 
had received, although he ^vl'ote at once to McCler- 
nand ; but, before the line was reopened, Sherman had 
embarked at Memphis, with thirty thousand men, and 
at Helena, was reenforced by twelve thousand more. 
He arrived at Milliken's bend, on the Arkansas side, 
and twenty miles above Yieksburg, on the 24th of 
December ; here he spent two or three days, in at- 
tempts to cut the Vicksburg and Shreveport railroad 
(by which reenfbrcements could have been sent to 
Vicksburg), and waiting to hear from Banks, who had 
been ordered to move up the river from New Orleans 
and cooperate in the attack on Vicksburg. The rebels 
probably made use of these two or three days to pre- 
pare for the attack which they knew must follow. 
On the 2Gth, under convoy of Admiral Porter and his 
fleet of gunboats, Sherman advanced on transports up 
the Yazoo liver, which empties into the Mississippi, 
aT)Out nine miles above the toAvn. He debarked his 
troops on the 27th, on the south side of the river, 
near the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou.* 

The long line of hills on which Vicksburg stands, 
turns off from the Mississippi, just above the town, 

* Tlic map of operations in Yazoo pass and Steele's bayou and map 
I' Campaign against Vicksburg illustrate the operations here described. 



144 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

and runs parallel to the Yazoo for several miles. Be- 
tween tlie latter river and tlie bluffs, lies a strip of 
country peculiarly susce^^tible of defence ; covered with 
a dense and tangled overgrowth, cut up with swamps 
and intersected Avith streams, and at this time almost 
entirely under water ; in fact, impracticable for in- 
fantry, except along one or two narrow causeways ; 
this strip of territory, some three miles wide, was 
commanded by the guns on the bluffs, which were 
strongly posted, and was besides completely within 
range from the numerous trenches and rifle-pits along 
the hills. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which 
rendered it impossible for Sherman to avail himself at 
any one time of half his force, he attacked the works 
on the 29th, got his men across this difficult coun- 
try, and into the rebel lines ; he even effected a lodg- 
ment on the hard land at the foot of the bluff's, but 
Avas finally driven back with severe loss. It was then 
determined to attempt a landing higher up the Ya- 
zoo, in the night, so as to attack the enemy's extreme 
right in cooperation with the naval force, and thus 
secure a base fi-om which communication with Grant 
might be opened. The preliminary movements were 
made, but a dense fog set in, so thick that the ves- 
sels could not move, nor could the men see each other 
at the distance of ten paces. This lasted till day- 
break, when it was too late to start. A heavy rain 
then set in, rendering the ground if possible still 
more impracticable, and the attempt was abandoned. 
Shennnn moved his troops out of the Yazoo, and at 
the mouth of tlie Missi.-^si])])i, he was met by I\[cCler- 
nand, on the '2d of January. lie at once relinquished 
his command to that officer, assuming himself the com- 
mand of a single corps. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. • 145 

He had lost one hundred and seventh-five men 
killed, nine hundred and thirty wounded, and seven 
hundi-ed and forty-three missing.* In his report to 
Grant, he attributed his failure " to the strength of 
the enemy's position, both natural and artificial." 
Grant, however, had no fault to find with him ; the 
assault was made at the only point where there was 
a chance of success, and was conducted with skill 
and judgment ; the men behaved with a gallantry 
not surpassed during the war, but the extraordinary 
nature of the defences rendered the attempt unavail- 
ino". The rebels had doubtless been reenforced from 
Pemberton's command, but this contributed nothing 
to the result, as Sherman had twice as many men as 
he could use on the difficult gi-ound where he fought.f 

* The rebels reported a loss of sixty-three killed, one hundred and 
tliii'ty-four wounded, and ten missing. 

t It has been supposed and stated by some, that Sherman's reverse 
was the consequence of a failure on Grant's part to move south from 
Grenada, and appear in the rear of Vicksburg at the time of the as- 
sault. I have already explained what was the nature and extent of 
the cooperation planned by Grant. He meant, if he could, to hold 
Pemberton at Grenada, and thus allow Sherman to enter Vicksburg 
without any material opposition : but the strength of the works was 
not fully appreciated when this arrangement was made ; they were so 
strong that had Grant been able to keep Peraberton's entire force in 
his own front, there would have been no different result to Sherman's 
endeavor. Sherman himself declared that his failure was owing to 
'•the strength of the enemy's position, both natural and artificial;" 
and he never could have anticii)ated a tactical cooperation from 
Grant, for Grant had neither promised nor suggested it. The letters 
from Grant to Halleck, and Grant's orders to Sherman, both given in 
full above (in the text or in notes), are proof of this assertion. Sher- 
man himself declared in his report of the operations : " I supposed 
their" (the rebel) "organized forces to amount to about fifteen thou- 
sand, which could be reenforced at the rate of about five thousand a 
day, 2^1'ovided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pemher- 
tonh forces at Grenada.'''' Again, in the same report : " Not one word 
could I hear from General Grant, who was supposed to be pushing 
10 



146 MixrrAKY history of 

Tlie seljels were jubilant over the double issue 
of tliis campaign, and tliey certainly succeeded in 
deferring the result at which the national command- 
er aimed. The success of Grant's plans was indeed 

govth." " I proposed ... to attack tlie enemy's right, which, if suc- 
cessful, would give us the substantial possession of the Yazoo river, and 
place V8 in communication with General Grant.'' " Of course I was sadly 
disappointed, as it was the only remaining chance of our securing a 
lodgment on the ridge between the Yazoo and the Black rivers, from 
which to operate against Vicksburg and the railroad east, as also to 
secure the navigation of the Y^'azoo river," " The rumor of General 
Grant having fallen back behind the Tallahatchie, became confirmed 
by my receiving no intelligence from him." " The effort was neces- 
sary to a successful accomplishment of my orders, and the combina- 
tions were the best possible under the circumstances. I assume all the 
responsibility, and attach blame to no one." 

In his orders to division commanders lefore the attacTc, dated Decem- 
ber 23d, Sherman said : " Parts of this general plan are to cooperate 
with the naval squadron in the reduction of Vicksburg, to secure pos- 
session of the land lying between the Y^azoo and the Black, and to act 
in concert with General Grant against Pemberton's forces, supposed to 
have Jacl-son, Mississippi, as a point of concentration^ In the same pa- 
per : " It may be necessary (looking to Grant's approach), before at- 
tacking Vicksburg, to reduce the battery at Ilaine's bluif first, so as to 
unable some of the lighter gunboats and transports to ascend the Y'a- 
7.00, and communicate irith General Grant." Again : " Granfs left and 
centre tcere at the last accounts approaching the Yallahusha, near Grenada, 
and the railroad to his rear, by which he drew his supplies, was re- 
ported to be seriously damaged. This may disconcert him somewhat, 
but only makes more important our line of operations. At the Talla- 
bttsha, General Grant mai/ encounter the army of General Pemherton, the 
same which refused him battle on the line of the Tallahatchie, which 
was strongly fortified; but as he" (Pemberton) "will not have time 
to fortify the Yallabusha, he will hardly fortify there, and in that event 
General Grant will immediately advance down the high ridge lying 
})ctwecn the Big Black and Yazoo, and will expect to meet us on the 
Yazoo, and receive from us the supplies which he needs, and which he 
knows we carry along." Finally: " I purpose to land our whole force 
on the Mississippi side, and then to reach the point where the Vicks- 
burg and Jackson railroad crosses the Big Black, after which to attack 
Vicksburg by land, whilst the gunboats assail it by water." 

Of course those who think or have said that General Grant was to meet 



TLYSSES S. GRANT. 147 

more tliaii once delayed ; sometimes by the skilful 
movements of his antagonists, and quite as often by 
the unskilful or unwilling operations of those whom 
he commanded : for in war, tlie loyalty of his subor- 
dinates is as important to the chief as tlie practica- 
bility of his plans or the steadiness of liis soldiers. 
In this instance, Grant could not complain of his gen- 
erals ; nor indeed is it easy to say that the fault was 
in his plans. The line he himself marched on, was 
that dictated by the rules of the military art, and, 
had he taken a larger force, his predicament would 
only have been so much the worse ; he would have 
had so many more men to feed. Sherman, too, had 
more troops than he could use, so that a different 
disposition of the forces could hardly have resulted 
more favorably. Indeed, when Grant threw both his 



Sherman at Vicksburg, or to cooperate with hira in the assault, never can 
have seen these papers. It is evident that Sherman understood exactly 
■what his chief meant to do, and explained those intentions to his own 
subordinates. It is plain that he felt the greatest anxiety to open up 
the Yazoo river, so that Grant might descend, and in order to open 
the Yazoo, he made the assault ; it is plain, not only, that he did not 
expect Grant to be at Vicksburg, but that he had heard and believed 
strong rumors of the disaster which had occurred to Grant's line of 
communication ; that, knowing the probability of this disaster having 
occurred, he was, like a good soldier and loyal subordinate, still more 
anxious to assault, in order to relieve his commander from what might 
be imminent stress ; that he know Grant's objective to be Pemberton, 
and declared that Pemberton's point of concentration was Jackson, 
fitly miles from Vicksburg ; that after the unsuccessful assault he still 
made no ungenerous attempt to lay the blame on any shoulders but 
his own, but assumed it all, if any blame there was in making a skil- 
ful and courageous though unsuccessful effort to take a place of unu- 
sual strength by storm. Sherman deserves all praise for his determi- 
nation to attempt the assault, when he knew, not only, that Grant neve" 
intended to support him in its tactical execution, but that he was prob 
ably unable to render even the strategical support to the movement 
which had originally been planned. 



148 jnUTAKY HISTOKY OF 

armies on the Mississippi, success still fled before liis 
advances, as coyly as in the interior. 

As has heen shown, he had early foreseen the 
especial difficulty which beset his army in this cam- 
paign ; but marched on, trusting that in the manifold 
chances of war, he might be able to overcome or 
evade it. The rebels, however, saw plainly what 
their game was, and played it well ; they withdrew 
before Grant's advance without risking a fight, and, 
then, suddenly cutting his communications, so as to 
hold him from any further progress, hastened by their 
interior lines to Yicksburg, to withstand Sherman ; 
wlio, however, would have been equally unable to 
carry his point of assault, if Pemberton had remained 
in front of Grant. Had this been the end, it would 
have been a defeat for Grant ; but nothing can be 
styled defeat which eventuates in success; and the 
idea of abandoning his aim was not even presented 
to this general's mind. He was baffled at Oxford, 
but before the rebel rear-guard was out of Holly 
Springs, he had planned another campaign with all 
his forces, by way of the Mississippi river. Delays 
and tlifficulties with him had only the effect of in- 
creasing his determination and provoking his obsti- 
nacy. Some men need the excitement of slight suc- 
cess to sustain their patience and inspire their hope ; 
(i rant's only enthusiasm w\is that confidence which be- 
comes serene when emergencies threaten and crowd. 

Upon leaving the Yazoo river, Sherman at once 
])roposed to McClernand that, while waiting for fur- 
ther orders from Grant, the expeditionary force should 
be eni])loyed in the capture of Arkansas Post, a 
stront; work on the Arkansas, fifty miles from its 
mouth. The object was to occupy the troops, and 



ULYSSES 6. GRANT. 140 

raise their spii'its, depressed by the recent failure, 
and also to secure the Hue of communication "by the 
Mississippi against attacks from the Arkansas side. 
McClernand immediately acquiesced in Sherman's 
proposition, and moved his force up the Arkansas, 
the fleet under Poi-ter accompanying. A naval bom- 
bardment, lasting several days, occurred ; and on the 
11th, the troops assaulted the works, when the post 
surrendered, after a tight of three hours, in which the 
squadron bore a conspicuous part. Five thousand 
prisoners and seventeen pieces of cannon fell into the 
hands of the victors ; McClernand lost about a thou- 
sand men, in killed, wounded, and missing. The guns 
of the fort were silenced by the fleet, and Admiral 
Porter received the sword of its commander, but the 
troops were surrendered to the army. 

This operation was planned and executed without 
Grant's knowledge or consent, and he was at first dis- 
pleased with the movement, whose effect on the con- 
templated campaign was not perceptible. Lacking any 
confidence in McClernand's military judgment, and 
supposing that the plan emanated solely from that offi- 
cer, he did not give it the same consideration it would 
have received, had he known that Sherman first sug- 
gested the idea. It seemed to him a mere side move, 
contributing: in no desiree to the s-reat result at which 
he was aiming ; and, throughout the war, he preferred 
to engage in no enterprise that did not tend directly 
to the accomplishment of his main object. He ex- 
pressed his dissatisfaction in this instance both to 
McClernand and to Halleck, but, subsequently, became 
convinced that the reasons offered in favor of the 
movement were sufficient to warrant McClernand in 
making it. 



150 MILITAKY HISTOKY OF 

Grant, mean while, Lad been extremely anxious on 
account of Sherman. Cut off, for more than a week, 
from all news from the North, and aware that the 
impossibility of holding any troops in his own front, 
might greatly increase Sherman's difficulties, he was 
yet unable to do any thing to relieve his subordinate. 
Even after communication with Memphis was re- 
opened, it was long before he heard directly from the 
river expedition. On the 4th of January, he had 
news of the assault, but neither official nor definite, 
and could not learn, for a week afterwards, whether 
Sherman had fought his way into Vicksburg or not. 
On the 4th, McPhei'son was ordered north from the 
Tallahatchie; but the backward movement was a 
slow one ; the roads were in miserable condition by 
reason of the winter rains, and, as it had been deter- 
mined to abandon northern Mississippi, the accu- 
mulated quartermasters' and ordnance stores had to be 
removed with the army. It was not until the 10th 
of January, that the headquarters Avere established at 
jNIemphis. 

From there, Grant wrote at once to McClemand 
that he had heard nothing official from the expedition 
since Sherman left : " This expedition must not fail. 
If there is force enough within the limits of my con- 
trol to secure a certain victory at Vicksburg, they 
will be sent there." Being urged by Ilalleck to send 
every thing j)ossible down the river, he stated his 
iradiness to reenforce McClernand with twenty thou- 
sand troops. He also, at this time, sent an officer to 
Admiral Porter, to survey the ground, and determine 
the practicability (vf reopening the canal across the 
tongue of land opi)osite Vicksburg. McClernand 
was ordered to rendezvous at Milliken's bend, or 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 151 

some other point convenient for cooperation with 
Banks, who Avas daily expected below Viclvsburg. 

It is necessary to a correct understanding of all 
these operations, and due to General Ilalleck, to keep 
constantly in mind that Major-General Banks had 
been sent to New Orleans, by sea, with an army of 
forty thousand men, and ordered to cooperate in the 
opening of the Mississippi river, and especially in the 
capture of Vicksburg.* He was to be supported by 
Admiral Farragut's fleet, already so renowned, and 
for months his arrival was constantly expected by 
Grant. Circumstances, which it is not my province 
to investigate or describe, delayed the movements of 
General Banks, who arrived at New Orleans in De- 
ceml)er, but did not start from there until Marcli, and 
returned the same month. His movements afforded 
no cooperation to Grant. 

All this while, Grant \vas greatly annoyed by 
McClernand's insubordinate behavior. That oificer 
claimed to have been placed in command directly by 
the President, and therefore to be independent of 
his superior. He constantly appealed from Grant in 
matters of military etiquette and law ; his language 
was as intolerable as his actions were injudicious; his 
official papers teemed with self laudation and grandil- 
oquent fustian, assuming credit to which he was not 
entitled, raising objections to the orders of his com- 
manding officer, making suggestions contrary to all 
the principles of military science, and fostering jeal 
ousies among different portions of the army and with 

* On the 2cl of Febmary, Halleck wrote to Banks: " General Grant's 
forces have been for some time operating in the vicinity of Yicksburg, 
and the President expects that you will permit no obstacle to prevent 
you from cooperating with him bv some movement up the Mississippi 
river." 



152 MILITAET mSTOKY OF 

the naval officers.* All these peculiarities indicated 
to Sherman, to McPherson, and to Admiral Porter the 
same traits, and those three officers urged upon Grant, 
in writing and in conversation, that the only chance 
for the success of the enterprise was in his assuming 
command of it in person. He finally received au- 
thoiity from Washington to relieve McClernand, and 
either appoint the next officer in rank in his place, or 
to assume himself tlie immediate command.f 

He, at first, desired to put Sherman in command ; 
as that officer had started from Memphis witli the 
expedition, and afterwai'ds been obliged to yield pre- 
cedence to McClernand, it seemed but fair to restore 
him. But Grant v^'as especially anxious to place 
Slierman at the head of the expedition, because he 
thought Sherman especially capable of directing its 
movements. It was, however, represented by those 
in his confidence, that as McClernand was the senior 
of Slierman, to give the junior the higher command, 

* On the 20th of January, Grant wrote to Halleck : " I regard it a3 
my duty to state that I found there was not sufficient confidence felt 
in General McClernand as a commander, eitlier by the array or navy, to 
insure him success. Of course, all would cooperate to the best of their 
aljilitics, but still with a distrust. This is a matter I made no inqui- 
ries al)0ut, but it was forced upon me. ... I want you to know 
that others besides myself agree in the necessity of the course I had 
alria<ly determined upon pursuing. Admiral Porter told me he had 
written freely to the Secretary of the Navy, with the request that what 
he said might be shown to the Secretary of War." 

On the 30th of January, McClernand wrote to Grant : " If different 
views are entertained by yon, then the question should be immediately 
rcfVrred to Washington, and one or other, or both of us, relieved. Ono 
thing is certain : two generals cannot command this army, issuing in- 
dependent and direct orders to subordinate officers." 

t See Appendi.\ for original and important papers relating to this 
expedition, and to :McClcrnand's command of it; also for further ex 
tracts iiom McC'lernand's correspondence, confirmatory of assertions in 
the U'.xt. 



FLYSSES S. GPvANT. 153 

even by autliority of the government, would un- 
doubtedly provoke feelings and conduct prejudicial 
to tbe public interest, especially in an officer of Mc- 
Clernand's peculiarities. Sherman, it is tnie, had 
submitted promptly to be relieved by McClernand, 
but he was a man with soldierly instincts, the iirst 
of which is subordination, and this was a trait that 
McClernand had seldom displayed, even towards 
Grant, his legitimate superior. Grant was, besides, 
the commander of the department, and entitled to 
direct the campaign in person ; no one could complain 
of this, for he ranked everybody in the West, and 
his assumption of immediate command would, in 
fact, relieve the question of all difficulty. 

This reasoning was unanswerable, and Grant al- 
lowed himself to be governed by it. He was loatli, 
however, to deprive Sherman of the opportunity to 
throw off the odium caused by his unsuccessful as- 
sault ; and, besides, disliked to use his own position 
as commander of the department, to claim the direc- 
tion of a campaign originally intrusted to another. 
But, Sherman was infonned of the reasons which led 
to the decision, and manifested a complete apprecia- 
tion of Grant's motives. During the tedious and 
often discouraging campaign that ensued, he never 
failed to display a zeal and loyalty towards his com- 
mander equal to that commander's anxiety to support 
and bring forward his subordinate, even at the risk 
of his own chances for fiime. 

On the l7th. Grant paid his first visit to the 
transport fleet, then lying off jt^apoleon, at the mouth 
of the Arkansas, with all the troops on board; from 
there, he wrote to Halleck, what the experience 
of many months eventually confirmed : '' Our troops 



154 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

must get below the city to be used effectually." On 
the 18th, he ^n-ote: "Should Banks pass Port Hud- 
son, this force Avill be ready to cooperate on Vicks- 
burg, at any time." On the 20tli, he returned to 
Memphis, and sent word to one of his subordinates : 
"The Mississippi river enterprise must take prece- 
dence of all others, and any side move must simply 
be to protect our flanks and rear." On the 22d, he 
said to McClernand : " I hope the work of cbanging 
the channel of tlie Mississippi is begun ; " and on the 
same day : " On the present rise, it is barely possible 
that the Yazoo pass might be turned to good ac- 
count in aiding our enterprise." These two ideas 
were already prominent in his mind ; they were des- 
tined to become fully developed ere long, and to be 
prosecuted witli energy and persistency, but both to 
prove unsuccessful. Although so persistently and 
zealously followed up by Grant, he was not at any 
time persuaded of their adequacy; but he thought it 
his duty to give them a fair trial, and, at any rate, to 
occupy the troops vigorously until he should be able 
to get them below the city. On the 20th, after his 
visit to Napoleon, he wrote : " The work of reducing 
Vicksburg will take time and men, but can be ac- 
comj)lislRMl." 

lie determined, now, to abandon the railroad from 
Jackson to Columbus, and to move all his troops 
south, except those absolutely necessary to hold the 
line from Memphis to Corinth. All heavy guns on 
the east bank, between Memphis and Columbus, and 
from Island Number Ten, as Avell as the floating bat- 
tei-ies below there, were at once removed ; as their re- 
maining only oflered inducements to the enemy to 
attack from the Tennessee side ; and the expedition 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 15.1 

was ordered to Young's ])oint, opposite tlie moiitli of 
tlie Yazoo. Grant wrote to Halleck, tliat lie sliould 
require a large force in tlie final ' struggle, but could 
dispense with any furtlier reenforcements for the 
present. He suggested, however, that it would Ije 
well to have the men in readiness when they should 
be needed. He also inquired if it would not be good 
policy to combine the four departments at the West 
— Kosecrans's, Steele's, Banks's, and his own — under 
one commander, and remarked: "As I am the rank- 
ing department commander in the West, I will state 
that I have no desire whatever for such combined 
command, but would prefer the command I now have, 
to any other that can he given." This suggestion 
was eventually acted upon, but not for many mouths, 
and until after the fall of Vicksburg, and the battle 
of Chickamauga, had demonstrated the sagacity of 
the thought, and made the selection of the man inevi- 
table. As much of the Department of Arkansas, 
however, as he might desire, was placed under his 
command at once, so that he had control of both 
banks of the Mississippi. Forts Henry and Donel 
son were at the same time transferred to the Depart- 
ment of the Cumberland, leaving Grant the exclusive 
task of opening and controlling the Mississippi river. 
On the 29th of January, General Grant arrived 
in person at Young's point, and, on the 30th, as- 
sumed immediate command of the expedition against 
Vicksburg. McClernand at once protested formally, 
but in vain. 



156 MILITAET HISTORY OF 



CHAPTEE VI. 

Character of Mississippi valley — Position and strength of Vlcksburg — Grant's 
force on taking command of expedition— Problem of the campaign — The 
Vicksburg canal — Continuous labor for months — Rise in river — Failure of 
canal— Lake Providence scheme— DiflRculties of this route — Abandonment of 
the plan— Alarm and subsequent derision of rebels— The Yazoo pass— Cir- 
cuitous route — Obstructions by rebels— Pass finally cleared — Troops enter 
the pass— Rebel fort at Greenwood — Naval attack unsuccessful — Reenforce- 
ments ordered into the pass — Route found impracticable— Steele's bayou ex- 
pedition—Remarkable natural difficulties— Sherman and Admiral Porter pro- 
ceed to Deer creek— Porter gets into danger— Sherman rescues the fleet- 
Further and irremovable obstructions— Return of both expeditions to Milli- 
ken's bend- Concentration of Grant's forces— Impatience of the country and 
government- Efforts to remove Grant— Grant's new plan— Opposition of 
Sherman and other of Grant's subordinates— Grant inflexible— Movement of 
Thirteenth Corps to New Carthage— Difliculties of route— Trouble with Mc- 
Clernand— Grierson's raid— Running of Vicksburg batteries— Cooperation of 
Admiral Porter— Attack on Grand Gulf— Failure to silence batteries— Fur- 
ther marches of troops— Running of batteries at Grand Gulf— Crossing of 
Mississippi river by Grant's advance— Demonstration by Sherman against 
Ilaine's bluff— Grant's confidence of success. 

All the way from Cairo to New Orleans the Mis- 
sissippi moanders througli a vast alluvial region, the 
whole of Avliieh is annually overflowed, except where 
the system of artificial emhankinents, called levees,* 
has, of late years, afforded a partial barrier. This 
great basin is nearly fifty miles in width, and extends 
on the east to the upland pbiins of Tennessee and 

♦ The wf.rd lerce is in universal use at the Southwest. Breaks in 
the embankments are caUcd crecasaes. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 157 

Mississippi, while on tlie west it is bounded by tlie 
lesser elevations of drift alone. The bluffs that form 
the escarpment of the eastern plains are usually quite 
steep, and 4:hickly overgrown with timber, under- 
brush, and vines. At various points in its course the 
river touches one extremity or the other of the bot- 
tom-land, washing the base of the bluffs, and often 
cutting deeply into the soft strata of which they are 
composed. Columbus, Fort Pillow, Memphis, Helena, 
Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, and Port Hudson are points 
of this kind, and rise from eighty to two hundred 
feet above the freshets. 

The Mississippi is, j^erhaps, the most tortuous 
stream in the world. Its course is frequently north, 
east, south, and west, within a circuit of twenty miles. 
Every few years it deviates from its channel here and 
there, leaving the former bed for some new route, and 
creating islands and peninsulas innumerable ; the flat 
nature of the country and the soft quality of the soil 
allowing these excursions, which occur whenever any 
unusual obstacle is presented to the vast momentum 
of the stream. Tlie alluvial region, throughout its 
entire extent, is higher near the banks of the river, 
and falls ofl* gradually till it reaches the line of 
the blufts ; the drainage is, therefore, necessarily tow- 
ards the hills, and is the source of the intricate net- 
work of bayous * for which the basin is remarkable. 
The Coldwater, the Tallahatchie, the Yazoo, the 
Washita, the Red, and Atchafalaya rivers, besides 
numerous other and smaller streams, are accordingly 
nothing more than huge side drains. Dm'ing freshets, 

* The streams that everywhere intersect these alluvial regions are 
called bai/ous — a corruption of the French word bo^/au — a gut or chan- 
nel. 



158 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

the water tliat breaks over the Mississippi banks, or 
tlirongli tlie crevasses, flows through c^'press-swamps, 
and a hil)yrinth of bayous, till it reaches the bluffs, 
and is again forced back into the parent 'stream. 

Besides the bayous, crescent-shaped lakes, the sole 
remains of the ancient meanderings of the river, 
abound on both sides, often at considerable distances 
from the present channel. The forests of the alluvial 
region are extremely luxuriant and dense; cotton- 
wood, tulip-trees, sweet gum, magnolia, sycamore, and 
ash are found, with an almost impenetrable jungle of 
cane and vine. The cypress-swamps that occupy the 
lower portions of the bottom are nearly always under 
water; and this, with the slimy character of the soil, 
and the treacherous beds, and slippery, steep banks 
of the bayous, renders the country almost impassa- 
ble in summer, and entirely so, except by boats, in 
winter.* 

Winding through this abnormal region, the Mis- 
sissippi makes a sudden bend below Young's point. 
o|)posite the mouth of the Yazoo, and turning towards 
the northeast, flows in that direction some four or five 
miles, till it strikes the Yicksburg hills, when it turns 
again, still more abruptly, and runs for almost the 
same distance towards the southwest. By this curve 
a narrow peninsula is formed of the Louisiana shore, 
which stretches out in the shape of a tongue, not 
more than a mile or two across. Opposite the lower 
side of the peninsula, the city of Yicksburg rises, 
leri'Mced <.n its i'ngL''<'<l site, and commanding the ap- 

* Viiliiablc malcrial for tliis doscription of the Mississippi valley, 
ns wi-H iis for this entire chapter, has been obtained from a manuscript 
tnenioir of the canipaij,m and siepre of Yicksburg, placed at my dis- 
posal by Brevet Major-General J. H. Wilson, lieutenant of engineers, and 
lieutenant-colonel on Grant's staff at the period of these operations. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 159 

proaclies from above and below, for a distance of 
lono- cannon-ransfe. The bluffs extend along^ the east- 
ern bank for nearly twenty miles. From Walnut hills 
to Warrenton the Mississippi washes the foot of the 
range. At few places is the interval between the river 
and the bluff more than six hundred yards ; and at 
the point where Vicksburg stands, the cliffs rise ab 
ruptly from the Avater's edge two hundred feet. 

Above the town the hills turn to the noi-theast ; 
the point where the range strikes the Yazoo nearly 
twenty miles from its mouth is known as Haine's 
bluff, and was the extreme right of the rebel line. 
It is very precipitous, and completely commands 
the navigation of the Yazoo, as well as the opposite 
shore. So long as this position was held by the 
rebels, Vicksburg could not l)e approached from the 
north. From Haine's bluff, which is twelve miles 
above the town, to the Mississippi, the highlands 
were completely and thoroughly fortified, and thence 
along down, till they recede from the river, at War- 
renton, seven miles below. Twenty-eight guns of 
heavy calibre were mounted on the river front, all of 
which had a plunging fire; they effectually baiTed 
all progress by the stream, for no gun in the squad- 
ron could be sufficiently elevated to be formidable to 
batteries crowning cliffs two and three hundred feet 
high. 

At the foot of the ridge, and along the slopes, 
rifle-pits were dug, that commanded the strip of 
swamp land which sometimes intervenes between tlie 
river and the bluffs. The Louisiana shore is swampy, 
and impracticable for the transportation or occupa- 
tion of troops. Rafts were moored, chains were 
stretched across the Yazoo, to detain vessels under 



IGO MILITAKY lUSTOEY OF 

fire, and tlms render any attempt at surprise imprac- 
ticable, so that troops could not possibly be lauded 
near enougli for an assault, except wliere Sherman's 
bold attack, in January, liad been so unsuccessful. 

In the rear of Vicksburg the range is rugged, 
broken by precipitous ravines, and presenting almost 
equally admii^able facilities for defence on the land 
side. Creeks and bayous also abound, even in this 
higher country, whose nearer slopes encircle the city 
^vith a parapet of hills. The region outside, between 
the Big Black river and the Pearl, was an abounding 
granary, from which the besieged could draw at will, 
without danger of exhausting the supply. 

This post was now the key to the Mississippi 
river, and to the magnificent valley which it fertilizes. 
At Grand Gulf, where the bluffs again approach the 
shore, some fifty miles below, another fortification 
was soon erected; and still another, of even greater 
strength, at Port Hudson, a hundred and fifty miles 
from the sea. Port Hudson and Grand Gulf were, in 
reality, the outworks of Vicksburg, and between tkem 
the mighty river was closed for a distance of four 
hundred miles, within which the rebels were as com- 
]>h'ti'lv masters as thouii'h the national flac: had never 
Ijeen supreme above its waters. But Banks, with an 
army of forty thousand men, and Farragut, with the 
iU'ct that had subdued New Orleans, were directed to 
j)Ut forth every eftbrt against Port Hudson; while to 
(J rant and his subordinates was assiccned the task of 
unlocking the greatest barrier that vexed the waters 
of the ^Iississi])pi on their way to the sea. 

( )n the L^Uth of January, the entire force in the 
l)e});iiinient of the Tennessee amounted to one hun- 
dred ami tliirtv thousand men. It was divided into 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. IGl 

four army corps, the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, 
and Seventeenth, commanded by Major-Generals Mc- 
Clernand, Sherman, Hiirlbut, and McPherson, respec- 
tively. The Arkansas troops had been assigned to 
the Thirteenth corps, which, in conjunction with the 
Sixteenth, now at Memphis and in West Tennessee, 
was required to protect Grant's rear, and keep open 
tlie river to Cairo. St. Louis and Memphis were 
made the depots for supplies. Porter's cooperating 
fleet numbered sixty vessels of all classes, carrying 
two hundred and eighty guns and eight hundred 
men. 

The troops composing the expedition were at 
Young's point and Milliken's bend, and fifty thou- 
sand in number ; they consisted of the Fifteenth and 
Seventeenth, and part of the Thirteenth corps ; these 
had already been disembarked, and put in camps 
along the west bank of the river, on the low swamp- 
land, overflowed this year to an unusual extent. 
This protracted freshet, together with the extraordi- 
naiy fall of rain, greatly increased Grant's difficulties, 
as well as the hardships of his army. 

The camps were frequently submerged, and the 
diseases consequent to this exposure prevailed among 
the troops; dysenteries and fevers made sad havoc, 
and the small-pox even was introduced, but speedily 
controlled. The levees furnished the only dry land 
deep enough for graves, and for miles along the river 
bank this narrow strip was all that appeared above 
the water, furrowed in its whole length with graves. 
The troops were thus hemmed in by the burial-places 
of their comrades. 

Every possible precaution, however, was taken to 
secure the health and comfort of the command ; tents 
11 



162 JflLITAET HISTORY OF 

were supplied, medical stores provided, aud during 
tlie long and tedious campaign that followed, the 
sanitary condition of the army remained as tolerable 
as inevitable emergencies and hardships would allow. 
But exao-^erated rumors of disease and even pesti- 
lence were circulated by the enemy, and at the North ; 
these added to the anxieties of the country, as well as 
to the difficulties of the commander. 

Grant's problem now was, to obtain a footing on 
the hio-hlands of the eastern bank, and a base from 
which to operate against the city and its communica- 
tions. A direct attack had already been tried by 
Sherman, at the only point where a landing was 
practicable, and failed, because of the character of the 
country, and the strength of the fortifications, at a 
time when those fortifications were much less elabo- 
rate than now. It remained, then, either to discover 
some means of reaching the Yazoo, at a point still 
farther from its mouth than Haine's bluff, and so 
secure a foothold in the rear of Vicksburg ; or, to get 
below the works, at Warrenton, and thence operate, 
on the eastern side, against the town. The rains had 
filled the swamps and bayous, so that there was no 
probal)ility of their drying again during the winter, 
or a landing might have been effected opposite Milli- 
ken's bend, and roads constmcted to the Yazoo, 
above Maine's bluff, when the enemy's works would 
have been turned. AVith Grant once back of the in- 
trenchments on the crest of the hills, the rebels would 
liave been compelled either to come out and irive him 
battle in the open field, or submit to have all their 
communications cut, and so be left to starve. The 
rains, however, rendered this operation impractica- 
ble 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 1G3 

But if an attempt sLoiild be made to get below 
tLe town, Vicksbiirg itself threatened tlie only line 
by wbicli supplies could be obtained. Three means 
of obviating this difficulty suggested themselves : 
First, to turn the Mississippi river from its course, 
and, by cutting a canal across the peninsula in front 
of Vicksburg, create a new channel, through w^hich 
the fleet might glide securely by the rebellious city, 
and in full view from its disappointed batteries, to 
the coveted position below. Second, by breaking 
levees, opening canals, and connecting and widening 
streams, a circuitous route, through bayous, and rivers, 
and swamps, could be opened, from Lake Providence 
on the Louisiana side, seventy miles above Vicksburg, 
and a passage found, through the Red river, into the 
Mississippi again, four hundred miles below. This 
route, however, would, at best, be long and difficult, 
and, if opened, would only afford an opportunity of 
reenforcing Banks, as the mouth of the Red river is 
just above Port Hudson. The third, and apparently 
only other possible plan, was to march the whole 
army along the western shore, to some point below 
the town, and then cross the river, and combine with 
Banks to operate against Port Hudson ; and, after 
that place should fall, begin a new campaign against 
Vicksburg, from Grand Gulf or Warrenton, depend- 
ing on supplies from below. The roads in Louisiana 
were, however, entirely under water, so that this plan 
was not now feasible; and until Port Hudson was 
taken and the river opened to New Orleans, the diffi- 
culty of supplying the army, when thrown below the 
town, appeared absolutely insuperable. 

As early as the 20th of January, Grant had in- 
structed McClernand to begin the enlargement of the 



164 iHLITARY HISTORY OF 

canal. He had himself been ordered by Halleck to di- 
rect his attention particularly to this undertaking, " as 
the President attaches much importance to this." It 
M-as a scheme of magnificent proportions, but more 
likely to attract an imagination like IVIr. Lincoln's 
than to stiike favorably a purely military mind. The 
country, Noiih and South, watched its progress anx- 
iously ; and, even in Europe, the plan of turning a 
misfhtv river from its course attracted attention and 
comment. The rebels loudly predicted failure, and the 
gibes of those who opposed the war at the Xorth, were 
incessant. Still Grant toiled on ; four thousand sol- 
diers were constantly employed on the work, besides 
negroes, who were comparatively of little use. On 
the 4th of February, however, he I'eported to Halleck 
that he had lost all faith in the practicability of the 
scheme. "The canal," he said, "is at right angles 
with the thread of the current at both ends, and both 
ends are in an eddy, the lower coming out under 
bluffs comj^k'tely commanding it. AVarrenton, a few 
miles below, is capable of as strong defences as Vicks- 
burg; and the enemy, seeing us at work here, have 
tui-ned their attention to that point." 

The peninsula is about three and a half miles 
long, and where the canal was located, only a mile 
and a fifth in width. As constructed by General 
Williams, the canal was ten feet wide and six deep, 
but his excavation did not extend throuo;h the stra- 
turn of black alluvial soil to tlie sandy substratum, 
and in 18G2, when the water rose so as to run throusrh, 
there was no enlargement. Grant's engineers at- 
tempted to remedy this, by cutting a wing, from a 
point two or three hundred yards further up the river, 
where the current imj)inges more strongly against the 



ULYSSES S. GRANT 165 

shore. It was hoped by the additional flow of water 
thus secured, and by the use of dredging-machines * 
to widen and deepen the main canal. The design 
was, to allow a passage for vessels with a breadth of 
beam of sixty feet, and a draught of eight or nine. 

The troops who . were engaged for two months 
on the canal, were encamped immediately on its 
west bank, and protected from possible inundation by 
a levee ; but the continued rise in the river made a 
large expenditure of labor necessary to keep the 
water out of the- camps and canal. The work was 
tedious and difficult, and seemed interminable; and 
towards the last it became also dano-erous, for the 
enemy, well aware how important it was to thwart this 
operation, threw shells all over the peninsula, and, 
as Grant had predicted, erected batteries which com- 
manded the lower end of the canal. But, at last, there 
seemed some prospect of success; the dredge-boats 
worked to a charm ; the laborers reached a sufficient 
depth in the soil ; the wing was ready to connect with 
the main artery, and the undertaking was apparently 
all but completed ; when, on the 8th of March, an ad- 
ditional and rapid rise in the river, and the consequent 
increase of pressure, caused the dam near the upper 
end of the canal to give way, and every attempt to keep 

* The following correspondence contains the only suggestion made 
by General Halleck to Grant during this ijortion of the Vicksburg 
campaign : 

" February 18. 
" Cannot dredge-boats be used with advantage in the canal ? There 
are four lying idle at Louisville, belonging to Barton, Robinson & Co., 
contractors. " U. W. Hai^leck, General-in-chief." 

" February 17. 
" We have one drcdging-machine here, and another ordered. More 
than two could not be advantageously used. 

" U. S. Grast. Major- GeneraV 



166 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

the rii.-li of water out proved abortive. The toiTent, 
thus admitted, stmggled for a while with the obsta- 
cles that sought to stay its course ; but finally, in- 
stead of coming out below, broke the levee of the 
canal itself, and spread rapidly across the peninsula, 
overwhelming every barrier, and separating the 
northern and southern shores as effectually as if the 
Mississippi itself flowed between them. It swept far 
and wide over the interior, submerging the camps, and 
spreading into the bayous, even to the Tensas and 
lower Eed. The troops w^ere obliged to flee for their 
lives, horses were drowmed, implements were broken 
and borne aAvay by the current, and all the labor of 
many weeks was lost. 

Attempts were made to repair the damages, but on 
the 27th of March, Grant reported that all work ex- 
cept repairing the crevasses in the canal levee had 
been suspended for several days, the enemy having 
driven the dredges entirely out. "The canal may be 
useful in passing boats through, at night, but nothing 
further." As he had foretold, the batteries erected on 
the hills Ijclow Vicksburg completely enfiladed the 
canal. The rebels declared that the Yankees had been 
as im})ious as the Titans, in their audacity, and as im- 
])()trnt, and hoped that in future they would not 
attempt to disturb the natural features of the globe. 

( )ii the ;5()tli of January, the day after he assumed 
(oiiiiikiikI <»f the Vicksburg expedition,* Grant gave 
ordei's for cutting a way from the Mississippi to Lake 
Providence and went himself to that place on the 
•Itli of February, remaining there several days. 

* At this time (jrant wrote to llaileck: 

" January 81. 
"I iiin J)u^^lling every tiling to gain a passage, avoiding Vicksburg." 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 167 

This sheet of water is a poi-tion of the old iDed of the 
river, and lies about a mile west of the present 
channel. It is six miles long, and connected by Bayou 
Baxter with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream com- 
municating in its turn with the Tensas, Washita, and 
Red rivers. Through these various channels it was 
thought possible to open a route by which transports 
of light draught might reach the Mississippi again, 
below, and thus enable Grant to reenforce Banks 
(then on either the Bed river or the Atchafalaya), 
and to cooperate with him against Port Hudson. 

The levee was cut, and a canal opened between 
the liver and the lake, through which the water 
passed rapidly ; but peculiar difficulties were en- 
countered in clearing Bayou Baxter of the overhang- 
ing forests and fallen timber with which it was ob- 
structed. The land, from Lake Providence, and also 
from Bayou Magon, recedes until the lowest interval 
between the two widens out into a cypress-swamp, 
where Bayou Baxter is lost. This flat was filled with 
water to the depth of several feet ; and the work of 
I'emoving the timber, that choked the bayou thickly 
for a distance of twelve or fifteen miles, was, in con- 
sequence, exceedingly difficult and slow ; but if this 
could have been accomplished, the channel, in high 
water, would have been continuous, although intricate 
and circuitous in a remarkable degree. So McPher- 
son's corps was engaged in the undertaking for many 
weeks. The impossibility of obtaining the requisite 
number of light-draught steamers, however, would 
have rendered this route useless, even had it been 
thoroughly opened. But no steamer ever passed 
through the tortuous channel, which served only to 
employ the superfluous troo2:)S, and to demonstrate 



168 inLITARY HISTORY OF 

the fertility and variety of devices developed during 
tins anomalous campaign. Tlie Lake Providence 
route was iinally rejected, in March, at about the 
same time that all hope of effecting any thing by the 
canal was abandoned. 

This project excited attention and speculation, 
esj^ecially in the rebellious states, where many ima- 
gined that the whole torrent of the Mississippi might 
be diverted, even into the Atchafalaya, and tlie old 
bed of the former stream forever denuded, which 
would have left Xew Orleans an inland town, far 
away from the river that was the sole source and 
cause of its prosperity. But no expectation of an}'- 
such stupendous results was entertained by Grant. 
He believed that Vicksburg was only to be won by 
liard fighting, and by destroying armies; and al- 
though he resorted to these various schemes for 
placing his troops where a foothold for active opera- 
tions could be maintained, and a route secured by 
which the new base might be supplied, he neverthe- 
less looked on them as in reality offering little prom- 
ise, and simply affording occupation for his men, till 
the subsidence of the waters should allow him to 
move in the ordinary way. 

At the same time that he bes^an these other under- 
takings, Grant sent Lieutenant-Colonel AVilson, of his 
Htaff, to Helena, to organize an expedition for open- 
ing and examining the Yazoo pass. This was with a 
view to destroying the rebel steamboats and embryo 
gunboats on the Yazoo river, al)Ove Haine's bluff. 
The pass is a narrow and tortuous bayou, sixty or 
eighty feet wide, and from twenty to thirty feet deep, 
running nearly east from a point on the Mississippi, 
81X miles below Helena, into Moon lake, the forjner 



ULYSSES S. GRAin'. 169 

"bed of the river. Issuing thence, it still flows east- 
ward, and, fifteen miles beyond, connects with the 
Coldwater. The latter stream, after fifty miles of 
windings, enters the Tallahatchie, which joins the 
Yallabusha to form the Yazoo, a hundred and fifteen 
miles below. This route was used in former times, 
as a roundabout way of reaching the Yazoo river 
with small steamers and light trading craft ; but, as 
the entire course lies in the alluvial region, the coun- 
try between the two rivers was frequently overflowed ; 
and, accordingly, the state of Mississippi constructed 
a large and strong levee at the entrance to the pass, 
so as to cut oft' all communication between its waters 
and those of the parent stream. 

This levee was cut on the 2d of February, and 
the water let in by the explosion of a mine planted 
at the mouth of the cut ; and, in two days, the tor- 
rent carried away the levee so completely as to allow 
the largest steamers to pass through the crevasse into 
Moon lake, about a mile beyond. But in the mean 
time, the rebels had bes^un to make obstructions 
lower down, by felling huge trees into the pass. The 
forest was extremely luxuriant, and the rafts and en- 
tanirlements thus formed were obstacles of the most 
formidable character, extending, with intervals, a dis- 
tance of nearly four miles. A single one of these 
barricades was a mile and a quarter in length, and 
composed of no fewer than eighty trees, reaching 
completely across the stream. Cottonwood, syca- 
more, oak, elm, and pecan-wood was used, and none 
of this timber, except the cottonwood, will float. 
The removal, in consequence, was a tedious task. 
Many of the trees, weighing at the least twenty tons, 
had to be hauled out entire upon the shore by strong 



Ik 



170 MILITAKT HISTORY OF 

cables, ^vllile a few of tlie most buoyant were cut in 
pieces and fastened along the banks. To add to the 
difficulties, the rapid rise of the water, from the cre- 
vasse at the entrance, submerged the entire country, 
except along a very narrow strip of land near the 
shore. The men, in parties of about five hundred, 
were thus obliged to work in the water, as well as 
during almost incessant rains. The barriers, however, 
being removed, and a heavy growth of overhanging 
timber cut away, the distance from Moon lake to the 
Coldwater was finally cleared. But, while Grant's 
forces were tlius diligently engaged in opening one 
end of the pass, the enemy had gained time to se- 
cui'ely fortify below. 

On the 15th of February, however, a way was 
open to the Tallahatchie, and Brigadier-General Ross, 
\vith forty-five hundred men, was ordered into the 
pass. He embarked on twenty-two light transports, 
preceded by two ii-on-clad gunboats, and a mosquito 
fiect, as the light-armored craft suitable for this navi- 
2:ation was called. Lieutenant-Commander Watson 
Smith commanded the naval force. The difficulty of 
procunng light transports delayed Ross over a week, 
but the combined fleet entered the pass on the 24th 
of February, and reached the Coldwater, twenty-five 
miles from the Mississippi, on the 2d of March. The 
Coldwater is over a hundred feet wide, and runs 
throutrh a dense wilderness, for nearly all its course. 
The Tallahatchie is a stream of similar nature, and, 
from its width and depth, no longer susceptible of 
obstruction by the enemy. Thii'ty miles below the 
moutli of the Coldwater, the Tallahatchie aftbrds free 
iiaviLjatiou for boats two hundred and fifty feet long. 
M'hen once the expedition reached these rivers, a great 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. I7l 

part of its difficulties would, it was hoped, be past. 
The naval commander moved cautiously, running but 
little faster than the current by dayliglit, and tying his 
boats to the shore after nightfall, so that the expedi- 
tion did not reach the lower Tallahatchie till the 10th 
of March. This long passage of two hundred and 
fifty miles, through an almost unbroken forest, was 
made without the loss of a man. The country being 
overflowed, the river-banks could not be approached 
in any force by guerillas or sharpshooters. 

Wilson now reported the practicability of the 
route as a line of important military operations, and 
Grant deteimined to prosecute his entire campaign, if 
possible, in this direction. The idea was to reach 
the Yazoo river, above Haine's bluif, with the whole 
army ; the distance from Milliken's bend would have 
been nearly nine hundred miles. At first, only a 
single division of troops, under Brigadier-General 
Quimby, was sent to the support of lioss ; but, short- 
ly afterwards, McPherson, with his whole corps, and 
an additional division from Hurlbut's command (at 
Memphis), was ordered into the pass, whenever suit- 
able transportation could be procured. Great difficul- 
ty, however, was found in obtaining light-draught 
steamers fit for the navio-ation of these naiTow and 
devious streams ; and the reenforcements were, in con- 
sequenc<3, delayed at Helena. 

Neai' where the waters of the Tallahatchie meet 
those of the Yallabusha, the small town of Greenwood 
is built; a little way above this point, the foiTuer 
stream sweeps to the east for eight or ten miles, and 
then doubles at the confluence ; while the Yazoo, 
which is formed by the junction, flows back again to 
within five hundred yards of the Tallahatchie. At 



172 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 

the naiTowest part of the neck of land thus created, 
the rebels had hastily constructed, of earth and cot- 
ton-bales, a line of parapet, running irregularly across 
from tlie Tallahatchie to the north bank of the Yazoo. 
This work they called Fort Pemberton ; it was de- 
fended by two heavy guns and a light battery, and so 
located as to command both the land and the water 
approaches, from the northwest ; it also guarded the 
Yallabusha, and the road in the rear to Grenada, as 
well as the Yazoo. It was built on ground so low 
that the water spread along its entire front, across the 
neck of land, and indefinitely towards the interior. 
All approach being thus rendered impracticable for 
infantry, the idea of a land attack was excluded, and 
the expedition was compelled to rely entirely upon 
the naval force for success. 

Two attacks were accordingly made by the iron- 
clads, on the 11th, and one on the 13th of March, 
at a range of eight or nine hundred yards, and aided 
by a battery erected on the shore. In these fights 
one vessel was disabled, six men were killed, 
and twenty-five wounded.* Neither of the attacks 
was successful, and as every thing depended on 
the ability of the gunboats to silence the rebel bat- 
teries, and enable the transports to run down and land 
troops immediately at or on the fort itself, operations 
were apparently at an end ; unless, indeed, the flood 
should drive out the occupants of the fort. As the 
Bite of the work was so little above water, a rise of 
two feet would accomplish this last object; and the 
levee on the Mississippi, three hundred miles away, 
was accordingly cut, at Austin, eighteen miles above 
IIcloii.'i, with the hoj)e that so large a volume of water 

♦ The enemy lost one man killed and twenty woimded. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 173 

might be induced to take the line of tlie Coldwater 
and TallaliatcLie, as to flood the country around tlie 
fort, The cut, however, did not prove large enough 
to produce this effect.* 

The rebels meanwhile had made haste to avail 
themselves of the delay occasioned by the lack of 
transportation for McPherson's corps, and Grant was 
informed that they were hurrying troops from Vicks- 
burg, over their shorter lines, to Greenwood. In 
order to relieve Ross, who was now in imminent dan- 
ger of being surrounded, isolated as he Avas, away off 
in this tangled network of forest and bayou. Grant 
devised still another scheme. 

This was to hem in the enemy on the Yazoo, by 
sending a force along another of these labyrinthine 
routes, that leaves the Yazoo river below Haine's bluff, 
and, after innumerable windings, reenters the same 
stream sixty miles above that point, and in the rear of 
Greenwood. The route was by way of the Yazoo liver 
to Steele's bayou, up the latter to Black bayou, through 
that to Deer creek, and alons^ Deer creek to the Roll- 
ing Fork; thence, across to the Big Sunflower, and 
down the Sunflower to the Yazoo ; in all, about a 
hundred and fifty miles. On the 1 4th of March, Ad- 
miral Porter made a reconnoissance of these streams, 
as far as Deer creek, and informed Grant that, up to 
the limit of exploration, they were navigable for the 

* There is a discrepancy between some of the statements made by 
subordinate army and navy officers about the Yazoo pass expedition. 
Each arm of the service blamed the other for delays and mishaps, for 
■which, perhaps, neither was fairly blamable. The difficulties were 
prodigious, and sufficiently account for the failure of the expedition, 
without attributing it to a lack of energy, much less of earnestness or 
courage in any concerned. When accounts differ, I have adopted the 
etatcments which seemed to me best authenticated. 



174 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 

smaller iron-clads. Grant, the next clay, accompanied 
the admiral on a second reconnoissance, and satisfied 
liimself that, so far as he had penetrated, the princi- 
pal ohstruction was in the overhanging trees. He at 
once returned to Milliken's bend, with the purpose 
of hurrying up men and means for clearing the chan- 
nel. " If we can get boats in the rear of them in 
time," he wrote, " it will so confuse the enemy as to 
save Ross's force. If not, I shall feel restless for his 
fate until I know that Quimby has reached him." 
Had this plan succeeded, it would, have left Green- 
wood between the two national forces, and made 
imperative the immediate abandonment of that strong- 
hold ; about thirty steamers of the enemy would 
thus have been destroyed, or have fallen into Grant's 
hands. 

On the 16th of IMarch, he sent Sherman with a 
division of troops (Stuart's) up Steele's bayou ; five 
iron-clads and four mortar-boats accompanied, under 
Porter. Tlie object was, not only to liberate Ross, 
but to find a ^practicable passage to the Yazoo, with- 
out passing the enemy's batteries at Haine's bluff; 
and to get possession of some point on the east 
bank, from which Vicksburg could be reached by 
<lrv land. Grant infonmed Quimby of Sherman's 
cooperation, and urged him to the support of Ross 
from the north, saying: "Sherman will come in below 
the enemy you are now contending against, and, 
between the two forces, you will find no further diffi- 
culties before reaching the ground I so much desire." 
In all these various operations, Grant never lost 
sight of his principal aim — to obtain a footing and a 
secure base from ^^•]^R•1^ to prosecute his campaio-n on 
dry land. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 1Y5 

Slierman's troops went up tlie Mississippi on large 
transports, about tliirty miles, to Eagle bend, wliere 
Steele's bayou runs within one mile of the river ; they 
thus saved the distance from the mouth of the Yazoo, 
and also the most difficult part of the navigation in 
the bayou. They marched across the strip of land 
between the river and the bayou, building floating 
bridges over part of the way, whicli led through a 
swamp called Muddy bayou. Small-class steamers 
then ferried them up the stream. Porter having the 
advance. The drift-timber soon began to ol>struct 
the channel, and the gunboats got entangled, but 
nevertheless forced a way through. The turns were 
so short, that the admiral was obliged to heave his 
vessels around the bends, having not a foot to spare. 
It took him thus twenty-four hours to advance four 
miles. 

By this time, it had become evident that transpor- 
tation for McPlierson, through the Yazoo pass, could 
not be procured ; his previous orders to go to the as- 
sistance of Ross were therefore countermanded. Grant 
now intendino" to brins: him to the lower end of the 
expedition. Quimby's orders, however, were not yet 
revoked. 

Poi-ter pushed along with his unwieldy iron-clads, 
through the labyrinth, his way obstructed now far 
more than in the earlier stages of the expedition. The 
gunboats moved like snails, but with great power, 
pushing all saplings, and bushes, and drift aside. The 
bayous were narrow and crooked, the turns sudden, 
the channel was half tilled with cypress and willows 
growing in the bed of the stream ; a thicket of trees 
overhead had to be thrust aside, but he broke the 
branches of the forest with his heav^-^ iron-clad boats, 



176 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

and made a tortnous path in advance of the lighter 
transports, which had still more difficulty than he 
in forcing a passage.* Trees had to be pulled up by 
the roots, and stumps sawn off below the surface of 
the water; chimneys, and guards, and pilot-houses 
were swept away by the wilderness of boughs that 
reached down from above, and stretched out on either 
side. 

There was no dry land along the route as far as 
Deer creek, and all the troops had finally to be re- 
moved from the transports and conveyed on tugs and 
coal-barges, the way having become impassable to 
tlie steamers. The movement of the land forces was 
therefore extremely slow, and the naval vessels got 
some thii'ty miles in advance, near the Eolling Fork. 
Here, on the 20th of March, Porter was attacked by 
sharpshooters, to whom liis heavy ordnance could 
render only ineffectual replies. The rebels had not 
only impeded his progress, by hewing heavy trees in 
his front, but begun doing the same in his rear. The 
labor of removing these artificial obstructions was 
prodigious ; it was prosecuted by night as well as by 
day, and under artillery and musketry fire; and 
Porter finally sent back for Sherman to huiTy up to 
his assistance. 

Sherman Mas then at the junction of the Big 
Black bayou and Deer creek. lie at once sent for- 
Mard all the troops which had arrived at that point; 
and, when, in a few hours, reenforcements came up, 
although it was night, lie marched at their head, 
along the narrow and only track of hard land that 

* " I never yet saw vessels so well adapted to knocking down trees, 
hauling them up by the roots, or demolishing hndgcs."" —Admiral Por- 
ttr^a liejiort. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 177 

hud been found, leading his ti'oops by liglited can- 
dles tlirougli tlie canebrake. They got up oppor- 
tunely for Porter, whose irou-clads were three feet 
below the banks of the river, and thus unable to re- 
ply to the sharpshooters. He had in fact begun to 
withdraw ; but the rebels had a force of about four 
thousand men in the swamps, and w^ere compelling 
negroes, at the muzzle of the musket, to fell trees all 
around the fleet, in rear as well as in advance. A 
battery of artillery was also established in front. 
Sherman, however, speedily drove away the annoying 
skirmishers, and saved the admiral with his fleet.* 

But the imj^racticability of the campaign had been 
demonstrated. So much time had been consumed, 
that the enemy was now fully aw^are of the movement. 
The creek was blockaded just where the boats would 
leave it for the Rolling Fork, and the rebels occupied 
the ground in force, from which they could prevent the 
removal of the obstructions. The admii'al, therefore, 
was forced to desist from any further effort to proceed, 
when within a few hundred yards of clear sailing to 
the Yazoo ; for, once in the Rolling Fork, there w^ould 
have been no more difficulties. The character of the 
country precluded the possibility of taking any land 
route, and it w^as accordingly necessary to return, 
without having accomplished any of the objects of 
the expedition. 

The troops had, however, been carried into the 
heart of the granary from which the Vicksburg forces 
were being fed, and great alarm had been caused to 
the enemy. Rebel guns were removed from batteries 
along the Mississippi, citizens in the interior fled fi'om 
their plantations, several thousand bales of cotton 

* The losses on both sides in this entire expedition did not amount 
to half a score. 

12 



178 MIUTARY HISTORY OF 

were burnt, lest tliey should fall into the hands of 
the national forces, and much of the bacon, Ijeef, and 
poultry of the region was consumed. But these re- 
sults were insignificant, when compared with those 
wliich it had been hoped to attain. 

The iron-clads had to back out of the stream into 
naviga]>le water, as there was not room to turn, and, 
with unshipped rudders, rebounded from tree to tree. 
Sherman, on shore, protected them during this diffi- 
cult and dangerous operation, and, on the 27th, he 
was back in his original camps opposite Vicksburg. 

Meanwhile, Ross had withdrawn from before Fort 
Peraberton, and on his way back met Quimby, on the 
2 2d of i\Iarch, near the head of the Yazoo pass. 
Quimby being senior, decided to return, and ascer- 
tain for himself the situation, but soon discovered 
that nothing could be done to remedy it ; and, as 
soon as Grant learned the failure of the Steele's 
bayou expedition, he directed the concentration of 
all his forces at Milliken's bend. 

These various attempts and expeditions on both 
sides of the Mississippi, although unsuccessful in 
their main objects, were yet productive of beneficial 
results. The national forces, so constantly employed, 
became hardened by exposure, and of course im- 
proved in spirits and health ; they obtained also a 
thorough knowledge of the peculiar difficulties of the 
country in ^\ hich they were operating, and were thus 
better able to encounter those difficulties. The en- 
emy, besides, was kept continually on the alert, and, 
obliged to move his troops liurriedly and frequently 
from ])lace to place ; not knowing in what quarter nor 
from what direction the blow might fall, he was 
forced to maintain large detachments at posts remote 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 179 

from Grant's real ()l)jective point. Tlie men were 
thus wearied and distracted, in advance of the great 
trial of their spirit and strength which was sure to 
come in the end. 

While all these oj^erations had been going on. 
Admiral Farragut, with a part of his fleet, had run 
by the batteries at Port Hudson, and communicated 
with Grant. For a while, he lay just below Warren- 
ton, ha\ang even passed the foi-tifications at Grand 
Gulf Through Farragut, Grant was enabled to com- 
municate with Banks. All hope of receiving any 
aid from that officer had long since been abandoned ; 
he had found the capture of Port Hudson as difficult 
a task as that of Yicksburg had proven to Grant; 
and, the latter, when it became apparent that neither 
the canal, nor the Lake Providence, nor the Yazoo 
pass, nor the Steele's bayou scheme w\as likely to be 
of any avail, now proposed to send an army corps to 
cooperate with Banks."^ With this increased force, 
Port Hudson could certainly be taken, and then 
Banks's entire army might be combined with Grant's, 
and, moving up from below, a cooperative attack be 
made on Yicksburg. The great distance that sepa- 
rated the two armies, however, between whom also 
lay the two strongholds w^hich were the objective 

* On the 2d of April, Ilallcck ^^•rote to Grant, using those words : 
..." What is most desired (and your attention is again called to 
this object) is, that your forces and those of General Banks should be 
brought into cooperation as early as possible. K he cannot get up to 
cooperate with you on Yicksburg, cannot you get troops down to help 
him at Port Hudson, or at least can you not destroy Grand Gulf be- 
fttre it becomes too strong ? " This and the dispatch of February 13th, 
already quoted, are the only orders or suggestions relating to military 
operations that were made to Grant by the general in-chief, from Jan- 
nary 29th to May 11th. That of May 11th will be given in its place. 



180 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

points of tlie campaign of each, prevented tlie reali- 
zation of tliis plan. 

The country, meanwliile, and the government, 
Lad become very impatient. Clamors were raised 
everywhere against Grant's slowness ; tlie old rumors 
about his personal character were revived ; his sol- 
diers were said to be dying of swamp fevers and dys- 
enteries, in the morasses around Vicksburg ; he was 
pronounced utterly destitute of genius or energy; liis 
repeatedly baffled schemes declared to emanate from 
a brain unfitted for such trials ; his persistency was 
dogged obstinacy, his patience was sluggish dulness. 
McClernand, and Hunter, and Fremont, and McClel- 
lan were spoken of as his successors ; senators and 
governors went to Vicksburg, and from Vicksburg 
to Washington, to work for liis removal. McCler- 
nand's machinations at this time came very near suc- 
ceeding, liis advocates were never so earnest nor so 
hopeful, while some of Grant's best friends failed him 
at the critical moment. But the President said : " I 
rather like the man ; I think we'll try him a little 
longer." * But for this persistency, Grant would un- 
douljtedly have been relieved, and McClernand put 
in command of the expedition against Vicksburg. 
Grant was aware of all these efforts to supplant him, 
and of the probalnlity of their success. His anxie- 
ties as a commander were of course enhanced by the 
near prospect of his removal. 

On the 2d of April, Halleck informed him that 

* A congressman, wlm had been one of Grant's warmest friends, 
was found wanting at this juncture. He went to the President with- 
out being sent for, and declared that tlie emergencies of the country 
seemed to demand another commander before Vicksburg. To him ^h. 
Lincoln replied: "I rather like the man. I think we'll try him a little 
longer." 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 181 

the President " seems to be ratlier impatient about 
matters on the Mississippi," and inquired if Grant 
could not cooperate with Banks against Port Hud- 
son. On the 9th, also, he wrote : " You are too well 
advised of the anxiety of the government for your 
success, and its disappointment at the delay, to ren- 
der it necessary to urge upon you the importance of 
early action ; " but, added in his own behalf: " I am 
confident that you will do every thing possible to 
open the Mississippi river." And, indeed, it is not 
surprising that tlie government should have urged 
him on. Ko substantial victory had cheered the flag- 
ging spirits of the North, since Grant's own successes 
at Corinth and luka, of the preceding autumn. Banks 
had achieved no military results, with his mammoth 
expedition ; Burnside, in December, had suffered the 
repulse at Frederick'feburg ; Rosecrans had not got 
fui-ther than Mui'freesboro ; and, the great force of 
sixty or seventy thousand men, at Grant's disposal, 
had accomplished absolutely nothing, during six long, 
weary months of effort and delay. 

The rebels were confident of the security of their 
strono-hold, and taunted Grant with his failures; 
every new plan awoke ncAV demonstrations of con- 
tempt, and Vicksburg was pronounced by Mr, Jef- 
ferson Davis to be the Gibraltar of America. A 
reconnoissance was made to Haine's bluff, but it only 
demonstrated the impracticability of attacking that 
place during tlie high stage of water. Whichever 
way the national forces turned, nature seemed to 
combine with art to render the rebel fortifications 
impregnable. The elements were the strongest de- 
fences of Vicksburg, stubborn and gallant as was the 
couracre of her soldiers. 



182 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

Still, Grant wi-ote, on the 4tli of April, after all 
these failures: "The discipline and health of this 
anny is now good, and I am satisfied the greatest 
confidence of success prevails." In the following 
words he described to Halleck the plan whicli he next 
essayed. It was the last : 

" There is a system of bayous running from Mil- 
liken's bend, also from near the river at this point" 
(Young's point), "that are na\'igable for large and 
small steamers, passing around by Riclimond to New 
Carthage. There is also a good wagon-road from 
]\Iilliken's bend to New Carthaofe. The dredires are 
now engaged cutting a canal from here into these 
bayous. I am having all the empty coal-boats and 
other barges prepared for carrying troops and artil- 
leiy, and have Avritten to Colonel Allen for some 
more, and also for six tugs to tow them. With them 
it would be easy to carry supplies to New Carthage, 
and any ])oint south of that.* 

" My expectation is for some of the naval fleet 
to run the batteries of Vicksburg, whilst the army 
moves through by this new route. Once there, I 
will move to Warrenton or Grand Gulf, probably the 
latter. From either of these points, there ai-e good 
roads to Jackson and the Black river brido^e, without 
crossing Black river. I will keep my army together, 
and see to it that I am not cut ofl:* from my supplies, 
or beat in any other way than a fair fight." 

Grant himself had long believed that he should 

* As early as February 4tb, Grant bad written to Halleck about this 
route : " There is no question but tbiit tins route is niucb more practi- 
cable than the present undertaking, and would bave been accomplished 
with nuich less lal)or. if commenced belbre the water had got all over 
the ecuatrv." 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 183 

eventually be compelled to adopt this plan ; but the 
submerged condition of the roads on the Louisi- 
ana shore had hitherto rendered it impracticable. 
When the idea became known to those in his inti- 
macy, to his staff, and to his corps commanders, it 
seemed to them full of danger. To move his army 
below Vicksburg was to separate it from the North, 
and from all its supplies; to throw what seemed an 
insurmountable obstacle between himself and his 
own base ; to cut his own communications, and place 
his army exactly where it is the whole object and 
aim of war to get the enemy. In a word, it was to 
hazard every thing, for if failure came, it was sure 
to be overwhelming ; only the most complete and 
speedy victory could insure him against absolute an- 
nihilation. These considerations were ui'ged upon 
Grant by the most accomplished soldiers of his com- 
mand ; those who have since acquired reputations of 
the most brilliant character, strove to divert their 
chief from what they considered this fatal error. 
Sherman, McPherson, Logan, Wilson, all opposed — 
all of course within the proper limits of soldierly 
subordination, but all with energy. 

Even after the orders for the movement had been 
issued, Sherman rode up to Grant's headquarters, and 
proposed his plan. He asserted, emphatically, that 
the only way to take Vicksburg was from the north, 
selecting some high ground on the Mississippi for a 
base. Grant replied that such a plan would require 
him to go back to Memphis. "Exactly so," said 
Sherman, " that is what I mean ; " and he developed 
the reasons, which seemed to him unanswerable, in 
favor of such a course. Grant, however, believed 
that a retrograde movement, even if temporary, would 



184 MILITARy HISTORY OF 

be disastrous to tlie country, which was in no temj^er 
to endure another reverse ; he was determined to 
take no step backward, and so declared. Sherman 
tliereupon returned to his own headquarters, and, on 
the 8th of April, addressed a formal communication 
to Lieutenant-Colonel Eawlins, Grant's chief of staff, 
in which he ao-ain set forth the advantas^es of the 
route he had recommended, and su^o-ested that Grant 
should call on all his corps commanders for their 
views. 

" Let the line of the Yallabusha be the base," he 
said, " from which to operate against the points where 
the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black, above Can- 
ton, and lastly where the Vicksburg and Jackson 
railroad crosses the same river. The capture of 
Vicksburg would result." * The letter was able, and 
in strict accordance with the established principles 
of military science; it was respectful and subordi- 
nate in tone, and concluded in these words : " I make 
these suggestions with the request that General Grant 
simply read them, and give them, as I know he will, 
a share of his thoughts. I would prefer he should 
not answer them, but merely give them as much or 
as little weight as they deserve ; whatever plan of 
action he may adopt will receive from me the same 
zealous cooperation and energetic support as though 
conceived by myself." 

Colonel Eawlins handed the paper to Grant with- 
out saying a word ; Grant read it carefully but in si- 
lence, and after the perusal was finished made no 
comment. The orders were not revoked, the council 
of war was not called, and the letter has never since 
been mentioned between the two conmianders. Its 

* See Appendix for ShL::r,an's letter in full. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 185 

existence was not disclosed "by Grant, until Sherman 
himself publicly related tlie incident, after the invest- 
ment of Vicksburg, when several prominent men were 
attributing to him the conception of tlie campaign 
which resulted in oj^ening the Mississippi river. 

Sherman, doubtless, was induced to take this 
step by his anxiety for the success of the cam- 
paign, as well as for the reputation of his cliief, be- 
tween whom and himself relations of such peculiar 
intimacy had long existed ; but Grant was firmly de- 
teimined to make the movement, and the disapproval 
of his ablest generals had no effect to deter him. 
Sherman, thinking the plan almost certain of defeat, 
for that reason felt the greater need of making the 
greater effort to insure its success. He did not fail, 
nor did any of those officers whose faith in the enter- 
prise was least, to do their utmost to falsify their 
own opinions. Indeed, had Grant's subordinates 
been less thoroughly subordinate, had they done less 
than their best to attain a result which they believed 
almost, if not quite unattainable, no determination^ 
nor daiing, nor energy in their commander could 
have availed. But, not a word of dissatisfaction or 
criticism escaped from these true soldiers, after it 
once became evident that Grant was immovable. 

At this time, however, he had not himself deter- 
mined to do all that he afterwards attempted. His 
plans, indeed, were always ripened into their full fru- 
ition by the emergencies and opportunities of a bat- 
tle or campaign ; his judgment was always sharpened 
by events, his faculties were always brighter at a cri- 
sis ; his decisions were most unerring when compelled 
to be most sudden and irrevocable. Then, words, if 
few, were not laggard, and always to tlie point ; and 



186 3IILITAEY HISTORY OF 

action followed as fast on tliought as a strong man's 
movements on liis will. 

His design, now, was to move liis anny to some 
point below Vicksburg, where lie might be able to 
supply himself by the roads and bayous in Louisi- 
ana, and thence send a cor]3S to cooperate with Banks 
in the reduction of Port Hudson. After that place 
should have fallen, Banks, with his whole anny and 
the corps from Grant, was to march up and unite in 
the campaign against Vicksburg. As the Mississippi 
would then be open from New Orleans, supplies 
could reach the army from below. In order to ac- 
complish this movement, it was necessary for Grant 
to throw his whole force simultaneously south of 
Vicksburg, as a single corps would be exposed to the 
I'isk of attack from the garrison, as well as from the 
rebel army in the interior. Banks was the senior of 
Grant, and upon a junction of their forces must have 
assumed command. 

Accordingly, in the last week in March, orders 
were issued for the concentration of all the forces of 
the expedition at Milliken's bend ; McPherson was 
brought from Lake Providence and the Yazoo pass, 
and Sherman from Steele's bayou ; Hmibut was 
stripped of every man that could be spared from the 
rear; yawls and flat-boats were collected from St. 
Louis and Cliicago, and, on the 20th of March, Mc- 
Clernand was sent by the circuitous roads that lead 
fi-om Milliken's bend, by Wciy of Bichmoud and west 
of Roundaway bayou, to New Carthage, twenty-seven 
miles below. McPherson and Sherman were to follow 
]\rc-Clernnnd, as rapidly as ammunition and rations 
could be forwarded. The movement was necessarily 
Blow; the roads though level, were intolerably bad, 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 187 

tlie effects of the long ovei-flow having not yet disap- 
peared. A new canal was being constructed at Duck- 
port, to connect the Mississippi with Roundaway 
bayou, and there was danger of McCleruand's route 
becoming overflowed from this canal. The wagon- 
road, even w^here built up, was only twenty inches 
above water in the swamp ; and the river was four 
and a half inches higher than the land, at the point 
where the water was to be let into the canal. Grant, 
at this time, wrote to Halleck : " The embarrassment 
I have Lad to contend against, on account of extreme 
high watei", cannot be apji^reciated by any one not 
present to witness it." 

New Carthage, however, was occupied on the 6th 
of April, but the levee of Bayou Vidal, which emp- 
ties into the Mississippi at that point, was broken in 
several places, and the country deluged for a distance 
of two miles ; boats were accordingly collected from 
all the bayous in the vicinity, and others were con- 
structed of such material as was at hand. One di- 
vision, with its artillery, was thus conveyed across 
Vidal bayou, and through the overflowed forest to 
the levee at New Carthage ; but, the feriiage of an 
entire army in this way would have been exceedingly 
tedious, and a new route was found from Smith's 
plantation, where the crevasse had occurred, to 
Perkins's, twelve miles below. This made the march 
from Milliken's bend to the new point from which it 
was now proposed to operate, about thuiy-five or 
forty miles. Four bridges, two of them six hundred 
feet long, had to be laid across the swollen bayous 
which interrupted this route. These were built of 
the barges and flats previously used at Smith's plan- 
tation, and of forest timber found near the crossincr. 



188 jnLITARY HISTORY OF 

The transport route, ttrougli Duckpoii; canal and 
the bayous, had just become practicable, when a fall 
in the waters of the Mississippi occurred, and one 
steamer only got through this passage. Afterwards, 
the depth of water was insufficient to allow trans- 
ports of the smallest draught to make their w\ay, and 
all supplies of ordnance stores and provisions had to 
be hauled by land over the miserable, muddy roads. 

As early as the 13th of February, Grant had 
■written to Ilurlbut : " It seems to me that Grierson, 
with about five hundred picked men, might succeed 
in cutting his way south, and cut the railroad east of 
Jackson, Mississippi. The undertaking would be a 
hazardous one, but it would pay well if carried out." 
This road was the principal avenue of communica- 
tion for the rebels with Vicksburg. Circumstances 
prevented the execution of the plan until the 9th of 
March, when full instnictions were issued to Hui'l- 
but to send Grierson on such an errand; but obsta- 
cles again intervened, and it was not till the middle 
of April that a cavalry force, seventeen hundred 
strong, was organized at La Grange, and the command 
given to Colonel B. H. Grierson, of the Sixth Illinois 
cavalry. This force was ordered to make its way 
south, from La Grange, through the state of Missis- 
sippi, to some point on the river below Vicksburg, 
destroying I'ailroads and cutting off supplies in every 
^\•ay possilde from the besieged city. The move- 
ment was also inti-nded to act as a diversion in favor 
of Grant's new campaign, as well as to test the idea 
he entertained, that the fortunes of the rebellion 
were Avaning, its armies l)ecoming exhausted, and its 
supplies rapidly decreasing; tbat, in fact, men and 
stores were alike drawn to the outside, and the so- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 189 

called Confederacy itself was only a " hollow sLell." 
Tills " shell " Grierson was to penetrate. He started 
on the l7th of April, and made one of the most 
memorable cavalry expeditions of the war, traversing 
the entire state of Mississippi, without meeting any 
large force to oppose him ; destroying stores, bm*ning 
bridges, tearing up railroads, and having a moral 
effect u2:)on the population of the interior altogether 
unprecedented. Larger cavalry forces often moved, 
far greater cavalry campaigns were made, but this 
was the most remarkable which had then occurred, 
and therefore produced a greater effect upon the im- 
aginations of the rebels than any that came after. 
Grierson emerged out of the unknown and hostile 
territory, at Baton Rouge, on the 2d of May. He 
had caj^tured five hundred prisoners, killed and 
wounded one hundred rebels, destroyed fifty miles 
of raili'oad and telegraph wire and three thousand 
stands of arms, and marched six hundred miles, in 
less than sixteen days. His loss was three killed and 
seven wounded. Five men were left on the road, 
sick, and nine straggled.* 

While Grant had been prosecuting his different 
campaigns, by land and river and s^vamp, above the 
city, several of the vessels in Porter's command had 
run by the Vicksburg batteries, with various fortune. 
One was captured, two were sunk, and one, the Queen 
of the West, passed by without serious injury. For 
several reasons it had now become indispensable to 
have a supply of boats below Vicksburg. Barges 
were needed to feny the troops across the river, to 
the point from which the new campaign was to com- 
mence ; and the transportation of supplies by land 
was so tedious, that Grant determined to risk send- 

* For Grierson's raid, see Map of Theatre of War. 



190 IIILITAEY HISTOKY OF 

ing three steamers and ten barges past tTie batteries, 
loaded witli rations and forage. The cooperation of 
Admiral Porter was necessary in this part of the un- 
dertaking ; and, whenever, in all this long and varied 
campaign, such cooperation was needed, Grant never 
applied in vain. On the 26th of April, he wrote : 
'• I am happy to say the admiral and myself have 
never yet disagreed upon any policy." 

Only two of the steamboat masters were willing 
to encounter the danger ; the crew of one transport 
also remained aboard, but all the others shrank. 
When, however, it became known in the army that 
volunteers were wanted for the dangerous task, men 
enough to man a hundred steamers pressed them- 
selves uj)on the commanders ; pilots, masters, engi- 
neers, and men, all were found in the ranks and 
among the officers on shore, and from these, crews 
were speedily improvised for the transport fleet. 
While seven of Porter's iron-clads ens^asred the bat- 
teries, the river steamers, protected by bales of cot- 
ton and wet hay, and towing the barges, were to run 
the gantlet of twenty-eight heavy guns that com- 
manded the river for over fifteen miles. 

The night of the 16th of April was selected for 
the undertaking. There was no moon, and by ten 
o'clock all was ready. One after another, and as si- 
lently as possible, the venturous fleet steamed down 
the river to the bend. From this point they pro- 
ceeded more leisurely, drifting ^vitll the current, the 
gunboats in advance. Porter led the way, on the 
Benton, and reached the first l^atteries without beino- 
discovered; but, at sixteen minutes past eleven, the 
artillery opened from the bluft's; the admiral at once 
responding with a rapid fire. The vessels of the 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 191 

squadron, all in line, followed Lis example, while the 
transports lingged tlie Louisiana shore, and sought 
to hurry by under cover of the smoke. Grant re- 
mained on a transport just above the bend, where he 
could watch the operations, within range. Shot and 
sliell fell thick around him. 

The night was dark, but houses were speedily set 
on tire by the rebels along the shore on either side, 
and the bright glare thrown across the water made it 
light as day. AVhen the fleet got opposite the city, 
the men at the batteries and in the streets of Vicks- 
burg, could be plainly seen. The first transports ar- 
rived opposite the court-house at twenty minutes past 
twelve. It was here they received the heaviest fire ; 
each vessel became a target to the rebel shot, and a 
storm of projectiles of every variety and size came 
crashing over them, cutting the roj^es and chimney- 
guys, bursting in the pilot-houses, and shivering the 
machinery. Men were stationed in the holds, to put 
cotton-bags into such openings as were made by the 
rebel shot; and, soon after getting under fire, the 
barges were cut loose, some of them sweeping down 
in the current, even below New Carthage. 

Every transport was struck, and two were drawn 
into the eddy, and ran over a part of the distance in 
front of Vicksburg no less than three times. The 
Forest Queen was disabled by a round shot, and 
drifted down opposite the lower picket stations, 
where the gunboat Tuscumbia took her in tow, and 
landed her just above the crevasse at New Carthage. 
The Henry Clay also became disabled, and was in a 
sinkiuo; condition soon after comino; within rano-e of 
the upper batteries ; she had in tow a barge with 
soldiers aboard, which was cast loose, and floated 



192 MILITAET niSTOEY OF 

down the stream. Not lonsr afterwards tlie boat it- 
self took fire, from the explosion of a shell, and 
"burned to the water's edge, drifting along witli tlie 
cm-rent, a flaming mass. General Sherman was in a 
small boat, watching the bombardment, and picked 
up tlie pilot as lie floated from the wreck. The crew 
pushed off in yawls to tlie Louisiana side, where 
they landed, and hid themselves behind an old levee, 
during the cannonade. After it had ceased, they 
made their way back through the submerged swamps, 
to camp. 

The light streamed up from the blazing bull of 
the Henry Clay, and threw into strong relief against 
the shadows of night tbe other transports, and the 
gunboats at their fiery work. The currents were 
strong, and dangerous eddies delayed tbe vessels; 
the lights glaring in every direction, and tbe smoke 
enveloping the squadron, confused the pilots; the 
bulwarks, even of the iron-clads, were crushed; and 
the uproar of artillery, reechoing from the hills, was 
incessant. One of the heaviest guns of tbe enemy 
was seen to burst in tbe streets of Vicksburg, and 
the whole population was awake and out of doors, 
watching the scene on which its destinies depended. 
For two hours and forty minutes, the fleets were un- 
der fire. But, at last, the transports and the gun- 
boats had all ijot out of rano-e, the blazins: beacons 
on the hills and on the stream burned low, the array 
of batteries belchino; flame and noise from the embat- 
tied bluffs had ceased their utterance, and silence and 
dai'kness resumed their sway over the beleaguered city, 
and the swamps and rivers that encircle Vicksburg. 

Oil the gunboats, no one was killed, and only 
eight ^vounded ; all of Porter's vessels were ready for 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 193 

sei-vice witliiu lialf an hour after passing t) -^ batter- 
ies. No casualties were re2:>orte(l on tlie tran. ^:)orts, 
but l)oth tlie steamers and barges were mater, vlly 
damaored. 

Meanwhile, McClernand's advance had ariived at 
New Carthage, and was switching anxiously the issue 
of the operation. At first, only the burning frag- 
ments of the Henry Clay, and the barge that had 
been cut loose, came floating down ; and an old rebel, 
on wdiose estate McClernand's headquarters were es- 
tablished, was jubilant at what he supposed the de- 
feat of the Yankees. " Where are your gunboats 
now ? " he exclaimed ; " Vicksburg has put an end 
to them all ; " and the national oflScers feared lest his 
elation might prove well-founded. By daylight, hoAv- 
ever, the wrecks had all passed by ; and, after a Avhile, 
a gunboat appeared below -the bend; and then, a 
transport ; then, one after another, the whole fleet of 
iron-clads and army steamers hove in sight, from their 
2:)erilous passage. The "Yankees" now had their 
turn of rejoicing, and thanked the rebel for teaching 
them the word. " Where are your gunboats now ? " 
they said. " Did Vicksburg put an end to them all ? " 
But the old man was too much exasperated at the 
national success, to endure the taunts he had himself 
provoked, and rushed away in a rage. The next day 
he set fire to his own house, rather than allow it to 
shelter his enemies. 

Ilis plantation was one of the loveliest in Loui 
siana ; high enough to be secure from inundation,, it 
overlooked the meanderings of the Mississippi for 
nearly fifty miles; wide savannas teemed with the- 
wealth of the corn and the cotton-plant, while the- 
spacious lawns were clad in all the charms of precot- 

13 



194 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

cious summer in this balmy clime. Japan plums 
and fig-trees grew in tlie open air, and groves of 
magnolia and oleander bloomed. The softness of the 
atmosi)here, redolent with unfamiliar fragrance, and 
the aspect of the landscape, brilliant with blossoms 
and verdure, enchanted the soldiers. " Here, at last," 
they cried, " we have found the sunny South." But 
desolation and destruction fell like a storm-cloud over 
the scene. In a few hours a blackened pile was all 
that remained of the stately mansion; the broad 
2)lantation became a camping-ground ; the venerable 
trees in which it was embosomed were hewn down 
for firewood, and the secluded fields were speedily 
transformed into a confused and bustlino- bivouac."^ 

Grant's orders to McCleruand had been explicit 
and urgent, to seize and occupy Grand Gulf. In or- 
der to appease the unappeasable ambition and con- 
ceit of his subordinate, he had given him command 
of the advance, and charged him with an operation, 
which, if successful, would have rendered McCler- 
nand famous at once. On the 12tli of April, he 
wrote to that officer: "It is my desire that you 
should get possession of Grand Gulf at the earliest 
practicaljle moment. ... I wanted particularly to see 
you about the facilities for getting troops from Smith's 

• " Tlie movement of troops from Milliken's bend to New Carthage 
will ))e so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply 
of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance required by pre- 
vious orders. Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all 
the beef cattle, corn, and other necessary supplies for the army, on the 
line of march, but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles 
useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and search- 
ing houses without proper orders from division commanders, are posi- 
tively prohibited. All such irregularities must be summarily pun- 
ished."— ^j^racf from Grant's General Order for this movement. (See 
ApjicndU for order, entire.) 



i 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 105 

plantation to New Carthage, and the chances for em- 
barking there." On the 13th; "It is not desirable 
that you should move in any direction from Grand 
Gulf,' but remain under the protection of the gun- 
boats. The present plan, if not changed by the 
movements of the enemy, will be to hold Grand 
Gulf." On the 18th: "I would still repeat former 
instructions, that possession be got of Grand Gulf at 
the earliest possible moment." Again : " I vnll be 
over here in a few da}'s again, and hope it will be 
my good fortune to find you in safe possession of 
Grand Gulf" 

But McClernand's inefficiency in conducting the 
movements of his corps was such, that Grant was 
obliged to instruct him in the most minute details."* 
Instead of appreciating this, McClernand resented it 
as inteiference. Admiral Porter, after the running 
of the batteries, also endeavored to make suggestions 
to the intractable and incompetent commander of the 
advance. He informed McClernand of opportunities 
for attacking Grand Gulf, and urged him to make a 
combined assault with the navy, on that place. But 
all in vain. 

Finally, Porter wrote to Sherman, with whom he 
was intimate, and begged him to induce General 
Grant at once to come down in person to the front, 
and examine the situation for himself, as the favora- 
able opportunity was fast slipping by. Grant was 
suffering from boils at the time, and almost unable 
to mount a horse; but, the day after receiving this re- 
quest, he rode forty miles, from Milliken's bend to 
Perkins's landing, and there gave McClernand further 

• See Appendix for Grant's letter to McClernand of April 18th. 



196 illLITAEY HISTOEY OF 

instructions. The time tliat had been wasted, how- 
ever, was irrecoverable ; the rebels had used it to ad- 
vantaf^e, and Grant became convinced that nothing 
would be accomplished until he took command in 
person, and remained with the advance. He returned, 
therefore, to Milliken's bend, to hasten the transpor- 
tation of McPlierson's corps. 

In fact, during this entire campaign, Grant con- 
stantly directed the quartermasters and commissaries, 
the movements of troops and the transportation of 
stores and ordnance, the plans of reconnoissances and 
the positions of important batteries. Not only was 
there no movement of a division, from the time he 
took command, in January, that was not expressly 
ordered by himself, but his instructions, even to regi- 
mental commanders, when these commanded detached 
posts, were numerous, and constant, and detailed. 
This course was indispensable, because of the compli- 
cated character of the campaign, the vast distances 
over which he was operating, and the extreme diffi- 
culties in transportation, against which he was obliged 
to contend. In no other way could he harmonize 
these various movements, and evoke unity out of the 
confused and apparently conflicting combinations. 
A commander who had not supervised every thing, 
at this emergency, would have failed.* 

On the 2Gth of April, six other transports at- 
temj)ted to run by the Vicksburg batteries; five of 
them succeeded, although in a damaged condition ; one 
was sunk, being struck in the hull by a solid shot. 
The crews of all these transports, like those of their 

• See Appendix for Grant's ordcra to Sherman, of April 24tb, 
Grant's letter-book to subordinates at this time is probably one of the 
wost curious in the history of war. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 197 

predecessors, were composed of volunteers for the 
piu-pose, from tlie army. Twelve barges, laden with 
forage and rations, were sent in tow of the last six 
steamers, and half of them got safely by. On this 
occasion, but one man was killed, and six or eight 
were wounded ; about five hundred shots were fired. 
Immediately after the running of the batteries, 
the vaiious vessels and barges were repaired, by order 
of Admiral Porter, who furnished the material. Me- 
chanics were found in the army to do the work ; for 
it was a striking feature of the volunteer service, 
throughout the war, that no mechanical or profes- 
sional need arose, when accomplished adepts could 
not be found in almost any regiment to perform the 
duty required. The anny craft was soon in a condi- 
tion to be of use in moving troops ; but, the destruc- 
tion of two transports and six barges, reduced the 
number so that it was found necessaiy to march the 
men from Perkins's plantation to Hard Times, twenty- 
two miles fui-ther, and a distance of seventy miles 
from Milliken's bend. The new road lay along the 
west bank of Lake St. Joseph, and across three large 
bayous, over whicb bridges were built by the troops, 
the materials being taken from plantation-houses 
near by. 

The whole route was in miserable condition, and 
after the march was once begun, the roads became 
intolerable. But, on the ' 29th of April, the entire 
Thirteenth corps had arrived at Hard Times, ten 
thousand men having moved from Perkins's planta- 
tion on transports. Grant's headquarters, on the 
24th, were with the advance. 

Reconnoissances of the eastern shore had mean- 
while been ordered by Grant, and resulted in the dis- 



198 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

coveiy that there was but one point between War- 
rentou and Grand Gulf, where a good road existed 
from the river to the bluffs, the whole country being 
still overflowed on the left bank of the river. This 
dry point was at a place called Congo Island, and was 
so strongly protected by natural defences, that it was 
not judged advisable to attempt a landing there. The 
road led to Cox's farm on the Big Black i*iver, and 
to use this landino^ would have necessitated crossinor 
the Big Black in the face of the enemy. 

The Seventeenth corps, under McPherson, had 
followed McClernand closely, and Grant, after con- 
sulting with Admiral Porter, now determined to at- 
tack the works at Grand Gulf. The Mississippi, at 
this place, has cut away the alluvium to the foot of 
the highland, and forms a large semi-circular bay or 
" gulf." The bluff rises into a bold promontory, and 
commands a full view of the river for five or six 
miles above. The fortifications consisted of a series 
of rifle-trenches, and of two batteries, mounting thir- 
teen heavy guns. The plan w^as, for the naval force 
to bombard and silence the batteries, and, immediately 
afterwards, the troops were to land at the foot of the 
bluff, and carry the works by storm. Accordingly, 
ten thousand troops of the Thirteenth corps were 
crowded aboard the transports and barges, and moved 
down the stream, to the front of Grand Gulf, at a 
point just out of range. 

Giant, however, had foreseen that a necessity for 
running by the batteries might again arise. In his 
order to McClernand for the attack, dated the 27th 
of April, he remarked : " It may be that the enemy 
will occupy positions back from the city, out of range 
of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 199 

past Grand Gulf and land at Kodney, ... or, 
it may be expedient for tlie boats to run past, but 
not the men. In this case, tlien, the transports would 
have to be brouo-ht back to where the men could 
land, and move by forced marches to below Grand 
Gulf, reembark rapidly, and proceed to the latter 
place." * Witli tbe exception of the march to Grand 
Gulf, this is "what actually occurred, two days after- 
wards. On the same day, Grant instructed McCler- 
nand: "The amount of transportation being limited 
for the number of men it is desirable to take to Grand 
Gulf, I especially intended that no horses, except 
what was necessary for drawing the artillery, should 
be taken." 

At eio^ht o'clock on the mornino; of the 29th, For- 
ter began the bombardment witli all his iron-clads, 
seven in number, and one ordinary gunboat. For 
five hours and twenty minutes, he kept up a vigor- 
ous fire, without intermission, running his vessels at 
times almost within pistol-shot of the batteries. The 
cun'ent of the Mississippi at this place is quite swift, 
and the stream too deep for anchorage, so that the 
gunboats were compelled to keep continually in 
motion ; they were turned round and round in thie 
eddies, exposed of course at every turn. The vessels 
"were handled witli skill and boldness, but the rebel 
batteries were too elevated for Forter to accomplish 
any thing ; he was not able to dismount a solitary 
piece, and it would have been madness to attempt a 
landing, under unsilenced guns like these. No se- 
rious injury was sustained by any of the fleet, but, at 
twenty minutes past one o'clock, the admii'al with- 

♦ See Appendix for Grant's orders to McClemand for the attack in 
full, April 27th. Also Grunt's orders of April 24th. 



200 jnLITART HISTORY OF 

drew, the utter futility of Ms effort having been am- 
ply demonstrated ; the enemy also suspended fire. 
Porter's loss was eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. 
One of his vessels was stnick as many as forty-seven 
times. 

Grant had witnessed the bombardment from a 
tug in the stream, and, immediately upon its close, he 
signalled the admiral, who took him aboard the flag- 
ship, There, he at once requested Porter to run by tbe 
batteries at Grand Gulf that night, with his entire 
fleet, as a cover to the transports, wdiile the troops 
should be disembarked at Hard Times, and marched 
to De Shroon's, a point on the western shore, three 
miles below Grand Gulf. Porter promptly acqui- 
esced, and that night the gunboats again engaged the 
batteries, while all the transports ran b}^, receiving 
no damage in the passage, only one or two being 
struck. They were thus ready, on the morning of the 
30th, to take the troops aboard at De Sliroon's. Dur- 
ing the night, the Thirteenth corps marched around 
to that place, on the levee. The gunboats also passed 
below the batteries. 

Grant liad previously ordered the eastern shore 
below Grand Gulf explored, to find a landing-place, 
and hardly hoped to get a footing anywhere north of 
llodney ; but, that night, information was procured 
from a negro, that a good road led from Bruinsburg, 
six miles below Grand Gulf, to Port Gibson, twelve 
miles in the interior, and on high ground. AVheu the 
embarkation began in the morning, it was with a 
view to steam down the liver, until hard land should 
1)6 found, but, this information being relied on, the 
first transports went direct to Bruiusbui'g, and found 
the negro's story correct; a good dry road leading to 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 201 

the bluffs, whicli were at least two miles from the 
river. 

At the same time that the attack on Grand Gulf 
was ordered, Grant ^n'ote to Sherman, who had not 
yet started from Milliken's bend, to make a demon- 
stration against Haine's bluff, which should serve as a 
diversion merely, in favor of the assault below. 
" The effect of a lieav^y demonstration in tliat direc- 
tion," said Grant, " would be good, so far as the ene- 
my are concerned ; but I am loath to order it, because 
it would be so hard to make our own troops understand 
that only a demonstration was intended, and our peo- 
ple at home would characterize it as a repulse." Sher- 
man had been so unfortunate, and the comments of 
the newspaper press on his career had been so un- 
justly harsh, that Grant felt an especial unwilling- 
ness to place him and his command in a position that 
would subject them to unpleasant criticism. Still, he 
preferred Sherman to any other commander, for this 
separate and important part of the entei'prise. But 
Sherman replied : " I believe a diversion at Ilaine's 
bluff is proj)er and right, and will make it, let what- 
ever reports of repulses be made." On the ?.9th of 
April, accordingly, he moved ten regiments up the 
Yazoo on transports, while the gunboats which had 
been left by Porter north of Vicksburg (eight in 
number), also appeared in sight of the bluff*, and en- 
gaged the batteries. The troops were landed, and 
mock dispositions made for attack; reconnoissances 
were sent out, and the enemy opened liea\'y^ fire both 
upon the naval and the land forces. This lasted for 
two days, and Grant afterwards learned that the 
movement caused great anxiety and many changes of 
troops, in the command at Vicksburg. Not a man of 



202 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

Sherman's force was Lurt, nor were there any losses in 
the squadron. On the 1st of May, Sherman got or- 
ders from Gi-ant to withdraw from before the bluff, 
and follow as rapidly as possible, on the heels of 
MoPliersou's corps. " Move up to Perkins's planta- 
tion, witli two divisions of your corps, as rapidly as 
possible." 

On tlie 29th, after passing Grand Gulf, Grant 
wrote to Halleck : " I feel now that the battle is more 
than half over." During this tedious month, his con- 
fidence had never failed. On the 2d of April, he 
said to Ilalleck : " In two weeks I expect to be able 
to collect all my forces and turn the enemy's left." 
AVhen Sherman returned, unsuccessful, from Steele's 
bayou. Grant consoled himself by saying that "the 
expedition has at least pushed our troops into the 
heart of the granary from which the Vicksburg 
forces are now being fed." On the 11th, he an- 
nounced : " My force in a few days will be all concen- 
trated ; I expect to take Grand Gulf." On the 17th : 
"I go to Kew Carthage to-night; if it is possible, I 
will occu])y Grand Gulf in four days." On the 18th : 
" I hope very soon to be able to repoi-t my possession 
of Grand Gulf." On the 21st: "My force is abun- 
dant, with a foothold once attained, to do the work." 
On the 24th, to Sherman : " I foresee great difficul- 
ties in our present position, but it will not do to let 
these retard any movements." Again : " Once at 
Grand Gulf, I do not feel a doubt of success in the 
entire clearing out of the enemy from the banks of 
the river." "Every effort will be exerted to get 
speedy possession of Grand Gulf, and from that point 
to open the Mississippi." 



ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 203 



CHAPTER VII. 

Preliminary orders for the campaign — ^Passage of the Mississippi river — Move- 
ment to the high land— Battle-field of Port Gibson— McClernand meets the 
enemy— Buttle of Port Gibson— Grant comes on the field in person— Arri- 
val of MePherson's command— Success on the right— McPherson's charge- 
Defeat of the rebels— Pursuit until dark— Rebels retreat beyond Port Gibson 
—Pursuit to Big Black river- Bridges burnt by rebels an 1 rebuilt by Grant 
— Evacuation of Grand Gulf— New plan of campaign— Reasons for the 
change — Dispatches from Banks — New plan not divulged to Ilalleck— EDforts 
to bring up troops and supplies — Demonstrations towards Vicksburg— In- 
structions to Hurlbut— McPherson advances — Sherman arrives — Correspond- 
ence with Sherman — ^Army moves— Position of troops — Grant's habit in 
planning campaigns — Grant's force at outset of campaign— Headquarters at 
Cayuga— More dispatches from Banks — ^Final dispatches to Halleck — McPher- 
son ordered to Raymond— Battle of Raymond— Capture of Raymond — 
Enemy retreat to Jackson — Pemberton deceived by Grant's manoeuvres- 
Advance of Sherman and McPherson — Pursuit of the rebels towards Jack- 
son — Johnston's arrival at Jackson — Pemberton ordered to attack Grant's 
rear — McPherson arrives at Clinton — Battle of Jackson — Position of Mc- 
Pherson and Sherman — Charge of Crocker's division — Capture of Jackson — 
Retreat of Johnston towards Canton — Destruction of railroad and stores- 
Frustration of Johnston's plans — Pemberton again ordered to join Johnston 
— Grant intercepts Johnston's dispatches — Moves at once towards Bolton- 
Grant converges while rebels diverge — Pemberton moves to cut Grant's com- 
munications — Receives Johnston's orders and reverses his column — Battle- 
field of Champion's Hill — McClernand's advance — Grant's arrival — Hovey's 
attack — Battle of Champion's Hill — Hovey's success — Enemy musses on 
Hovey — Grant reentorces Hovey — McClernand repeatedly ordered up, but 
does not arrive — McPherson outflanks the enemy — Rebels finally driven from 
the field — McClernand arrives when the battle is over — Rea.sons for McCler- 
nand's delay insufficient — Pursuit of the rebels — Rout of the enemy com- 
plete — Loring cut ofiF— Losses on both sides — Hill of Death — Grant gets in 
advance of column — Johnston loses a day — Sherman ordered to Bridgeport 
with pontoon train — McClernand comes up with enemy at Black river bridge 
Battle-field of Black river bridge — Gallant charge of Lawler— Demoraliza- 
tion of rebels — Firing of bridge — Capture of prisoners and cannon — Rapid 



-204. MILITAET HISTORY OF 

reconstruction of bridges — Passage of Blacic river by entire army— Pursuit 
of the rebels to A''icksburg— Sherman strikes Walnut hills— Investment of 
Vicksburg— Evacuation of Haine's bluff— Results of campaign — Rebel move- 
ments during campaign — Reflections — Comparison with Italian campaign in 
1T96. 

The orunboats beino: now all below Grand Gulf, 
it was possible that tlie rebels miglit send armed 
steamers down tlie Big Black river, and up tlie Mis- 
sissippi as far as Perkins's plantation, where Grant 
had established a depot of supplies. In order to pre- 
vent any damage to this depot by the enemy, Grant, 
on the night of April 29th, ordered McPherson, who 
had arrived at Hard Times, to improvise a gunboat 
l)y putting a section of light artillery aboard one of 
the transports, and to send it up to guard the planta- 
tion. He also directed four thirty-pound Parrott guns, 
which he was taking with him on this campaign, to 
be hauled by oxen to the bank of the river at Per- 
kins's, and put in battery there. These arrangements 
effectually protected the position. 

On the 30th, orders were issued to the chief com- 
missary and quartermaster of the command, to pre- 
pare two more tugs to run the blockade, each with 
two barges in tow, and to load them to nearly their 
full capacity with rations. "Do this," said Grant, 
" with all expedition, in forty-eight hours from receipt 
of orders, if possible. Time is of immense impor- 
tance. Sliould their crews decline running through, 
call on tlie commanding officer for volunteers, and 
discharge the crews." The same day, the chief com- 
missary of the Thirteenth corj)s received the fol- 
lowing directions: " You will issue to the troops of 
this command, without provision returns,* for their 

♦ ProtUion returns are the vouchers invariably required of officers 
drawing rations for troops. They are minute in character, and to de- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 205 

subsistence during the next five days three rations ; " 
and corps commanders were instnicted to direct their 
" chief quartermasters to seize, for the use of the army 
in the field during the ensuing campaign, such land 
transportation as may be necessary, belonging to the 
inhabitants of the country through which they may 
pass." 

These orders and dispatches were all written in 
Grant's own hand, and nearly all signed with liis own 
name. Like most of the important papers emanating 
from his headquarters during the war, they were his 
own composition, struck out at the moment they 
were needed by the emergency of the moment, and 
sent off without emendation or change. Dates and 
names, and matter of that description in the largei' 
reports were, of course, often supplied by others, but 
the gist and the text were Grant's own. None of his 
staff-ofiicers ever attempted to imitate his style.* 

On the 30th of April, as soon as the troops could 
be supplied witli three days' rations in their haver- 
sacks, the advance of McClernand's corps was marched 
from Bruinsburg, at the mouth of the Bayou Pierre, 
towards the high ground, two and a half miles in- 
land. The road runs close to the south side of the 
bayou, entering the hills through a defile which might 
easily have been defended. The remainder of the 
Thirteenth, and two divisions of the Seventeenth corps 
were ferried across the river as rapidly as possible, 
fi'om De Shroon's. Kot a tent nor a wagon accom- 
panied them, nor was any personal baggage trans- 
lay at this time for their preparation would have retarded the movement 
of the army, 

* The quotations in this history are invariably given in Grant's origi- 
nal language, and from papers not touched up by any subordinate. 



206 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

ported until all the troops were over. Grant and his 
staff crossed in the early morning, and in advance of 
theii' horses, which did not reach them again for 
several days. Not only was every bai-ge and tug 
crowded to its utmost capacity, but the gunboats 
were offered for the ferriage of artillery and troops, 
by Porter, who fully appreciated the value of every 
moment. The Mississippi here is over a mile wide ; 
the distance from De Shroon's to Bruinsburg is six 
miles. 

What was necessary now was to gain the high 
land and establish a base, before the enemy should 
become aware of the movement. This Grant deemed 
a matter of vast importance. But as soon as the 
march of troops should be discovered, his purpose of 
reaching the interior would of course become appar- 
ent. The means of ferriage were limited, and the 
weather was intensely hot; but within twenty-four 
hours from tlie first landing, the infantry and artillery 
of the Thirteenth corps, and one division of McPher- 
son's command were firmly established on the main 
land of Mississippi. The bluffs were reached an 
hour before sunset, and McClernand pushed on at 
once, in the direction of Port Gibson, hoping to sur- 
prise the rebels if they attempted to defend that 
place, as well as to prevent their destroying the 
bridges across the Bayou PieiTe. Port Gibson is 
twelve miles from Bruinsburg, and at the junction of 
the road from the latter place with that from Grand 
Gulf; it is besides on the direct route from the Mis- 
sissippi to Jackson, the capital of the state, as well 
as t<^ Vicksburg. Its possession would turn Grand 
Gulf, and compel the evacuation of that stronghold. 

At two A. M., on the 1st of Mav, McClernand's 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 207 

advanced division came in contact with the enemy, 
about eight miles out from Bruinsburg. Some little 
skirmishing took place, and as fast as the troops got 
up they became engaged. No heavy fighting, how- 
ever, occurred before daybreak, when the enemy was 
discovered in position, and evidently determined to 
accept battle. His force was composed of the garri- 
son of Grand Gulf, which had marched out promptly 
under General Bowen, with the idea of holding Grant 
in check near the Bayou Pierre, until reenforcements 
could arrive from Vicksburg.* Including these last. 
Grant estimated the number of the enemy at eleven 
thousand, f His own force engaged was composed 
of the Thirteenth corps and two brigades of the 
Seventeenth, amounting in all to nearly nineteen 
thousand men. J 

The country at this place is admirably adapted 
for defence ; a series of irregular ridges is divided by 

* All the unqualified statements of rebel movements or forces made 
in this chapter are taken from the rebel official reports. I have exam- 
ined Johnston's, Pemberton's, Bowen's, Loring's, and all the sub- 
reports, having had access to the original documents, now in the pos- 
session of the government. 

t Bowen himself reported that he had fifty-five hundred men en- 
gaged, but Loring reports that, after the battle, Bowen told him he had 
still about seven thousand. This was exclusive of the reenforcements 
brought by Loring. After careful examination of all data, rebel and 
national, I am inclined to estimate Bowen's force at between seven and 
eight thousand. 

I Throughout this work I am indebted to Brevet Major-General Raw- 
iins, chief of staflf to the General of the Army, for estimates of both na- 
tional and rebel forces and losses. General Rawlins was with Grant from 
the outset of his career, and always in his confidence. lie knew, as 
well as anybody could, the exact number of troops brought into the 
field on each occasion; and every oflicer of experience is aware how 
frequently such numbers diflfer from those borne on the rolls. General 
Rawlins has entered into minute calculations of regiments and bat- 
teries, so that my statements may be taken without qualification. I 



208 MTLITAEY HISTORY OF 

deep and difficult ravines, and the ground, where not 
opened for cultivation, is grown up with heavy tim- 
ber and an underbrush of cane ; the roads are few, 
and run along the lidges, making it impossible to de- 
ploy any considerable portion of the troops at once. 
The road to Port Gibson divides upon the battle- 
field, branching in exactly opposite directions, but the 
branches soon converge again, a little west of the 
town. The enemy was in position across both these 
roads (never more than two miles apart), and the at- 
tacking party was thus obliged to follow, separated 
by steep ravines, that were choked up with magnolia- 
trees and tangled with bamboo and vine. A very 
small force could in this way retard the progress of a 
much larger one for hours. 

McClernand, however, bringing up his rear divi- 
sions, developed his whole force as rapidly as the 
country allowed. On the right, were the divisions of 
Hovey, Carr, and A. J. Smith, and on the left, the 
division of Osterhaus, all in the Thirteenth corps. 
The national troops faced east, and as soon as the 
oiimmerino; of the risiuo; sun and the smoke of the 
previous skirmishing had ceased to blind theii* eyes, 
the battle began. In less than an hour, nearly the 
whole command was engaged. The artillery fire was 
heard at the landing, eight miles off, and Grant started 
at once for the front, arriving on the field at ten a. m., 
on a borrowed horse, and with no escort but his staff. 
lie immediately assumed direct command. 

liave especially striven to avoid under-estimates of national strength 
and losses, and exagnferation of those of the rebels. 

I shall owe much of whatever accuracy and authenticity this vol- 
ume n)ay possess, in other departments besides that of statistics, to 
the remarkable memory of General Rawlins — a memory almost never at 
fault, and which my researches have corroborated hundreds of times. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 209 

At tLis time, McClernand was pressing the rebels 
vio-orously on the right with tlie bulk of his force, 
and slowly but steadily gaining ground; but Oster- 
haus's division on the left had not been so successful. 
The enemy's troops in his front were posted on a 
ridge admirably chosen ; their left in a sunken road, 
and the right protected by an almost impassable 
ravine. Osterhaus made repeated efforts to dislodge 
them, but was foiled, until two brigades of Logan's 
division in McPherson's corps appeared. 

The battle had now been going on for several 
hours, and McPherson pushed his men as rapidly as 
possible, coming on the ground in person, with his 
advance, as soon as the last of the Thirteenth corps 
was out of the road. This was about noon. Grant 
at once directed him to throw John E. Smith's bri- 
o-ade to the support of Osterhaus, with instructions to 
advance on the left, and, if possible, outflank the 
enemy. Grant and McPherson accompanied this 
brigade, and the movement was perfectly successful. 
As soon as the position of the enemy could be defi- 
nitely ascertained, and the ground sufficiently recon- 
noitred, a charoje was made across the ravine and on 
the rebel flank, simultaneously with a direct attack 
by Osterhaus in front. This combined effort soon 
dj'ove the rebels fi'om their position on Grant's left, 
and sent them in precipitate retreat towards Port 
Gibson. Before sunset, their right was completely 
turned, and the entire line broken and swept away. 

McClernand, meanwhile, notwithstanding the de- 
termined gallantry and steady progress of Hovey, 
Carr, and A. J. Smith, was sending repeated mes- 
sages to Grant for reenforcements on the right; but 
his wishes were only partly gratified. Grant had 

14 



210 mUTARY HISTORY OF 

been on that part of tlie field in person, and did not 
see how additional troops could be used to advan- 
tao-e. The three divisions there had been steadily 
driving tlie enemy from position to position, all day. 
Early in the action, Ilovey pushed boldly forward, 
and caj^tured a four-gun battery. But, later, the 
enemy held his ground with more tenacity, encour- 
aged doubtless by reenforcements which arrived from 
Vicksburg during the fight, having marched more 
than twenty miles. Although in the face of greatly 
superior numbers, the rebels now obstinately disputed 
every inch of the field ; they had, however, every pos- 
sible advantage of position, the ridges commanding 
the approaches on every side. 

McClernand had asked for two more divisions, 
and Grant finally sent him one brigade of Logan's 
troops, under Stevenson, at the same time that he 
ordered McPherson to the left, with Smith's brigade 
of Logan's division, and Logan in person. But, be- 
fore Stevenson's brigade appeared on the light, the 
rebels had begun to withdraw, and the sight of fresh 
national troops probably added to their demoraliza- 
tion, although not to their discomfiture, as Stevenson 
did not really become engaged. Finding himself 
outnumbered, and, in spite of his strenuous exertions, 
beaten on every part of the line, Bowen finally gave 
way, and fell back rapidly towards Port Gibson, leav- 
ing his dead and wounded on the field. 

The pursuit was continued from point to point, 
till night closed in, and as long as possil)le after 
dark. It reached to within two miles of Port Gib- 
son, but the nature of the country was such that fur- 
ther advance in the dark was not deemed prudent 
or desirable. The enemy making the appearance of 



ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 211 

anotlier stand, the troops slept on their aims till day- 
lio-ht. Grant thought it evident that the rebels would 
attemj)t a retreat under cover of the night, and his 
last order to McClernand was : " Push the enemy with 
skirmishers well thrown out, until it gets too dark 
to sec him; then place your command on eligible 
ground wherever night finds you. Park your artil- 
lery so as to command the surrounding country, and 
renew the attack at early dawn. If possible, push 
the enemy fi'om the field or capture him. No camp- 
fires should be allow^ed, unless in deep ravines and to 
the rear of troops." 

In the battle of Port Gibson, Grant's loss was one 
hundred and thirty killed, and seven hundred and 
eighteen wounded. He took six hundred and fifty 
prisoners, and estimated the enemy's loss in killed 
and wounded as about equal to his own.* Six field- 
guns were captured. Bowen's advance to Port Gib- 
son was bold, and his defence a good one, but the 
national forces were too heavy for the rebels, and the 
movement l»y Bruinsburg was undoubtedly a surprise. 

Pi'isoners stated that Bowen had taken up his 
position on the battle-ground of Port Gibson, late in 
the night of the 30th, having made a forced march 
from Grand Gulf, as soon as Grant's movement was 
discovered. He had expected reenforceraents of five 
thousand men from Vicksburg, and others from Jack- 
son, under Loring ; but the national troops were too 
quick for him, and only two brigades arrived from 
Vicksburg to participate in the fight. General Tracy, 
of the rebel army, was killed, and many evidences of 
demoralization appeared. Pemberton, who was in 
command of the rebel department of Mississippi, that 

* Bowen reported four hundred and forty-eight killed and wounded, 
and three hundred and eighty-four missing I 



212 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 

niglit telegraphed to General Josepli E. Johnston, his 
immediate superior: "A furious battle has been 
going on since daylight just below Port Gibson. 
Enemy can cross all his army from Hard Times to 
Bruinsburg. I should have large reenforcements. 
Enemy's movements threaten Jackson, and, if success- 
ful, cut off Vicksburg and Port Hudson." 

During the night, as Grant had foreseen, the 
rebels evacuated Port Gibson, and Avithdrew across 
the two forks of the Bayou Pierre, destroying the 
bridges in their rear. They left a battery and several 
regiments of infantry to prevent the reconstruction 
of the bridge over the North fork. Early on the 
morning of the 2d,McClernand's troops, flushed with 
tlie success of the day before, and elated at the idea 
of being at last on dry land, with plenty of open 
country for operations, pushed into the town, finding 
no enemy but the wounded. Grant immediately de- 
tached one briojade of Lo2:an's division to the left, to 
engage the attention of the rebels there, while a 
heavy detail of McClernand's troops was set to work, 
rebuilding the bridge across the South fork. The 
break was more than a hundred and twenty feet 
long, but was repaired with extraordinaiy rapidity, 
officers and men working up to their waists in the 
water, and the houses in tlie neis-hborhood beino; 
torn down for timber. While this was doing, two 
brigades of Logan's division forded the bayou and 
marched on. 

Meanwhile, another division (Crocker's), of Mc- 
Pherson's corps, had been ferried across the Missis- 
sippi, and, stopping only to fill their haversacks with 
three days' rations, which they were ordered to make 
last five, had come up with the command. McArthui*'s 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 213 

division of this corps had been left to guard the lines 
of communication from Milliken's bend to Perkins's 
plantation, until relieved by Sherman. Grant now 
ordered McPherson to "push across the bayou and 
attack the enemy in flank, and in full retreat through 
Willow Springs, demoralized and out of ammuni- 
tion." 

McPherson started at once, and before night his 
two divisions had crossed tlie South fork and marched 
to the North fork, eight miles farther on. They 
found the bridge at Grindstone ford still burning, 
but the fire was extinguished and the bridge repaired 
in the night, the troops passing over as soon as the 
last plank was laid. This was at five a. m. on the 3d. 
Before one brigade had finished crossing, the enemy 
opened on the head of the column with artillery ; but 
the command was at once deployed, and the rebels 
soon fell back, their movement being intended only 
to cover the retreating force. McPherson followed 
rapidly, driving them through Willow Springs, and 
gaining the cross-roads. Here Logan was directed 
to take the Grand Gulf road, while Crocker continued 
the direct pursuit. Skirmishing was kept up all day ; 
the broken country, the narrow, toi-tuous roads, and 
impassable ravines offering great fiicilities for this 
species of warfare : the enemy availed himself fully 
of every advantage, contesting the ground with great 
tenacity. This continued all the way to Hankin- 
son's feri-v, on the Bis: Black river, fifteen miles 
from Port Gibson. Several hundred prisoners were 
taken in the pursuit. 

At four o'clock in the afternoon, McPherson came 
up with the rebels, in force, and Logan at the same 
time appearing on their right flank, caused them to 



214 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 

move precipitately towards tlie liver. McPliersoD 
followed bard, and arrived just as the last of the rebels 
were crossing, and in time to prevent the destniction 
of the bridge. It being now dark, and the enemy- 
driven across the Big Black, the command w^as rested 
for the night. McPherson was ordered to hold the 
position with one division, from the Big Black river 
to Willow Springs, and McClernand, on his arrival, 
to join in this duty. 

McClernand was also directed to guard the roads 
to the rear, especially towards Grand Gulf, and to 
" watch the enemy's movements far dow^n the Bayou 
PieiTe." "Make a reconnoissance in that direction 
with one division; the enemy may be practising a 
sharp game to get in our rear with a force to destroy 
all we have hano^insr behind." 

At this time, Grant learned the success of Grier- 
son's raid, and the timely effect it was producing on 
the Southern people. The rebel newspapers were 
filled with accounts of the damage done; and this 
really daring exploit, unexampled at that period of 
the war, was magnified into proportions and impor- 
tance greatly superior even to what Grant had hoped.* 
Nothing could have been more opportune. On the 
2d, also, telegi-ams between Bowen and Pemberton 
were interce})ted, in which the former announced that 
he had been compelled to fall back, after a deter- 
mined effort to hold his own, his ammunition having 
become exhausted. Pemberton, in reply, promised 
that "ammunition should be sent in due time." 

* " So great was the consternation created by this raid, that it waa 
impossible to obtain any reliable information of the enemy's move- 
ments, rumor ijlaciug him in various places at the same time." — P<;7»- 
btrtoii^a lieport. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 215 

Grant's army was now in fine condition, although, 
since leaving Milliken's bend, it had marched by- 
night as well as by day, through mud and rain, with- 
out tents, and on irregular rations. There was no 
murmuring, and almost no straggling. Grant had, in 
McClernand and McPherson's command, five divi- 
sions, amounting in all to nearly thirty thousand 
men. " My force," he said, " is composed of hardy 
and disciplined men, who know no defeat, and are 
not willino: to learn what it is." 

By this time, it was evident that the rebels were 
evacuating Grand Gulf, which, indeed, tliere was noth- 
ing more to gain by holding ; * and their movements, 
since the battle, had all been made to cover the escape 
of the garrison. Accordingly, on the morning of the 
3d, Grant started from Willow Springs in person, 
with one brigade of Logan's division, and a cavalry 
escort of twenty men. for the town. On the way, he 
learned that the rebels had already abandoned all the 
country between the Big Black river and the Bayou 
Pierre. He determined, therefore, not to detach any 
troops from his main column ; and the brigade which 
accompanied him was turned off, where the road to 
Grand Gulf forks, about seven miles out, the last of 
the retreating force having already passed on, towards 
Hankinsou's ferry. Grant then rode into the town, 
with his staff and cavalry escort, to make the neces- 
sary arrangements for removing his base of supplies 
from Bruinsbursr to Grand Gulf 

He found the naval force in possession. Porter 

* " Grand Gulf was not selected as a position for land defence, but 
for the protectiou of the mouth of the Big Black, and also as a pre- 
cautionary measure against the passage of transports." — Peniberton'a 
Jieport. 



216 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

having landed early in the day ; but the magazines 
liad been blown up in the night, the cannon buried 
or spiked, while the garrison had begun its retreat at 
ei«'-ht o'clock the evenins; before. Grant's movements 
were so rapid that it was impossible to withdraw the 
heavy guns, and thirteen pieces fell into the hands of 
the victors.* On the water front, works were found 
elaborate and extensive even beyond expectation, 
while on the land side the place was susceptible of as 
complete defence as Vicksburg ; but, cut off from all 
reenforcements or relief, it was sure to fall, and a de- 
lay in the evacuation would only have sacrificed the 
srarrison. 

Grant had not been abed, nor had off his clothes, 
since leaving Bruin sburg, three days before, and went 
aboard one of the gunboats, where he borrowed a 
change of linen, and wrote dispatches till midnight. 
He sent long letters to Halleck, announcing the suc- 
cess of his operations, and detailing tlie movement 
against Grand Gulf, tlie march to the interior, and 
the battle of Port Gibson. Sherman, now on the 
march from Milliken's bend, was informed : " My 
base is now at this place, and in executing j^our or- 
ders fur joining me you w^ill govern yourself accord- 
ingly. . . . Logan is now on the main road from here 
to Jackson, and "McPherson, closely followed by Mc- 
Clernand, (»n tlio branch of tbe same road from V/il- 
low Springs. . . . The road to Vicksburg is open. . . ." 

It had already become apparent that " the coun- 
try would supply all the forage recpiired for an active 
campaign, ns wvW as tlie necessary beef; all other 

* " So grcsit wcro his" (Grant's) " facilities for transportation, and «o 
rapid his monemenls, that it was impracticable to withdraw the heavy 
guns." — PeinJiertohi Report. 



ULYSSES S. GRAIST. 217 

supplies would have to be drawn from Milliken's 
bend, a long and precarious route;" but Grant de- 
clared: *'I have every confidence of succeeding in 
doing it." Accordingly, lie wrote tliat night to Sulli- 
van, who commanded the district between Milliken's 
bend and Smith's plantation : "You will give special 
attention to the matter of shortening the line of land 
transportation from above Vicksburg to the steamers 
below. As soon as the river has fallen sufficiently, 
you will have a road constructed from Young's point 
to a landing just below Warrenton, and dispose of 
your troops accordingly. Every thing depends upon 
the promptitude with which our supplies are for- 
warded." To Sherman he said : " I wish you to col- 
lect a train of one hundred and twenty wagons at 
Milliken's bend and Perkins's plantation, send them 
to Grand Gulf, and there load them Mith rations, as 
follows : one hundred thousand j^ounds of bacon, the 
balance, coffee, sugar, salt, and hard bread. For your 
own use on the march fi'om Grand Gulf, you will 
draw five days' rations, and see that they last five 
days. It is unnecessary for me to remind you of the 
overwhelming importance of celerity. . . . All we 
want now are men, ammunition, and hard bread ; we 
can subsist our horses on the countiy, and obtain 
considerable supplies for our troops." 

It has been seen that, up to the time of crossing 
the Mississippi, Grant's intention was to collect all 
his " forces at Grand Gulf, and get on hand a good 
supply of provisions and ordnance stores, and, in the" 
mean time, to detach a corps to cooperate with Banks 
against Port Hudson, and so effect a junction of their 
forces." But, having beaten the enemy at Port Gib- 
son, and followed him to the Big Black river, Grant 



218 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

was now fifteen miles on the road from Grand Gulf 
either to Jackson, Black river bridge, or Vicksburg. 
He could not afford to delay, much less to retrace his 
steps. Many days could not elapse before the battle 
must be fought on ^vhich the fate of Vicksburg would 
depend, and it was impossible to predict how long 
the contest misrht last. Grant had also certain infor- 
mation that the rebel General Joseph E. Johnston 
was on his way to Jackson, and that reenforcements 
Avere constantly arriving at that place from Port 
Hudson and other Southern cities. Instead of reen- 
forcing Banks, there was need of Banks to come to 
the sujjport of Grant. 

But, at this crisis, he received a letter from Banks, 
who was now west of the Mississippi, near Alexan- 
dria, and who declared that he could not reach Port 
Hudson before the 10th of May, and that, even after 
the reduction of that place, he could reeuforce Grant 
with only twelve thousand men. Grant at once de- 
termined to turn all his forces against Vicksburg. 
To delay until the 10th of May, and after that for 
the reduction of Port Hudson, would be fatal; it 
would not leave him relatively as strong as if he 
moved promptly with what force he already had at 
his command. The losses he would undoubtedly 
suffer during the Port Hudson campaign, from sick- 
ness and strao:o:linQ:, and in battle and durinsj the 
siege, would reduce his numbers so, that with the 
added strength the enemy was daily receiving, no 
actual reenforcement would be gained. These were 
the negative considerations which influenced him. 

But the positive ones were of greater force, as 
they always were with this commander. He had 
won a victory, had gained a foothold on the high 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 219 

land and on the east bank, that he had been five 
months striving to obtain ; he had captured Grand 
Gulf, one of the rebel strongholds, and an outwork 
of Vicksburg ; his troops were encouraged, and the 
enemy demoralized. He, doubtless, himself felt the 
inspiration of success, and it was his nature, in war, 
always to prefer the immediate aggressive. He de- 
termined, that night, to detach no force to Banks, but 
to begin operations at once against Vicksburg. 

But there was still a point of vital impoi-tance to 
decide, upon which, indeed, hinged all that gave this 
campaign its distinctive character. Having obtained 
that for which he had been all winter struggling, 
having at last reached high dry ground upon which 
to operate, apparently Grant's most natural course 
was to march direct upon Vicksburg, and at once 
begin the siege, or, at least, attack its garrison, should 
that come out to meet him. He was not more than 
twelve miles from Warrenton, and had only one for- 
midable natural obstacle to encounter, the Big Black 
river, the line of \yhich would probably be taken by 
any enemy opposing him. Pemberton was in Vicks- 
burcr and alons: the Vicksburi^ and Jackson railroad, 
with, as afterwards proved, fifty-tw^o thousand men,* 
but as Grant then supposed, witli thirty thousand. 
Another force, about equally distant, was collecting 
towards the east and north, and supposed to be com- 
manded by Gregg, of whose strength Grant was not 
w^ell informed. This force would, of course, endeavor 
to unite with the garrison of Vicksburg, and the two 
would be able to outnumber, and, perhaps, over- 
power the national commander. Grant determined 
to prevent this ; to push between the two armies be" 

* Pembcrton's field return for his entire command on the 31st of 
March showed a force, present, of 59,411 men. 



220 MELITAEY HISTORY OF 

fore tliey could comloine ; to drive eastward the 
weaker one ; attack and beat Gresrs- "before Peniber- 
ton could come to the rescue ; and to seize Jackson, 
the capital of the state, situated fifty miles in the 
rear of Vicksburg, and at the junction of the rail- 
roads by which Vicksburg is supplied. "When once 
the roads that centre there were destroyed, troops 
as well as stores would be cut off, and Vicksburg 
with its garrison isolated from the would-be Confed- 
eracy. 

This movement presented the most absolute and 
splendid advantages, but it also presented difficulties 
and dangers sufficient to deter any but the most con- 
fident of commanders. To undertake it. Grant must 
not only advance between two ai-mies, either of which 
was a formidable opponent, and run the daily risk 
of their combining to crush him ; but, more daring 
still, by moving towards Gregg, he would expose his 
only line of communication with the Mississippi to 
attacks from Pemberton. If he attempted to guard 
that line, he must weaken his moving column, so 
that it would be unsafe to cope with Gregg, now 
daily expecting reenforcements from the south and 
east. He at once decided to abandon his base alto- 
gether, to plunge into the enemy's country with three 
days' rations, trusting to the region itself for forage 
and supplies, and to the chances of victory to enabde 
him to regain some point on the Mississippi, in spite 
of all the opposition of two hostile armies. In doino- 
this, he risked greatly to gain greatly. If the rebel 
forces were able to combine, they were almost certain 
to crush him ; if he could be kept from his base he 
was ruined. The utmost celerity of movement, as 
well as a series of victories over both armies, ^ras 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 221 

indispensable, not only to Lis success, but to Ms sal- 
vation. 

Believing tliat he would not be allowed to make 
tlie campaign if he announced his plan beforehand, 
Grant did not now inform the general-in-chief of what 
he contemplated. It was fortunate that he took this 
precaution. Kot one syllable of encouragement had 
reached him since starting from Milliken's bend, and 
the President wrote, after all was over : " When you 
got below, and took Poi-t Gibson, Grand Gulf, and 
vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and 
join General Banks; and when you turned north- 
ward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mis- 
take." "' This disapprobation was not confined to the 
President. When Grant's plan of campaign was in- 
dicated, a few days later, Halleck at once sent him 
orders to return and cooperate ^vith Banks : " If pos- 
sible, the forces of yourself and Banks should be 
united hetween Vicksburg and Port Hudson^ so as to 
attack these ]:)laces separately wdth the combined 
forces." This dispatch was dated the 1 1th of May, 
ten days after the battle of Port Gibson. Hooker 
had just been defeated at Chancellorsville, and the 
government must have been aghast at the news that 
Grant had plunged into the hostile region of Missis- 
sippi, confronting two armies, and cutting loose from 
all communication. But there was no telegraphic line 
in operation from Washington, further than Cairo, 
and nearly a ^veek elapsed before the counter- 
manding dispatch was received. Had the general-in- 
chief, however, been able to reach his subordinate, 
the Yicksburg campaign would never have been 
fought. 

* This letter is given in full on page 399. 



222 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

So Grant was alone ; his most trusted subordinates 
besought him to change liis plans, while his superiors 
were astounded at his temerity and strove to inter- 
fere. Soldiers of reputation and civilians in high 
place condemned, in advance, a campaign that seemed 
to them as hopeless as it was unprecedented. If he 
failed, the country would concur with the govern- 
ment and the generals. Grant knew all this, and ap- 
preciated his danger, but was as invulnerable to the 
apprehensions of ambition as to the entreaties of 
friendship, or the anxieties, even of patriotism. That 
quiet confidence in himself which never forsook him, 
and which amounted indeed almost to a feeline of 
fiite, was uninterrupted. Having once determined in 
a matter that required irreversible decision, he never 
reversed, nor even misgave, but was steadily loyal to 
himself and his plans. This absolute and implicit 
faith was, however, as far as possible from conceit or 
enthusiasm; it was simply a consciousness, or con- 
viction, rather, which brought the very strength it 
l)elieved in ; which was itself strength, and which in- 
spired others with a trust in him, because he was 
able thus to trust himself. 

At midnight of the 3d, he turned his back on 
the Mississippi river, and started for Hankinson's 
ferry. 

Directions were given at once, for the supply of the 
entire force with three days' rations, and several days 
were spent in bringing Sherman's corps across the 
river to Grand Gulf, and preparing for the march. 
Supplies liad to l^e liauled sixty miles, from Milliken's 
btnd to Hard Times, and then ferried across the river 
and hauled eighteen miles further, to Hankinson's 
ferry, or wherever else the army lay. Every hour 



ULYSSES S. GRA]NT. 223 

now was invaluable. Grant's dispatches teem with 
indications of the efforts tliat were made to save 
time. 

To Sherman, who had left Blair's division at ]\Iil- 
likcn's bend, to guard that place, he wrote : " Order 
forward immediately your remaining division, leaving 
only two regiments (to guard Richmond), as required 
in previous orders. Have all the men leave the west 
bank of the river, with three days' rations in haver- 
sacks, and make all possible dispatch to Grand Gulf" 
In order that Blair might be brought forward, Hurl- 
but, who was still at Memphis, was directed to order 
four redments of his command to Milliken's bend, 
" with the utmost dispatch." " Take them from the 
troops most convenient to transportation." On the 
5th, Grant also ordered Hurlbut to " send Lauman's 
division to Milliken's bend, to be forwarded to this 
ai-my with as little delay as practicable. . . . Let 
them move by brigades, as fast as transportation can 
be o-ot. . . . This order for Lauman's division is in 
addition to the four regiments ordered a few days 
since.'' 

The commissary of subsistence at Grand Gulf was 
instmcted: "You will load all teams presenting 
themselves for rations with promptness and dispatch, 
regardless of requisitions or provision returns. There 
must be no delay on account of either lack of energy 
or fonnality." To an officer of his staff, who had been 
left at Grand Gulf to hurry up supplies and superin- 
tend transportation, Grant wrote : '' See that the com- 
missary at Grand Gulf loads all the wagons present- 
ing themselves for stores, ^ith great promptness. Is- 
sue any order in my name that may be necessary to 
secure the greatest promptness in this respect. . . . 



224 inLITARY HISTORY OF 

Every day's delay is worth two thousand men to the 
enemy." 

To the same officer he said, on the 6th : " Send 
me a report of about the number of rations on hand 
and sent forward to Grand Gulf. Send also to McFeely 
and Bingham,"' and remind them of the importance 
of rushing forward rations with all dispatch. The 
road to below Warrenton ought now to be completed. 
If so, rations can be got over by that route very rap- 
idly. . . . How many teams have been loaded with 
rations and sent forward ? I want to know as near 
as possible how we stand in every particular for sup- 
plies. How many wagons bave you ferried over the 
river ? How many are still to bring over ? What 
teams have gone back for rations ? " 

On the morning of tbe 3d, Admiral Porter had 
started with a part of his fleet for tbe Ked river, to 
cooperate with Banks, and left orders with Captain 
Owens, the naval officer next in command, to obey 
the directions of Grant. Accordingly, on the 5th, 
Grant instructed Owens to "place his flag-ship in the 
mouth of Black river, to watch any movement of the 
enemy in that direction. Leave Captain Murphy's 
vessel in front of Grand Gulf, to guard the stores and 
to convoy any steamer that may require it. ... Send 
the remaining iron-clads to the vicinity of Warrenton, 
to watch the movements of the enemy there, and pre- 
vent them fi'om sending troops across the I'iver to in- 
terrupt our lines from Milliken's bend and Young's 
l)oint." 

On the 4tli, while the troops were resting on the 
Big Black, waiting for Sherman and supplies, Grant 

* The chief cominissary of subsistence and chief quart cnnastcr of 
the commaiKl. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 225 

said to McClernand : " There will be no general move- 
ment of the troops before the cool of the evening, if 
at all to-day. You can tlierefore collect for your 
command such supplies as the country affords. Ke- 
connoitre the Jackson road, and ascertain if the 
enemy has retreated in that direction, and if so, 
whether any considerable portion of them." And to 
McPherson, on the same day : " I wish you would 
have a reconnoissance made of the roads near the 
river, np and down." These demonstrations were 
made, partly, to induce the enemy to suppose that the 
short route to Vicksburg was the one Grant now con- 
templated taking. They reached to within six miles 
of Vicksburg, on the west side of the Big Black 
river, and it was believed that their object of conceal- 
ing Grant's real intention was accomplished. Pem- 
berton, at any rate, made no show of approaching on 
the right, nor any attempt to get between Grant and 
Jackson, much less to combine with the force cover- 
ing that place. On the contrary, these movements 
demonstrated that Bowen had retreated across the 
Big Black at llankin son's ferry, and was now con- 
centrating with the main portion of the enemy, at 
Bovina station, on the Vicksburg and Jackson rail- 
road. 

Hurlbut was to remain at Memphis, and, on the 
5th, Grant sent detailed instructions to govern him 
during the campaign.* " You will have a large force 

* " I am ordering to you all the cavalry at Helena except two regi- 
ments. You can further strengthen your southern line by bringing 
troops from the District of Columbus. The completion of the road 
from Grand Junction to Corinth v,i\\ enable you to draw oflf all the 
troops north of that road. Make such disposition of the troops within 
your command as you may deem advisable for the best protection of 
your lines of communication. When the road to Corinth is completed, 
15 



226 MILITAEY IIISTOKY OF 

of cavalry ; use it as mucli as possible in attracting 
attention from tLis direction. Impress upon the cav- 
alry tlie necessity of keeping out of people's houses, 
or takincr what is of no use to them in a military 
point of view ; " and, in conformity with the views 
entertained by him, since Shiloh, he said : " They must 
live as far as possible off the country through which 
they pass, and destroy corn, wheat-crops, and every 
thing that can be made use of by the enemy in pro- 
longing the war. Mules and horses are to be taken 
to supply all our own wants, and, when it does not 
cause too much delay, agricultural implements may 
be destroyed. In other words, cripple in every way, 
without insulting women and children, or taking theii* 
clothes, jewelry, etc." 

While he was lying at Hankinson's feriy, the 
horses and personal luggage of Grant and his staff 
arrived at headquarters. Up to this time, he and his 
officers had messed with any general near whose camp 
they liappened to halt, riding borrowed horses, and 
sleeping in the porches of houses on the road. When 
he left Hard Times, Grant took no bas^srao-e with him 
but a tooth-brush. 

On the 6th, he informed Halleck : " Ferrying land 
transportation and rations to Grand Gulf is de- 
taining me on the Black rivei". I will move as soon 
as three days' rations are secured, and send the 
wagons back to the Gulf for more to follow. Infor- 
mation from the other side leads me to believe the 

put in there, as speedily as possible, sixty clays' supply of provisions and 
forage. . . . Telegraph to General Halleck direct, the forces I have 
drawn from you, and should rceuforcements be found necessary to hold 
your district, let him know it. Whilst headquarters are so distant, 
communicate direct with Washington in all important matters, but 
keep mc advised at the same time of what is going on." 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 227 

enemy are bringing forces from Tullalioma" (in Ten- 
nessee). *' Should not Kosecrans at least make a dem- 
onstration of advancing ? " The only answer to this 
was the dispatch recalling Grant. 

On the 6th, Grant ordered McPherson : " Move 
one of your divisions to Rocky Springs to-morrow, 
leaving the other to occupy from your present head- 
quarters to the ferry. On the approach of Sherman's 
advance, order up tlie second." Accordingly, at ten 
A. M. on the 7th, McPherson's troops were again in 
motion, Logan's division in the advance, followed 
closely by Crocker. They marched to Rocky Springs, 
about ten miles distant, where they remained in 
camp till the 9th. On the 8th, Grant's headquarters 
were removed to Rocky Springs. 

After making his demonstration against Haine's 
bluif, Sherman had left Blair's command at Milli- 
ken's bend, and, on the morning of the 2d of May, 
started witb Steele and Tuttle's divisions for Hard 
Times. He reached there by noon of the 6th, crossed 
the Mississippi during that night and the following 
day, and, on the 8th, after filling his haversacks with 
three days' rations, pushed on to the front, marching 
from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry, eighteen 
miles ; at the latter place, he relieved Crocker's divi- 
sion, of McPherson's corps. 

This day. Grant announced to Halleck : " Our ad- 
vance is fifteen miles from Edward's station, on 
Southern railroad.* All looks well. . . ." 

One staff ofi&cer, Captain Bowers, had been left 
at Milliken's bend, and to him Grant wrote on the 
9th; "What I have A\-ished to impress upon the gen- 

* This estimate was incorrect. 'Rocky Springs is full twenty-five 
miles from Edward's station. 



228 MILITAEY niSTOEY OF 

erals remaining upon tlie Louisiana side of the Mis- 
sissippi is, that the wagon road from Milliken's bend 
to Perkins's plantation should be shortened by every 
practicable means, and that, when circumstances will 
admit of it, it shall run from Young's point to a 
point below "Warrenton. Meanwhile, all possible 
exertions should be made to keep the ai-my supplied 
by the present route. Hard bread, coffee, and salt 
should be kept up anyhow, and then the other arti- 
cles of the ration as they can be supplied." On this 
point his anxiety was unabated, for it was of para- 
mount importance ; and, on the same day, he informed 
Captain Owens of the navy: "A road is now about 
complete across the point from Young's point to be- 
low the Warrenton batteries. This will shorten the 
route over which supplies have to be drawn, to about 
eight miles, and enable me to abandon the route 
across to Richmond. I would request that you keep 
the Tuscumbia at the depot below Warrenton ; keep 
one of the other gunboats at Grand Gulf, and with 
the other two, keerp the river clear between the two 
points." 

Sherman was still uneasy about the success of the 
campaign. Tie did not, as yet, undei*stand that Grant 
contemplated marching without any base at all, and 
vn'ote to his superior from Haukinson's ferry, de- 
scribing the confusion among troops and trains, and 
urging him to " stop all troo2)s till youi* army is par- 
tially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick 
as possible. For this road will be jammed, as sure 
as life, if you attempt to supply fifty thousand men 
by one single road." To this. Grant replied : " I do 
not calculate upon the possibility of suj^plying the 
ai-my with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 220 

will be impossible without constructing additional 
roads. What I do expect, however, is to get up what 
rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and 
make the country fiiruish the balance. We started 
fi'om Bruinsburg with an average of about two day^ 
rations, and received no more from our own supplies 
for some days; abundance was found in the mean 
time. Some corn-meal, bacon, and vegetables were 
found, and an abundance of beef and mutton. A 
delay would give the enemy time to reenforce and 
fortify. If Blair was up now, I believe we could be 
in Vicksburg in seven days. The command here lias 
an average of about three days' rations^ ichich coxdd 
he made to last that time!^ You are in a country 
where the troops have already lived oif the people 
for some days, and may find provisions more scarce ; 
but, as we get upon new soil, they are more abun- 
dant, particularly in com and cattle. Bring Blair's 
two brigades up as soon as possible. . . ." 

"V\Tien the march from Hankin son's ferry began ^ 
McPherson's corps had the left, on the Rocky Springs 
road, nearest Black river ; McClernand kept to the 
right, and moved direct by the road from Willow 
Springs, while Sherman followed with his corps di- 
vided on the two roads, and closely guarding the fei'- 
ries across the Big Black, against Pemberton. But, 
at Rocky Springs, Grant heard that the rebels were 
foi-tifS'ing and concentrating at Edward's station, 
about twenty-five miles off, on the Vicksburg and 
Jackson railroad, and he at once determined to 
change the relative positions of the corps. It was 
his intention now to hug the Black river as closely 
as possible, with McClernand and Sherman's corps, 

* These italics are not Grant's. 



230 MILirAEY IIISTOBY OF 

and strike the railroad with them beyond Edward's 
station, somewhere between that place and Bolton, 
forty or fifty miles from Hankinson's ferry. Mean- 
while, McPlierson was to move by way of Utica to 
Kaymond, thirty-five miles from the ferry, and thence 
into Jackson, twenty miles further, destroying the 
railroad, telegraph, and public stores there ; he was 
then to push west and rejoin the main force. By 
these dispositions, Grant would avoid a battle with 
the main rebel army on the ground selected by Pem- 
berton; he could also protect McPherson in his east- 
erly movement, and keep all his own troops within 
supporting distance of each other, no matter on which 
side they might be attacked ; while, at the same time, 
he divided the enemy, interposing between Pember- 
ton and the rebel forces at Jackson. 

Sherman and McPherson understood this arrange- 
ment ; the latter especially was aware that, if possi- 
ble, he was to push on towards Jackson, though, of 
course, not mthout express orders. These Grant 
never gave in advance ; it was his custom always to 
await the contingencies of a campaign. None of his 
plans Avere so precise that he could not vaiy them ; 
all allowed for the uncertain and unexpected move- 
ments of the enemy. After the great features of a 
campaign, or the principal object of a battle \vas 
indicated, and the position of troops at the outset 
determined, he contented himself beforehand with 
giving orders for the earliest movements ; always 
expecting to be governed afterwards by the emer- 
gencies that were sure to arise. Many of his most 
notable successes were ins])ired at the moment, like 
the advance of Smith, at Donelson, or the move to 
the interior, in the Yicksburg campaign. Yet these 



ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 231 

sudden and unforeseen determinations tended essen- 
tially to tlie consummation of objects long before and 
patiently souglit. So, now, McPlierson only knew 
tliat it was probable lie should go to Jackson, and 
McClernand was not informed of this intention at 
all ; Grant feared to intrust McClernand with an in- 
dependent expedition, wliicli the movement against 
Jackson seemed likely to prove ; and therefore put 
him on the left. McClernand was sure always to 
claim the most important position or command, but 
as he was now really nearer the great bulk of the 
rebel army, he had no reason to complain, supposing 
himself to be in the advance. 

McPherson marched, accordingly, on the 9th of 
May, to a point seven miles west of Utica, and Mc- 
Clernand to the Big Sandy river. That evening, 
McPhei-son was directed : " March your command to- 
morrow to water beyond Utica, provided you find it 
within six or seven miles of the place, on the direct 
Raymond road." The only regiment of cavalry in 
the command was now given to McPherson, and, by 
Grant's orders, it reconnoitred vigorously on the right 
flank and fi'ont of the Seventeenth corps. The same 
day (May 9th), McClernand was ordered : " Move 
your command to-morrow, on the telegraph road, to 
ri\'e-mile creek. Instructions have been given to 
Generals Sherman and McPherson to move so as to 
continue on the same general front with you. Have 
all the lateral roads leading from your line of march 
carefully examined, to facilitate communication with 
the other corps in case of necessity." All the move- 
ments, thus far, were preliminary merely, or of the 
nature of developments, the necessary supplies and 
ammunition for the march not having yet ariived. 



232 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

On the 10th, liowever, the headquarters were re- 
moved to Cayuga, eight miles beyond Rocky Springs, 
and, in accordance with the plan already described, 
McPherson moved to the north and east of the rest 
of the ai-my ; Sherman had the centre, while McCler- 
nand, further west, kept one division as far to the left 
as the Big Black river, and, in his turn, was ordered 
to watch the ferries, and thus secure the rear against 
Pemberton. Grant's position now w^as with the cen- 
tre, Sherman's corps. He had at this time about 
forty-three thousand men in motion, besides an ar- 
tillery force of one hundred and twenty guns; but 
these numbers include Blair's division, as well as Mc- 
Arthur's, of the Seventeenth corps, neither of which 
had yet crossed the river. The column absolutely in 
march on the east side of the Mississippi, on the 10th 
of ^lay, did not number more than thirty-five thou- 
sand men, and twenty light batteries.* 

"When I crossed tlie Mississippi river," said 
Grant, "the means of ferriage were so limited, and 
time so important, that I started without teams, and 
an average of two days' rations in the haversacks. . . . 
We picked up all the teams in the country, and free 
Africans to drive them. Forasce and meat were found 

* There were not more than sixteen thousand men in any one of 
tlie thri'C corps at any time during the campaign, even if the whole 
force had comeuj); but Bhiir's division of Sherman's command did 
not reach the army until after the capture of Jackson, on the 14th of 
May ; while, of McArthur's division in the Seventeenth corps, one bri- 
gade only had arrived, at the battle of Champion's Hill, on the 16th; 
another joined the conuuand about the time of the battle at Black 
River bridge, on the 17th ; and the third brigade did not get up at all, 
until the siege of Vicksburg. Besides these subtractions, McClernand's 
command was reduced, after the battle of Port Gibson, by casualties} 
sickness, and other contingencies, to fifteen thousand men, so that the 
estimate in the text is not too small. 



ULYSSES S. GRAISTT. 233 

in jrreat abundance tlirouirli the countrv." AATiat Lis 
expectations were at this time, may be gathered from 
a dispatch to Sullivan : " Keep all prisoners sent to 
Milliken's bend until further orders. If they are sent 
north, the}' will be sent east for exchange. I prefer 
keeping them where they are, until the fate of Vicks- 
hurg is decided, and then iJaroling them.^'' 

On the 10th of May, Grant heard again from 
Banks, who was now earnestly demanding reenforce- 
ments on the Red river. But Grant wrote at once 
to that commander, explaining the situation in rear 
of Vicksburg. "My advance will occupy to-day 
Utica, Auburn, and a point equally advanced towards 
the Southern Mississippi railroad, between the latter 
place and the Big Black.* It was my intention, on 
gaining a foothold at Grand Gulf, to have sent a suffi- 
cient force to Port Hudson to have insured the fall 
of that place with your cooperation, or rather to have 
cooperated with you to secure that end." He then 
set forth the reasons for the change in his plaus,f and 

* On the 10th, Grant said to McCIernand, from Cayuga: "My head- 
quarters will remain here to-night, and be removed to Auburn in 
the morning. You need not move to-morrow, except to better your 
I^osition on Five-mile creek." To McPherson, he wrote : " General 
McCIernand is now on Five-mile creek, on the Telegraph road to 
Edward's station. He is directed to move no farther to-morrow, but 
to reconnoitre the road to Fourteen-mile creek. Sherman will not get 
much past this place to-night. In the morning, he will move forward 
to Auburn, and if he meets with no resistance, will throw his advance 
forward to Fourteen-mile creek, on the Raymond road. Move your 
command forward also, so as to occupy something near the same east 
and west line with the other army corps. Let me know what point 
you move to. Send your cavalry out to watch the enemy as far to the 
southeast as you can." These orders were obeyed. 

t " Meeting the enemy as I did below Port Gibson, however, I fol- 
lowed him to the Big Black, and could not afford to retrace my steps. 
I also learned, and believe the information to be reliable, that Port 



234 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

concluded : " I would urgently request, therefore, that 
you join me, or send all the force you can spare, to 
cooperate in the great struggle for opening the Mis- 
sissippi river." 

On the 11th of May, Grant finally wrote to Hal- 
leck, from Cayuga : " My forces will be this evening 
as far advanced towards Jackson as Fourteen-mile 
creek, the left near Black river, and extending in a 
line as nearly east and west as they can get without 
brino-insr on a battle. As I shall communicate with 
Grand Gulf no more, except it becomes necessary to 
send a train with heavy escort, you may not hear 
from me again for several days." Singularly enough, 
this was the date of Halleck's dispatch to Grant, to 
return and cooj)erate with Banks. While the gen- 
eral-in-chief, at Washington, w^as issuing his orders 
forbidding the campaign, Grant, of course in igno- 
rance of these commands, sent word to his superior: 
" I shall communicate with Grand Gulf no more." 

On the same day, he ordered McPherson, who was 
now beyond Utica: "Move your command to-night 
to the next cross-roads, if there is water, and to-mor- 
row, with all activity, into Raymond. . . . We must 
fight the enemy before our rations fail, and we are 
equally bound to make our rations last as long as 
possible. Upon one occasion you made two days' 
rations last seven. We may have to do the same 
thing again. . . . Sherman is now moving out on the 
Auburn and Raymond road, and will reach Fourteen- 
mile creek to-night. When you arrive at Raymond, 

Hudson is almost entirely evacuated. This may not be true, but it ia 
the concurrent testimony of deserters and contrabands. Many days 
cannot elapse before the battle will begin, which is to decide the fate 
of Vicksburg, but it is impossible to predict how long it laay last. I 
would urgently request, therefore," etc. 



ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 235 

lie will be in close supporting distance. I sliall move 
McClernand to Fourteen-mile creek, early to-mon'ow, 
so that lie will occupy a place on Slierman's left." * . . . 
Accordingly, on the 12th, at three and a half a. m., 
Logan's division moved towards Raymond, followed 
by Crocker, at four. The rebel videttes showed them- 
selves fi-equently soon after the march began, and 
three miles out, McPherson ordered two regiments to 
be deployed on each side of the road, Avith skirmish- 
ers in advance ; these were followed by the remainder 
of the column, the cavalry being called in and placed 
on the flanks. At eleven o'clock, McPherson came 
upon the enemy, about five thousand strong, within 
two miles of Eaymond. This body was a part of the 
I'eenforcements from Poii; Hudson, and under the 



* Tlie following instructions were also sent on tlie 11th, to Sherman : 
" It will be necessary to guard Hall's ferry with a regiment of infantry 
and a company of cavalry, until our positions are fully taken, after 
which cavalry alone can watch the rear. McClernand is directed to 
guard Baldwin's ferry. I will direct Tuttle to send a regiment for this 
duty, so that you need not make any further detail until you want his 
relieved by some other troops." And at fifteen minutes past eight 
r. M. : " McClernand is ordered to move up by the Telegraph road, also 
a road to the left of that, to Fourteen-mile creek, starting at day- 
light. McPherson is ordered to move on to Raymond. I will go 
forward to-morrow, probably as far as Raymond, and return in tho 
evening to near Fourteen-mile creek for headquarters." 

At the same hour, Grant wrote to McClernand : " In accordance 
with my verbal instructions this afternoon, you will move your com- 
mand at daylight to-morrow, on the Auburn and Edward's station 
road, and if practicable, a part of one division by the road to the 
westward of the one just mentioned. Move cautiously, but rapidly as 
convenient, and so that your entire corps will arrive on the Fourteen- 
mile creek simultaneously and in a comi^act line. It is also important 
that your corps reach the creek at or about the time that Sherman 
does, he having to move only about seven miles. I shall pass to the 
front early to-morrow, and go to Raymond if I can, from that place. 
I shall return on the road to a convenient point for headquarters in 
the vicinity of Fourteen-mile creek." 



236 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 

command of Gregg. It was judiciously posted, with 
two batteries of artillery so placed as to sweep the 
road, as well as a Lridc-e which McPherson had to 
cross. The greater portion of the rebel infantry was 
posted on a hill to the left of the road, and in the 
timber and ravines in front of the hill. The fig-ht for 
RajTiiond, it was evident, must take place here. 

Orders were immediately sent back to move all 
trains out of the road, and for the remainder of Lo- 
gan's division to advance as rapidly as possible, fol- 
lowed by Crocker, who was to form the reserve. 
Both sides of the road were occupied, and at two p. m. 
the whole line Avas ordered forward. Scarcely had 
the advance begun, when the battle opened vigor- 
ously on the centre and left centre, where, under 
cover of woods and ravines, the rebels had massed a 
large portion of their force. McPherson, however, 
outnumbered Gregg by two to one, and before Crock- 
er's division had reached the field, the enemy was 
beaten, and in full retreat towards Raymond. A 
battery of artillery was moved to an open space on 
the right, and played vigorously on the rebel flanks 
during their retreat. They made one attempt to 
charge and capture this battery, but were met with a 
fire of grape and canister, under which they speedily 
broke and fled from the field. 

Pursuit was made at once, and Raymond was en- 
tered by the national troops at five p. m., the rebels 
liaving passed through, without stopping, on the 
Mississippi Sj^rings road, towards Jackson. The 
rough and impracticable nature of the country, filled 
with ravines and a dense undergro^^iih, prevented 
very rai)id pursuit, and McPherson followed no fur- 
ther than Raymond. In this short but spirited en- 



ULYSSES S. GEAJS-T. 237 

gagement he lost sixty-nine men killed, three hun- 
dred and foi-ty-one wounded, and thii'ty missing. 
The enemy's loss was one hundred killed, and three 
hundred and five wounded, besides four hundred and 
fifteen prisoners; two pieces of cannon were disabled 
and. a quantity of small-arms fell into McPherson's 
hands. Many rebels threw down their arms and 
deserted. 

Pemberton had been completely deceived by 
Grant's manoeuvres ; supposing the object of the lat- 
ter to be Edward's station, he remained at that 
place with the bulk of his force, awaiting an attack, 
and sent word to Gregg to strike the national forces 
in flank and rear, as soon as they became engaged.* 
Reenforcements under Walker were also ordered up 
from Jackson to the suppoi-t of Gregg. But Grant, 
instead of assaulting the main rebel force concentrat- 
ing to meet him on his left, pushed out with his right 
under McPherson, and destroyed the opposition at 
Raymond, where he met only a detachment of the 
enemy. He thus completely opened the road to 
Jackson, avoided a battle where he did not care to 
fight, in order to fight where the enemy was unpre- 
pared, and, for the second time since the campaign 

* " On the 12th, the following was addressed to Major-General Ste- 
venson : ' From information received it is evident that the enemy is 
advancing in force on Edward's depot and Big Black bridge. . . . 
You must move up your whole division to the support of Loring and 
Boweu at the bridge.' ... In consequence of this information Briga- 
dier-General Gregg was ordered not to attack the enemy until he was 
engaged at Edward's or the bridge, but to be ready to fall on his rear 
or flank at any moment." — Femlertoii'a Report. 

Pemberton also sent telegrams, on the 12th, to Johnston and ]Hr. Jef- 
ferson Davis, announcing: "The enemy is apparently moving his heavy 
force towards Edward's depot on Southern railroad. With my limited 
force I will do all I can to meet him. That will he the lattle-^lacej''' 



238 MILIT ART HISTORY OF 

bad begun, divided the rebels and beat them in de- 
tail. 

During tliis engagement Grant in person was with 
Sherman, who had gained the crossing at Fourteen- 
mile creek, after slight skirmishing, the enemy first 
destro}nng the bridges. McClernand was west of 
Sherman, on the Telegraph road, with three divisions, 
one Ijeing thro^vn around by Baldwin's ferry. At 
forty-five minutes past ten a. m., Grant sent word to 
McPherson, from Fourteen-mile creek, announcing 
the situation there, and said : " If you have gained 
Raymond, throw back forces in this direction, until 
communication is opened with Sherman. Also feel 
to tLe north towards the railroad, and, if possible, 
destroy it and the telegraph. If the road is opened, 
I will ride over to see you this evening, but I cannot 
do so until I know McClernand is secure in his posi- 
tion." To McClernand, he said : " Sherman wiU prob- 
ably succeed in following out original intentions of 
going in advance of this place (Fourteeitmile creek) 
to the cross-roads. Gain the creek with your com- 
mand, if possible, and hold it, with at least one divi- 
sion throvv^n across. Reconnoitre the roads in ad- 
vance, and also in this direction, so as to open com- 
munication with General Sherman and myself. If 
bridges are destroyed, make fords." 

The marching over this rugged country was hard, 
and the troops were obliged to forage on the road.* 
They seized all the flour-mills, grinding whatever 

* " Durin£T these thirteen days" (up to May 12th), " my corps sub- 
sisted on six days' rations, and what scanty supplies the country in the 
immediate vicinity of the route afforded; were wholly without tents 
and reprular trains, and almost without cooking utensils, yet they were 
cheerful and prompt in the discharge of d\xtj."—MeCleniand'a B&- 



ULYSSES S. GTIANT. 239 

corn was found in store-liouses. Tlie ambulances 
were used as ammunition wagons. 

Later on tlie 12tli, Grant said to McClemand, 
from Dillon's plantation: "Edward's station is evi- 
dently tlie point on the railroad the enemy have most 
prepared for receiving us ; I therefore ^^'ant to keep 
up appearances of moving upon that place, but want 
to get possession of less guarded points first. You 
will then move to-morrow, to keep up this appear- 
ance, a short distance only from where you now are, 
with the three advanced di\dsions, leaving the fourth, 
or Smith's, in about its present position." McCler- 
nand had some skinnishing before he was able to 
cross Fourteen-mile creek. But, on the evening of 
the 12th of May, the Army of the Tennessee occupied 
a line almost parallel with the Vicksbui'g and Jack- 
son railroad, and about seven miles south of it. Mc- 
Pherson was on the right, at Raymond; Sherman 
seven miles to the west, at Dillon's plantation ; and 
McClernand, four miles to the left, at Montgomery 
brido-e, on Fourteen-mile creek, with a detachment 
guarding Baldmn's feriy. Grant's headquarters were 
at Dillon's. 

The rebels retreated direct through Raymond to 
Jackson, where Johnston next day took command, 
having just amved in the state from Tullahoma, 
Tennessee. He was still expecting reenforcements 
from the south and east, of which Grant was fully 
aware. It was necessary, indeed, for the enemy to 
collect his forces at once, or the control of the Missis- 
sippi river was forever gone. 

The battle of Raymond, and the flight of the 
rebels to Jackson, confirmed Grant in the idea that a 
strong hostile force was on his right flank, and he at 



240 MELITAKY HISTORY OF 

once determined to move his entire army in that di- 
rection, deflecting McClernand and Sherman from the 
course he had previously ordered them to pui'sue. 
McPherson alone might not have been able to dis- 
lodge Johnston from Jackson, which was strongly 
foi-tified ; and the destruction of that place as a rail- 
road centre was absolutely necessary, in order to de- 
prive the rebels of its use in concentrating a force to 
interfere with Grant's future operations. He there- 
fore determined to make sure of Jackson, and leave 
no enemy in his rear. 

At a quarter past nine, on the evening of the 
12th, he directed McPherson to " move on to Clinton 
and Jackson, at daylight in the morning." Sherman's 
orders were changed at the same hour : " After the 
severe fight of to-day at Raymond, and repulse of the 
enemy towards Clinton and Jackson, I have deter- 
mined to move on the latter place, by way of Clin- 
ton, and take the capital of the state, and work from 
there westward. McPherson is ordered to march at 
da}light to Clinton. You will march at four a. m. 
in the morning, and follow McPherson. McClernand 
will follow you with three divisions, and send his 
fourth back to Old Auburn, to await the arrival of 
trains now on the road, and Blaii''s division to con- 
duct them to the army." Instructions conformable 
to this dispatch were sent at once to McClernand: 
" Start with three of your divisions as soon as pos- 
siljle, by the road north of Fourteen-mile creek, to 
this place " (Dillon's), " and on to Raymond." It was 
fortunate that Grant acted with such promptness, for, 
on the night of the 13th, Johnston arrived at Jack- 
eon, and took supreme command of all the rebel 
forces in the state ; and he was a man of far more 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 241 

genius aud energy tlian liis subordinate. A^Tien 
Johnston reached Jackson, he found a force there, re- 
ported at six thousand men, pai-t of which had been 
driven from Raymond the day before ; Maxcy, with 
a brigade from the south, was expected on the 14th, 
as well as other reenforcements under Gist, so that 
Johnston estimated his whole available force would 
amount to eleven thousand men. In addition to 
these, twelve thousand or thirteen thousand more 
were on the road to join him from the east; for he 
had urged the rebel government to make every ef 
fort, if they hoped to retain Vicksburg and the com- 
mand of the Mississippi. 

Ascertaining, on the 13th, the approach of the na- 
tional anny, Johnston that night ordered Pemberton, 
who was now at Edward's station,* with all his force 
except the garrison of Vicksburg, to come up in the 
rear of Grant, and attack him at once at Clinton.f 
Johnston's hope, undoubtedly, was to detain his an- 
ta2:onist in front of Jackson until the reenforcements 
from the south and east could arrive, and then to 
unite with Pemberton and his whole force in an at- 
tack both in front and rear of Grant. But the move- 
ments of the national commander were not coopera- 
tive with those of the enemy. 

On the 13th, in obedience to orders, McPherson 
moved cautiously but rapidly towards Clinton, for it 

* Pemberton did not arrive in person at Edward's till the 14tb, 
but his troops were there the day before. 

t " I have lately arrived, aud learn that Major-General Sherman is 
between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is- important to reestab- 
lish communications, that you may be reenforced. If practicable, 
come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of 
immense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble should be 
brought. Time is all-important." — Johnston to Pemberton, May I'dth. 
16 



242 MILITAEY niSTOEY OF 

was important to deprive the rebels as speedily as 
possible of the use of the railroad. He reached the 
town by two o'clock in the afternoon, without oppo- 
sition, and at once set about tearing up railroad track 
and ties, bending the iron, burning bridges, and de- 
stroying culverts and telegraph poles and wires. Im- 
portant dispatches from Pemberton to Gregg were 
also captured at this time, from which it was evi- 
dent that Pemberton still expected an attack at Ed- 
ward's station, and was remaining on the defensive 
there. 

Sherman had arrived at Raymond before McPher- 
son left the town, and Grant immediately ordered 
him to take the direct or southern road to Jackson. 
By night, he had reached a position near Mississippi 
Spiiugs, and parallel with McPherson's corps. During 
this day, McClernand withdrew from his position near 
Edward's station, where his pickets had been within 
two miles of Pemberton's army. One division of the 
Thirteenth corps was drawn up in line of battle ; and, 
behind this cover the remainder of the command re- 
tired without embarrassment, the enemy discover- 
ing the movement too late to interfere ; McClernand's 
troops then marched to a point near Rajmiond, where 
they were in a position to cooperate ^^dth either of 
the two corps in the advance ; one division lay at the 
point of divergence between Sherman and McPher- 
son's commands, and the remainder of the corps was 
left in Raymond, or still further to the rear. Clinton 
is only ten or twelve miles from Raymond, so tliat 
the entire command was now well in hand. Grant 
remained that night in Raymond, equally near to 
either corps. It was at this time that Johnston sent 
his order to Pemberton to attack tlie national forces, 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 243 

supposing Sherman to he alone at Clinton, unsup- 
ported by any other portion of Grant's command. 

Durino- the evening, MePherson was ordered to 
" move at early dawn upon Jackson," ten miles from 
Clinton, and Sherman also to "move directly tow- 
ards Jackson, starting at early dawn in the morning." 
At thirty minutes past seven. Grant directed McCler- 
nand: "Move one division of your corps through 
this place" (Raymond) "to Clinton, charging it with 
destroying the railroad as far as possible to a point 
on the direct Raymond and Jackson road. Move 
another division three or four miles beyond Missis- 
sippi Springs, and eight or nine miles from this place, 
and a third to Raymond, ready to support either of 
the others. Also, direct your thirty-pound siege- 
guns to follow close behind the advance guard of 
the division which takes post beyond Mississippi 
Springs, on the main Jackson road. You will begin 
your movements at four a. m. to-morrow." 

Early on the morning of the 14th, Grant sent word 
to Halleck : " I will attack the state capital to-day." 
A coui'ier carried the message to Grand Gulf, through 
a country unprotected by national troops. This was 
the first report Grant had made since severing com- 
munication with the government.* 

Sherman and MePherson communicated before 
morning, so as to arrive at Jackson at the same hour ; 

* " Ratmoxd, 3faij 14^^.— MePherson took this place on the 12th, 
after a brisk fight of more than two hours. Our loss fifty-one killed, 
and one hundred and eighty wounded ; enemy's loss seventy-five killed, 
and buried by us. One hundred and eighty-six prisoners, besides 
wounded. MePherson is now at Clinton, Sherman on the direct Jack- 
son road, and MeClemand bringing up the rear. I will attack the 
state capital to-day." The losses were larger on both sides than Grant 
was aware of when this dispatch was written. 



244 jnLITAEY HISTOEY OF 

and tbeir combined forces moved at daylight. The 
rain had fallen in torrents during the night, making the 
roads at first slippery, and then miry; but the troops 
marched in excellent order, without straggling, and in 
the best of spirits. At nine o'clock, the pickets of 
Crocker's division, which had the advance of Mc- 
Pherson's corps, engaged the enemy, about five miles 
out from Jackson. The rebel outposts were speedily 
driven in, and Crocker pushed on till within two and 
a half miles of the city, where the enemy was found 
in position, outside of the defences, and under the 
command of Johnston. This force was composed of 
the troops that had been driven from Ra}inond two 
days before, as well as the garrison of Jackson. Be- 
sides these, reenforcements from South Carolina and 
Georgia regiments amving in the night, had been 
immediately marched out and put into position at 
the rebel front.* Reconnoissances were made at once, 
and artillery brought up to reply to the rebel guns, 
which had already opened on the national advance. 

McPherson now had the left, on the Clinton road, 
and Sherman was deployed to the right, on the south 
and south^vest of Jackson, where he met a small force 
of infantiy and artilleiy at about the same distance 
from the city as the troops in McPherson's front. 
There was a gap of nearly two miles between the 
Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps, but Grant had esti- 
mated the rebel strength, and calculated that either 
part of liis command was more than a match for 
Johnston's entire force, in case the enemy assumed 
tlie offensive ; he made no effort, therefore, to connect 
the ^^■ings, thinking it more important to hold the 

* I state this on the authority of McPherson. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 245 

soutliern road, and prevent the escape of the gar- 
rison in that direction. 

In conformity with his orders, McClernand now 
occupied Clinton with one division, Mississippi Si:)ring3 
with another, and Raymond with a third ; his fourth 
division was at Auburn. Blair's division, of Sher- 
man's corps, had come up witli a wagon-train from 
Grand Gulf, and was also at New Auburn ; * while 
McArthur, with one brisrade of his division of Mc- 
Pherson's corps, had also arrived from the river, and 
was moving towards Raymond, on the Utica road. 
These forces were all held in reserve: it was not 
Grant's intention to move them any nearer to Jack- 
son, but simply to have them within supporting dis- 
tance, if the resistance at that place should prove 
more obstinate than there seemed reason to antici- 
pate. 

"^^^lile dispositions for the attack were making 
at the front, a very heavy shower set in, which de- 
ferred the battle for an hour and a half; the rain 
coming down in such torrents that tliere was great 
danger of the ammunition being spoiled, if the men 
opened their cartridge-boxes. The time, however, 
was well employed, putting the troops in position ; 
and McPherson brought up Logan's division as a re- 
serve. The enemy in McPherson's front occupied a 
a semicircular rids-e stretchinor across the main Clin- 
ton road, his right holding a piece of woods, and his 
centre and left commanding a rolling ground in front, 
over which it was necessary for McPherson to pass, in 
order to make an assault. Two rebel batteiies were 

* Blair started from Grand Gulf on the 12th of :\ray, and guarded 
a train of two hundred wagons, the only supplies that Grant received, 
after cutting loose from his base, during this campaign. 



246 5IIL1TARY HISTOEY OF 

also in position, one covering the road, and the other 
having a good range across the open field. The na- 
tional troops were deployed on both sides of the 
road, in the timber, and in the open field ; and Ste- 
venson's brio-ade of Loo-an's division was thi'own 
across a ravine, to the extreme left, with orders to ad- 
vance and gain a road which enters the city from the 
northwest. 

At eleven o'clock, the rain having partially ceased, 
McPherson ordered an advance, preceded by a heavy 
line of skirmishers, which soon became warmly en- 
gaged. These drove the pickets of the enemy back 
towards his main line, and into a ravine filled with 
willows. Here the national skirjnishers halted for a 
few moments, when the rebel fire becoming heavy, 
they were recalled to their regiments, and a charge 
was ordered. Crocker's whole line at once swept 
forward with cheers, and in perfect order, drove the 
enemy out of the ravine, and charged gallantly up 
the hill.'^ The rebels did not wait to receive the full 
force of the assault, but broke and fled precipitately, 
behind their Avorks. 

McPherson followed for a mile and a half, till he 
came within range of the artillery of the defences 
of Jackson. Here he wheeled two batteries into 
tlie first advantageous position, and opened a well- 
directed and effective fire on the retreating enemy. 
When the troops reached this point, they were halted, 
and the line was re-formed, havins^ become somewhat 
broken in marching over the uneven ground. Skir- 
mishers wei'c immediately thi'own out, and oflicers 

* I have often licard General Grant say, tliat except Sherman 
and Sheridan, he never knew a better division commander than 
Crocker. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 247 

sent forward to reconnoitre tlie enemy's position and 
defences. 

In tliese operations, McPLerson had occupied 
nearly three hoiu-s; and Sherman, meanwhile, ad- 
vancing on the Mississippi Springs road, had forced a 
rebel battery from its position, where it commanded 
the road, as well as a bridge and stream over which 
he was obliged to pass. A determined advance of 
his skirmishers soon drove the small infantry force in 
his front into a skirt of woods, in front of the in- 
trenchments at Jackson. Tuttle's division followed, 
and the enemy took refuge behind his rifle-pits, not 
attempting to destroy the bridge. The Fifteenth 
corps at once emerged from the woods, and occupied 
the ground beyond the stream, and on both sides of 
the road. In front, and as far to the left as could be 
seen, appeared a line of intrenchments; and the en- 
emy kept up a brisk fire of artillery from the points 
enfiLadino- Sherman's road. 

Grant had been with Sherman all the morning, 
and finding the obstacles important, he now ordered 
that commander to send a force to the extreme right, 
as f'dv as the Pearl river, and reconnoitre the flanks 
of this line of intrenchments. The party not returning 
promptly, and Sherman being still detained. Grant 
rode to the right himself, escorted only by his staff, 
and found a clear road into Jackson. The enemy 
had evacuated the town, and Grant, with his party 
of about a dozen oflicers, was the first to enter the 
works. His son, a lad of thirteen years, accompanied 
liim on this campaign, and as they rode up to the 
limits of the town, the boy spurred on his horse, and 
galloped, ahead of the army, into the capital of Mis- 
sissippi. 



248 MILITAEr HISTORY OF 

The detacliment sent to the right by Sherman 
soon discovered the weakness of the enemy ; and their 
appearance caused the rebels to retire from that part 
of the line. Tuttle's troops at once advanced to the 
rear of the guns which had been playing on them 
in front, caj^turing ten pieces of artillery, together 
with all the gunners, a hundred and fifty in number ; 
and the Fifteenth corps advanced into Jackson. At 
about the same time, McPherson also learned that 
the rebels had abandoned the place, and his troops 
moved forward inside the defences simultaneously 
with those of Sherman. Crocker captured seven 
guns, which the enemy in his haste had neither in- 
jured nor attempted to withdraw. By three o'clock, 
the two corps were in possession of Jackson. Crock- 
er's troops raised the national flag over the capi- 
tol. 

It was now apparent that McPherson had en- 
gaged the bulk of Johnston's command, without fur- 
ther aid than the moral support afforded by the ene- 
my's knowledge of Sherman's presence on the south 
side of the works. Only a small infiintry and artil- 
lery force had been stationed to impede Sherman's 
progress ; but, as has been seen, it was impossible to 
ascertain the strength of the enemy, at this part of 
the line, in time to justify an immediate assault. 
WJicn the troops in McPherson's front were di-iven 
in, those opposing Sherman of course retired; a few 
of the ai-tillerists, however, remained in position till 
the last moment, evidently instructed to delay the 
advance as long as possible, and expecting, no doubt, 
CO be captured in the end. It was these that Tuttle 
had taken prisoners. AVhile this show of opposition 
was iH'ini; made in Sherman's front, McPherson was 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 249 

held long enougli for tlie main body of the enemy to 
escape by the Canton road, on the northern side of 
the town, by which alone Johnston could effect a 
junction with Pemberton. McPherson immediately 
dispatched Stevenson's brigade to cut off the retreat, 
but the troops arrived too late, and the rebels re- 
ceived no further injury. McPherson considered 
Stevenson's delay unnecessary, and blamed his sub- 
ordinate. 

The rapidity of the march from Raymond, how- 
ever, had frustrated Johnston's plans ; he was unable 
to hold Grant until the rebel reenforcements could 
come up from the east ; and the same celerity also 
took Grant out of the reach of Pemberton, who had 
been ordered to attack his rear. The visjor of Mc- 
Pherson's assault had been such that Johnston was 
unable to save his artillery. Seventeen cannon fell 
into the hands of the victor. In this battle, McPher- 
son lost thirty-seven men killed, and two hundred 
and twenty-eight wounded. He reported the ene- 
my's loss at eight hundred and forty-five, in killed, 
wounded, and prisoners.* Sherman was but lightly 
eno-ao-ed; his loss was four killed and twentv-one 
wounded. 

That night Grant slept in the house occupied by 
Johnston the night before. There was proof that 
the rebel party had been a gay one ; probably anti- 
cipating the destruction of their enemy on the mor- 
row. 

Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon. 
Grant sent for his corps commanders, and gave them 
their orders at the state-house. McPherson was to 

* Johnston's ofScial report contains no statement of kis losses at 
Jackson. 



250 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 

encamp one division inside the iutrencliments, and 
tlie other between the battle-field and the city. 
Sherman was directed to occupy the line of rifle-pits 
at once, and, on the following day, to destroy eftect- 
ually the railroad tracks in and about Jackson, and 
all the propei-ty belonging to the enemy * He set 
about his work in the morning, and utterly destroyed 
the railroads in every direction, north, east, south, 
and west, for a distance in all, of twenty miles. All 
the bridges, factories, and arsenals were burned, and 
whatever could be of use to the rebels, destroyed.f 
The importance of Jackson, as a railroad centre and 
a depot of stores and military factories, was annihi- 
lated, and the principal object of its captui'e attained. 
A hotel and a churck in Jackson were burned with- 
out orders, and there was some pillaging by the sol- 
diers, ^vllich their officers sought in every way to re- 
st rain. J 

* " Designate a brigade from your command to guard the city. 
Collect stores and forage, and collect all public property of the enemy. 
The division from which such brigade may be selected will be the last 
to leave the city. You will direct them, therefore, to commence im- 
mediately the effectual destruction of the river railroad bridge, and 
the road as far east as practicable, as well as north and south. The 
Fourth Iowa cavalry and a brigade of iufimtry should be sent east of 
the river, with instructions for the cavalry to go on east as far as possi- 
ble. Troops going east of the river should burn all C. S. A. cotton and 
stores they find." 

t The owners of a valuable cotton factory protested against its 
destruction, on the ground that many females and poor families were 
employed in the workshojis; but Sherman decided that the machinery 
could so easily be converted to hostile purposes, that the buildings 
must be burned. He offered, however, to take the poor back to the 
Mississippi, and feed them there, till they could find employment or 
seek refuge elsewhere, 

I The hotel was called the Confederate Ilotel, and the men who 
l)unicd it had been led prisoners through the streets of Jackson some 
months before. The cattle-cars on which prisoners were transported 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 251 

On tlie 14tli, Jolinston marclied six miles on the 
Canton road, and tlien went into camp. He sent 
Gist forty or fifty miles to tlie east, and ordered 
Maxcy to " return to liis wagons and provide for tlie 
security of his brigade, for instance, by joining Gist." 
It was hoped thus to prevent Grant from drawing 
supplies from the nortli and east.* From his new 
camp, Johnston also sent dispatches to Pemberton, 
announcino; the loss of Jackson, and said : " As soon 
as tlie reenforcements are all up, tliey must be nnited 
to tlie rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force 
assembled tliat may be able to inflict a heavy blow 
upon the enemy." In the same dispatch, he inquired 
if Grant could " supply himself from the Mississippi. 
Can you not cut liim off from it, and above all, 
should he be compelled to fall back for want of sup- 
plies, beat him?" It had not occurred to either 
Johnston or Pemberton that Grant had cut Hs own 
communications a week before, and was at this time 
drawing all his supplies from the country where he 
moved. 

It was apparent now that a concentration of the 
rebels was imminent, and, before dark, Grant got pos- 

were halted in front of tbis building, and tlae captives asked for a cnp 
of cold water only. This was refused them, with scurrilous taunts, by 
the inmates of the hotel. The prisoners were soon afterwards exr 
changed; and returning to Jackson as conquerors, they remembered 
the house where this indignity had been offered them, and burned it 
to the ground. 

* '• Telegrams were dispatched when the enemy was near, directing 
General Gist to assemble the approaching troops at a point forty or 
ffty miles from Jackson, and General Maxcy to return to his wagons, 
and provide for the security of his brigade— for instance, by joining 
General Gist. That body of troops will be able, I hope, to prevent 
the enemy in Jackson from drawing provisions from the east, and this 
one may be able to keep him fi'om the country towards Panola." — Johii^ 
Stan's Heport. 



252 MILITARY HISTOKY OF 

itive information of Johnston's orders to Peinbei*ton, 
of the nio^Lt before, to attack his rear.* Accord- 
ingly, that afternoon, McPherson was directed to re- 
trace his steps, marching early in the morning, on the 
Clinton road, towards Bolton, about twenty miles 
west of Jackson, and the nearest point where John- 
ston could strike the railroad. Grant also informed 
McClernand of the capture of Jackson, and of John- 
ston's line of retreat, and ordered him to face all his 
troops towards Bolton. " It is evidently the design 
of the enemy to get north of us and cross the Black 
river, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not 
allow them to do this. Turn all your forces towards 
Bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting 
there. Move troops by the most direct road from 
wherever they may be on the receipt of this order.'' 
General Frank Blair had, by this time, got up near 
Aubuni, with his division of the Fifteenth corps, and 
lie also was instructed to move in the direction of 
the enemy. " Their design is evidently to cross the 
Big Black, and pass down the peninsula between the 

* Johnston sent the order to Pemberton in triplicate, and one of 
the originals reached Grant. Some months before these events, a 
loyal man in Memphis, anxious to serve the national cause, had been 
drummed out of that place by Hurlbut with a great show of disgrace, 
for uttering seditious language and communicating with the enemy. 
He was furnished with papers indicating the cause of his expulsion, 
and went south beyond the national lines. With such evidence of his 
fealty to the rebellion, he had been able to obtain accurate informa- 
tion, and on several occasions furnished it opportunely to Hurlbut. 
Tliis man was in Jackson when Grant came up from Raymond ; he of- 
fered to carry the dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton; a dangerous 
task, as the national army lay between the two rebel commanders. 
One so noisy in his professions was of course regarded as safe; the dis- 
patch was intrusted to the national spy, who brought it direct to Mc- 
Pliersou, and McPherson fonvarded both dispatch and messenger to 
Grant. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 253 

Black and Yazoo rivers. We must "beat them. 
Turn your troops immediately to Bolton ; take all 
the trains ^vitll you. Smith's division, and any other 
troops now with you, will go to the same place. If 
practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide youi' 
troops and train." 

By these dispositions, Grant's whole command 
would converge at Bolton, marching by different 
roads. The troops were admirably located for such 
a move. The heavy rains, however, had impeded the 
march, and pioneers had sometimes to drain the roads 
before artillery or wagons could pass. These rapid 
movements taxed the strength of the troops, but no 
one murmured. Officers and men seemed inspired to 
extraordinary efforts, and finding that every time 
they met the enemy they outnumbered and beat him, 
beo-an to understand that life was saved and success 
secure<l by the rapidity which cost them only tempo- 
rary fatigue. " Better weary our legs in marching, 
than lose them altogether in battle," said the soldiers, 
and moved on cheerfully. 

When Grant's orders reached McClernand, that 
commander had Ilovey's division on the Clinton 
road, four miles in rear of McPherson, and facing 
Jackson; another division (Carr's) was within six 
miles of Sherman, near Mississippi Springs, and a 
third, under Osterhaus, was at Eaymond. Smith s 
division was back near Auburn, with Blaii', guarding 
the only train of supplies that Grant received from 
Grand Gulf during this campaign. McClernand 
faced about his troops jiromptly, and moved, on the 
15th, at an early hour. By nine and a half o'clock, a 
detachment of cavalry in Osterhaus's command had 
seized Bolton, driving out the enemy's pickets, and 



254 3nLITARY IIISTOEY OF 

capturing several prisoners, Hovey came np soon 
after from Clinton, and occupied tlie town. By dark, 
Carr and Osterhaus were posted nearly parallel with 
Hovey, but three miles to the left, on the middle 
road from Raymond to Edward's station ; and Smith, 
arriving from Auburn in the night, bivouacked north 
of Eaymond. Blair, too, was at Raymond, in Smith's 
rear. 

At five o'clock on the morning of this day, Lo- 
gan's division of McPherson's corps, had started for 
Bolton from Jackson, followed by Crocker, at seven. 
They were instructed to march as far as possible by 
four p. M., and then go into camp. Passing through 
Clinton, the advance came up with Hovey, shortly 
before four o'clock, about a mile and a half from Bol- 
ton ; and Logan went into camp on Baker's creek, 
within supporting distance of Hovey. Crocker bi- 
vouacked on the Clinton road, in rear of Logan."^ 
At forty-five minutes past four, Grant reached Clin- 
ton in person, and immediately ordered McClernand : 
*' Move your command early to-morrow morning 
towai-ds Edward's depot, marching so as to feel the 
enemy's force if you encounter him, and without 
bringing on a general engagement, unless you feel 

* On the loth, Grant reported to Ilalleck, sending the dispatch as 
before, by coiirier, to Grand Gulf. "Jackson, May 15;;/;.— This place 
fell into our hands yesterday, after a fight of about three hours. Jo. 
Johnston was in command. The enemy retreated north, evidently 
with the design of joining the Vicksburg force. I am concentrating 
my forces at Bolton, to cut them off if possible. A dispatch from 
Banks showed liim to be off in Louisiana, not to return to Baton Rouge 
until the 10th of May. I could not lose the time. I have taken many 
prisoners from Port Hudson, who state that it will be evacuated on 
the appearance of a force in the rear. I sent a special message to 
Banks, giving him the substance of the information I had, and asking 
him to join me as soon as possible. The message was sent on the 10th." 



FLYSSES S. GRAKT. 255 

entirely alDle to contend ^vitli liim. Communicate 
this order to Major-General Blair, who will move 
with you." 

On the 14th, Pemberton, still at Edward's station, 
liad received Johnston's orders of the day before, to 
attack Grant at Clinton, but disobeyed them * He 
held a council of war while Grant was attacking 
Jackson, and declared that the movement indicated 
by Johnston was extremely hazardous. A majority 
of liis officers, notwithstanding, advised obedience ; 
but he decided, instead, to marck against Dillon's, and 
cut Grant's communications with the Mississij^jjl.t 
He had been informed that Grant had an army corps 
at Dillon's. As Johnston had fled towards Canton, 
after the fall of Jackson, and scattered his forces fifty 
miles away, the rebels were now actually moving in 
three different dii^ections — Pemberton south, John- 
ston north, and Gist to the east — wdiile Grant was 
converfrino: between tkem ; Pemberton seeking to cut 
Grant's communications with the Mississippi, while 
Grant, with kis whole command, flushed with another 

* Johnston renewed these orders on the 15th, but in a qualified 
form : " Would it not be better to place the forces to support Vicks- 
burg between General Loring and that place, and merely observe the 
ferries, so that you might unite, if opportunity to fight presented it- 
self? . . . General Gregg -will move towards Canton to-morrow. If 
prisoners tell the truth, the forces at Jackson must be half of Grant's 
army. It would decide the campaign to beat it, which can be done 
only by concentrating, especially when the remainder of the eastern 
troops arrive. They are to be twelve thousand or thirteen thousand." 
— Johnston's Report. 

t At forty minutes past five P. M. on May 14th, Pemberton sent 
word to Johnston from Edward's depot : " I shall move as early to- 
morrow as practicable a column of seventeen thousand on Dillon's. 
The object is to cut the enemy's communications, and force him to at- 
tack me, as I do not consider my force sufiicieut to justify an attack 
on the enemy in position, or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson." 



256 MILITAEY IIISTOEY OF 

victory, was returning to Yicksburg, and beaidng 
down from three several directions on Pemberton. 

At one o'clock on the 15th, in open disobedience 
of his orders, Pemberton moved his entire force from 
Edward's station towards Dillon's; but the heavy 
rains had made Baker's creek imj^assable by the or- 
dinary ford on the main Raymond j'oad, and the 
bridge had been washed away by previous freshets : 
the column was, therefore, marched by the northern 
or Clinton road, on which there was a good bridge; 
and after crossing the creek, it filed to the right on a 
neighborhood road, so as to strike the Raymond road, 
about three and a half miles from Edward's depot ; 
a short distance beyond this junction Pemberton 
went into camp. He was anxious to reconnoitre in 
front, and his troops were in motion till midnight ; 
he, therefore, did not issue orders to continue the 
movement on the 16th.* 

At about six and a half o'clock of the next day 
(the 16th), however, he received positive orders from 
Johnston to join him at Clinton. " May 15th, 1863, 
8.30 A. M. Our being compelled to leave Jackson 
makes your plan impi'acticable. The only mode by 
which we can unite is by your moving directly to 
Clinton, and informing me that we may move to that 
point with about six thousand men." Pemberton, 
no longer daring to disregard his sujierior, imme- 
diately directed a retrograde movement, reversing Ins 
column as it stood. His purpose was to return 

* " The divisions of Generals Stevenson and Bowen having been 
on the march until past midnight, and the men considerably fatigued, 
desiring also to receive reports of reconnoissances made in my front 
hclbrc proceeding farther, I did not issue orders to continue the move- 
ment at an early hour the following morning" (May IGth). — Pember- 
ton''t Report. 



T3XYSSES S. GRANT. 257 

towards Edward's depot, and take tlie Brownsville 
road, and then proceed nortli of tlie railroad towards 
Clinton. He notified Johnston in liaste that his 
communication had been received, and informed him 
of the route of march. 

At about five o'clock on this morning, two men 
employed on the Jackson and Yicksburg railroad, 
and who had passed through Pemberton's army the 
night before, were brought into Grant's headquarters 
at Clinton. He was wakened at once to receive the 
news. The men stated that Pemberton was at Ed- 
ward's station, fifteen or eighteen miles off, with 
eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries of ar- 
tillery. They estimated his whole force at twenty- 
five thousand troops, still advancing. From them, 
also. Grant heard again of the enemy's design to at- 
tack his rear. Until this time, it had been his inten- 
tion to leave one division of Sherman's corps still 
another day in Jackson, to complete the destruction 
of roads and stores ; but this information detennined 
him to bring up his entire command at once ; and, at 
five and a half o'clock, he dispatched to Sherman, 
to move promptly to the support of the main army, 
at Bolton or beyond : " Start one of your divisions 
on the road at once with their ammunition wao-ons, 
and dii'ect the general commanding the division to 
move with all possible sj)eed, until he comes up with 
our rear, beyond Bolton. It is important that the 
greatest celerity should be shoAvn in carrying out this 
movement, as I have evidence that the entire force of 
the enemy was at Edward's depot at seven p. m. last 
night, and was still advancing. The fight may there- 
fore be brought on at any moment ; we should have 
every man in the field." The other division of the 
17 



258 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

Fifteenth corps ^vas to follow as speedily as possible. 
This dispatcli reached Shennan at ten minutes past 
seven, and his advance division (Steele's) was in mo- 
tion, in one hour from that time. At half past five 
Grant also ordered Blair, who was near Auburn, to 
push forward his division in the direction of Ed- 
ward's station, with all dispatch : " The enemy have 
moved out to Edward's station, and are still pushing 
on to attack us with all their force. Push your 
troops on in that direction as rapidly as possible. If 
you are already on the Bolton road, continue so ; but 
if you still have a choice of roads, take the one lead- 
ing to Edward's depot. Pas-9 your troops to the front 
of your train., except a rear-guard, and heep tlie am- 
munition ivagons in front of all others.^'' This last 
injunction was very necessary, as Blair was obliged 
to reverse his command, which would bring the 
wagon-trains in front. 

McClernaud was now directed to assume com- 
mand of Blair, and establish communication between 
him and Osterhaus at once, and to keep it up, moving 
forward cautiously: "Direct Major-General Blair to 
move with his di\'ision to the support of General 
Osterhaus, as soon as possible, moving on the same 
line, by the first lateral road leading into the one on 
which Osterhaus is now marching." At forty-five 
minutes past five, McPherson was also ordered for- 
ward to the support of Hovey: "The enemy has 
crossed Big Black, with the entire Vicksburg force, 
lie was at EdNvard's depot last night, and still ad- 
vancing. You Avill, therefore, pass all trains and 
move forward to join McClernand " (Hovey's divi 
sion). " I have ordered your rear brigade to move at 
once, and given such dii'ections to other commanders 



ULYSSES s. GEAirr. 25(T 

as will secure a prompt concentration of your forces." 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of Grant's staff, ^yas at 
this time sent forward to communicate to McClernand 
the information received, and with verbal instnictions 
for tlie disposition of his forces. 

Three roads lead to Edward's station from the 
Eaymond and Bolton road, one diverging a mile 
and a half north of Raymond, a second three miles 
and a half farther north, and on the third, which is 
seven and a half miles from Eaymond, Hovey and 
McPherson were movincr. Tliese were known as tlie 
southern, middle, and northern roads to Edward's 
station. McClernand was ordered to move Blair and 
A. J. Smith hy the southern road, to put Carr and 
Osterhaus on the middle road, converging to the 
same point, and to advance Hovey on the direct road 
from Bolton to Edward's station ; and, finally, to es- 
tablish communications between all parts of his line. 
When these dispositions were made, he was to feel 
the enemy with a heavy line of skirmishers, but not 
to bring on a general engagement unless certain of 
success. 

He advanced slowly ; and, at seven o'clock, just as 
Pemberton's reverse movement began, the rebel skir- 
mishers were met by Smith's division, on the south- 
em road, about five and a half miles from Edward's 
station. The enemy's pickets at once retired, and 
Smith, advancing about half a mile, delivered a brisk 
artillery-fire, which was immediately returned. Hear- 
ing the report of guns on his left, Osterhaus now 
pushed forward on the middle road, as far as a thick 
wood covering a chaos of hills and aV)rupt ravines. 
He drove a line of rebel skirmishers from the skirt of 
this wood, and uncovered a large body of the enemy. 



260 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

Not knowing yet whether these movements in- 
dicated an attack in force, or simply an armed recon- 
noissance, and, indeed, utterly ignorant that Grant's 
entire army was in this neighborhood,* Pemberton at 
first continued his backward movement ; but, the dem- 
onstrations soon becoming serious, he directed his 
division commanders to form a line of battle on the 
cross-road from the Clinton to the Raymond road, 
with Loring on the right, Bo wen in the centre, and 
Stevenson on the left. This AYas the line with which 
Grant had to contend in the battle of Champion's 
hill. Pemberton declared in his official report that 
it included only seventeen thousand five hundred 
men.f Grant estimated it at least as high as twenty- 
five thousand. 

McClernand had notified McPherson of the move- 
ments of his command ; and McPherson, anticipating 
Grant's directions, at once ordered Logan to follow 
Hovey, and Crocker, who was in column further 
back, to come uj) as rapidly as possible with his divi- 
sion. After proceeding about five miles, Hovey sent 

* " When General Johnston, on the 13th of May, informed me that 
Sherman was at Clinton, and ordered me to attack him in the rear, 
neither he nor I knew that Sherman was in the act of advancing on 
Jackson, which place he entered at twelve o'clock on the next day ; 
that a corps of the enemy was at Raymond, following Sherman's march 
upon Jackson ; and that another corps was near Dillon's, probably 
moving in the same direction ; and, consequently, that the orders to at- 
tack Sherman could not be executed. Nor was I myself aware until 
several hours after I had received and promised to obey the order, that 
it could not be obeyed without the destruction of my army; but on 
my arrival at Edward's depot, two hours after I received the order, I 
found a large force of the enemy at Dillon's, on my right flank, and 
ready to attack me in the flank or rear if I moved on Clinton." — Pem- 
hertoii'a additional Jieport. 

t I shall take occasion, furtbftr on, to tU>pute this assertion of 
Pemberton. Sue page 399. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 2G1 

word to McPlierson that he had met the enemy in 
force, strongly posted on the northern or Bolton 
road. 

At six and a half o'clock, McPherson dispatched 
to Grant : " I think it advisable for you to come for- 
ward to the front as soon as you can." * Grant 
started at once, at forty minutes past seven, for the 
advance. On the way, he found Hovey's division at 
a halt, and the road blocked up with wagon-trains at 
the crossing, and himself ordered all quartermasters 
and wagon-masters to draw their teams to one side, 
and make room for the passage of troops. McPherson 
was brought up by the road thus cleared. Passing 
to the front. Grant found Ilovey's skirmishers near 
the enemy's pickets. The troops were rapidly getting 
into line, and Hovey could have brought on an en- 
gagement at any moment. 

The enemy was strongly posted, with his left on 
a high wooded ridge, called Champion's hill, over 
which the road to Edward's station runs, making 
a sharp turn to the south, as it strikes the hills. This 
ridge rises sixty or seventy feet above the surround- 
ing country, and is the highest land for many miles 
around; the topmost point is bald, and gave the 
rebels a commanding position for their artillery ; but 
the remainder of the crest, as well as a precipitous 
hillside to the east of the road, is covered by a 
dense forest and undergrowth, and scarred with deep 
i-avines, through whose entanglements troops could 
pass only with extreme difficulty. To the north, the 

* 3IcPherson saw that a battle was imminent, and ^rcClcrnand was 
the ranking officer at the front. McPherson was unwilling to risk his 
troops under that general, unless it became unavoidable, and therefore 
eent the dispatch given above. After the battle, he explained this to 
Grant. 



2(52 MILITAKY niSTOEY OF 

timber extends a slioi-t distance down tlie Lill, and 
tlien opens into cultivated fields on a gentle slope 
towards Bakers creek, almost a mile away. Tlie 
rebel line ran southward along the crest, its centre 
coverino; the middle road from Raymond, while tlie 
extreme right was on the direct or southern road. 
The whole line was about four miles long. Midway,* 
or Champion's hill, on the rebel left, was evidently 
the key to the whole position. 

Hovey's division was disj^osed for attack on the 
Bolton road, and reached to the hill-side and into the 
wooded ravine; two brigades of Logan's division 
were thrown to the right of the road, and almost 
to the rear of the enemy; w^hile Crocker "was still 
coming up in column on the road. But Grant would 
not permit the attack to begin until he could hear 
from McClernand, now advancing wdth four divisions 
from Eaymond. McClernand, in person, was with 
Osterhaus and Carr, on the middle road. Staff" offi- 
cers were sent to him at once, and successive mes- 
sages dispatched, for him to push forward wdth all 
rapidity; but, by the nearest practicable route of 
communication, he was at least two and a half miles 
off. At fifteen minutes past ten, Grant sent him 
written orders : " From all information gathered from 
citizens and prisoners, the mass of the enemy are 
south of Hovey's division. McPherson is now up 
with Ilovey, and can support him at any point. 
Close up all your forces as expeditiously as possible, 
but cautiously. The enemy must not be allowed to 
get to our rear. If you can communicate with Blair 

* Midway hill was so called from being midway between Jackson 
and Vicksbnrg. CLampion was the name of the piincii)al proprietor 
of the neighborhood. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 263 

and Ransom, do so, and direct tliem to come np to 
your support by the most expeditious route." 

Eansom's brigade, of McArtliur's division, in 
McPlierson's corps, was marcliing up on the road 
from Grand Gulf, and supposed to be now within 
supporting distance of the left of the army. Grant, 
therefore, directed Ransom to move his command so 
as to join the forces north of him, by the first road 
leading northward. " Enemy are reported as having 
sent a column to our left and rear ; avoid being cut 

off." 

Continuous firing had been kept up all the morn- 
ino- between Hovey's skii'mishers and the rebel ad- 
vance ; and, by eleven o'clock, this grew into a bat- 
tle. At this time, Hovey's division w^as deployed 
to move westward, against the hill, the two brigades 
of Logan supporting him. Logan was formed in the 
open field, facing the northern side of the ridge, and 
only about four hundred yards from the enemy ; Lo- 
gan's front and the main front of Ilovey s division 
being nearly at right angles with each other. As 
Hovey advanced, his line conformed to the shape of 
the hill and became crescent-like, the concave towards 
the hill. McPherson now posted two batteries on 
his extreme right, and well in advance ; these poured 
a destructive enfilading fire upon the enemy, under 
cover of which the national line began to mount the 
hill. The enemy at once replied with a murderous 
discharge of musketr}-; and the battle soon raged 
hotly all along the line, from Hovey's extreme left to 
the light of Logan ; but Hovey pushed steadily on, and 
drove the rebels back six hundred yards, till eleven 
guns and three hundred prisoners were captured, 
and the brow of the height was gained. The road 



264 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 

here formed a natural fortification, whicL the rebels 
made liaste to use. It was cut through the crest of 
the ridge at the steepest part, the bank on the upper 
side commanding all below ; so that even when the 
national troops had apparently gained the road, the 
i-ebels stood behind this novel breastwork, covered 
from every fire, and masters still of the whole de- 
clivity. These were the only fortifications at Cham- 
pion's hill, but they answered the rebels well. 

Finding himself, however, in spite of this advan- 
tage, losing ground on a point so vitally important, 
the enemy now pushed reenforcements rapidly ; and, 
when these arrived, rallied, under cover of the woods, 
and poured down the road in great numbers on the 
position occupied by Hovey. For a while, Ilovey 
bore the whole brunt of the battle, and, after a des- 
perate resistance, was compelled to fall back, though 
slowly and stubbornly, losing several of the guns he 
had taken an hour before. But Grant was watching 
the fight on the first spur of the hiiy"' under fire, and 
seeing that the enemy was getting too strong for 
Ilovey, he sent in a brigade of Crocker's division, 
which had just arrived. These fresh troops gave Ho- 
vey confidence, and the height, that had been gained 
with fearful loss, was still retained. The preponder- 
ance, however, was even yet in favor of the enemy, 
for ]\rcClernand's advance divisions had not arrived. 

Meanwliile, the rebels had made a desperate at- 
tempt, on their left, to capture the battery in Mc- 
Pherson's corps which Avas doing them so much 
damage ; they were, however, promptly repelled by 
Sniitli's brigade of Logan's division, which drove 
them back with great slaughter, capturing many 

* Ilis son, tliirtecn years old, was close by liis side all day. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 265 

prisoners. Discovering, now, tliat liis own left was 
nearly turned, tlie enemy made a determined effort to 
turn the left of Hovey, precipitating on that com- 
mander all his available force ; and, while Logan was 
carrying every thing before him, the closely-pressed 
and nearly exhausted troops of Hovey were again 
compelled to retire. They had ])een fighting nearly 
three hours, and were fatigued and out of ammuni- 
tion ; but fell back doggedly, and not far. The tide 
of battle, at this point, seemed turning against the na- 
tional forces, and Hovey sent back repeatedly for 
support. Grant, however, was momently expecting 
the advance of McClernand's four divisions, and never 
doubted the result. At thirty minutes past twelve, 
he had again disjDatched to McClernand: "As soon 
as your command is all in hand, throw forward skir- 
mishers and feel the enemy, and attack him in force, 
if an opportunity occurs. I am with Hovey and Mc- 
Pherson, and will see that they cooperate." 

That commander, however, did not arrive; and 
Grant, seeing the critical condition of affairs, now di- 
rected McPherson to move what troops he could, by 
a left flank, around to tlie enemy's right front, on the 
crest of the ridge. The prolongation of Logan to the 
right had left a gap between him and Hovey, and 
into this the two remainino; brio^ades of Crocker were 
throAvn. The movement was promptly executed ; 
Boomer's brigade went at once into the fight, and 
checked the rebel advance, till Holmes's brigade came 
up, when a dashing charge was made, and Hovey' 
and Crocker were hotly engaged for forty minutes, 
Hovey recapturing five of the guns he had already 
taken and lost. But the enemy had massed his forces 
on this point, and the irregularity of the ground pre- 



266 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 

vented the use of artillery in enfilading him. Though 
baffled and enraged, he still fought with courage and 
obstinacy, and it was apparent that the national line 
was in dire need of assistance. In fact, the position 
was in dano;er. , 

At this crisis, Stevenson's brigade of Logan's divi- 
sion was moved forward at a double quick into a 
piece of wood on the extreme rigbt of the command ; 
the brigade moved parallel with Logan's general line 
of battle, charged across the ravines, up the hill, and 
through an open field, driving the enemy from an im- 
portant position, where lie was about to establish his 
batteries, capturing seven guns and several hundred 
prisoners. The main Vicksburg road, after following 
the ridge in a southerly direction for about a mile, to 
the point of intersection with the middle Raymond 
road, turns almost to the west again, running down 
the hill and across the valley where Logan was now 
operating, in the rear of the enemy. Unconscious of 
this immense advantage, Logan swept directly across 
the road, and absolutely cut off the rebel line of re- 
treat to Edward's station mthout being aware of it. 
At this very juncture, Grant, finding that there was 
no prospect of McClernand's reaching the field, and 
that the scales were still balanced at the critical 
point, thought himself obliged, in order to still fm-ther 
reenforce Ilovey and Crocker in front, to recall Logan 
from the right, ^vhere he ^\as overlap] )ing and out- 
ilanking the rebel left, nad the national commander 
been acquainted with the country, he would, of course, 
liave ordered Logan to push on in tke rear of the 
enemy, and thus secured the capture or annihilation 
of tlui whole rebel army. But the entire region was 
new to the national troops, and this great oppor- 



ULYSSES 3. GEA^^T. 267 

tunity unknown. As it was, however, the moment 
Logan left the road, tlie enemy, alarmed for his line 
of retreat, finding it, indeed, not only threatened, but 
almost gone, at once abandoned his position in front ; 
at this crisis a national battery opened from the 
right, pouring a well-directed fire, and the victorious 
troops of Hovey and Crocker pressing on, the enemy 
once more gave way ; the rebel line was rolled back 
for the third time, and the battle decided. 

Before the result of the final charge was known, 
Logan rode eagerly up to Grant, declaring that if one 
more dash could be made in front, he would advance 
in tlie rear, and complete the capture of the rebel 
army. Grant at once rode forward in person, and 
found the troops that had been so gallantly engaged 
for hours withdrawn from their most advanced posi- 
tion, and refilling their cartridge-boxes. Explaining 
the position of Logan's force, he directed them to use 
all dispatch and push forward as rapidly as possible. 
He proceeded himself in haste to what had been 
Pemberton's line, expecting every moment to come 
up with the enemy, but found the rebels had already 
broken and fled from the field. Logan's attack had 
precipitated the rout, and the battle of Champion's 
hill was won. This was between three and four 
o'clock in the afternoon. 

Arriving now at the Raymond road. Grant saw on 
his left, and along the next ridge, a column of troops 
approaching, which proved to be Carr's division : Mc- 
demand was with it in person. To the left of Carr, 
Osterhaus soon afterwards appeared, with his sku*- 
mishers well in advance. Grant at once sent word to 
Osterhaus that the rebels were in full retreat, dii'ect- 
ing him to press forward with all speed. The situa- 



2G8 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

tionwas soon explained, and Carr also was ordered 
to pursue as rapidly as possible to Black river, and 
cross it if he could. Osterliaus was to follow Carr. 
Some of McPlierson's troops Lad already got into the 
road in advance, but, havina^ marched and ensfaGfed. 
the enemy all day, they were fatigued, and gave way 
to Carr, who continued the pursuit until after dark. 

While the day had been so obstinately contested 
on the right, Grant, as has been seen, repeatedly sent 
orders to McClernand to push the divisions of Carr 
and Osterhaus into the fight, and. to communicate 
similar orders to Blair and A. J. Smith. These four 
divisions were admirably situated for attack, and, by 
ten o'clock, were so close as to have their skirmishers 
engaged. Ransom's brigade of McArthur's division 
had also arrived, and moved to their support ; but, 
notwithstanding all this, and Grant's urgent and re- 
peated orders, they were not so directed as to take 
any important part in the action; indeed, their influ- 
ence was altogetlier inadequate to their strength or 
oppoi-tunities. Had McClernand caused them to act 
with any degree of vigor, to do only half so much as 
Ilovey and McPlierson performed, it is difficult to 
perceive how any portion of the rebel army could 
have l)een witlidrawn as an organized force. At 
half-past three or four o'clock, the enemy was broken 
and flying from the field, but a vigorous eflfort on tlie 
part of McClernand would have accomplished the 
defeat by noon. The rebel right might have been 
destroyed, and tlie massing on their left prevented ; 
or, later in the figlit, Logan could have been kept in 
their rear, if McClernand had come up in time; and, 
Avith all retreat cut ofl*, the enemy might have been 
forced to surrender on the field, in mass. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 269 

But tlie battle Wcas fouglit witli McPhersou's com- 
mand and Ilovey's division of the Thirteentli corps, 
Grant directing all of Hovey's movements liiraself, in 
tlie absence of McClernand.* Immediately after the 
retreat began, Kansom arrived on tlie field, where the 
main battle had been fought ; and Blair also was up, 
in time to engage in the j^ursuit. McClernand's delay 
was occasioned by an excess of caution ; the country 
he marched through was broken and densely wooded, 
as Avell as unknown to him, and a comparatively 
small force of the enemy had detained him. While he 
was developing and manoeuvring, instead of attacking, 
the battle was fought elsewhere. Fifteen thousand 
men thus lingered under his command, in the vicinity 
of the field, though moving on roads converging to 
the front. The force opposed to him was probably 
not greater than six or seven thousand. The rebels 
were not intrenched, and a good soldier would at once 
have tested their opposition, especially after the per- 
emptory orders of his chief, and within sound of a 
critical battle, not three miles off. Even during the 
pursuit, when the beaten enemy came headlong across 
his front, McClernand, supposing this an assault, de- 
veloped his troops, and prepared to receive a flank 
attack from the pell-mell fugitives.-)- 

Grant had, in Hovey and McPherson's command, 
about fifteen thousand men engaged : every man in 
the three divisions was under fire. This hardest- 
fought battle of the campaign cost him four hundred 
and twenty-six men killed, eighteen hundred and 

* During the battle McCleruand sent positive directions to Hovey to 
connect with the right of Carr ; in order to obey, Hovey would have 
had to fall back two miles. But Grant was with Hovey at the time, 
and of course forbade the movement. 

* See Osterhaus's Report, 



270 illLITARY IIISTOET OF 

forty-two TTOunded, and one hundred and eighty-nine 
missing. Hovey, alone, lost in killed, wounded, and 
missing, twelve hundred men, one-tbii\l of his com- 
mand. McPherson lost about one thousand men ; 
and McClernand fifteen killed, and one hundred 
wounded. The losses were thus heavy from the na- 
ture of the ground ; Grant was compelled to mass his 
men in order to charge ; and, in the ascent of the hill, 
the fire from the rebel infantry into the serried ranks 
of the assaihmts was murderous. 

The enemy's loss was estimated at between three 
and four thousand men, in killed and wounded ; and 
nearly three thousand prisoners were captured on the 
field, or during the pursuit.* Hovey alone captured 
three hundred under fire, and four hundred after the 
battle ceased, besides paroling five hundred and 
sixty-nine sick and wounded, and burying two hun- 
dred and twenty-one rebel dead. Logan captured 
eleven guns and thirteen hundred prisoners. Besides 
these, Loring's entire division, which had held the 
right of the rebel line, on the direct Eaymond road, 
had become separated from the main army by the 
rai)idity of Grant's advance after the battle, and 
found no chance in the flight to unite with the rest 
of the command. Abandoning all his artillery, 
Loring, therefore, determined to make an efibrt to 
join Johnston, nnd set out in the darkness of the 

♦ The oflicial reports of Pcmberton and Johnston, contain no state- 
ment of the losses in this battle, or in any battle of the caniixiign. I 
have, liowovcr, found a rebel pamphlet published in 18G3, and pur- 
porting to have been written by one engaged iu the siege of Vicks- 
burg ; this gives the rebel loss at Champion's hill as six thousand men 
and thirty cannon. Two of the brigade commanders reported their 
losses; in one case these were six hundred, and in the other nine 
hundred and ninety-five men. 



ULYSSES B. GRANT. 271 

niglit, towards Utica. In order to avoid capture or 
destruction, lie was forced to make a wide detour to 
the south and east, losing hundreds if not thousands 
of his men by desertion and straggling; but, after 
several days, he succeeded in making a junction with 
Johnston near Jackson, having suffered greatly on 
the road. One whole division was thus cut off from 
the garrison of Vicksburg ; for this force never was 
able to rejoin Pemberton.* Grant estimated Loring's 
strength, after the battle, and exclusive of desertions, 
at four thousand men.+ Havins: been in McClernand's 
front, it had not been seriously engaged. 

The rout of the rebels was complete. Large 
numbers of men on Pemberton's left had abandoned 
the field without orders, even before the battle was 
over, and made their way to the rear in haste and 
confusion. J General Tilghman was killed, Loring 
cut off, and the separation from Johnston final. 
Many of the men threw away their small-arms and 
gave themselves up as prisoners, unasked. Two bat- 
teries, of six guns each, were left in the swamps, and 
every step of the pursuit was strewn with the wrecks 
of the dissolving army. Pemberton himself fled that 
night to Smith's ferry, where the railroad bridge 

* Pemberton had the same trouble with Loring that Grant had found 
with iMcClernand. Ue reijeatedly ordered Loring to come to the as- 
Bistance of the left, where the battle raged, but was unable to move 
him. The consequence was. that when the fighting ceased, and Pem- 
berton was driven towards Vicksburg, Loring, unable to join \us chief, 
was cut off by the advancing columns of Grant. 

t ^lay 24th, Loring reported 5,778 men at Jackson. 

t "A part of Stevenson's division broke badly, and fell back in 
great disorder." 

" Large numlicrs of men were abandoning the field on Stevenson's 
left, deserting their comrades." 

" Although a large number of men had shamefully abandoned their 
commands, and were making their way to the rear, the main body of 
the troops retired in good order." — Pemherton'a Report. 



272 MILITAKY niSTORY OF 

crosses the Big Black, about fifteen miles distant; 
and a pait of his command bivouacked at Bovina, 
marching: till after midnis^ht. One division remained 
at tlie bridge to hold it for Loring's crossing. But 
Loring never came.* 

As soon as McPherson's cartridcre-boxes could be 
refilled, the Seventeenth corps continued the pursuit, 
and kept it up until dark, the troops bivouacking 
from two to five miles in advance of the battle- 
field; one brigade, however, remained to guard the 
wounded, and assist in burying the dead, and secur- 
ing tlie spoils of the enemy. These amounted to no 
less than thirty cannon, besides numerous stands of 
colors, and large quantities of small-arms and am- 
munition. Carr reached Edward's station at eight 
o'clock p. M., where his command, with tliat of 
Osterhaus, remained during the night. Blair cap- 
tured three hundred prisoners, and rested three 
miles southeast of Edward's station ; Logan readied 
a point within three miles of Black river bridge; 
while Ilovey was left at Midway, to care for the 
wounded and buiy the dead. The heroes slept on 
tlie field they had won so dearly. Men, horses, can- 
non, and all tlie ^vrecks of tlie battle, were scattered 
around in wild confusion ; rebels and Union men 
heaped upon each other; dead and dying; their 
struggles ended, their hot rage all chilled. The sol- 
diers called the spot the " Hill of Death." 

Grant and his stafi' pushed on at the head of the 
column of pursuit until long after dark ; and, in the 

* " I awaited in vain intelligence of General Loring. It was neces- 
sary to hold the position to enable him to cross the river, should the 
enemy, which was probable, follow him closely up. For this purpose 
alone I continued the troops iu position." — Pemherton. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 273 

ardor of victory, got so far aliead of tlie main body 
that it Avas thoiiglit advisable to halt for tlie night. 
The house where they stopped was lonely, and, be- 
fore long, they discovered that their position was un- 
safe, in fact, a mile or more in advance of the troops, 
and they returned to the vicinity of the column, 
which was just going into bivouac on the road. The 
headquarters' tents and wagons had not come up, and 
they stretched themselves under the porch of a house 
used as a rebel field hospital. The bleeding and the 
dying from the battle were crowded close inside, and 
the slumbers of the men who had conquered were 
disturbed by the groans of their wounded foes. 

That night. Grant received Ilalleck's dispatch of 
the 11th of May, ordering him to return and cooper- 
ate with Banks; but the campaign that seemed so 
darino: had been won. The subordinate was indeed 
retracing his steps, but with victorious banners; no 
danger now of rebuke; no more countermands, no 
more recalls. 

Only the celerity of the movements which have 
been described prevented the junction of the rebel 
armies ; for, as has been seen, Pemberton was actually 
moving to join Johnston when Grant came up and 
attacked him. Pemberton had even sent word to 
Johnston of the route he was taking, saying : " I am 
thus particular, that you may be able to make a junc- 
tion with this army ; " but, in a postscript, he added : 
"Heavy skirmishing now going on in my fi'ont." 
This was the preliminary firing of the battle which 
forever prevented any junction between the two 
rebel armies. The next dispatch from Pembei-ton 
announced to his commander that he had been " com- 
pelled to full back with heavy loss." 
18 



274 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

On the 16th, while this furious battle was being 
fouirht, Jolmston, who had marched ten miles and a 
half the day before, rested his troops, and lost a day * 

Sherman liad evacuated Jackson by noon of the 
16th, paroling his prisoners, and leaving his wounded 
on account of the hasfe of the movement.f He 
marched twenty miles, reaching Bolton with his en- 
tire command the same day, and was that night in- 
formed of the victory of Champion's hill, and ordered 
to turn his corps northward to Bridgeport, pressing 
forward without delay. His rear-guard arrived at 
Bolton at two a. m. on the morning of the 17th, and 
the same troops started for Bridgeport at four and a 
half 

Blair was informed : " Sherman is ordered to 
Bridgeport with his corps. He will probably arrive 
there this morning " (May 17th). '• Move to the same 
point with your division, and take the pontoon train 
with you." Blair was to move by way of Edward's 
station. This arranoement brou2;ht Sherman's whole 
corps together at the most favorable position for 
crossing the Big Black river, and turning the enemy's 
left flank, or, if it became more desirable, for stri- 
king the important position of Haine's bluff. It had 

* " The brigadier-generals reporting that their troops required rest, 
after the fatigue tlicy had undergone in the skirmishes and marches 
preceding the retreat from Jackson, and having yet no certain intelli- 
gence of General Pemberton's route or General Gist's position, I did 
not move on Saturday." — JoJi>iii(o7i's Report. 

" It is a matter of great anxiety to me to add this little force to your 
army, hut the enemy being exactly between us, and consultation by 
correspondence so slow, it is difficult to arrange a meeting." — Johnston 
to Pivilwrton , May l(jth,from Calhoun. 

t On the 17th, Grant sent back an officer under flag of truce with 
provisions for these wounded, necessarily left to tlie tender mercies of 
the rebels. He sent supphes for his wounded enemies as well. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 275 

now become a matter of the highest consequence to 
secure a base of supplies. None of importance had 
been received since leaving Grand Gulf, and, although 
in this rich and fertile country where he was operat- 
ing. Grant had found forage and beef in abundance, 
all other supplies were getting short. Two hundred 
wagons had come up from Grand Gulf, with Blair, 
but no other reojular rations were received after leav- 
ing Hankinson's ferry. The only pontoon train with 
the army was therefore sent with Sherman, to Bridge- 
port, and the other two corps pushed on to the Black 
river, lower down, to force a passage. The main col- 
umn, moving on the direct road to Vicksburg, could 
thus operate favorably on the flank of any force at- 
tempting either to confront Sherman, or to defend 
Haine's bluff; wdiile, if the rebels still remained in 
force before Grant, Sherman was in a position to 
threaten their line of retreat, interposing between 
them and Vicksburg. To Sherman, Grant said : " I 
will endeavor to hold the enemy where he is, to give 
you time to cross the river, if it can be effected. The 
moment the enemy begins to give w^ay, I will en- 
deavor to follow him so closely that he wdll not be 
able to destroy the bridge. Let me hear from you 
the hour you expect to arrive at Bridgeport." 

At three and a half o'clock, on the morning of the 
l7th, McClernand's corps resumed the pursuit, Carr's 
division in the advance, followed closely by Oster- 
haus. Six miles to the west, the enemy was dis- 
covered in force, strongly posted at Big Black river 
brido-e. The river at this crossins; makes a bend 
somewhat in the shape of a horse-shoe, open towards 
the east. Hio-h bluffs extend on the western shore 
to the water's edge ; on the eastern side, is an open 



276 SnLITARY HISTOEY OF 

bottom nearly a mile in width, and surrounded by a 
stagnant bayou, two or three feet deep and nearly 
twenty feet across. At the narrowest part of this 
bend, and immediately inside of the bayou, the rebels 
had constructed a strong line of infantry parapet, 
and, at intervals, dispositions were made for artillery. 
The line was about a mile in length, abutting north 
on the river, and south on a cypress-brake that ex- 
tends to the bank of the river below. The bayou 
was parallel to the works, making a natural wet ditch 
of a formidable character ; the trees and brush grow- 
ino- in its bed had been felled, and left to obstruct the 
national advance; while the intrenchments behind 
were commanded by the bluffs on the right bank of 
the river ; the open space between, however, afforded 
no cover for the rebels, if once driven from the 
trenches. This tete-de-pont was defended by twenty 
pieces of artillery, and a garrison of four thousand 
men — as many as could be advantageously used on 
the line. The main rebel army had already crossed 
on boats and bridges, but Pemberton said : " I de- 
termined not to abandon so strong a front while 
there was a hope of Loring's arrival." * 

The exterior of the bridge-head was situated in 
the bottom land, with open fields in front, excej)t on 
the extreme left of the enemy, where a thick copse 
reached from the road to the river. Carr's division 
occui)ied the right in investing the place, and Law- 
k'r''s bricjade had the rii-'ht of the division. Osterhaus 
was on Carr's left, extending to the river below. Mc- 
Pherson remained in roar and in column, on the road, 

* " So strong was the position, that my greatest, almost only appre- 
hension, was a Hank movement by Bridgeport or Baldwin's ferry, 
which would have endangered my communications with Yicksburg."— 
Pemherton. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 277 

ready eltlier to support McClernand, if necessary, or 
to effect a crossing Liglier up, and, in conjunction 
with Sherman, drive the enemy from the position at 
the bridge, by marching on his left flank. 

Artillery-flre and skirmishing continued for several 
hours. The day was hot, and Lawler, who was rush- 
ing around without a coat, discovered that by moving 
one portion of his brigade througli the copse, under 
cover of the river-bank, and the remainder directly 
against the left flank of the enemy, he could reach a 
position from which he might be able to carry the 
work by storm. Accordingly, he marched eleven 
hundred men, the rest of the command supporting, 
across the open ground, exposed to a destructive fire 
of musketry, up to tlie very edge of the ditch. The 
supports charged as soon as they saw Lawler start, 
for the troops were inspired by their continued suc- 
cess, and emulous of each other's glory. The head 
of the assaulting column arrived opposite the end of 
the rebel parapet, and discovered that the trees and 
brushwood had not been felled in the stream at this 
point, so that there was a narrow and unobstructed 
defile, through which four men could pass abreast. 
Through this the entire party rushed, crossed the 
ditch in a moment of time, and before the enemy 
could make any disposition to resist the attack, the 
whole rebel line in front of Lawler was driven from 
the parapet. The remainder of Carr's division and 
Osterhaus's command, heanng the cheers of Lawler's 
men, moved forward on a run, but met no opposition. 
The enemy had fled before Carr and Osterhaus could 
reach the ditch.* Tlie unexpected success of the 

* " Our troops on their front did not wait to receive thera, but 
broke and fled precipitately. One portion of the line being broken, 
it very soon became a matter of sauve qui pent." — Peniberton. 



278 MLLITAEY HISTOKY OF 

charge completely demoralized the rebels, already 
disheartened by the great defeat of the day before. 
They fled at once to the crossing, abandoning their 
guns without a struggle. The panic spread to the 
troops on the western bank, who set fire to the 
brido^e before half of those on the eastern side had 
crossed. Then began a Avild struggle to reach the 
river; some few rebels succeeded in swimming across, 
among them General Green, but many were drowned. 
No regard for rank was observed ; officers and men 
made up one mass of fugitives. Some were too timid 
to expose themselves to the fii^e of the pursuing 
enemy, and remained in the trenches to surrender. 
One entire brigade was thus surrounded and cap- 
tured. Grant's loss in this engagement was twenty- 
nine killed and two hundred and forty-two wounded. 
Seventeen hundred and fifty-one prisoners fell into 
his hands, and eio'hteen cannon and five stands of 
colors were also trophies of this brilliant movement. 
The number of killed and wounded among the rebels 
is not known ; it was, however, small. 

Without any delay, or any further attempt to re- 
sist the crossing of the national troops, Pemberton now 
stai-ted at once for Vicksburg, with his depressed and 
discomfited followers. Strag^srlers in larsre numbers 
had already abandoned his aimy, whose spirit seemed 
absolutely destroyed ; he was ignorant of the fate of 
Loring's division, and was alarmed lest Grant, by a 
flank movement on Bridgeport or Baldwin, might 
even reach Vicksburg before him. The rapidity and 
strangeness of the latter's manoeuvres had evidently 
aftected the imasrination of his antasjonist, for he said : 
"The enemy, by a flank movement on my left at 
Bridgeport, and on my right by Baldwin's or other 



FLYSSES S. GRANT. 279 

ferries, miglit reacli Vicksburg almost simultaneously 
with myself, or perliaps interpose a heavy force be- 
tween me and that city. I myself proceeded at once 
to Yicksbiirg to prepare for its defence." Grant, in- 
deed, could have gone into Vicksburg, that night, if the 
bridges had not been destroyed. The battle of Black 
river bridge was over by ten o'clock in the morning. 
Lawler bad received no orders to make bis gallant 
charge ; be and his men deserve all the credit of its 
success.* Of course, it greatly facilitated the advance 
of tbe national anny, entirely uncovering every road 
to Vicksburo;. 

Grant at once directed the construction of bridges, 
for at this place the Big Black is vride and deep, and 
the rebels had secured at least twelve hours' advance, 
by the destruction of the crossing. He also ordered 
all the cavalry at bis disposal to move out as far as 
Brownsville, and ascertain if possible the position 
and intentions of Johnston. During the day, he sent 
word to Sherman: "Secure a commanding position 
on tbe west bank of Black river, as soon as you can. 
If tbe information you gain after crossing warrants 
you in believing you can go immediately into the 
city, do so. If there is any doubt in this matter, 
throw out troops to the left, after advancing on a 
line with the raili-oad bridge, to open your communi- 
cations with the troops here. We will then move in 
tbree columns, if roads can be found to move on, and 
either have Yicksbiu-g or Haine's bluff to-morrow 
nigbt. The enemy liave been so terribly beaten yes- 
terday and to-day, that I cannot believe that a stand 

* Colonel Kinsman, of the Twenty- Third Iowa, who was killed at 
the head of his regiment, is said to have suggested the charge. 



280 JULITAKY HISTORY OF 

will be made, unless tlie troops are relying on John- 
ston's arriving witli large reenforcements ; nor that 
Johnston would attempt to reenforce with any thing 
at his command, if he was at all aware of tlie present 
condition of things." 

McPherson and McClernand constructed floatinsf 
bridges out of the dry timber taken from the trestle- 
work of the railroad, and from cotton-gins and faim- 
houses in the neighborhood. One was built of cot- 
ton bales, fastened together by boards, and covered 
with a roadway of plank obtained from adjacent 
houses. Eansom built a bridge by simply felling 
large trees on either bank, and bending them so as 
to meet in the middle of the stream. Planks were 
then laid across, and the troops marched over. These 
labors continued all night, and by eight o'clock on 
the morning of the 18th of May, the Thirteenth and 
Seventeenth corps were again in motion for Vicks- 
burg. 

Sherman reached Bridgeport by noon of the 17th, 
and found Blair already there, witli his pontoon- 
train. The enemy's bridge of boats had been de- 
stroyed, and a body of rebels was intrenched to de- 
fend tlie crossing ; but, on the appearance of nation- 
al troops, they at once displayed a white flag, 
and the pontoon bridge was laid. Blair and Steele 
passed over that night, Tuttle following in the morn- 
ing. 

On tlie l7th, Johnston marched fifteen miles, 
towards the point indicated in Pemberton's dispatch 
of the lOtli, for their junction; but, Pemberton had 
already been ])eaten at Champion's hill, and was then 
beinrr beaten again at the Big Black bridge. That 
night, he retired within the lines at Vicksburg, and 



ULYSSES S. GRAITT. 281 

Jolinston marcliea, on tlie 18th, to Vernon, where he 
hoped to form a junction with his unlucky subor- 
dinate, if the latter should ever succeed in cutting his 
way out of the town. 

Starting at break of day, on the 18th, Sherman 
pushed rapidly on, and, by nine and a half o'clock, 
the head of his column had struck the Benton road, 
three miles and a half from Vicksburg ; he thus com- 
manded the Yazoo river, interposing a superior force 
between the rebels in the town and their forts on the 
Yazoo. His advance now rested till the whole com- 
mand should close up. 

Grant was with Sherman when his column struck 
the Walnut hills. As they rode together up the 
farthest heig^ht, where it looks down on the Yazoo 
river, and stood upon the very bluif from which 
Sherman had been repulsed six months before, the 
two soldiers gazed for a moment on the long-wished- 
for goal of the campaign, — the high dry ground on 
the north of Vicksburg, and the base for their sup- 
plies. Sherman at last turned abruptly round, and 
exclaimed to Grant: "Until this moment, I never 
thought your expedition a success. I never could 
see the end clearly, until now. But this is a cam- 
paign ; this is a success, if we never take the town.'' 
The other, as usual, smoked his cigar and made no 
reply. The enthusiastic subordinate had seen the 
dangers of this venturesome campaign so vividly, that 
his vision was dimmed for beholding success, imtil it 
lay revealed on the banks of the Yazoo ; but then, 
with the magnanimity of a noble nature, he rejoiced 
in the victories whose laurels he could not claim. 
His chief had believed all alono^ that he should ac- 
complish what was now performed, and the realiza- 



282 MILITARY HISTOPvY OF 

tion of this belief neither surprised nor elated the 
most equable of commanders * 

Grant now directed Sherman to operate on the 
rio-ht, and irave McPherson the centre, while McCler- 
nand had the left of the command. Sherman pushed 
the head of his column till the sldrmishers were 
within musket-range of the defences of Vicksburg ; 
and, by dark, he had reached the bluffs on the Mis- 
sissippi river. Early next morning, possession was 
obtained of the enemy's outer works ; his camps, and 
many prisoners, left behind in the hasty evacuation, 
were also captured ; and Steele's pickets were within 
easy range of the new rebel line. At eight a. m. on 
the 19th of May, the enemy was compassed on the 
north side of Vicksburg ; Grant's right resting on the 
Mississippi river, within full view of the national 
fleet at the mouth of the Yazoo. Vicksburg itself 
was in plain sight, and nothing separated Sherman 
from the enemy but a space of about four hundred 
yards, cut up by almost impassable ravines, and the 
rebel line of intrenchments. 

McClernand and McPherson also moved, at the 
earliest practicable moment on the ISth, Grant 
liavino; ordered: "No teams allowed to cross the 
river until all the troops are over, except ambulances 
and ammunition-wagons." f McPherson crossed the 

♦ Sherman had not been present at any of the victories in this cam- 
paign, except Jackson. It so chanced that his corps had done more 
than its share of the marching, and none at all of the heavy lighting, 
fluring the twenty days ; he therefore had not felt that splendid confi- 
dence which only those who engage in successful battle know, 

t " Move your corps as early as possible, taking the direct road as 
far as Mount Albans. From that point reconnoitre well as you advance. 
If a parallel road can be found within three miles of the direct road, 
take it. Ko trains will be allowed to cross the river until all the troops 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 283 

Big Black, above tlie Jackson road, early in the day, 
and came into the same road ^vitll Slierman, but in 
the rear. His advance arrived after nightfall, at the 
place where Sherman had turned to the right, and 
took a position on Sherman's left. The remainder of 
the Seventeenth corps bivousccked, that night, further 
back on tlie road, where there was water, and came 
into line in the morning. McClernand marched, by 
the Vicksburg and Jackson road, to Mount Albans, 
and then turaed to the left, to the Baldwin's ferry 
road. At sunset, he had reached a point about 
four miles from Vicksburg. By these dispositions, 
the three army coi'ps covered all the gi'ound their 
strength would allow, and on the morning of May 
19th, the siege of Vicksburg began. 

Communication was at once opened with the 
fleet, and a force was sent to take possession of 
Haine's bluff; for the enemy had abeady abandoned 
that sti'oughold, wdiich had so long opposed the na- 
tional commanders, and its garrison was withdrawn 
into Vicksburg. It was, of course, impossible" for 
Pemberton to hold the place after Grant had got 
between Haine's bluff' and Vicksburg. Fourteen 
heavy guns had been abandoned, for there was not 
time to remove them ; these were taken possession of 
by the navy, before the troops arrived. Chickasaw 
landing, at the foot of Walnut hills, was at once 
made the base for supplies during the siege ; bridges 
and roads were built, to bring up ammunition and 
provisions ; and the very post that had so long ob- 
structed Grant was thus compelled to minister him 

are over, except ambulauces and ammunition-wagons. One brigade 
will be left to guard the bridge and trains, and to bring the latter over 
after the troops have all passed.''— Grant to McClernand. 



284 iraJTAEY HISTOEY OF 

strength, while he prosecuted his efforts against the 
city of which it had been so formidable an outwork. 
But, the rebels had now given up all outworks, and, 
discomfited in the open field, the relieving army 
driven away, all communication destroyed, all sup- 
plies cut off, the garrison had retired within the de- 
fences of Vicksburg. 

It was just twenty days since the camj)aign be- 
gan. In that time. Grant had marched more than 
two hundi'ed miles, beaten two armies in five several 
battles, captured twenty-seven heavy cannon and 
sixty-one pieces of field-artillery, taken six thousand 
five hundred prisoners, and killed and wounded at 
least six thousand rebels more. He had forced the 
evacuation of Grand Gulf, seized the capital of the 
state, destroyed the railroads at Jackson for a dis- 
tance of more than thirty miles, and invested the 
principal rebel stronghold on the Mississippi river. 
Separating forces twice as numerous as his own, 
he had beaten first, at Port Gibson, a portion of 
Perabei-ton's army; then, at Kaymond and Jackson, 
the troops under Johnston's immediate command ; 
Mnd again, at Champion's hill and the Big Black 
river, the whole force that Pemberton dared take 
outsitle of the works of Vicksburg. Starting with- 
out teams, and with an average of two days' ra- 
tions in haversacks, he had picked up wagons in the 
country, and sul)sisted principally on forage and 
rations that he found on the road. Only five days' 
rations had been issued in the twenty days, yet 
neither suffering nor comj^laint was witnessed in 
the command. Ilis losses were six hundred and 
ninety-eight killed, three thousand four hundred and 
seven wounded, and two hundred and thirty miss- 



ULYSSES S. GP»ANT. 285 

ing ; in all, four tliousand three hundred and thirty- 
five.^' 

The rebel movements in this campaign could 
hardly have been better contrived to facilitate the 
movements and objects of the national commander. 
When Grant moved south of Vicksburg, Pemberton 
was at once apprised of the fact by Bowen, and made 
what lie supposed ample dispositions to meet the na- 
tional forces.f The demonstration at Haine's bluff, 
however, distracted the rebel general, who repeated- 
ly alludes to it in his official reports. But he sent 
orders for Loring, who was at Jackson, to huny with 
two regiments to the support of Bowen, and also di 
rected Stevenson, in command at Vicksbui'g, to have 
five thousand men ready to reiinforce the garrison at 
Grand Gulf J "When it was discovered that Grant 

* The following extracts from NaiDolcoii's proclamation to liis sol- 
diers after Lis first great Italian campaign, illustrate liow curiously 
Uistory repeats itself: " Soldiers ! in a fortnight you have gained six 
victories, taken twenty-one pairs of colors, fifty-five pieces of cannon, 
several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont ; you 
have made fifteen thousand prisoners, and killed or wounded more 
than ten thousand men. . . , Destitute of every thing, you have sup- 
plied all your wants. You have gained battles without cannon, crossed 
rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked 
without brandy, and often without bread. The republican i^halanxes, 
the soldiers of liberty alone, could have endured what you have en- 
dured. . . . The two armies wliich so lately attacked you boldly are 
fleeing aflrighted before you ; the perverse men who laughed at your 
distress, and rejoiced in thought at the triumphs of your enemies, are 
confounded and trembling." 

t Pemberton had anticipated an attack on Grand Gulf as early as 
April 23d, immediately after the passage of the batteries by Grant. 

X On the 28th of April, Pemberton ordered Stevenson, "All troops 
not absolutely necessary to hold the works at Vicksburg, should be 
held as a movable force for either Warrenton or Grand Gulf; " and ou 
the 29th he informed Johnston: "The enemy is at Ilard Times, in 
large force, with barges and transports, indicating a purpose to attack 
Grand Gulf, with a view to Vicksburg." 



286 Jin.ITAKY HISTOKY OF 

had absolutely landed, these forces were all ordered 
forward; but the rebels did not move with the 
celerity of their antagonists; before Loring anived, 
and when about half of the troops from Vicksburg 
were on the field, the bat'tle of Port Gibson was lost 
and won. Had the reenforcements all got np, how- 
ever, the result would probaldy have been unchanged. 
The fragments of his army, that Pemberton sent for- 
ward, were mere mouthfuls to Grant, who was ad- 
vancing with all his disposable force. Port Gibson 
was lost as a matter of course, and Grand Gulf fell, 
before the rebels had time to carry off their heavy 
guns. 

Johnston, although so far away, saw this emer- 
gency more clearly than his subordinate. He tele- 
graphed from Tullahoma, May 1st, after the battle of 
Port Gibson : " If Grant's army lands on this side of 
the river, the safety of Mississippi depends on beat- 
ing it. For that object you should unite your whole 
force." And again on the 2d: "If Grant crosses, 
nnite your whole force to beat him ; success will give 
back what was abandoned to win it." Very good 
advice, but easier to give than to execute ; and, at any 
rate, written after the events had occurred which 
rendered obedience impossible; for Grant was, at 
this moment, in possession of Grand Gulf and in pur- 
suit of Bowen.* 

In his report he dechires : "It was the hope of being able to hold 
the position on Bayou Pierre, upon which the safety of Jackson de- 
pends, tlint made me most anxious to rei'nforce General Bowen." 

* Pemberton thus explains his failure to move against Grant at this 
time : "The only means of subsisting an army south of Big Black are 
from Vicksl)urg or Jackson, the former requiring a transportation by 
dirt road of forty, and the latter of forty-five miles, in addition to that 
by rail. Without cavalry, I could not have protected my own com- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 287 

He did Dot give Pemberton time to develop any 
plan of liis own, but pushed on to tlie Big Black 
river, threatening Vieksburg, and, by liis demonstra- 
tions towards the west, probably prevented the reb- 
els fi'om detecting his real design of attacking Jackson. 
Pemberton at any rate made no effort to interfere, 
but remained carefully in Vieksburg, or near it, while 
Grant ^vas bringing up reenforcements and supplies. 
When the eastern movement at length began, Pem- 
berton still seemed not to comprehend it ; apparently 
not dreaming that Grant would dare move so far 
from a base, he saw him start to the interior without 
alarm, thinkino; himself sure of cuttina: the communi- 
cations of the national army. But, even yet, he did 
not attempt to accomplish his own designs, until 
Grant reached Raymond. Then, indeed, he fell into 
the snare designed; supposing Edward's station to 
be the objective of Grant, he waited there securely 
to receive an attack ; and, in his foolish confidence, 
even ordered troops from Jackson and Raymond to 
fall on the flank and rear of his antagonist. These 
unfortunates accordingly came up to Raymond and 
met their own destruction ; for Grant, instead of as- 
saulting the mass of the rebels at Edward's station, 
where they were prepared, reached out after this de- 
tachment at Raymond, falling upon it once more 
with a superior force, which left no doubt of the re- 
sult. 

Johnston now appears upon the scene in person. 

municatioua, mucli less have cut those of the enemy. To have marched 
an army across Big Black with sufficient strength to warrant a reason- 
able hope of successfully encountering his very superior forces, would 
have stripped Vieksburg and its essential flank defences of their garri- 
sons, and the city itself might have fallen an easy prey into the eager 
hands of the enemv." 



288 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

He amved at Jackson the day after the defeat at 
Raymond, and, finding a corps of Grant's army ad- 
vanced as fir as Clinton, supposed it to be entirely 
detached from the rest of the national command, that 
command being only ten miles off. Johnston ordered 
Pemberton to fall at once on the rear of this detached 
eor])S, while the troops at Jackson should come out 
in its front, and the corps would be annihilated. 
Again, a very pretty plan to conceive, but again a 
difficult one to execute. In the first place. Grant's 
entire army was within supporting distance, and had 
Johnston's orders been literally obeyed, the result 
would hardly have been more fortunate. But John- 
ston's orders were set at nausjht. Pemberton did 
not like risking his communications mth Vicksburg, 
and remained quiet for a day, after receiving this 
order; while Grant moved with two corps against 
Johnston, a third time beating the enemy in detail ; 
but, this time, meeting other troops and a new and 
greater general. 

Jackson fell, the railroads were destroyed, and 
Pemberton's real communications cut, if he had had 
but the wit to know it; for he could not live in 
Vicksburg, with a hostile army between himself and 
Jackson. Pemberton was besieo:ed ^vhen Jackson 
fell. But Johnston now, in his turn, beo-an scatter- 
ing his troops; he went himself with one division 
towards Canton, and ordered another body coming 
up, to remain forty or fifty miles to the east, out of 
tlie reach of this army of Grant, that was falling 
upon every scattered detachment in the state. If he 
could not unite his forces, at least he would disperse 
and save them. So Johnston went north and Gist 
went east, while Grant converc^ed. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 289 

At tliis time, Pemberton, not dreaming that Grant 
bad readied and captured Jackson, proposed to fall 
on tlie communications of Lis antagonist, supposing 
tliese could be cut at Dillon's. But what communica- 
tions Grant now bad were witb Jackson, and liis face 
was turned tow^ards Vicksburg, wben Pemberton set 
out to attack bis rear at Billon's. Slowly moving, 
Pemberton bears of Johnston's defeat, and gets re- 
newed orders to unite witb bis commander. At last 
be obeys ; reverses bis column, to form a junction witb 
Johnston, and is struck in the act by the whole anny 
of Grant, already back from Jackson, and moving up 
in three columns to the assault. Pemberton falls 
into position in which to receive the national attack ; 
a position strong by natui-e, and defended by twenty- 
five thousand troops, who as yet bad not been de- 
feated by Grant. Here he fights well, and, at last, 
is in numbers a match for bis foe; but neither num- 
bers nor position avails ; he is driven in utter confu- 
sion from bis lofty height, and the garrison of Vicks- 
buro; is fusfitive. 

O CD 

Demoi-alization now begins. The rebel troops are 
disheartened at their series of reverses; whichever way 
they turn, this omnipresent enemy falls upon them. 
They flee to the Big Black river, but be is already on 
their left, and they fear be will soon he in their rear; 
wben he attacks in front, they lose their wonted 
courage, which had stood them so well in many a 
gallant fight, and ignominiously succuml). Large 
numbers are captured without resistance; and the 
army that set out from the stronghold of Mississippi 
so proud and so terrible, returns a cowering, dis- 
comfited mob; many of its numbers left dead and 
wounded on a well-contested field, thousands cut oft" 

19 



290 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

none knew how nor wliere, thousands prisoners in 
the hands of the enemy — thousands straggling, de- 
sertin<^ — all flying before a flushed and victorious 
foe; their banners captured, their guns left in the 
hands of the enemy. Three cannon only are said to 
have been carried back into Vicksburg by Pemberton. 

Grant followed up rapidly, and shut the rebels in 
on every side ; the day of their arrival, the hostile 
lines were formed, and Vicksburg was besieged. 

The campaign in the rear of Vicksburg was re- 
markable, not only for the rapidity with which it was 
executed and the success which attended its move- 
ments, but for the originality of its conceptions, both 
in their general plan and in detail. The war of the 
rebellion was not like wars on European battle-fields, 
where the opposing generals can overlook the con- 
tending armies as two chess-players do their board. 
The extensive forests w^hich cover the Southern coun- 
try gave the rebels the advantage of a great natural 
defence, and afforded a cloak to all their movements 
to sui'prise or outflank an invading army. In this 
wilderness, good common roads were almost unknown, 
and military roads, like those in Europe, unheard of; 
heavy rains often converted the rivulets into rivers, 
and tlie highways into impassable canals. Railroads, 
therefore, became the vital lines of support to all de- 
fensive armies, and the object of attack to every in- 
vading column. All the strategy of the war was 
based on the importance and applicability of this 
principle. The rapid concentration of troops and 
the transportation of supplies, the relief of beleag 
uered gan-isons, the separation of supporting armies, 
often depended solely on the security or destruction 
of railroad lines. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 291 

It was this wliicli induced commanders to risk 
raids and raarcliing columns far into the wilderness, 
leaping from one base of supx)lies to another, hun- 
dreds of miles away. Grant's march tli rough the 
forest till he passed below Vicksburg, his crossing 
the almost impassable Mississippi, an enterprise 
deemed so difficult that the rebels hardly considered 
it in their arrangements for defence, his throwing his 
columns into the wilderness in the rear of the city, 
and suddenly appearing before Johnston and beating 
him in detail, then driving Pemberton into Vicks- 
burg, and striking for a new base on the Yazoo — 
were all due to the conclusion he arrived at, that the 
rules of strategy laid down in the books and applica- 
ble in a champaign country, should be violated in 
the wilderness. The condition of things was unpre- 
cedented in the wars we read of; his mode of over- 
coming such unknown obstacles had to be, and was, 
orio-inal. His mind, indeed, was never much inclined 
to follow precedents, or to set store by rules. He 
was not apt to study the means by which other men 
had succeeded; he seldom discussed the campaigns 
of crreat commanders in European wars, and was ut- 
terly indifferent to precept or example, whenever 
these seemed to liim inapplicable. He thus disap- 
pointed his greatest subordinates, and, indeed, even 
the general-in-chief and the government, as well as 
the enemy, none of whom anticipated the success of 
his plans, or foresaw the means by which that suc- 
cess was to be accomplished. 

But Grant remembered and applied the lesson 
taught him at Holly Springs. He had learned there 
that an army could live ^vithout a base; and now 
with a larger army, and for a longer penod, and amid 



292 MELrrAKY history of 

tenfold greater dangers, lie put tlie principle to tlie 
test. No anny in modern times had ever made a 
similar attempt. Napoleon, indeed, as lie tersely 
said, made war support war, but it was on a different 
plan from Grant's. Tlie great Corsican forced the 
cities and towns tliat lie conquered to furnisli liim 
supplies ; but lie did it deliberately, and in advance ; 
lie made Lis arrangements according to a system of 
forced requisitions, and tlirough tlie authorities; be 
never plunged into a hostile region Avith no more 
supplies than his army carried in their haversacks. 
This may, indeed, have been done for a day or two, 
on a forced march, or for a special object, but never 
at the outset of a campaign which was expected to 
endure for weeks, and in which a force greater than 
his own was sure to be encountered. Yet such op- 
erations were infinitely more feasible in the rich and 
cultivated plains of Europe, than among the sparsely 
settled wilds of Mississippi. 

The people of the country, of course, suffered 
greatly in this campaign. The system of foraging 
was veiy simple. There was no time for elaborate 
requisitions. Parties of men were disj^atched each 
night, as well as often during the march by day, who 
scoured the country for miles on each side of the 
main column of march; these visited every planta 
tion and fanuhouse, ransacked every barn, worked 
every mill, seized every animal; they were always 
siipi)osed to l)e under command of officers, but it 
often happened that squads of men were without 
tliis restraint. There was, however, not much time 
lor pillage; the movements were too rapid, and the 
tlanger of capture to stragglers too imminent, for any 
great amount of plundeiing : indeed, the constant 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 293 

motion of the troops gave less time for even the col- 
lection of supplies, than might otherwise have been 
tlionght indispensable. What was endured was 
doubtless hard enough, but instances of outrage and 
insult were rare. The rebels, too, were as merci- 
less in their demands upon the country as the na- 
tional troops, and lived oif the people quite as 
closely,* so that the inhabitants had small choice 
between friend or foe. They were stripped bare of 
supplies. 

The Vicksburg campaign has frequently been 
compared with that of Napoleon at Uhu ; f but, how- 
ever much it may resemble that wonderful series of 
operations in some of its results, it will be seen, upon 
closer study, to bear still more resemblance to the first 
fifteen days of the same great warrior in Italy in 1796, 
than to any other campaign in modern times. In 
each, the invader was opposed by two armies, se[)a- 
rated by a distance of thirty or forty miles; in each, 
the natural obstacles were prodigious; Napoleon 
crossed the Appenines, Grant the Mississippi; in 
each, the invader penetrated between the two armies 
that should have combined to crush him. In both 
campaigns the successful soldier massed his forces each 
time upon a smaller body of the enemy, and, although 
with fewer troops in all, contrived to be the superior 

* " Instructions had been given from Bovina that all cattle, sheep, 
and bogs belonging to private parties, and likely to fall into the hands 
of the enemy, should be driven within our lines. A large amount of 
fresh meat was secured in this way. The same instructions were given 
in regard to corn, and all disi)osable wagons applied to this end." — 
Peiribertoti'a lieport. 

t"In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of 
routes, these operations will compare most favorably with those of 
Napoleon about Ulm." — HaUecJc to Grant, July 31, 1863. 



294 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 

wherever Le met tlie foe ; in both, tMs was accom- 
plislied by a celerity wliicli left the enemy no time 
to recover from tlie effect of one blow' before another 
fell; in both, the rapidity of the marching, and the 
unexpected novelty of the combinations, made the 
strategy more imj^ortant than the fighting ; in both, 
tlie results were still more remarkable than the man- 
ner of the achievements. Napoleon secui'ed Genoa, 
and divided the kingdom of Sardinia fi'om the Aus 
trian alliance; while he created a new base for the 
splendid operations which speedily followed in Par- 
ma and Lombardy. Grant, besides the immediate 
successes of the campaign itself, won Vicksburg, 
opened the Mississipj)! river, and dealt the rebel- 
lion a blow from which it was destined never to 
recover. 

Grant's disadvantages were enhanced by his uu- 
familiarity with the country, and by the broken, 
rugged natui-e of the hills, which gave the rebels in- 
numerable and splendid opportunities for defence, of 
which they never foiled to avail themselves. Every 
hillside was a fortification, every creek a ditch, every 
forest an al)atis. Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, 
Champion's hill, and the Big Black — each battle illus- 
trates this, and added to the losses and difiiculties of 
the national conmumder. But Napoleon had more 
mobile and better-trained troops to contend with, 
and found the lastnesses of the Appenines as diflicult 
as the ravines of Mississippi were to the American ; 
so that their difiiculties were probably equalized. 
Finally, although Napoleon had conquered a kino-- 
doin when he ended the campaign, he had still other 
states to master, which it took him a whole year to 
subdue ; while Grant, too, was only ready to begin a 



ULYSSES S. GEAXT. 295 

siege when the field-fighting and the marching were 
concluded; success to each was but the stepping-stone 
to other struggles, the vestibule to other and greater 
victories/^ 

* See Appendix for Grant's correspondence with the government, in 
regard to the Vicksburg campaign, entire. 



296 MILITAEl HISTORY OF 



CHAPTEK VIII. 

Land defences of Vicksburg — Johnston orders Pemberton to evacuate — Pem- 
berton determines to hold out — Position of Grant's army on 19th of M;iy — 
Partial and unsuccessful assault — Rebels i-ecover their spirit — National 
troops rested and supplies brought up — Orders for a general assault on the 
22d — Reasons for this assault — Mortar bombardment — Heavy cannonade on 
land front — Sherman assaults with Blair and Steele's divisions — Troops reach 
the parapet, but are repelled — Ransom's assault — Difficult nature of the 
ground — Failure of McPherson's attempt — ^McClernand's assault determined 
and gallant, but completely repelled — Distmguished bravery of individuals — 
Failure of assault all along the line — McClernand's dispatches — Grant's re- 
plies — Renewal of the assault — Second failure — Grant's position during the 
assault — Renewed dispatches from McClernand — Reenforcements sent to 
McClernand — Death of Boomer — Results of the assault — Comparison with 
assaults in European wars. 

The ground on Avliicli the city of Vicksburg 
stands is supposed by some to have been originally a 
plateau, four or five miles long and about two miles 
wide, and two or three hundred feet above the Mis- 
sissippi river.'*' This plateau has been gradually 
washed away by rains and streams, until it is trans- 
formed into a labyrinth of sharp ridges and deep ir- 
regular ravines. The soil is fine, and when cut verti- 

'•' The Dllicial rqiort of engineer operations at the siege of Vicksburg, 
by Captains Prime and Comstock, U. S. Engineers, and the manuscript 
memoir, already referred to, of Lieutenant (now Brevet Major-General) 
Wilson, have furnished most of the details of engineer operations for this 
and the following chapter. 



ULYSSES S. GRAITT. 297 

cally "by the action of the Avater, remains in a per- 
pendicular position for years; and the smaller and 
newer ravines are often so deep that their ascent is 
difficult to a footman, unless he aids himself with his 
hands. The sides of the declivities are thickly 
wooded, and the bottoms of the ravines never level, 
except when the streams that formed them have been 
unusually large. 

At Vicksburg, the Mississippi runs a little west of 
south, and all the streams that enter it from the east 
run southwest. One of these empties into the river 
five miles below the city, and the dividing ridge 
that separates two of its branches was that on 
which the rebel line, east of Vicksburg, was built. 
On the northern side of the town, the line also ran 
alono; a dividing: rido^e, between two small streams 
that enter the Mississippi just above Vicksburg: 
these ridges are generally higher than any ground in 
their vicinity. Leaving the Mississippi on the north- 
ern side of Vicksburg, where the bluffs strike the 
river, the line stretched back two miles into the in- 
terior, crossed the valleys of two small streams, and 
reached the river again below, at a point where the 
bluff falls back from the Mississippi nearly a mile. 
Here, the works followed the bluff up the ri\er for a 
mile or more, so as to give fire towards the south on 
any troops that might attempt an attack from that 
direction, by moving along the bottom-land between 
the bluff and the Mississippi. 

The whole line was between seven and eight miles 
long, exclusive of the four miles of rifle-trench and 
heavy batteries on the water-front. It consisted of a 
series of detached works, on prominent and com- 
manding points, connected by a continuous line of 



298 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

trench or iille-i)it. The works were necessarily ir- 
regular, from the shape of the ridges on which they 
were situated, and, in only one instance, closed at 
the gorge. They were placed at distances of from 
seventy-five to five hundred yards from each other. 
Tlie connecting rifle-pit was simple, and generally 
about breast - high. The ravines were the only 
ditches, except in front of the detached works, but 
no others were needed, trees being felled in fr-ont of 
the Avhole line, and forming, in many places, entan- 
glements which, under fire, were absolutely impas- 
sable. In military j^arlance, Vicksburg was rather 
an intrenched camp than a fortified place, owing 
much of its extraordinary strength to the difficult 
nature of the ground, which rendered rapidity of 
movement and unity of efFoi*t in an assault, impos- 
sible. 

North of the Jackson road, the hills are higher, 
and covered ^vith a denser growth of timber, and 
here, in consequence, the enemy had been able to 
make his line exceedingly strong, and difficult of ap- 
proach. But, from the Jackson road to the river, on 
the south, the country was cleared and cultivated ; 
the ridges also were lo^^'er, and the slopes more gen- 
tle, though the ground was still rough and entirely 
unfitted for any united tactical movement. What 
the enemy kicked on this side, in natural defences, he 
liad supplied by giving increased strength to his 
works. Tlie whole aspect of the rugged fastness, 
bristling with bayonets, and crowned with artillery 
that swept the narrow defiles in every direction, was 
calculated to inspire new coiu*age in those who came 
thronging into its recesses and behind its bulwarks, 
from their succession of disasters in the oj^en field. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 299 

Here, too, were at least eight thousand fresh troops, 
who as yet liad suffered none of the demoralization 
of defeat ; and, with his thirty thousand men, and 
nearly two hundi^ed cannon, the rebel leader thought 
himself well able to stand a siege. If he had sup- 
plies enough to feed his army, he could surely hold 
out till another force, under Johnston, could be col- 
lected for his relief 

But, as soon as Johnston learned that Pemberton 
had been driven into Vicksburg, he dispatched to 
that commander: "If Haine's bluff be untenable, 
Vicksburs: is of no value, and cannot be held. K, 
therefore,^ you are invested at Vicksburg, you must 
ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, in- 
stead of losing both troops and place, you must, if 
possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evac- 
uate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to 
the northeast." This order reached Pemberton on 
the 18th of May, while Grant was still advancing on 
the Jackson road. Pemberton, as usual, called a 
council of war, to deliberate on the propriety of obe- 
dience. The council ^vas composed of all his general 
officers, and their opinion was unanimous, that " to 
withdraw from Vicksburg, with such morale and 
materiel^ as to be of further service to the Confed- 
eracy, would be impossible." Before the council 
broke up, the guns of the advancing army were 
heard, as they opened on the works of Vicksburg, 
and reports came in, that Grant's troops were (»'Oss- 
ino: the Yazoo river, above Ilaine's bluff. Pember- 
ton at once replied to his commander : " I have de- 
cided to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, with 
the firm hope that the government may yet be able 
to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the enemy's 



300 julitaey history of 

free navigation of the Mississippi." He was deter- 
mined to be besieged. 

Pemberton was now, according to bis own state- 
ment, able to liring into the trenches eighteen thou- 
sand live hundred muskets; from these, however, his 
reserves were to be deducted, which, he said, would 
reduce the force in tlie trenches to fifteen thousand 
five hundred men.'* Stevenson was put on the right, 
his troops reaching from the Warrenton road to the 
railroad, a distance of nearly five miles ; Forney had 
the line between the raib-oad and the Graveyard 
road ; and Smith, with his own troops, and some rem- 
nants of Loring's fugitive command that had strag- 
Med back into Vicksburo^, had the extreme left, from 
the Graveyard road to the river on the north. Bowen 
was held in reserve, ready to strengthen any portion 
of the line most threatened. In addition to the guns 
on the water-front, one hundred and two pieces of 
artillery of different calibre, principally field, were 
placed in position on the land side, and details of 
men were set to work strengthening the fortifications. 
All cattle, sheep, and hogs belonging to private par- 
ties, as far as Bovina, had been driven into the 
Avorks several days before, and all corn on the road 
also collected. " With proper economy of subsistence 
and ordnance stores," said Pemberton, "I knew I 
could stand a siege." 

The steep hills and deep gullies in the rear of 
Vicltsburg extended beyond the rebel fortifications 
aiul into the region occupied by Grant. The stiff 

* Althougb Pemberton said that he had only eighteen thousand 
five hundred men at this time, he surrendered thirty-one thousand 
nearly seven weeks later, and received no reentbrccmcnts in the mean 
while. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 301 

hard day of wLicli the soil is comj)osed was mucli 
cut up by the wasli of streams, and covered with, as 
dense a forest, here, as inside the works ; the valleys 
were filled with cane and willow, and accessilde only 
by two or three tolerable roads. In the diy season, 
which was now approaching, water is very scarce, 
and found only in pools or ponds made by damming 
up the little gullies. It was through this broken 
country, and across these wooded cliffs and rugged 
chasms, that the national line was formed. Sher- 
man's corps was on the right, McPherson had the 
centre, and McClernand the left of the command. On 
the northern and eastern sides of the city, the invest- 
ment was complete, but the line did not reach to the 
river again on the south, there being more ground 
along McClernand's front than he had troops to cover 
it with. The investment was made close on the north- 
ern rather than the southern side, in order to ja'event 
any junction between Johnston's army and the garri- 
son, before Grant could make an assault, as well as 
to cover the new base of supplies at Chickasaw 
bayou. Grant had, at this time, about thirty thou- 
sand men in line. 

The troops w^ere buoyant with success and eager 
for an assault, and tlieir commander believed himself 
justified in an attempt to carry the works by storm. 
The conduct of the rebel army at the Big Black 
bridge, and the precipitate flight into Vicksburg af- 
terwards, had sufficiently proved the demoralization 
of his antagonists; he also underestimated Pcmber- 
ton's numbers, supposing them to be about tweh'e 
thousand or fifteen thousand effective men. Accord- 
ingly, on the first day of the investment, the 19th 
of May, Grant ordered his corps commanders to 



302 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

" push forward carefully, and gaiu positions as close 
as possible to the enemy's works, until two o'clock 
p. M. ; at that hour, they will fire three volleys of ar- 
tillery from all the pieces in position. This will be 
the si2:nal for a 2:eneral charsre alono; the whole line." 
There was slight skirmishing on various parts of 
the line from early morning, and everywhere the 
troops were deployed and put into position ; on the 
right, important ground was gained, and Sherman 
moved forward Blair's division on the right and left 
of the road leading to the enemy's intrenchments, dis- 
posing his artillery so as to cover the point where the 
fortifications were to be entered. At the appointed 
hour, Blair advanced in line, but the ground on both 
sides of the road was so impracticable, cut up in deep 
chasms, and filled w^ith standing and fallen timber, 
that it was impossible for the assaulting parties to 
reach the trenches in any thino; like an ors-rmized con- 
dition. The Thirteenth United States infantry was the 
first to strike the works, and planted its colors on the 
exterior slope ; its commander, Captain Washington, 
was mortally wounded, and seventy-seven men out of 
two hundred and fifty, were either killed or wounded. 
Two volunteer regiments reached the same position 
nearly as soon, and held their ground, firing upon 
every head that presented itself above the parapet, 
but failed to eftect a lodgment or even penetrate the 
line. Other troops also gained positions on the right 
and left, close to the parapet, but got no further than 
the counterscai-p. The rebel fire was hot, and the 
national loss severe. Steele's division, on Sherman's 
extreme right, was not close enough to attack the 
mam line, but carried a number of outworks and cap- 
tiiicil a few prisoners. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 303 

McPlierson had arrived in front of Vicksburg 
after niglitfall of the 18th, bivouacking on the road; 
but, early on the 19th, he moved forward into posi- 
tion, in the ravines and along the ridges ; his line 
was well protected by the nature of the ground, but 
the roughness of the countiy prevented any decided 
advance, except by Eansoni's brigade, Avhich made 
a brief and unsuccessful attempt to carry the works 
in its front. McClernand, having more ground to 
march over than either of the other corps, was still, 
at early dawn, four miles from Vicksburg ; but his 
troops were deployed at once, batteries were put in 
position, and opened on the rebel line, and, by two 
o'clock, the whole coi^s was advanced as close to the 
enemy's works as the irregular ground allowed. The 
extreme steepness of the acclivities, the strength of 
the works, and the vigorous resistance everywhere 
made, all rendered it necessary to move with circum- 
spection ; so that without any fault or hesitation on 
the pai-t of either troops or commanders, night had 
overtaken the national forces before they were really 
in a condition to obey the order of Grant, except at 
the point where Sherman had readied the works, but 
failed to make any serious impression. Blair, how- 
ever, held his advanced position with tenacity until 
dark ; and, as soon as night closed in, Sheraian or- 
dered him back a short distance, to a point where the 
shape of the ground gave partial shelter and the 
troops could bivouac. The result of the assault was, 
therefore, unsuccessful. The Fifteenth corps was the 
only one able to act vigorously ; the other two having 
succeeded no further than to gain advanced positions, 
covered from the iire of the enemy.* 

* No report was made to Grant of the losses in this assault. They 



304 MILITAEY HISTOPwY OF 

The rebels Lad evidently begun to recover tlieii 
spirits. Driven to their last strongliold, like wild 
beasts at l)ay, they still held off tlie pursuers who 
had chased them so far and hard amoug the hills. 
It often happens that a panic-stricken army, after 
long flight and apparently irremediable disaster, 
suddenly recovers its tone and makes the new mettle 
more conspicuous by comparison with former recre- 
ancy. Something like this occurred at Vicksburg. 
The re])el3 had reached the works in a condition 
which their own records prove to have been as mis- 
erable as any in which an army ever fled towards its 
citadel. Late on a Sunday night, the main body of 
the vanquished forces began j^ouring into the town. 
Neither order nor discipline had been maintained on 
the march ; the men were scattered for miles along 
the road, declaring theii' readiness to desert rather 
than serve again under Pemberton. The planters 
and population of the country, fleeing from the pres- 
ence of the victorious enemy, added to the crowd and 
the confusion ; and the inhabitants of the city awoke 
in terror, to find their streets thronged ^vith fugi- 
tives — one vast, uproarious mass, in which, with 
shrinking citizens and timid women and children, 
were mingled the remnants of Pemberton's dismayed 
and disorganized army. And these were the troops 
that were now the reliance of Vicksburg." But, 
comforted by the sight of the formidable hills. Na- 
ture's own fortress, and looking up at the works 
which had already withstood so many sieges and as- 

were estimated by liini at fewer than five liimdi'ed; of these about one 
hundred •were killed or severely wounded. 

* Sec a rebel narrative of the siege of Vicksburg, by H. S. Abrams, 
published in 18G3, at Atlanta, Georgia. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 305 

saults, the rebels, who were good enougli soldiers, as 
full of courage and endurance as any men that ever 
fought, grew ashamed of their strange unmanliness ; 
and, when Sherman's troops ruslied up, thinking to 
march easily into Vicksburg, they found not only the 
ramparts were difficult, but the defenders had got 
new spirit, and were once more the men who had 
fought at Donelson, and Shiloh, and at Champion's 
hill. 

But, although unsuccessful, the operations of this 
day were important to Grant. The nature of the 
enemy's works and their approaches, the character of 
the ground, and the unusual obstacles by which it 
was encumbered, together with the policy of the de- 
fence, all became known ; while the national lines 
were advanced, j)ositions for artillery selected, and 
the relations of the various parts of the army were 
fully established and understood. It was clearly 
seen, from the knowledge thus obtained, that to carry 
the works of Vicksburg by storm was a more serious 
undertaking than had been at first supposed. 

The troops having been constantly on the march 
from the middle of April, and for the most of the 
time with short supplies, were now greatly fatigued ; 
the weather was warm and dusty; a change of 
clothing, as well as a supply of rations, was required. 
Plenty of meat had at all times been obtained during 
the march, but bread had been more scarce, and the 
men began seriously to feel its need. The camp and 
garrison equipage had been left behind, as well as all 
extra clothing; and it was imperative to look, in 
some degree, after the comfort of tlie army, before 
any thing further was attempted. 

The 20th and 21st of May were devoted to the 

20 



306 MILITARY KESTOEY OF 

accomplii;=hment of these objects; communications 
were opened, from the right and rear of the lines, 
with the steamboat landing near Chickasaw bayou ; 
new roads were made, so that the trains going and 
comino- might not interfere with each other ; bridges 
of flat-boats were laid across the bayou ; steamboats 
were brought to the landing, loaded with supplies of 
subsistence, forage, and ordnance stores, and served 
as store-houses until their cargoes should be needed. 
In case of disaster, they were thus ready to move off 
without the sacrifice of their vast quantity of stores. 
McClernand was directed to open communication 
with Warrenton, and for a while drew his supplies 
from that point; trains on the west bank moving 
from Milliken's bend to a point opposite Warrenton, 
whence stores were ferried to the eastern shore. The 
hospitals and supplies at Grand Gulf were also or- 
dered up to Warrenton. Hard bread, coffee, and 
sugar were hauled out to the fr-ont ; and the troops 
rested for two days, clearing the ground on which 
they were to encamp, and acquiring a more distinct 
idea of that over which they were to advance. Lau- 
man's division was now arriving at Chickasaw bayou, 
and the rest of McArthur's command at Warrenton. 

Pickets were pushed forward, in the mean time, 
and positions selected for the artillery. On the 20th, 
also, Grant sent Admiral Porter word : " A gunboat 
playing on the second water-battery would materially 
help us ; " and, at noon of that day, the moriar-fleet 
took jwsition on the west side of the peninsula, and 
commenced the bombardment of the city. This fii'e 
continued without intermission on the 21st, accom- 
panied by occasional musketry and artillery attacks 
from the land side, to which but slight response was 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 307 

made. Several rebel guns were dismounted, the 
works were ploughed up in one or two instances, and 
a number of officers and men killed and wounded.* 
Pemberton, however, liad determined to be economi- 
cal in the use of ammunition, and forbade both picket 
skirmishing and artillery combats. In consequence of 
this, Grant was able to push forward his oavu sharp- 
shooters, and obtain better positions for his guns. 
The mortar bombardment was so heavy that the citi- 
zens be2:an di^o-ino- caves in the sides of the hills, to 
which they retreated for shelter. Pembei-ton had de- 
sired them to leave the toAvn, but in vain ; they de- 
clared themselves availing to risk the horrors of a 
siege rather than quit their homes. At this time, 
also, it was found impossible to feed the large num- 
bers of horses and mules in Yicksburg, and they were 
driven beyond the lines for pasturage. This relieved 
Pemberton of a serious encumbrance, which would 
otherwise have made heavy demands upon his limited 
supplies of forage. 

On the 21st, the arrangements for drawing sup- 
plies of eveiy descrij)tion being complete, Grant de- 
cided to make another attempt to carry Vicksburg 
by storm. There were many reasons which deter- 
mined him to adopt this course. Fii'st of all, and 
most important, he felt that a resolute assault from 
the advanced positions obtained on the 19th, would 
succeed, if made with the proper vigor and coopera- 
tion. He believed that if he formed his columns of 
attack on the main roads, he could reach the rebel 
works in sufficient order and with weiii'ht enouirh to 
break through, before any serious loss could be inflict- 
ed by the enemy. The distance to be passed over iu no 

* See rebel reports. 



308 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

case exceeded four liundred yards, and in almost 
every instance partial cover could be obtained, up to 
witliin one hundred yards of the rebel line. 

In addition to these tactical considerations, it was 
known that Johnston was at Canton, with the troops 
tliat had escaped from Jackson, reenforced by others 
from the east and south ; that accessions were daily 
reaching him, and that every soldier the rebel gov- 
erament could gather up, in all its territory, would 
doubtless soon be sent to Johnston's support. In a 
short time he might be strong enough to attack Grant 
in the rear, and, possibly, in conjunction with the 
garrison, be able to raise the siege. Possession of 
.Vicksburg, on the contrary, would enable Grant to 
turn upon Johnston and drive him fi'om the state ; to 
seize all the raiboads and practical military high- 
ways, and effectually secure all the territory west of 
the Tombigbee river, before the season for active 
campaigning in this latitude should be past ; the gov- 
ernment would thus be saved all necessity of send- 
ing him reenforcements, now. so much needed else- 
where. 

Finally, the troops themselves were impatient to 
possess Vicksburg, the prize of all their battles, and 
bivouacs, and marches. The weather was growing 
extremely hot, the water among the hills was getting 
scarce, and likely to fail entirely during tlie summer. 
The temper of the army, after its triumphant march, 
was such that neither officers nor men would have 
worked in the trenches with any zeal, until they be- 
came certain that all other means had failed. The 
capture of the works on the Big Black river was too 
recent in their memories for them yet to tolerate the 
tedious processes of a siege. " They felt," said one 



ULYSSES S. GKAIO'. 309 

wlio was witli them, " as if they could march straight 
througli Vicksburg, and up to their waists in the 
Mississippi, without resistance." So, although Grant 
certainly expected to succeed, he felt now, as lie did 
at Belmont, that there was a moral as Avell as a mili- 
tary necessity for the assault. The spirit of the men 
demanded it, and to this spirit every real com- 
mander will defer ; or rather, with this spirit his own 
is sure to be in unison. Either he feels the same 
causes, and recognizes the same effects as they ; or he 
infuses into his men the passion, or temper, or idea 
with which he himself is animated. It takes both 
troops and commander to make an army ; consciously 
or not, they sympathize, like the soul and body of a 
livins: man. 

On the 21st of May, accordingly. Grant issued his 
orders for a general assault along the whole line, to 
commence at ten a. m. on the morrow. Corps com- 
manders were directed to examine thoroughly all the 
ground over which troops could possibly pass, to put 
in position all the artillery that could be used, and 
to advance their skirmishers as close as possible to 
the enemy's works. The ai-tillery was to make a 
vigorous attack at an early hour ; while the infantry, 
with the exception of reserves and skii*mishers, was 
to form in columns of platoons, or by a flank, if the 
ground would not admit of a wider front. The col- 
umns of attack were to move at quick time, with 
fixed bayonets, caiTjHng only canteens, ammunition, 
and one day's rations, and not to fire a gun till the 
outer works were stormed ; the skirmishers to ad- 
vance as soon as possible after the heads of columns, 
and scale the walls of any works that might confront 
them. "If prosecuted with vigor, it was confidently 



310 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

believed that tliis course would carry Vicksburg in a 
slioi-t space of time, and with very much less loss of 
life than would result from a protracted siege." 
" Every day's delay," said Grant, " enables the enemy 
to streno-then his defences and increase his chances 
for receiving aid from outsiders." Grant also wrote 
to Admiral Porter, on the 21st : "I expect to assault 
the city at ten a. m. to-morrow. I would request and 
urgently request that you send up the gunboats be- 
low the city, and shell the rebel intrenchments until 
that hour, and for thirty minutes after. If the mor- 
tars could all be sent down to near the point on the 
Louisiana shore, and throw in shells during the 
night, it would materially aid me." Mc Arthur's di- 
vision, not having yet arrived in line, was to act in- 
dependently, moving up from Warrenton by the 
direct road, and striking Yicksburg on the left of 
McClernanil, beyond the line of investment. " Move 
cautiously," said Grant, " and be prepared to receive 
an attack at any moment. Penetrate as far into the 
city as you can. Should you find the city still in 
possession of the enemy, hold as advanced a position 
as you can secure youi'self upon." 

The mortars wei-e mounted on large rafts and 
lashed to the further side of the peninsula. Porter 
kept six of them playing rapidly all night on the 
town and works, and sent three gunboats to shell the 
water-l)atteries and any places where rebel troops 
could be rested during the night; and, at three 
o'clock on the morning of the 2 2d, the cannonade be- 
gan from the land side. Every available gun was 
l)rought to bear on the works ; sharpshooters at the 
same time began their part of the action ; and nothing 
could be heard but the continued shrieking of shells. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 311 

the heavy booming of cannon, and the sharp whiz of 
the Minie balls as they sped with fatal accuracy tow- 
ards the devoted town. Vicksburg was encircled by 
a girdle of fire; on liver and shore, a line of mighty 
cannon poured destruction from their fiery throats, 
while the mortars played incessantly, and made the 
heavens themselves seem to drop down malignant 
meteors on the rebellious strono-hold. The bombard- 
ment was the most tenible durins: the sieg-e, and 
continued without intermission until nearly eleven 
o'clock, while the sharpshooters kept up such a rapid 
and galling fire that the rebel cannoneers could seldom 
rise to load their pieces ; the enemy was thus able to 
make only ineffectual replies, and the formation of 
the columns of attack was undisturbed. 

All the corps commanders had set their time by 
Grant's, so that there might be no difference between 
them in the movement of the assault. Grant himself 
took a commanding position near McPherson's front, 
from which he could see all the advancinc: columns of 
the Seventeenth, and a part of those of the Thirteenth 
and Fifteenth corps. Promptly at the appointed 
hour the three corps moved to the assault. Xo men 
could be seen on the enemy's works, except that oc- 
casionally a sharpshooter would show his head and 
quickly discharge his piece. A line of select skir- 
mishers was placed to keep these down. 

As on the 19th, Sherman's main attack was along 
the Graveyard road. Blair was placed at the head 
of this road, with Tuttle in support, while Steele was 
left to make his attack at a point in his own front, 
about half a mile further to the right. The troops 
were grouped so that, as far as the ground would al- 
low, the movement might be connected and rapid. 



312 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 

The Graveyard road ruus along tLe crown of an in- 
ferior ridge, over comparatively smooth ground. Its 
general direction was perpendicular to the rebel line ; 
but, as it ajiproaclied the works, it bent to the left, 
passing along tlie edge of tlie ditch of the enemy's 
bastion, and euterino; at the shoulder of the bastion. 
The timber, on the sides of the ridsre and in the 
ravine, had been felled, so that an assault at any 
other point in front of the Fifteenth corps was almost 
impossible. The rebel line, rifle-trench as well as 
small works for artillery, was higher than the ground 
occupied by the national troops, and nowhere, be- 
tween the Jackson road and the Mississippi on the 
north, could it be reached without crossing a ravine 
a hundred and twenty feet below the general level 
of the hills, and then scaling an acclivity, whose nat- 
ural slope Avas everywhere made more difficult by 
fallen trees and entanglements of stakes and vines. 

A forlorn hope was formed of a hundi-ed and fifty 
men, ^vho carried poles and boards to cross the ditch. 
This i:»arty Avas follo^ved closely by Ewing's brigade ; 
Giles Smith and Kilby Smith's brigades bringing up 
the rear of Blair's division. All marched by the 
flank, following a road selected the night before, on 
which the men were partially sheltered, until it be- 
came necessary to take the crown of the ridge, and 
ex])ose themselves to the full view of the enemy, 
known to be lying concealed behind his well-planned 
])arapet 

At the very moment named in Grant's orders, the 
storming Jiarty dashed up the road, at the double 
quick, followed by Ewing's brigade, the Thii-tieth 
Ohio leading. Five batteries, of six pieces each, sta- 
tioned on tlie ridge, kept up a concentric fire on the 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 313 

bastion, wliicli was doubtless constructed to com- 
mand the very approach on wliicli Sherman was 
moving. The storming party reacted the salient of 
the bastion, and passed towards the sally-port, when 
rose from every part along the line commanding 
it, a double rank of the enemy, and poured on the 
bead of the column a terrific fire. The men halted — 
wavered — sousrht cover. But the column behind 
pressed on ; it crossed the ditch on the left face of 
the bastion, clambered up the exterior slope, and 
planted its colors on the outside of the parapet ; the 
fire, however, was too hot to bear them further. The 
briirade broke, and the men burrowed in the earth to 
shield tlieraselves from a flankin2^ fire. 

Ewing being thus unable to carry this point, the 
next brigade, Giles Smith's, was turned down a ra- 
vine, and, making a circuit to the left, found cover, 
formed line, and threatened the parapet at a point 
three hundred yards to the left of the bastion ; while 
the brigade of Kilby Smith was deployed on the off- 
slope of one of the spurs, where, wdth E wing's bri- 
gade, it kept up a constant fire against any object 
that presented itself above the parapet. At about 
two o'clock, Blair reported that none of his brigades 
could pass the point of the road swept by the terrific 
fire which Ewing had encountered, but that Giles 
Smith had got a position more to the left, where, in 
connection with Ransom, of McPherson's corps, he 
was ready to assault. Sherman thereupon ordered a 
constant fire of artillery and infantry to he main- 
tained, in order to occupy the attention of the enemy 
in front, while Ransom and Giles Smith charged up 
against the parapet. 

The ground over which they passed is the most 



314 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

difficult about Vicksburg. Three rapines cover the 
entire distance between the Graveyard and the Jack- 
son roads, and, opening into one still larger, rendered 
this portion of the line almost unapproacliable, ex- 
cept for individuals. Nowhere between these points 
could a company march by the flank in any thing 
like order, so broken is the ground, and so much was 
it obstructed by the slashing which had been made 
by felling forest-timber and the luxurious vines along 
the sides of the ravines. But, although these ob- 
structions were thus almost insurmountable, they yet 
afforded effectual cover to the assailants till they got 
within eighty yards of the enemy; and, even then, 
they rendered the rebel fire much less destructive 
than it would have been on the open ground. The 
troops pushed on, and struggled in the blazing sun 
to reach the enemy's stronghold; but, like the col- 
umn of E^^'ing, they became hopelessly broken up 
into small parties, and only a few, more daring than 
the rest, succeeded in getting close enough to give the 
rebels any serious cause for alarm. But these were 
met by a staggering fire, and recoiled under cover of 
the hillside. Many a brave man fell after he had 
passed through the difficulties of the approach and 
reached the rebel line. The foremost Avere soon com- 
pelled to crawl behind the logs and under the brow 
of the hills, where they waited for single opportuni- 
ties to bring down the enemy, as he showed himself 
along the parapet or in the rifle-trench. 

Steele's artillery had been placed in position on 
the abandoned outworks of the enemy, along a ridge 
on the north side of a creek which separated the bel- 
ligerents at this point. His infantry was on the 
]-()ad, under the bluffs and behind the hills. The val- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 315 

ley between had been cleared and cultivated ; it was 
wider near Ewing's right, and exposed, for tliree- 
-juarters of a mile, to a plunging fire from every point 
of the adjacent rebel line. The distance to pass un- 
der fire was not less than four hundred yards; and, 
thouo-h the obstacles to overcome were less, the ex- 
posure to fire being greater, made the result here the 
same as in the assault on Sherman's left. The 
main effort of Steele's rii>:ht was directed ao;ainst a 
water-battery, at the mouth of a creek which emp- 
ties into the Mississippi, above Vicksburg. But, by 
two o'clock, it ^vas evident that the national forces 
could not reach the rebel fortifications at any point 
in Sherman's front in numbers or order suflicient to 
carry the line, and all further operations were sus- 
pended.* 

In the mean time, the troops of McPherson and 
McClernand's corps had advanced promptly at ten 
o'clock. McPherson's line extended from Sherman's 
left to within half a mile of the railroad. Ransom on the 
rio-ht and in the ravines, Lo2:an on the main Jackson 
road, and Quimby in the valleys towards the south. 
The rebel works here followed the line of the ridge, 
I'unning nearly north and south ; they were about 
two miles from the river, and three hundred and 
twenty-nine feet above low-water mark. Tliey were 
strongly constructed, and well arranged to sweep the 
approaches in every dii*ection. The road follows the 
tortuous and uneven ridge separating two deep ra- 

* General Sherman's report of this assault is very full and viviil. I 
have not hesitated to avail myself of his language whenever it suited 
my purpose. General Sherman, indeed, has offered me unrestricted 
access to all his papers, and in conversation often thrown light en 
points that could not otherwise have been made clear. 



316 MiLrrAEr history of 

vines, and was completely swept at many points by 
direct and cross fires from tlie enemy's line. In Lo- 
gan's division, John E. Smith's brigade, supporting 
Lesrs-ett's, was on the road, and Stevenson in the ra- 
vines and on the slopes to the south ; all moved for- 
ward under cover of a heavy artillery fire. 

Their order of battle, however, was weak, from 
the nature of the ground — columns of regiments not 
greater than platoon front, battalions by the flank, in 
columns of fours, or regiments in single line of battle, 
supported by troops in position, and covered l)y 
skirmishers. Notwithstanding the bravery of the 
troops, they became broken and disorganized by the 
diflScult ground and the fire of the enemy from trench 
and parapet; and they, too, were compelled to seek 
cover under the brows of the hills along which they 
had advanced. John E. Smith was thus checked by 
the cross-fire of artillery commanding the road, and 
it soon became apparent that nothing favorable could 
be expected from efforts in this quarter. Stevenson, 
however, was somewhat protected by the uneven 
ground, and, although compelled to advance into a 
reentrant of the enemy's line, he had a better oppor- 
tunity to assault. His advance was bold, and nearly 
reached the top of the slope in his front, but being 
only in line, and therefore without any great weight, 
unsuppoi-ted by columns or heavy bodies of troops 
to give it confidence or momentum, it also failed. 
Quimby's troops moved out, but the enemy's line in 
their front being a strong reentrant, no great eflPort 
was made by them. At this time, they were simply 
useful from the menacing attitude they held. 

IMcCleraand's corps occupied the extreme left of 
tlie line ; A. J. Smith on the right of the raih'oad, 



ULYSSES S. GRAIfT. 317 

in and across tlie ravines, on Quimby's left. Tlie 
gully nearest the railroad afforded excellent cover, 
and led to within twenty yards of the enemy's line. 
Carr's division joined Smith's left, on the railroad, and 
extended south, along and behind a narrow ridge. 
Osterhaus was still further to the south, with an in- 
terval of about two hundred yards between his right 
and Carr's left, in a ravine, the general direction of 
which was towards the point where the railroad en- 
ters the rebel line. This ravine was well swept by 
musketry, as well as by the guns of the rebel bat- 
teries. The side ravines were extremely difficult and 
intricate, though not encumbered, as in Sherman's and 
part of McPherson's front, by fallen timber. Ho- 
vey's division was stiU further to the left, and some- 
what more distant from the enemy's line; the ground 
in his front was more difficult, being still more un- 
even, and covered with a heavier growth of timber. 

The only heavy artillery with the army, con- 
sisting of six thirty-pound Parrott rifles, had been 
placed in battery, just to the left of the railroad, on 
a prominent point close in rear of Carr's right. The 
field-batteries of the Thirteenth corps, numbering 
thii-ty-three guns, were also posted advantageously 
along the ridges and prominences in the rear. These 
opened early, and McClernand succeeded in breach- 
ing several points of the enemy's works, temporarily 
silencing one or two guns, and exploding four rebel 
caissons.* At the precise time appointed, the bugles 
sounded the charge, and, with all the alacrity of Poi-t 
Gibson and the Big Black bridge, McClernand's col- 
umns moved to the assault ; but, as in the case of 
McPherson and Sherman, by brigade, regiment, or 

* See rebel reports. 



318 MILITAET mSTOKY OF 

"battalion front, in weak order, and without coopera- 
tion or unity. The right, under Smith, succeeded in 
pushing close to the enemy's works, but was met by 
the destnictive fire of musketry, and unable to get 
further. Lawler's brigade, in Carr's division, which 
had carried the tete-de-pont on the Big Black river, 
dashed forward with its old impetuosity, supported 
by Landrum's brigade of Smith's division ; and, in less 
than fifteen minutes, a part of one regiment, the 
Twenty-second Iowa, succeeded in crossing the ditch 
and parapet of a rebel outwork ; but, not receiving 
the support of the rest of the column, could not push 
further, nor drive the enemy from the main work 
immediately in rear. A hand-to-hand fight here en- 
sued, lasting several minutes ; hand - grenades also 
were thrown by the rebels in rear, while the national 
troops still commanded the outer parapet. Ev^ery 
man in the party, but one was shot down. Sergeant 
Joseph Griffith, of the Twenty-second Iowa, fell at 
the same time with his comrades, stunned, but not 
seriously luirt. On his recovery, he found a rebel 
lieutenant and sixteen men lying in the outwork, 
still unwounded, though exposed to the fire of both 
friend and foe. He rose, and bade them follow him 
out of the place, too hot for any man to stay and 
live. The rebels obeyed, and, calling to the troops 
outside to cease their firing, Griffith brought his i)ris- 
oners over the parapet, under a storm of rebel shot 
tliat killed four of those so willing to surrender* 

* For this act of gallantry, Griffith was next day promoted hy Grant 
to a lirst lieutenancy, thus literally, like a knight of the middle ages, 
winning his spurs on the field. He was not twenty years old, and 
.shortly afterwards received an appointment to the Military Academy at 
West Point, where he was known as " Grant's cadet," and graduated in 
18G7, fifth in his class. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 319 

The colors of the One Hundred and Thirtieth 
Illinois were now planted on the counterscarp, and 
those of two other regiments were also raised on the 
exterior slope of the parapet. The work, however, 
was completely commanded by others in rear, and no 
real possession of it was obtained by the national 
soldiers. But the troops remained in the ditch for 
hours, although hand-grenades and loaded shells were 
rolled over on them, from the parapet. The colors 
were not removed ; as often as a rebel attempted to 
grasp the staff, he was shot down by soldiers in the 
ditch; and the national flags waved all day on 
the rebel work, neither party able to secure them, 
but each preventing their seizure by the other. After 
dark, a national soldier climbed up stealthily and 
snatched one of the flags away ; the other was cap- 
tured by a rebel, in the same manner, leaning over 
suddenly from above. 

Fired by the example of Lawler and Landrum's 
commands, Benton and Burbridge's brigades, the 
former in Carr's, the latter in Smith's division, now 
rushed forward, and reached the ditch and slope of 
another little earthwork, planting their colors also 
on the outer slope. Captain White, of the Chica- 
go Mercantile battery, rivalling Grifiith's gallantry, 
dragged forward one of his pieces, by hand, quite to 
the ditch, and, double-shotting it, fired into an em- 
brasure, disabling a gun just ready to be discharged, 
and scatterino^ death amono^ the rebel cannoneers.* 

* General A. .7. Smith had been ordered by McClernand to get two guns 
up to this position, and called upon five or six batteries successively; 
but the captains all protested that it was impossible to drag guns, by 
hand, down one slope and up another, under fire. Smith, however, ex- 
claimed : " I know a battery that will go to if you order it there." 

So he sent for Captain White, of the Chicago MercanUle battery, and 



320 MELITAKY HISTORY OF 

A defcachment liere got into tlie work, but tlie rebels 
rallied and captured every man. These were tbe 
only troops that actually earned or gained posses- 
sion, even for a moment, of any portion of the enemy's 
line. 

Hovey and Osterhaus liad also pushed forward 
on the left, under a withering fire, till they could 
hear the rebel words of command. They reached 
the top of the hill, and advanced along the naked 
brow, through a storm of grape, canister, and mus- 
ketiy, under which they also broke, seeking cover 
behind the irregularities of the gTound, but not re- 
tiring. Indeed, they had gone on so far, that retreat- 
ing was as dangerous as to advance. But, from 
eleven till two, a desultory and aimless skii-mish was 
maintained. 

In the mean time, McArthur's division, of the 
Seventeenth corps, had crossed the Mississippi, at 
Warrenton. It went into position, on the extreme 
left, on the 21st, extending from the Hall's ferry road 
to the crest of the hill immediately on the river. 
The naval forces had moved at seven o'clock, and 
four gunboats engaged the Avater-batteries ; they ad- 
vanced in some instances within four hundred and 
fifty yards of the enemy, inflicting severe damage, 
dismounting several guns, and bursting one ; but re- 
ceived in return the hottest fire they ever yet had 

tol.l liim what he wanted. White replied: "Yes, sir, I will take my 
crvms tliere." And his men actually dragged the pieces over the rough 
ground, by hand, carrying the ammunition in their havei-sacks. One 
gun was stuck on the way, but tlie other thoy hauled up so near the 
rebel works, that it was difficult to elevate it sufficiently to be of use; 
finally, however, White succeeded in firing into the embrasure. The 
gun was then dragged off down the ravine, and, after nightfoll, hauled 
away; but the ammunition being heavy, was left on the tield. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 321 

known ; one vessel was severely damaged, "but not a 
man was killed. Doubtless, the sliare in the bom- 
bardment, taken by the fleet, served materially to dis- 
tract and annoy the garrison, but tlie distance of the 
lower works from the river, and their elevation, were 
too great for any permanent effect to be accomplished 
by the gunboat fire. McArthur, however, was pre- 
paring to take advantage of the temporary silence of 
the rebel works in this quarter, when he received 
other orders. 

Thus, all along the line, the assault, though made 
by heroes,^ had completely failed. Each corps had 
advanced, had met the shock, and then recoiled. The 
rebel position was too strong, both naturally and 
artificially, to be taken by stonn. At every point 
assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the 
enemy was able to show all the force his works could 
cover ; while, the difficulties of the ground rendered 
an attack in column, or indeed almost any tactical 
movement by the national troops, utterly impossible. 
Each corps had many more men than could possibly 
be used, on such ground as intervened between it 
and the enemy. Grant's loss had been great, both in 
killed and wounded. The hillsides were covered 
with the slain, and with -unfortunates who lay pant- 
ino- in the hot sun, cryino; for w^ater which none could 
biing them, and writhing in pain that might not be 
relieved ; while the rebels, ensconced behind their 
lofty parapets, had suffered but little in comparison. 
The national troops had everywhere shoAvn the great- 
est individual braveiy. Regiments, in all three 
corps, had planted their flags on the enemy's works, 
where they still waved, the rebels unable or afraid to 
remove them ; national detachments, after ineffectual 
21 



322 MTLITAEY HISTORY OP 

efforts to penetrate further, liad sheltered themselves 
on the outer slopes of the parapets, and behind the 
brows of the ridges, watching for opportunities to 
injure the enemy ; while the main body of the troops, 
at a greater distance and along the hills in rear, kept 
the rebels down by an incessant fire of musketiy, 
whenever an object exposed itself for a moment on 
the works.* The brunt of the battle incident to the 
first assault was over in less than an hour, and no 
substantial result had been obtained. It was plain 
that Grant could not hope to succeed by assault. 

At about twelve o'clock, while near McPherson's 
headquarters, Grant had received a dispatch from Mc- 
Clernand, that lie was hard pressed at several points : 
" I am hotly engaged with the enemy. He is massing 
on me from the right and left. A vigorous blow by 
McPherson would make a diversion in my favor." 
Grant replied : " If your advance is weak, strengthen 
it by drawing from your reserves or other parts of 
the line." He then rode around to Sherman's fi-ont, 
and had just reached that point, W'hen he received a 
second dispatch from McClernand: "We are hotly 
engaged with the enemy. We have part possession 
of two forts, and the stars and stripes are floating 
over them. A vigorous push ought to be made all 
along the line." This note reached Grant, after the 
repulse of both Sherman and McPherson. He showed 
it to Sherman and to his own staff. He and his staff 
had witnessed, from a high and commanding point, 
the assault of McClernand's corps ; had seen a few 

* In many instances, the riflemen who had got too near to with- 
draw with safety, stood up, exposed from head to foot, facinjr the rehel 
parapet, and held their pieces at a ready, to fire on any head that 
showed itself. The fire of the works was invariably kept down where 
the national soldiers had nerve enough for this desperate defence. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 323 

men enter the works, and the colors planted on the 
exterior slopes ; but had also seen the whole column 
repelled. Grant was disinclined to renew the as- 
sault wliich had been so unsuccessful ; yet he could 
not disregard these positive assertions. Sherman 
was, therefore, immediately ordered to repeat the at- 
tack in his front, and McClernand was directed to 
order up McArthur to his assistance. " McArthur is 
on your left; concentrate with him and use his forces 
to the best advantage." 

Grant himself started at once for McPherson's 
front, to convey to him the information contained in 
this last dispatch, so that he, too, might make the di 
version required. But, before he reached McPherson 
he met a messenger with a third dispatch from Mc 
demand: "We have gained the enemy's intrench 
ments at several points, but are brought to a stand 
I have sent word to McArthur to reenforce me if he 
can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole 
or a part of his command on this point ? P. S. — I have 
received your dispatch ; my troops are all engaged, 
and I cannot withdraw any to reenforce others." 

The position occupied by Grant, during most of 
the assault, gave him a better opportunity of seeing 
what was going on, in front of the Thirteenth corps, 
than it was possible for its commander to enjoy. He 
had not perceived any possession of forts, nor any 
necessity for reenforcements, up to the time when he 
left this place, between twelve and one o'clock. He 
again expressed doubts of the accuracy of the reports; 
but these reiterated statements could not be unheed- 
ed, for they might possibly be correct : and that 
no opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold 
should be allowed to escape, through fault of his, 



324 MILITAKY HISTOEY OF 

Grant now sent liis clilef of staff, with McClernand's 
note, to McPherson. indorsing on it an order for 
Quimby's division (all of McPherson's corps tlien 
available, except one brigade), to report to McCler- 
naud. The dispatch was sent to McPherson, to satisfy 
him of the necessity of an active diversion on his 
part, so that as great a force as possible might be 
held in his and Sherman's fronts. IVIcPherson sent 
the dispatch and order to Quimby, who forwarded it 
at once to Colonel Boomer, commanding his left bri- 
gade, with orders to move promptly to McClernand's 
support. Grant notified McClernand of these ar- 
rangements ; that Quimby was to join him, and that 
McPherson and Sherman would renew their assaults 
by way of a diversion in his favor. 

Sherman and McPherson, accordingly, made their 
advance, which was prompt and vigorous. Sherman 
now put into battle IMower's brigade, of Tuttle's di- 
vision, which had as yet been in reserve, while Steele 
was hotly engaged on the right, and heavy firing 
was going on, all- down the line on Shei-man's left. 
Mower's charge was covered by Blair's division, de- 
ployed on the hillside, and the artillery posted be- 
hind parapets, within j^oint-blank range. Mower 
carried his brigade up, bravely and well, but again 
arose a fire, if possible, more severe than that of the 
first assault, with an exactly similar result. The 
colors of the leading regiment were i:)l anted by the 
side of those of Blair's storming party, and remained, 
but the column was shattered and repelled. Steele, 
too, passed through a scathing fire — clouds of mus- 
ket-balls descendino* on the uncovered ground over 
whith he had to cross, and beating down his men as 
a rain-storm does the grass; still, he reached the para- 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 325 

pet, but could not carry it ; lie held possession of tlie 
hillside, however, till nightfall, when, by Sherman's 
order, he was withdrawn. 

McPherson's advance, likewise, had no result ex- 
cept to double the number of killed and wounded. 
His position was not advanced, nor any other advan- 
tage gained. His efforts continued until dark, though 
in a desultory manner, but clearly revealing his pres- 
ence and power to the enemy. 

At half-past three o'clock, Grant received a fourth 
dispatch from McClernand : "I have received your 
dispatch in regard to General Quimby's division and 
General McArthur's division. As soon as they ar- 
rive, T will press the enemy with all possible speed, 
and doubt not I will force my way through. I have 
lost no ground : my men are in two of the enemy's 
forts, but they are commanded by rifle-pits in the 
rear. Several prisoners have been taken, who inti- 
mate that the rear is strong. At this moment, I am 
hard pressed." 

McArthur did not arrive till the next morning, 
and it was nearly sundown, before Quimby's division 
reached McClernand ; it had been on the field all dnj, 
marching or fighting, but was immediately moved to 
the front, where it was required to relieve a part of 
A. J. Smith's division from an exposed position in 
line of battle. The enemy now made a show of ad- 
vancing, and the lines being so close, the action, 
which had for some time been lulled, was renewed 
with the greatest fury. For a few minutes, the fire 
of musketry was murderous. The third brigade, of 
Quimby's division, lost many men and some of its 
most valuable officers, including its commander, the 
gallant Boomer. He bore on his person the dispatch 



326 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

from McClernand, wliich had occasioned all this add- 
ed loss, and which proved as fatal to Boomer as the 
wound of w^hich he died. No other attack was made 
by McClernand. 

The battle was thus prolonged, many lives were 
sacrificed, and no advantage was gained, all owing to 
the incorrect accounts forwarded by McClernand. No 
part of any fort had been carried or held by him ; his 
men had displayed extraordinary gallantry, his corps 
had accomplished quite as much as either Sherman 
or McPherson's, but, like all the troops along the 
line, it was repelled disastrously. The fact that a 
dozen men, at one place, got inside the tebel lines and 
wevo killed, and that elsewhere, others reached the 
ditch and were captured, was magnified by him into 
the capture of a fort. His repeated calls for assist- 
ance cost the army hundreds of lives.* 

Three thousand national soldiers were killed or 
wounded in this disastrous fight ; and the army was 
now made sadly sure that over ground so rough, and 
so much obstructed, with formations necessarily so 
weak, it could not hope to carry Vicksburg by storm. 
But the quality of the troops was proven. There 
was no murmuring, no falling back, no symptom of 
demoralization. Detachments remained, till night- 
fall, close up to the advanced positions reached during 
the day, and then dug their way back out of the 
ditches. Save in one or two instances, they bore off 
the national flags that had waved over the works of 
Vicksburg, prematurely but prophetically. One, that 
could not be carried away, was buried in the eai'th 
of the ditcli, with the soldier who bore it thither; 

* See Appendix, for official letters of Generals Sherman and ]\Ic- 
Pherson, concerning this assault. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 32 Y 

tlieii* most glorious resting-place was tlie spot where 
they fell together. 

This assault was, in some respects, unparalleled 
in the wars of modern times. No attack on fortifica- 
tions of such strength had ever been undertaken by 
the great European captains, unless the assaulting 
party outnumbered the defenders by at least three to 
one. In the great sieges of the Peninsular war, the 
disproportion was even greater still. At Badajos, 
AYelliugton had fifty-one thousand men, eighteen 
thousand of whom were in the final assault, while 
the entire French garrison numbered only five thou- 
sand ; the British loss, in the assault alone, was thirty- 
five hundred. At Ciudad Eodi-igo, Wellington had 
thirty-five thousand men, and the French, less than 
two thousand, not seventeen hundred being able to 
bear arms; the British loss was twelve hundred and 
ninety, seven hundred and ten of these at the breaches ; 
while only three hundred Frenchmen fell. But Bada- 
jos and Rodrigo were carried. 

In the second assault on Vicksburg, Grant had, in 
his various columns, about thirty thousand men en- 
gaged ; of these, he lost probably three thousand, in 
killed and wounded. He, however, was met by an 
army, instead of a garrison. Pemberton, according 
to his own statement, put eighteen thousand five hun- 
dred men in the trenches.'^ It was, therefore, no re- 
proach to the gallantry or soldiership of the xVrmy of 
the Tennessee that it was unable to carry works of 
the strength of those which repelled it, manned by 

* The rebel pamphlet, to wliicli I have before alluded, gives the 
rebel loss as eight hundred. Pemberton said, on the 29th of May : 
" Since investment we have lost about one thousand men, many offi- 
cers." I can find no other official statement of his losses on this occa- 
sion. 



328 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

troops of the same race as themselves, and in Dum 
bers so nearly equal to their own. Neither can the 
generalship which directed this assault be fairly cen- 
sured. The only possible chance of breaking through 
such defences and defenders was in massing tlie troops, 
so that the weight of the columns should be abso- 
lutely irresistible. But, the broken, tangled ground, 
where often a company could not advance by flank, 
made massing impossible; and this could not be 
known in advance. The rebels, too, had not shown, 
in the week preceding the assault, any of the deter- 
mination which they displayed behind their earthen 
walls at Vicksburg; the works at the Big Black 
river also were impregnable, if they had been well 
defended; and Grant could not know, beforehand, 
that Pemberton's men had recovered their former 
mettle, any more than he could ascertain, without a 
trial, how inaccessible were the acclivities, and how 
prodigious the difficulties which protected these re- 
invigorated soldiers. But, Badajos was thrice be- 
sieged, and oftener assaulted, ere it fell; and the 
stories of Saguntum and Saragossa prove, that Vicks- 
burg was not the only citadel which long resisted 
gallant and determined armies. 

On the night of the 22d, the troops were with- 
drawn from the most advanced positions reached 
(luring the assault, still retaining, however, ground 
that was of importance during the siege. They took 
back many of their wounded with them, but the 
dead remained unburied. There was not time enough 
to remove the bodies before daybreak, when tlie rebel 
lire commanded all the ground where they lay. For 
two days, the unburied corpses were left festering be- 
tween the two armies, when the stench became so in- 



CTLYSSES S. GRAITT. 329 

tolerable to the garrison, that Pemberton was afraid 
it might breed a pestilence. He, therefore, proposed 
an armistice for two and a half hours, to enable Grant 
to remove his dead and the few wounded wlio had 
not yet been cared for * The offer was promptly ac- 
cepted, and tlie rebels also availed themselves of tlie 
opportunity to carry off the dead horses and mules 
that lay in their front, and were becoming very of- 
fensive to the besieo-ed. These were tbe animals that 
Pemberton had turned loose from tbe city and driven 
over the lines, from want of forage. They were shot 
wherever they were seen, by the sharpshooters of the 
besieging army, that the stench arising from their 
putreftiction might annoy the enemy. 

The suspension of hostilities lasted several hours, 
during which time, many exchanges of civilities took 
place between the officers and meu of the two armies. 
There was an utter absence of insulting language, as 
well as of any manifestations of malice or animosity. 
The belligerents had too much reason to respect each 
other's prowess to indulge in petty exhibitions of 
spite or spleen. Soldiers, indeed, are apt to get rid 
of their bad blood in battle, and leave ^\Tangling and 
revenge to those who stay a good way off in time of 
danger.f 

* Pemberton accused Grant of inhumanity, in not sooner burying 
his dead and caring for liis wounded. But, as stated in the text, most 
of the wounded had already been removed, and the impossibility of 
relieving the others was occasioned by Pemberton's own troojjs, of 
which, however, Grant had no right to complain. The wounded suf- 
fer frightfully after every battle, and the party which is repelled is 
always unable to bestow attention on those whom it leaves on the 
field." 

t During the war of the rebellion, the women and clergymen, at 
the South, were everywhere more oflensive in their behavior and lan- 
guage to national soldiers, than those who bore arms, relying on their 



330 jnLITAEY HISTORY OF 

On the 22d, Grant reported to Halleck his arrival 
at the Mississippi, and the investment of Vicksburg. 
In narrating the events of the assault, lie said : " Gen- 
eral McClernand's dispatches misled me as to the 
facts, and caused mucli of this loss. He is entirely 
unfit for the position of coi-ps commander, both on 
the march and on the battle-field. Looking after his 
cor23s gives me more labor and infinitely more un- 
easiness than all the remainder of my department." 
On the 24th, also, Grant made his first report of the 
battle of Champion's hill, whick had been fought 
eight days before. After leaving Jackson, he had no 
opportunity of communicating with tke government 
until he arrived before Vicksburg ; and, since then, 
he had been too busy to ^vrite reports. 

sex or their cloth to shelter them from punishment, Next to them, 
the politicians, who brought on the war which the people did not 
desire, were universally inclined to fight with tongue or pen, rather 
than with more warlike weapons. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 331 



CHAPTEK IX. 

Preparations for the siege — Grant orders troops from Memphis — Halleck sends 
reenforeements from the East and West — Lack of siege material — Scarcity 
of engineer officers — First ground broken 23d of May — Engineer operations 
— Ingenuity of officers and men — Enemy's defence — Sorties — "Wood's ap- 
proacli — Loss of the Cincinnati — Tuttle's approach — Blair's approach — Ran- 
som's approach — Logan's approach — A. J. Smith's approach — Carr's approacli 
— Hovey's approach — Lauman's approach — Herron's approach — Menacing 
attitude of Johnston — Correspondence with Bunks — Osterhaus sent to the 
Big Black — Blair sent to the Yazoo — Mower and Kimball sent to Mechanics- 
burg — Attack on Milliken's bend — Arrival of Herron and Parke — Completion 
of investment — Fortification of Haine's blufif — Corps of observation — Line 
of countervallation — Pemberton prepares for escape — ilcClernand re- 
lieved — Condition of garrison — Sufferings of inhabitants — Mine of June 25th 
— Hardships of national troops — ^Persistency of Grant — Final assault fixed 
for July 6th — Pemberton proposes surrender — Terms of capitulation — Inter- 
view between commanders — Surrender of Vicksburg — Treatment of prison- 
ers — Pemberton's headquarters — Garrison paroled and marched out of 
Yicksburg — Fall of Port Hudson— Opening of Mississippi river — Sherman 
sent against Johnston — Johnston retreats to Jackson — Slieiinan besieges 
Jackson — Johnston evacuates — Destruction of railroads — Return of Sherman 
— Results of entire campaign — Congratulations of the President and general- 
inchief— Grant made major-general m regular army — Joy of the country — 
Dismay of the rebels. 

The assaults on Vicksburg Laving failed, Grant 
at once set about his preparations for a siege. The 
three corps retained the same relative positions tliey 
ali-eady occupied, Sherman having the right, McPher- 
son the centre, and McClernand the left of the line ; 
but Lauman's division, arriving on the 24th of May, 
was put on the left of McClernand, where it guarded 



332 MELITAEY HISTORY OF 

tlie HalFs ferry and Warrenton roads ; wliile Mc Ar- 
thur's entire command had, by this time, joined the 
Seventeenth corps. Grant now ordered Prentiss and 
Hurlbut to send forward " every avaihible man that 
could possibly be spared." " The siege of Vicksburg 
is going to occupy time, contrary to my exj^ectations 
when I arrived near it. To watcb the enemy, and 
to prevent Wm from collecting a force outside, near 
enough to attack my rear, I requii'e a large cavalry 
force. Contract every thing on the line of the route 
from Memphis to Corinth, and keep your cavalry well 
out south of there ; by this means, you ougkt to be 
able to send here quite a large force." 

But even these reenforcements would be insuffi- 
cient. It was certain that the rebel government 
would still make strenuous efforts to rescue Vicks- 
burg, and, if possible, drive the besieging force from 
the advantaojeous footino* it had obtained, at the ex- 
pense of so muck blood and labor and time; and, 
should this prove impossible, Johnston would un- 
doubtedly endeavor to raise tke siege, at least long 
enough to extricate the garrison. The remnants of 
the rebel array outside of Vicksburg, with reenforce- 
ments already i-eceived from the East, were collected 
at Canton — sui'e earnest of a determination to strike 
one more blow ; while the inactivity of Eosecrans, in 
Tennessee, gave ground for fears that, rather than lose 
all on the INIississippi, the rebels, in order to reen- 
force Johnston heavily, might withdraw a heavy 
force from Brag-or ^yJio was in front of Eosecrans. 

OCT' 

Grant wa^ thus obliged, not only to assemble a force 
sufficient to conduct the operations of the siege, but 
at the same time to hold the line of the Bis: Black 
river, keep Johnston in check, and to cover the Y 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 333 

ZOO, from tlie mouth of tliat stream to Haine's bluff. 
The resources of his owu department, although con- 
siderable, were insufficient for these emergencies. But 
the general-in-chief appreciated tlie importance and 
character of the crisis, and made every exertion to 
supply Grant's necessities. He did not even wait to 
be asked, but, as soon as he learned the situation, 
telegraphed : " I will do all I can to assist you. I 
have sent dispatch after dispatch to Banks to join 
you." In such matters Ha,lleck w^as never lacking; 
his patriotism was pure, and his anxiety for success 
never flagged. If he neither planned victories, nor 
achieved them, he was always ready to further the 
plans of others, as soon as it became evident that 
only through those plans could victory be achieved. 

Grant had now abqut forty thousand men for 
duty, and on the 23d, orders were given for the axe 
and the shovel to support the bayonet. The hot season 
was at hand, the troops had already endured many 
hardships, they were almost altogether unprovided 
with siege material, so that the difficulties before the 
national army were not only formidable, but peculiar. 
The engineer organization was especially defective; 
there were no engineer troops in the entire command, 
and only four engineer officers, while twenty would 
have found ample opportunity for all their skill.* 
Several pioneer companies of volunteers were, how- 
ever, used for engineering purposes, and, although 
raw at first, became effective before the close of the 
siege. Tliere were no permanent depots of siege 

* Captain Prime, of the corps of engineers, was at first in charge 
of the engineer operations, but he fell sick, and was obliged to Ipave 
the field ; and, late in the siege, his place was supplied by Captain 
(now Brevet Brigadier-General) C. B. Comstock, of the same corps. 



334 JIILITAKY HISTORY OF 

material ; ppades and picks were kept at the steam 
l)oat landing, on the Yazoo, and in the camps near 
the trenches; gabions* and fascines were made as 
they were needed, by the pioneer companies, or by 
details of troops from the line. Grant's artillery was 
simply that nsed during the campaign, with the ad- 
dition of a battery of naval guns of larger calibre, 
loaned him by Admiral Porter. Thei-e was nothing 
like a siege train in all the West, no light mortars, 
and very few siege-howitzers nearer than "Washing- 
ton ; and there was not time to send to northern ar- 
senals for supplies. With such material and means 
the siege of Vicksburg was begun. 

Each commander was at once set to work putting 
his men into as comfortable camps as could be estab- 
lished in the woods and ravines, and as close to the 
enemy's works as shelter could be found. Most of 
the camps were within six hundred yards of the rebel 
parapet. Camp equipage and working utensils were 
l)rought up, and large quantities of quartermaster's 
and subsistence stores accumulated at the landing, to 
be hauled to the front whenever required. TJie 
numlier of wagons on hand M'as limited, and it was 
not tliought desirable to establish large depots of 
supplies near the lines, to be abandoned in case of an 
attempt to raise the siege ; only three or four days' 
rations, therefore, were kept at the front for issue. 

As soon as the troops were well settled in camp, 
and their wants supplied, the ground meanwhile 
having been accurately examined, details were made 
to ojien roads and covered ways from one camp to 
another ; while other details were slowly cutting out 
the fallen timber, and constructinof the rec^ular ap- 

* See Appendix, page GTo for glossary of siege terms. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 335 

proaclies of the siege. Tlie first ground was broken 
on the 23d of May, and batteries placed in the most 
advantageous positions to keep do\vn the rebel fire. 
Lines of parapet, rifle-trench, and covered way were 
then constructed to connect these T»atteries. The 
enemy seldom showed his guns, hardly attempting, 
indeed, to prevent the l^esiegers from getting their 
artillery into position ; for, the slightest exposure or 
demonstration on the part of the rebels excited the 
liveliest fire from the national batteries, and the ad- 
vantage was always in favor of the latter, as they 
could brins: to bear a much larger number of guns 
than the enemy. This, and the remarkable activity 
and vigilance of Grant's sharpshooters, in a great 
measure kept down the fire of the besieged. The 
enemy, however, was undoubtedly scant of ammuni- 
tion, and anxious to husband what he had, for more 
effective use at closer quarters. 

The connecting parapets, as well as all other 
available positions within rifle range, were kept oc- 
cupied by a line of sharpshooters during daylight, 
and by trench-guards and advanced pickets, after 
dark. Wherever an approach gave opportunity, 
loopholes were formed, by piling sand-bags and pieces 
of square timber on the parapet, or logs and stumps, 
when these were more convenient ; the men were 
thus enabled to shelter themselves completely. This 
timber was rarely displaced by the enemy's fire ; but, 
had the rebel artillery opened heavily, splinters must 
have become dangerous to tlie besiegers. The posi- 
tions of the national sharpshooters were generally 
quite as elevated as those occupied by the rebels; 
and the approaches, running along the hillsides and 
up the slopes in front of the enemy's works, were 



336 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

lower tlian the besieged, so that the sappers and 
working-parties could not be molested by the rebels, 
Avithout very great exposure on their own part to 
sharpshooters of the attacking force. So effective 
was this system, that, by the end of the first fortnight, 
nearly all the artillery of the enemy was either dis- 
mounted or withdra^vn, and the rebels scarcely ever 
fired. 

The style of work in the batteries was varied, 
depending entirely on the material that could be 
obtained at the time. In some cases, the lines were 
neatly revetted with gabions and fascines, and fur- 
nished with substantial plank platforms ; while, in 
others, a revetting of rough boards or cotton bales 
was used, and the platfonns were made of timber 
from the nearest bam or cotton-gin house. The em- 
brasures were sometimes revetted with cane, and 
sometimes lined with hides taken from the beef-cattle. 
The parapets were not often more than six or eight 
feet thick, as the enemy's artillery-fire was feeble; 
but, in all close batteries, the gunners soon found the 
necessity of keeping the embrasures closed against 
rifle-balls, by plank shutters, sometimes swung from a 
timber across the top of the embrasure, sometimes 
merely placed in the embrasure, and removed in 
firing. In close approaches, the sap was generally 
revetted with gabions, empty barrels, or cotton bales, 
but sometimes left entirely unrevetted ; for, when the 
enemy's fire was heavy, it became difficult to prevent 
the working-parties from sinking the sap as deep as 
five or even six feet, when, of course, revetting be- 
came unnecessary. 

^Material for gabions was abundant, grape-vine 
being chiefly used, though this made the gabions in- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 337 

conveniently heavy, tlie vines being too large. Cane 
was also used for wattling, the joints being crushed 
with wooden mallets, and the rest of the cane split, 
and interwoven between the stakes of the gabion. 
The cane made excellent fascines, and was frequently 
used in this way. At first, some difficulty was found 
in making sap-rollers, which should be imj^ervious to 
Minie balls, and yet not too heavy for use on the 
rough ground over which the sap must run. Two 
barrels, however, were placed head to head, and the 
sap-roller was then built of cane f^iscines, wound 
around this hollow core. At one point, the enemy's 
salient was too high for the besiegers to be able to 
return the hand-grenades which were thrown into the 
trenches so freely. There were no Cohorn-mortars 
with the army, and wooden mortars were therefore 
made, by shrinking iron bands on cylinders of tough 
wood, and boring them out for six or twelve pound 
shells. These mortars stood firing well, and gave 
sood results at a distance of one hundred or one 
hundred and fifty yards. 

The labor in the trenches was performed either 
by men of the pioneer companies, by details from the 
line, or by negroes. Several of the pioneer com- 
panies had negroes attached to them, who had come 
within the national lines, and were paid according to 
law. These proved very efficient, when under good 
supervision. The labor performed by details from 
the line was light, in comparison with that done by 
the same number of pioneers or negroes ; without the 
stimulus of danger, or pecuniary reward, troops of 
the line would not work so efficiently, especially at 
night, and after the novelty of the labor had worn oif. 

The lack of engineer officers gave the siege one 

22 



338 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

of its peculiar characteristics ; at many times, and at 
different places, the work to be done depended on offi- 
cers and men without either theoretical or practical 
knowledo-e of siege operations, and who had, there- 
fore, to rely, almost exclusively, on their native good 
sense and ingenuity. Whether a battery was to be 
constructed by men who had never built one before, 
or sap-rollers made by those who had never heard 
the name, or a ship's gun-carriage put together by in- 
fantry soldiers, it was always done, and, after a few 
trials, well done. This fertility of resource and power 
of adaptation to circumstances, possessed in so high a 
degree by the volunteers, was, however, displayed 
while a relieving force was gathering in Grant's rear. 
Officers and men had to learn to be engineers while 
the siege was going on. Much valuable time was in 
this way lost, and many a shovelful of earth was 
thrown that brouo-ht the sieo;e no nearer to an end. 

One result of this scarcity of engineers was, that 
Grant gave more personal attention to the super- 
vision of the siege than he would otherwise have 
done. His militarv education fitted him for the 
duty, and he rode daily around the lines, directing 
the scientific operations, infusing his spirit into all 
his subordinates, pressing them on with energy to 
the completion of their task, and, ^vith imflagging 
persistency devising and employing every means to 
l)ring about the great end to which all labor, and 
skill, and acquirement was made to tend.* 

There were eight principal points of approach, all 
on the main roads leadino; into Vicksburo;. These 
roads had originally been built on the most suitable 

* At one time every graduate of the ^Military Academy, m Grant's 
army, below the rank of general, was on engineer duty. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 339 

and even ground for ingress to tlie city; in almost 
every case, they followed tlie back of a narrow trans- 
verse rid ire, between ravines on either side, more or 
less ruo-sied and tortuous in character. The nature 
of the ground gained in the assaults allowed the na- 
tional forces to dispense with the first and second 
parallels, generally necessary in a siege ; the natural 
surface, undefended by either artillery or skirmishers, 
affording ample protection in all cases, up to within 
six hundred yards, and often within four hundred 
yards of the works. Thus, the reverse side of the 
hills corresponded to the first and second parallels in 
an ordinary siege. The approaches to these were 
thi'ough the transverse ravines, by roads cut into the 
hillsides, the fallen timber being first cleared away. 
Whenever it became necessary to cross a ravine com- 
manded by the enemy's sharpshooters or artillery, ad- 
vantage was taken of the night, to build a parapet 
of logs entirely across the unprotected space, and of 
sufficient height to cover the advance. The enemy 
dared not open on such a work as this, as for each 
shot fired he would have received twenty in return.* 
The ao-o-recrate lenoih of the trenches was twelve 
miles. Eighty-nine batteries were constructed dui'ing 
the siege, the guns from those in rear being moved 
forward as the siege advanced. The troops were 
moved on at the same time, and encamj^ed in the 
rear of batteries, at the heads of ravines. On the 
30th of June there were in position two hundred and 
twenty guns, mostly light field-pieces; one battery 

* " A novel reconnoissance of the rebel ditch was made, one morn- 
ing, by means of a mirror attached to a pole; this was raised above 
the sap-roller, a little to the rear, and then inclined forward. A per- 
fect Niew of the ditch was thus obtained."— ^n^i«^r'« Report. 



340 JUUTAEY HISTORY OF 

of heavy guns, on the right, was manned and offi- 
cered by the navy. 

After the assault of May 2 2d, the enemy's defence 
was feeble. As the national batteries were built and 
opened, the rebel artillery-fire slackened, until, tow- 
ards tlie close of the siege, it was hardly employed at 
all ; the enemy contenting himself with occasionally 
running a gun into jDOsition, firing two or three 
rounds, and withdrawing the piece again as soon as 
the national fire was concentrated in reply. At al- 
most any point, if the rebels had put ten or fifteen 
guns into position, instead of one or two, which 
merely invited concentration of the besiegers' fire, 
they might have seriously delayed the approaches. 
This silence of the artillery was attributed to a lack 
of ammunition ; but a judicious use of the ordnance 
which the rebels really possessed would have inter- 
fered greatly with Grant's operations. As it was, he 
had little but musketry-fire to contend with in the 
more distant approaches and parallels, and even this 
was sparingly used, in comparison with that of the 
besiegers : a deficiency in percussion caps probably 
accounts in some measure for this fact. 

The enemy sometimes resorted to mines, to delay 
the approaches of Grant ; but they were feeble, their 
charges always light, and they rarely did other dam- 
age than to make the ground where they had been 
exploded, impracticable for mining by the besiegers. 
Occasional sorties were also made, sometimes delay- 
ing operations for a day or two. At one point, the 
enemy opened ninety yards of trench, as a co\m- 
ter-work, running down the ridge from a rebel sa- 
lient, and quite up to the parallel of the besiegers. 
But the position was recovered the next night by a 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 341 

bayonet cliarge, tlie enemy routed from liis own 
trencli, twelve muskets captured, a portion of the 
rebel trench then filled vip, and the rest easily guard- 
ed. Once or twice, the rebels succeeded in throwing 
fire-balls, until one lodged under the edge of a sap- 
roller. Hand-o-renades were next thrown into the 
fire made by the spreading of the inflammable fluid 
contained in the ball ; the grenades bursting, threw 
fragments all around, tearing the sap-roller, and the 
enemy then kept up an incessant musketry-fire, until 
the roller was destroyed and the trench exposed. 
None of these efforts, however, made any remarkable 
change in the operations of Grant. 

The aim of the rebels seemed to be to await 
another assault, losing in the mean time as few men 
as possible. This indifference to Grant's approach 
became, at some points, almost ludicrous. The be- 
sieo-ers were accustomed to cover the front of their 
night-working parties by a line of pickets, or by a 
covering party ; and, while these were not closer than 
a hundred yards, the enemy would throw out his 
pickets in front. At one point, the rebel pickets 
entered into a reo:ular asfreement with those of the 
besiegers, not to fire on each other at night ; and, as 
most of the work in a siege is done at night, this ar- 
rangement w'as eminently satisfiictory to the working- 
parties. On one occasion, the picket-oflacer was di- 
rected to crowd his pickets on the enemy's, so as to 
allow the working party to push on another parallel. 
In doing this, the two lines of pickets became inter- 
mixed, and, after some discussion, the opposing offi- 
cers arranged their lines by mutual compromise, the 
pickets, in places, not being ten yards apart, and in 
full view of each other. A working party was then 



342 MILITAEY HISTOKY OF 

Btretclied out in rear of the national line, and tlie 
work was begun. The enemy's out-guard could see 
all that was going on, but made no effort to interfere, 
and a trencli was opened within sixty yards of the 
rebel salient. The ground was such that it would 
have been difficult to carry on the Avork in any other 
way; by merely remaining in his fortifications, and 
firing an occasional volley, the enemy could have 
easily stopped the approach. The advantage of this 
arrangement, novel in war, was entirely on one side. 
The rebels, however, allowed it at no other point on 
the line. 

The armament of the rebels, on the land front, was 
field-ai-tillery, and one ten-incb mortar ; the batteries 
on their extreme left, being also used against the ves- 
sels in tbe river, mounted heavy guns, and were able 
to sweep a small section of the land approaches. One 
gun in the water-battery, in front of Wood (v/lio had 
the right brigade of Steele's division, of Sherman's 
corps), was particularly troublesome, though it did 
but little actual damage. Against this gun, and the 
battery in whicli it was situated. Wood's first opera- 
tions were directed. A line of emj)ty rifle-trench, on 
the hill opposite the enemy's left, was occupied, and 
in a few days converted into good cover for infantry 
and batteries for artillery. One field-battery of howit- 
zers and rifles was stationed on tbe extreme point, 
and, near it, arrangements were made for the battery 
of ship's guns sent ashore by Porter, and manned 
and ofiicered by the navy. A line of simple trench 
running down the hillside, from the point of the 
ridge to the mouth of a creek that empties into the 
Mississippi here, was the first and only approach 
made on this road. The workmen were often an- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 343 

noyed during tlie day, being within easy rifle-range, 
while the rebels were but little exposed to the fire 
of the assailants. 

This trench was pushed on rapidly, under the 
personal supervision of Wood, till it reached the 
plateau and terrace of a farm-house in its front. The 
plateau, although overlooked by the rebels, and in 
close range, was occupied by a line of trench running 
around the outer part of the crest, for the purpose of 
keeping the enemy out of the part of the valley im- 
mediately below. From the terrace, the approach 
was continued down the slope, towards the mouth of 
the creek, and then directed upon a small mound on 
the noi-th side of the stream, fi'om the top of which it 
was thought the guns of the water-battery might be 
seen and silenced by sharpshooters. The work was 
completed, and the result all that had been hoped 
for. The enemy spiked his guns and abandoned the 
work. But, although unable to occupy the position 
during the day, he still continued to make it a picket- 
station at night. This could not well be prevented, 
as the banks of the stream, between the approach 
and the rebel work, were both steep and high ; and 
the water here had cut the bed of the stream into an 
almost impassable chasm. There being no available 
means of getting across the creek, or driving the sap 
closer, there was an end to all approaches on this 
road. But the troops were not allowed to remain 
idle. The batteries were completed, and the naval 
guns put into position. The fleet-battery consisted 
of two eight-inch ship-howitzers ; it opened, on the 
7th of June, and did excellent ser^4ce, completely 
Bilencing all the guns within its range. 

On the 27th of May, in compliance wdth a request 



344 MILITARY HISTOKY OF 

of Grant, Porter sent the iron-clad Cincinnati from 
above, Lieutenant-Commander Bache commanding, to 
attack the water-battery, and enfilade the left of the 
rebel line. The vessel vs^as packed with logs and 
hay, for protection; and, at half-past eight o'clock, 
with a full head of steam, she stood for the position as- 
signed her. No sooner had she got within range, than 
the rebels opened rapidly with heavy guns from dif- 
ferent batteries. Their shots at first went wild, but, 
as the iron-clad was rounding, broadside to, abreast 
of a battery, she received a shot in her magazine, 
flooding it almost immediately. Shortly after this, 
the starboard tiller was carried away, the enemy now 
firing Avith greater accuracy, and hitting almost every 
time; his shots passed entirely through the triple 
protection of hay, wood, and iron. The national 
batteries, and all of Sherman's musketry within range, 
opened in support of the gunboat ; but, the current 
being very swift, the Cincinnati was compelled to lay 
head to the stream, exposing her stern, which w^as 
unprotected by plating. She was especially annoyed 
by plunging shots from a ten-inch columbiad and a 
heavy rifle on the hills, two hundred feet above the 
decks. Iler stern was repeatedly struck, and the 
flag-staff shot away, but the colors were nailed to the 
stum]x Officers and men behaved admirably. The 
enemy's metal, however, was too heavy ; and the leak 
in the magazine, with the shot-holes in the stern, 
compelled the commander to withdraw. lie ran the 
vessel up stream, as near the right-hand bank as his 
damaged steering aj)paratus would allow, got out a 
plank, and put the wounded ashore. Next, he at- 
tempted to make his vessel fast to a tree, but before 
the hawser could be tied, the boat beccan driftins: 



ULYSSES S, GRANT. 345 

out, and, wliile near tlie shore, and under rebel fire, 
tlie Cincinnati filled and sank, lier flag still flying 
from the shattered mast. Fifteen of her crew were 
drowned, and twenty -five killed or wounded ; several 
others floated down the stream, opposite the city, 
where they were taken prisoners. For some weeks, 
the vessel lay near the shore, about a mile from 
Steele's position ; but, during the siege, the river sub- 
sided, leaving her nearly out of water. The guns 
were then taken out, and two of them placed in bat- 
tery, by Wood, in the latter pai-t of June, 

The point selected for this battery was near the 
bank of the Mississippi, and a few yards above the 
mouth of the creek. A trench leading to it was con- 
structed down the hillside, giving concealment to the 
working-parties. It was hoped that, by using the 
heavy guns of the Cincinnati, the town might be 
reached from this point, and much damage done, 
while the enemy's heavy batteries could at the same 
time be effectually annoyed. The rebel fire was 
several times drawn upon the battery, but no injury 
received. The completion of the work was, however, 
delayed by the want of sling-carts, and means of 
transporting the guns through the bottom to the 
point where they were to be used, and the siege ter- 
minated before the battery was ready to open. The 
other operations of Steele's division were of no great 
importance. The approach along the ridge road was 
not pushed with vigor, and was exposed to a long 
line of plunging fire. 

Tuttle's advance, on the left of Steele, was begun 
behind a spur, through which a deep cut was made. 
It led down the slope, in plain view of the rebels, 
and was directed perpendicularly on their line. The 



346 MiLrrAEr history of 

approacli was a full sap, covered on both sides by 
gabions, and, on the top, by a roof of cane gabions. 
This protection was necessary till it reached the foot 
of the hills, on the crest of which the enemy's line 
was situated ; the hills, however, were so steep as to 
afford perfect shelter from the hostile fire, up to with- 
in thirty yards of the parapet. At this part of the 
line, the timber had been cleared some time before, 
but the ground, in front of the rebel trench, was ob- 
structed by an entanglement of posts and vines. 

The principal position, however, for Sherman's 
batteries was on the ridge, about four hundred yards 
from the enemy's line, and at a point near the head 
of the stream, on the north side of the rebel defences. 
Four batteries, of six guns each, were disposed on 
Blair s front. Ilis approach started from the left of 
the principal battery, near the Graveyard road, and 
was directed against the salient of the work com- 
manding this road, the same which he had assaulted 
on the 22d of May. It was carried steadily forward, 
till it reached a large oak-tree, standing alone, about 
one hundred and twenty yards from the rebel works. 
Tliis tree was subsequently known as the " Lone 
Tree," and gave name to a battery erected here^ or 
rather to a parapet and place of arms. The place o± 
arms was fm-nished witli communications with both 
flanks, l)y boyaux leading down into the ravines, and 
was well revetted, and prepared with a banquette for 
shaii^sliooters. From its right, a new double sap was 
started, following around the hillside ; this was, at first, 
directed just outside the enemy's line, but then, turn- 
ing, it ran up-hill in the du-ection of the rebel salient. 
At the turn, it was defiled, by excavating it till the 
part of the hillside towards the enemy became a com- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 347 

plete protection. When tlie sap reached the axis of 
the ridge upon wliich the road was located, a sap- 
roller was used, and the sap carried steadily on, with- 
out important interruption, to within fifteen feet of 
the rebel ditch. The enemy's pickets, at night, seemed 
to watch its progress with great interest, but attempt- 
ed no serious disturbance. The work was generally 
suspended during the day, except for widening and 
finishing tlie approaches and communications. The 
situation of the sharpshooters, on the different ridges, 
was the best protection for the working-parties. 

From the right of the place of arms, at the " Lone 
Tree," a half parallel was constructed to the foot of 
the hill in front. This was a very laborious piece of 
side-cutting, but allowed the construction of a para- 
j^et on the brow of the hill, and within eighty yards 
of the enemy's work, from which Grant's sharp- 
shooters were able to give the rebels serious annoy- 
ance. 

Ransom's brigade, in McArthur's division, was on 
the left of Blair. Beins: camped in a ravine, the bri- 
gade was compelled to employ its entire strength, for 
several days, in clearing out a road down the ra- 
vine, to the hill just in front of the enemy's line, and 
in the construction of batteries on the rio-ht and 

O 

left of the ravine. Ransom's works were well built, 
the entrance to the main advance being by a broad, 
well - constructed, and completely defiladed road, 
through the ravines. The trenches themselves were 
well located in the hillside, which here was very 
steep and difficult of ascent. The obstructions of 
fallen timber were removed, and roads or heads of 
gap constructed up the slope. The road or parallel 
continued around the foot of the hill, so as to allow 



348 MHJTAEY HISTORY OF 

the assembling of an entire brigade, and a deboucLe 
for eacli regiment, wide enough for columns of fours 
to rush up the hills and assault the enemy's line, in 
strong support of SheiTuan's columns, along the 
Graveyard road. 

A high and precipitous ridge, pointing towards 
the enemy, separated the camp of Blair's di^dsion 
from Ransom's, and the water from different branches 
of the stream, here, flowed by each division. The 
communication by the ravine was tortuous, in some 
places exposed to a raking fire of the enemy, and 
everywhere obstructed by fallen timber or difficult 
gi'ound. For these reasons, the two covered ap- 
proaches, through the main branches of the ravines, 
were connected by a road leading over tlie point of 
the ridge, instead of around it. By this means, com- 
munication was shortened and rendered much less 
difficult. 

As early as the 19th of May, a position for artillery 
had been selected on the Jackson road, by Logan's 
division, but the guns were not put in position till 
the 21st. On that day, another battery was posted 
near the same point. When the regular approaches 
began, these positions, being favorable, were retained 
for artillery. McPherson commenced systematic oper- 
ations on the 24th, by completing these batteries, 
and preparing the road, so as to allow the yard of a 
house, near by, to be reached without exposure. This 
was done by excavating along the hillside, so that its 
crest would defile the advance of troops until they 
reached the ridge where the battery was posted. Al- 
thou2;h this ridg-e was within a few hundred yards 
of the rebel work, its reverse side and the ravine near 
it were used for camps, the men constructing huts by 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 349 

digging into tlie hills, and tLatching the huts with 
brush and cane. On the 26th, these roads were made 
passable, and the trenches were begun. Tlie trench 
was constructed five feet deep and eight feet wide, 
with a parapet and banquette for infanti-y. The 
parapet ^vas surmounted by square logs and sand- 
bags, through w^hich apei"tures were made for the 
marksmen. Three hundred men were kejit at work 
both night and day, but the heads of saps advanced 
only under cover of darkness. During the day, the 
details were employed in widening the trenches and 
finishino; them for defence. 

The most important approaches to the enemy's 
line were, thus, the two by trench', along the Grave- 
yard and Jackson roads, and the two covered ap- 
proaches of Blair and Hansom, through the ravines. 
By these approaches and covered ways, and the sec- 
ondary approaches of Tuttle's division, Grant was 
able to move two divisions, under cover, to Avithin an 
average distance of two hundi-ed yards from the 
works, and with means of debouching upon compar- 
atively good ground with the heads of columns. Bat- 
teries on Logan's, Ransom's, Blaii-'s, Tuttle's, and 
Steele's fronts were able to brinor a convero-ino-, direct, 
enfilading, and reverse fire on all that part of the rebel 
line lying in their front. These batteries were contin- 
ually being strengthened, or changed in position, in or- 
der to obtain greater advantages of aim. The one on 
the high ridge of the Graveyard road was raised six or 
eight feet, so as to give as great a view of the ground 
inside and behind the enemy's works as possible. Its 
height, above the level of low water in the Missis- 
sippi, was over two hundred feet. 

Quimby's division retained its old position, aftei 



350 jnXITAET HISTORY OF 

the assault of the 22d; it lay on tlie lower ground 
and in the ravines, on the left of Logan, and was 
employed erecting batteries and constructing rifle- 
trenches, along the ridges parallel to the enemy's 
woi'ks. These were intended to streno;then the main 
approach along the Jackson road, and to prevent 
sorties. 

The positions occupied by McClernand's infantry 
and ai'tilleiy, at the beginning of the siege, were sub- 
stantially those of the 2 2d of May. Two of the thirty- 
pound Parrott guns had been sent to McPherson, but 
the others remained in battery, as before. This battery 
was strengthened by increasing the height and thick- 
ness of the parapet, and a large magazine was con- 
structed, just in rear. A. J. Smith's approach fol- 
lowed the line of the Baldwin's ferry road. He 
pushed forward during the night, and constructed a 
rifle-trench in his fi'ont, so as to annoy the rebels and 
keep tliem on the alert. From the broken nature of 
the ground, his trench could not be connected either 
with those on his left, in front of Carr, or ^nth 
Quimby's, on the right. The rear communications, 
however, with both these divisions were good. They 
Avere by roads running along the reverse sides of the 
ridges, or across the back of the inferior ravines, so 
that a sortie upon any portion of the line could have 
been promptly met by troops from other points. 
AVhen Smith's approach reached the immediate vi- 
cinity of the salient against which it was directed, its 
progress was much impeded by the rebel artillery 
fire, and the sappers were greatly annoyed by hand- 
grenades. The rebels threw fire-balls constantly, and 
attempted to blow up the sap-roller with mines. 

Carr's approach followed the railroad cut for a 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 351 

liunclrecl yards, and was directed upon one of the 
largest rebel works; it was pushed to within ten 
yards of the enemy's ditcli ; one parallel was made 
at the distance of sixty yards, from wMcli the salient 
was to have been stormed. A burnt house near the 
railroad was selected as a position for field artillery ; 
it was seized in the niglit, and a rifle-pit hastily con- 
structed, parallel to tlie enemy's works. To the right, 
tlie trench extended down the bill, into the ravine, 
and, to the left, along the line of ridges as fur as Carr's 
left. It was, however, extremely difficult to induce 
McClernand to give the necessary orders to widen 
and strengthen this parallel sufficiently to allow free 
communication. The engineers, supervising opera- 
tions in his front, repeatedly requested him to extend 
the trench from Carr's front, across the ridge, to 
Hovey's right, a distance of two hundred yards ; but 
McClernand objected to this, that he could go around 
by one of the valleys in the rear, a distance of not far 
from a mile. At last, however, he reluctantly yield- 
ed, and gave the necessary orders, but the work still 
made slow progress.'^ The trench was pushed for- 
ward on the main road, till within a few feet of the 
enemy's works, where, as in the cases on the right 
and left, the sappers Avere greatly annoyed by hand- 
grenades thrown from the rebel works. 

Hovey's approach, directed on a redoubt, was not 
beo;un until late in the sies-e, althou2:h the o-round o;ave 

O 7 

cover here to within a short distance of the rebel 
line. This was one of the many instances where the 
need of engineer officers was apparent. AVith a 
proper number of officers, the ground, in all its de- 

* This statement is taken from the manuscript memoir of General 
Wilson. 



352 JIILITAET HISTOEY OF 

tails, would have been tliorouglily examined, and the 
best positions chosen for approach, instead of wasting 
work, as in this case, where the best apj)roaches were 
only selected when the siege was nearly half over. 
The quality of the work on this front was not so 
good as that done by Sherman or McPherson ; but 
this arose from no lack of capacity or zeal on the part 
of the men, but from the peculiarities of theu' com- 
mander. The engineer officer in charge, here, was ex- 
tremely fortunate in accomplishing as much as he 
did, in the face of such negative support as he re- 
ceived. 

Lauman's division arrived on the 24th of May, 
and was put in position on the south side of the city, 
effectually guarding the Hall's ferry and Warrenton 
roads. At first, Lauman was not required to push 
forward a system of approaches, so much as to main- 
tain a strong position on this part of the line, for the 
purpose of preventing egress, and to hold the rebels 
in check until assistance could be sent, should an at- 
tempt to escape be made. Herron's division, from 
the Army of the Frontier, Department of Missouri, ar- 
rived on the 11th of June, and was assigned a posi- 
tion on the extreme left of the besieoinor force, ex- 
tending from the Hall's ferry to the Warrenton road. 
Lauman was then moved furtlier to the right, extend- 
ing to tlie left of Hovey; and, for the first time, the 
investment became complete, all possibility of Pem- 
l)erton's escape, without assistance from outside, be- 
ing effectually cut oft*. 

Lauman now began an approach, near the en- 
trance of the Hall's ferry road, where a battery of 
naval guns was placed in position. The approach, at 
fii-st, was on a ridge which ran out from the enemy's 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 353 

line, east of tlie Hall's ferry road ; but this was after- 
wards abandoned for tlie road itself, the ravines there 
giving cover, np to within three hundred yards of the 
rebel line. This approach was directed against a 
work very salient, and therefore very weak. The 
rebels, conscious of this weakness, made repeated 
sorties, driving off the working-parties, and taking a 
few prisoners. In one case, they filled up fifty yards 
of trench, from which they were driven the follow- 
ing night with loss. In spite of serious opposition, 
the head of this sap was pushed to within a few feet 
of the rebel line. 

In Herron's front a strong line of trench was be- 
gun on the 11th of June, running along the "Warren- 
ton road. Little was done here until late in the 
siege, except driving in the enemy's pickets and 
erecting three batteries. The approach was directed 
ao-ainst the extreme southern limit of the defences of 
Vicksburo;. It afforded safe and convenient shelter 
to the troops guarding the left, and allowed an ad- 
vance, by a defiladed trench, upon the rebel work 
guarding the entrance of the Warrenton road. Saps 
were driven towards this work, and, notwithstanding 
the ground over which they were conducted was 
swept by the fire of a ten-inch columbiad and smaller 
guns, they were pushed with vigor. Guns were 
placed in position on the bro^v of the hills, at the ex- 
treme left, troops were sent into the bottom, and 
around the head of the swamp as far as the river-bank, 
and all communication by courier, in this direction, 
was completely intercepted. The Hall's ferry road was 
tortuous, and afforded good means of approach tow- 
ards the city. An approach, here, reached to within 
two hundred yards of the rebel line, and, at other 

23 



354 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

points, tlie lines ran so near tliat the enemy was 
greatly annoyed by Herron's sharpsliooters. 

While the investment of Yieksburg was thus pro- 
ceeding, the menacing attitude of Johnston bad early 
attracted Grant's attention, and made it necessary to 
establish a strong corps of observation in the rear. 
Immediately after the assault of the 22 d of May, the 
small cavalry force attached to the command was 
sent out, to interruj^t the enemy's communications, 
and to obtain accm'ate information as to the move- 
ments of the relievino; force. It was soon learned 
that Johnston had been joined by at least ten thou- 
sand fresh troops ; and Grant was thus made reason- 
ably certain that the rebels would endeavor to raise 
the siege, attacking from the northeast, with all the 
men they coidd command. He, therefore, wrote to 
Banks, on the 25th: "I feel that my force is abun- 
dantly strong to hold the enemy where he is, or to 
whip him if he should come out. The place is so 
strongly fortified, however, that it cannot be taken 
without either a great sacrifice of life, or by a regular 
siege, I have determined to adopt the latter course, 

and save my men The great danger now to be 

apprehended is that the enemy may collect a force 
outside, and attemj^t to rescue the garrison. ... I 
deem it advisable that as larsre a force be collected 
here as possible. Having all my availal)le force that 
can be spared from West Tennessee and Helena here, 
to get any more I must look outside of my own de- 
partment. You l)eing engaged in the same enter- 
l)rise, I am compelled to ask you to give me such as- 
sistance as may be in your power. ... I would be 
pleased, general, to have you come, with such force as 
you may be able to spare." 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 355 

Osterhaus's command was, at this time, sent out as 
far as the Big Black river, to obstruct tlie approaches 
to Vicksburg from the east, and to destroy all the 
raib'oad bridges and forage that could be reached. 
"All trains and cattle should be brous-ht in, and 
every thing done to prevent an army supplying itself 
coming this way. Wherever there is a bridge or 
trestle-work, as far east as you send troops, have them 
destroyed." On the 26th, Grant also sent a force of 
twelve thousand men, under Blair, to drive off a 
body of the enemy supposed to be collecting between 
the Big Black river and the Yazoo. This command 
was not expected to fight Johnston, but simply to 
act as a corps of observation, and to destroy all stock, 
forage, roads, and bridges as it returned. Blair moved 
along the Yazoo about forty-five miles, and efi'ectually 
accomplished the pui'pose of his expedition, preventing 
Johnston from moving upon Vicksburg in that direc- 
tion, and also from drawing supplies in the fertile re- 
gion between the two rivers. He was absent nearly a 
week, and reconnoitred the whole region thoroughly. 

On the 31st, Grant Avrote : " It is now certain that 
Johnston has already collected a force from twenty 
thousand to twenty-five thousand strong, at Jackson 
and Canton * and is usinsr everv efibrt to increase it 
to forty thousand. With this he will undoubtedly 
attack Haine's blufi", and compel me to abandon the 
investment of the city, if not reenforced before he can 
get here." Admiral Porter was accordingly requested 
to direct a brigade of amphibious and usefid troops 
at his disposal, known as the Marine brigade, to de- 
bark at Haine's bluff and hold the place until re- 

* On tbe 4th of June, Johnston had twenty-four thousand infantry 
and two thousand eight hundred cavahy, (See his ofiScial report.) 



356 MILITAKY HISTOEY OF 

lieved by otlier forces. Hurlbut was directed to 
hurry up tlie reenforcements already ordered from 
his command. " No boat will be permitted to leave 
Memphis, going north, until the transportation is 

fully provided for all trooj^s coming this way I 

want your district stripped to the very lowest po-s- 

sible standard The entire rebel forces heretofore 

against me are completely at my mercy. I do not 
want to see them escape by being reenforced from 
elsewhere." 

On the same day, Grant received a letter from 
Banks, setting forth the necessity of concentration, 
and callino; for ten thousand men. To this he re- 
plied : " Concentration is essential to the success of 
the general campaign in the West, but Vicksburg is 
the vital point. Our situation is, for the first time 
during the entire Western campaign, what it should 
be. We have, after great labor and extraordinary 
risk, secured a position which should not be jeopard- 
ized by any detachments whatever. On the con- 
trary, I am now, and shall continue to exert myself 
to the utmost to concentrate. I have ample means 
to defend my present position, and effect the reduc- 
tion of Vicksburg within twenty days, if the relation 
of affairs which now obtains remains unchanged. But, 
detach ten thousand men from my command, and I 

cannot ans\ver for the result I need not describe 

the severity of the labor to which my command must 
necessarily be subjected, in an operation of such mag- 
nitude as that in which I am now engaged. Weak- 
ened by the detachment of ten thousand men, or even 
half that number, with the circumstances entu'ely 
changed, I should be crippled beyond redemj)tion. 
ISIy arrangements for supplies are ample, and can be 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 357 

expanded to meet any exigency. All I want now is 
men." 

On Blair's return, Grant sent a brigade of troops 
under Brigadier-General Mower, and nearly t\velve 
hundred cavalry, up the Yazoo to IMeclianicsburg, to 
watch the crossings of the Big Black, from Bridgeport, 
and obstruct the roads. On the 3d of June, one division 
from Hurlbut arrived, under Brigadier-General Kim- 
ball, and was sent at once after Mower to Mechanics- 
burg, with the same instructions that Mower had al- 
ready received. Grant himself went up to Satartia, on 
the 8th of June, to inspect the condition of affiiirs there, 
and became still further convinced that the enemy was 
collecting a large force at Canton, of course with a 
view to raise the siege. To Kimball, he said : " It 
is important that the country be left so that it cannot 
subsist an army passing over it. Wagons, horses, and 
mules should be taken from the citizens, to keep them 
from being used with the Southern army." 

On the Yth, the enemy, nearly three thousand 
strong, attacked IMilliken's bend, which, however, 
was successfully defended by black and white troops 
under Brigadier- General Dennis, ably assisted by the 
gunboats Choctaw and Lexington. Grant at once 
ordered Mower's brio^ade to reenforce Dennis, with 
instructions to drive the rebels beyond the Tensas 
river. " Every vestige of an enemy's camp ought to 
be shoved back of that point " (Richmond). 

On the 8th of June, anotlier division of troops^, un- 
der Brigadier-General Sooy Smith, arrived from jMem- 
phis, and was ordered to Haine's bluff, where Wash- 
burne was now placed in command. This place had 
again become of vital importance ; for, if the national 
forces should be compelled to raise the siege, and yet 



358 JIILITARY HISTORY OF 

remain in possession of Haine's bluff, with undis- 
puted control of tlie Mississippi river, they could still 
concentrate resources for a new effort, either against 
the city itself or its means of supply. The orders were 
to fortify it, so that it could be held against a sudden 
movement by ten thousand men, and be capable of 
giving protection to at least forty thousand. The 
position, naturally strong, was defended, on the south 
and east, by a line of continuous rifle-trench, with 
live small batteries on commanding points, situated 
so as to sweep the ground exterior to the rest of the 
line, while a parapet of weak profile was constructed, 
from the foot of the bluff, across the bottom-laud to 
the river. The entire position was enclosed, after 
three days' labor, and rendered practically defensible 
against any force likely to attack it. The strange 
anomaly was thus presented of a work against which 
the national efforts had so long been spent in vain, 
now fortified by national efforts against the very 
po^ver for whose protection it had originally been 
built. Even while Grant was prosecuting the siege 
of Vicksburg with all his might, he was preparing to 
defend the strongest outwork of Vicksburg against a 
reV)el army. 

lleenforcements, meanwhile, continued to arrive. 
Since the beginning of the siege. Grant had received 
twenty-one thousand additional troops from his own 
department; Ilerron's division, the strongest in the 
combined army, arrived from Schofield's command, on 
the 11th of June; and, by the wise prevision of the 
general-in-chief, two divisions of the Kinth corps, un- 
der Major-General Parke, were diverted from their 
march to East Tennessee, and amved before Vicks- 
burg, on the 14th of the same month. Herron was 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 359 

put on the left of the line of circumvallation, and 
Parke was sent to Haine's bluff. By this time, Grant's 
force amounted to seventy-five thousand men, about 
half of whom remained in the trenches till the end 
of the siege. The others formed an army of observa- 
tion, and closely watched all the movements of the 
relievino* force. 

On the 11th, Grant informed Sherman that reen- 
forcements were expected, and told him, if Ilaine's 
bluff should be besieged, "You will be detached 
temporarily from the command of your corps here, to 
take command of Haine's bluff." On the same day, 
Grant said : " It is evident the enemy have brought 
large reenforcements from Bragg's army, and I can- 
not think it is with any other design than to raise 
the siege of Vicksbu'rg." He had now ten thousand 
or twelve thousand men at Ilaine's bluff, but ordered 
both Mcpherson and Sherman to hold part of their 
forces in readiness, in case that place should be be- 
sieged. Detailed instructions w^ere at the same time 
given to McClernand, to govern him if the garrison 
should attempt to take advantage of the expected 
arrival of a relieving army, and the consequent weak- 
ening of the besiegers. The most constant watchful- 
ness was required on the front towards the city, 
w^hile, at the same time. Grant's dispatches were in- 
cessant and anxious to all the commanders in the 
corps of observation, especially to Washburne, who 
was yet in command at Haine's bluff. 

On the 21st of June, Grant received curious infor- 
mation through the rebel pickets ; the national works 
had now approached so close to those of the besie- 
gers, that the two picket-lines were within hail of 
each other ; and, one of the rebels made an agi-eement 



360 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

with a national sentinel, that they should lay down 
their arms and have a talk. The rebel declared that 
Grant's cannonading had killed and wounded a great 
many in the rifle-pits; tliat the besieged had fully 
expected another assault, and been prepared to meet 
it ; but, as no assault was made, the troops had been 
canvassed by their officers, to see if they could not 
be got outside to attack the " Yankees." ]S'ot only 
was this declined, but many were ready to mutiny, 
because their officers would not surrend-er. The men, 
however, were reassured, and told that provisions 
enough remained to last them seven days more ; in 
that time, two thousand boats would be built, and 
the besieged could escape by crossing the Mississippi 
river. The rebel finished by announcing that houses 
in Vicksburo; were now beino; torn down to fret ma- 

o o o 

terial for the boats.* 

This singular story excited attention, and prepa- 
rations were made to render abortive any such at- 
tempt at escape as had been described. Admiral 
Porter was warned, the pickets were redoubled at 
night, and material was collected to light up the river, 
should a large number of boats attempt to cross. 
Batteries also were got ready behind the levee on the 
western bank, but the attempt was never made. 

On the 22d, positive information was received 
that Johnston was crossing the Big Black river, and 
intended marching immediately against Grant. Sher- 
man was at once directed to assume command of the 
force in the rear. Troops were taken from his corps 

* On the 22d of June, Johnston -wrote to Pemberton : " If I can do 
nothing to relieve you, rather than surrender the garrison, endeavor to 
cross the river at the last moment ; " and, vrhen Vicksburg fell, a large 
number of badly-constructed boats was found in the town, evidently 
intended for some such purpose as that spoken of in the text. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 361 

and that of McPherson, in tlie line of intrenchments, 
and added to the force which was to meet Johnston ; 
the four divisions of Washburne and Parke were also 
included in tliis new command, which amounted to 
nearly half of Grant's army. Besides these, Herron 
and A. J. Smitli were notified to he in readiness to 
move at a moment's notice. " Should Johnston 
come, we want to whip him, if the siege has to he 
raised to do it." To Sherman, Grant said : " Use all 
the forces indicated, as you deem most advantageous, 
and, should more he required, call on me, and they 
will be furnished to the last man here and at Young's 
Point." To McPherson, he said : " Sherman goes out 
to meet Johnston. If he comes, the greatest vigi- 
lance will be required on the liue, as the Vicksbui'g 
garrison may take the same occasion for an attack 
also. Batteries should have a good supply of grape 
and canister." To Parke : " We want to whip John- 
ston at least fifteen miles off, if possible." 

A line of works was now constructed from the 
Yazoo to the Big Black river, quite as strong as those 
which defended Vicksburg, so that the city was not 
only circumvallated, but counter- vallated, as welL In 
case of an attack, Johnston would have been obliged 
to assault Grant's rear, under the same disadvantages 
that Grant himself had encountered in attacking 
Vicksburg. Grant's position, however, was at this 
time peculiar, if not precarious. He was again be- 
tween two large rebel armies : besieging one, he was 
himself threatened with a siege by the other ; while,' 
if both combined to assault him from different sides, 
it seemed quite possible that the garrison of Vicksburg, 
that splendid prize for which he had been so long strug- 
gling, might even yet elude his grasp. He might be 



862 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

compelled to tlirow so mucli strength on his eastern 
front, that the besieged could succeed in effecting 
their escape by some opposite and comparatively un- 
guarded avenue. To prevent this contingency was 
tlie object of unceasing vigilance. It would not do 
to go out after Johnston, lest the prey inside should 
evade the toils that had been spread so carefully; 
and yet, while Grant remained in his trenches en- 
veloping the city, his own communications and base 
were threatened from outside. Haine's bluff was 
once more an object of immense solicitude, and the 
Big Black had again become the line of defence ; but, 
this time, it was a defence to national troops against 
the rebels; for Grant now, in part, faced east, and 
the men of the South were striving to fight their way 
to the Mississij)pi. 

On the 17th of June, Grant received formal and 
official communications from both Sherman and Mc- 
Pherson, couched in the strongest and most indig- 
nant language, and complaining of a congratulatory 
order issued by McClernand to his corps, on the 
30th of May. The order had never been seen by 
Grant, although army regulations and the orders of 
tlie department both required subordinates to for- 
ward copies of all such papers to their superiors. It 
was unmilitary and offensive in tone, magnifying Mc- 
Clemand's services and importance, and full of in- 
sinuations and criminations ao-ainst the officers and 
soldiers of the rest of the army. It had been pub- 
lished in a Northern newspaper, copies of which 
were sent to Sherman and McPherson, who at once 
resented the assertions it contained, brand ins; them 
in so many words as *'fjilse," and calling on their 
commander to inteifere. Grant immediately wrote 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 363 

to McCleniand :is follows: "Enclosed I send you 
AvLat purports to be your congratulatory address to 
the Thirteentli array corps. I would respectfully ask 
if it is a true copy. If it is not a correct copy, fur- 
nish me one by bearer, as required both by regula- 
tions and existing orders of the department." A copy 
of the address was sent at once to his headquarters, 
and, the next day, McClernand was relieved of the 
command of his corps, and ordered home. Major- 
General Ord was appointed in his stead, subject to 
the approval of the President.* 

This was the termination of the troublesome con- 
nection with McClernand. It had begun at Cairo, in 
1861. McClernand had served under Grant, at Bel- 
mont, and Donelson, and Shiloh, but early developed 
the qualities which afterwards insured his downfall. 
At first, he had been willing to learn from men versed 
in their profession and experienced in war; but he 
soon set about accomplishing his advancement by 
political means. His efforts, partially successful, to 
obtain a high command ; his protracted machinations 
to supersede Grant, which were only defeated by the 
wise counsels of the general-in-chief, and the practi- 
cal good sense of the administration ; his insubordina- 
tion, incompetency, and restless ambition, disj^layed 
on so many occasions during the Vicksburg cam- 
paign, gave Gi'ant the only real embarrassment pro- 
ceedins: from the conduct of subordinates that he ex- 
perienced for more than a year. 

The commander was long - suffering indeed. 
Though repeatedly urged to relieve McClernand, 
when that officer wrote letters such as no soldier 

* See Appendix for McClernaad's order, and the letters of Generals 
Sherman and McPherson. 



364 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

slioiild receive from a subordinate ; or, wlien lie suff. 
gested in writing the plans wliieb Grant Lad already 
dictated in conversation; or when, with intolerable 
assumption, he claimed the credit of operations which 
his own inefficiency had nearly marred, Grant's only 
answer was : " I cannot afford to quarrel ivith a man 
xcliom I am obliged to command^ He constantly 
gave McClernand as important positions as it was 
possible to intrust him with, having any reference to 
the safety or success of the enterprise; he regarded 
his rank, and disregarded his military character, 
although constantly informing the government of 
his own ^news of that character. Finally, about the 
14th of May, he received " authority to relieve any 
person who, from ignorance in action, or for any 
cause, interfered vnth or delayed his operations." He 
was even informed that the government expected 
him to enforce his authority, and would hold him re- 
sponsil)le for any failure to exert his powers. When, 
after this, the congratulatory order was brought to 
his notice, the interests of the service forbade any 
longer delay, and action was summary.* 

As early as the 29th of May, Johnston had sent 
word to Pemberton : " I am too weak to save Yicks- 
burg. Can do no more than attempt to save you and 
your garrison. It ^ill be impossible to extricate 

* " A disposition and earnest desire on my part to do the most I 
could with the means at my command, without interfering with the 
assignment to command which the President alone was authorized to 
make, made me tolerate General McClernand long after I thought the 
good of the service demanded his removal. It was only when almost 
tbe entire army under my command seemed to demand it, that he was 
relieved. . . . The removal of General McClernand from the command 
of tlie Thirteenth army corps has given general satisfaction; the 
Thirteenth army corps sharing, perhaps, equally in the feeling with 
other corps of the army."— G7-a«« to Uallecl; June 26, 1863. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 365 

you unless you cooperate." On tlie 14tli of June, lie 
said to Lis subordinate: "By fighting the enemy 
simultaneously, at the same points of his line, you 
may be extricated ; our joint forces cannot raise the 
sieo-e of Vicksburj?." On the 18th, Johnston in- 
formed the rebel Secretary of War: "Grant's posi- 
tion, naturally very strong, is intrenched and pro- 
tected by powerful artillery, and the roads obstructed. 
. . . The BiiT Black covers him from attack, and would 
cut off our retreat if defeated." 

The garrison, meanwhile, was suffering for sup- 
plies. Pemberton was particularly short of percus- 
sion caps, and his scouts contrived, occasionally, to 
elude the pickets of Grant, and transmit this infor- 
mation to Johnston, Supplies, in consequence, were 
sent as far as Grant's lines, but were generally cap- 
tured ; in several instances, how^ever, caps were success- 
fully conveyed to the besieged, sometimes two hun- 
dred thousand at a time ; canteens full of caps being 
carried by rebel scouts in the national uniform, and 
suddenly thrown across the picket line. After the as- 
saults in Muy,the ammunition scattered in the trenches 
was collected by the rebels, and even the cartridge- 
boxes of the dead, in front of the works, were emptied. 

The meat ration was reduced by Pemberton at 
first to one-lialf, but that of sugar, rice, and beans, at 
the same time, largely increased. Tobacco for chew- 
ing was impressed, and issued to the troops. After 
a while, all the cattle in Vicksburg was impressed, 
and the chief commissary was instructed to sell 
only one ration a day to any officer. At last, four 
ounces of rice and foui' of flour were issued for 
bread — not half a ration. Still, on the 10th of 
June, Pemberton sent word to Johnston: "I shall 



366 MILITAEY niSTOKY OF 

endeavor to hold out as long as we Lave any 
tiling to eat. Can you not send me a verbal mes- 
sage by carrier, crossing tlie river above or below 
Vicksburg, and swimming across again, opposite 
Vicksburg? I have heard nothing of you or from 
you since the 25th of May." In the same dispatch, 
he said : " Enemy bombard day and night J&*om seven 

moi-tars He also keeps up constant fire on our 

lines with artillery and musketry." On the 15th: 
" We are living on greatly reduced rations, but I 
think sufficient for twenty days yet. . . . Our men, 
having no relief, are becoming much fatigued, but are 
still in pretty good spirits." On the 19th: " On the 
Graveyard road, the enemy's works are within twenty- 
five feet of our redan, also very close on Jackson and 
Bakhvin's ferry roads. I hope you will advance with 
the least possible delay. My men have been thirty- 
four days and nights in the trenches mthout relief, and 
the enemy within conversation distance. . . . We are 
living on very reduced rations, and, as you know, are 
entirely isolated. What aid am I to expect from you ? " 
The prices of food in the town had, by this time, 
risen enormously. Flour was five dollars a pound, 
or a thousand dollars a barrel (rebel money) ; 
meal was one hundred and forty dollars a bushel; 
molasses, ten and twelve dollars a gallon; and beef 
(very often oxen killed by the national shells and 
])icked up by the butchers) was sold at two dollars 
and two dollars and a half, by the pound. Mule-meat 
sold at a dollar a pound, and was in great demand. 
IMany families of ^^•ealth had eaten the last mouthful 
of food they possessed, and the poorer class of non- 
combatants was on the verge of starvation. There 
was scarcely a building that had not been struck 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 367 

by shells, and many were entirely demolished. A 
number of women and cliildren had been killed or 
wounded by mortar-shells, or balls; and, all who did 
not remain in the damp caves of the hillsides, were in 
dano-er.* Even the hospitals where the wounded 
lay were sometimes ■ struck, for it was found impos- 
sible to prevent occasional shells falling on the build- 
mgs, which of course would have been sacred from 
an intentional fire. 

Fodder was exhausted, and the horses were com- 
pelled to subsist wholly on corn-tops, the corn being 
all ground into meal for the soldiers. In the conver- 
sations that nightly occurred between the pickets, 
the rel)el3 were always threatened with starvation, 
even if another assault should fail. For, the pickets 
of both armies were good-natured enough, and often 
sat down on the ground together, bragging of their 
ability to whip each other. Sometimes, they dis- 
cussed the merits of the war; the debates would be 
carried on ^vith vehemence, till argument failed on 
one side or the other, when the parties separated, 
as one of them said, " to avoid a fight on the subject." 
Incidents like these relieved the tedium of the siege 
to those outside, and lessened some of its horrors for 
the rebels. A favorite place for the meetings was at 
a well, attached to a house between the lines; hither, 
after dark, the men from both sides repaired, slipping 
outside their pickets in search of the delicious draught ; 
for water was scarce, and, at this point, there was none 
other within a mile. The house was unoccupied, 

* The sufTcrincrs of the inhabitants are very fully described in the 
pamphlet of A. S. Adams, who was an eye-witness and participant. 
All my statements of what occurred in the town during the siege, are 
taken from this narrative, or from the rebel official reports. 



368 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

having been riddled with shot from both besiegers 
and besieged, and, over the broken cistern, the rebel 
and national soldiers held their tacit truce, a truce 
which neither ever violated. 

Meanwhile, the heads of sap had reached the 
enemy's lines, on the Graveyard and Jackson roads 
and in Kansom's front, as well as on the Baldwin 
and Hall's ferry roads. Mining had been resorted to 
by both besiegers and besieged, and, on the Jackson 
road. Grant fired a heavy mine on the 25th of June. 
It extended thirty-five feet from the point of start- 
ing : fifteen hundred pounds of powder were depos- 
ited in three difi^erent branch mines, and seven hun- 
dred in the centre one; fuses were arranfred so as 
to explode tliem all at the same instant, and the 
mine Avas tamped with cross-timbers and sand-bags. 
Troops were disposed so as to take advantage of 
any result. At three and a half p. m. the explo- 
sion took place, and a heavy artillery-fire opened 
along the line at the same moment. Huge masses 
of earth were thrown up in the air, and the ground 
was shaken as if by a volcano. As soon as the earth 
was rent, a bright glare of fire issued from the bm-n- 
ing powder, but quickly died away, as there was 
nothing combustible in the fort. A fe^v rebel sol- 
diers were hurled into the air, one or two of whom 
came down alive, inside the national lines. The 
enemy, however, had detected the building of the 
mme, and, in anticipation of the explosion, removed 
most of his troops behind a new line in the rear. 
Counter-mining had also been resorted to by the 
rebels, and several sappers, who were in the lower 
shaft, were bmied : all the troops in the neighbor- 
hood were jarred by the shock. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 369 

The cavity made was large enoiigli to hold two 
reghnents, and, as soon as the partial destruction of 
the parapet was discovered, a column of Grant's in- 
fantry, which had been concealed in a hollow beneath 
the tort, rushed forward with loud cheers to gain 
possession of the breach. The ditch and slope were 
gained, and a desperate struggle ensued in the crater, 
but the rebels soon retired to their interior line, only 
a few feet back. Pioneers went to work at once, clear- 
ing an entrance to the crater, but both sides were reen- 
forced i)romptly, and no further result was attained. 
The loss on the national side was thirty men in killed 
and wounded, and to the besieged about the same.* 

The crater was cone-shaped, and entirely exposed 
to field projectiles or loaded shells thrown by hand, 
but McPherson's men rushed into this gulf, light- 
ing and throwing grenades in return. The enemy, 
however, from his higher position, could throw ten 
shells to their one, and, in nearly every case, could 
see to direct them with deadly effect; indeed, the 
rebels had only to lay the lighted missiles on the 
parapet and roll them down. But, on the night after 
the exi3losion, details from Leggett's brigade relieved 
each other in the attempt to hold the crater. Xo sys- 
tematic attempt could be made to carry the enemy's 
work, or to take possession of his parapet and run 
boyaux along the exterior slope; yet, all night long, 
parties of men, fifty, sixty, or eighty at a time, stood 
in the crater, along its sides not shaped into ban- 
quettes, and fired at an enemy tliey could not see; 
for, after the first hour, the rebels ceased to appear- on 
the parapet at all, contenting themselves witk the 
use of the grenades. 

* The statement of the rebel loss is merely an estimate. 
24 



370 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

After aAvliile, feathered grenades were given to the 
national troops, and thrown inside the rebel line, with 
some effect ; but many of these failed to explode, and 
were hurled back by the rebels, with terrible results. 
Boxes of field-ammunition were also brought out by 
the enemy, who lighted them with port-fires and 
threw them by hand into the crater. Nearly every 
one took effect, killing and wounding sometimes half 
a dozen men. The crater was called by the soldiers 
"the death-hole;" bnt the ground that had been 
gained was held through all the horrors of the night, 
and rifle-pits next day were built across the aperture. 
A covered gallery was also at once commenced, from 
which further mines or counter-mines could lead. 

As it was found impossible to continue the work, 
until the rebels were driven from the outer face of 
the opposing parapet, another mine was at once be- 
gun. This was sprung on the 1st of July. The re- 
sult was the demolition of an entire redan, leaving 
only an immense chasm where the rebel Avork had 
stood. The greater portion of the earth was thrown 
towards the national forces, the line of least resist- 
ance being in that direction. The rebel interior line, 
however, was much injured, and many of those man- 
ning the works were killed or wounded.* But no 
serious attemj)t to charge was made, the result of 
the assaults, on the 25th, having been so inconsid- 
erable. 

From this time forward, the engineers were kept 
constantly and busily employed, mining and countei- 
mining on different portions of the line. Demonstra- 
tions were made by Johnston, and some of his dis- 
patches were intercepted, from which it was dis- 

* Pemberton's report. 



tJLYSSES S. GRANT. 371 

covered that lie intended immediately to attempt the 
forcible relief of the garrison. The works on the Big 
Black, extending from that river to the Yazoo, a dis- 
tance of eight miles, were strengthened, in anticipa- 
tion of such a movement. The troops on the west 
side of the Mississippi also were on the alert, as there 
was danger that the rebel general, Eichard Taylor, 
might move up from Louisiana against them."^ Grant 
was constantly warning and directing his officers on 
the western shore. 

A continuous siege, and a mighty battle immi- 
nent. A citadel sun-ounded by land and water. The 
bombardment almost incessant. The beleaguered 
garrison reduced to quarter rations ; living on mule- 
meat, and thinking it good fare. The population of 
the town hiding in caves to escape the storm of mor- 
tar-shells exj^loding in their streets. A squadron 
thundering at their gates, by night as well as day. 
Mines tremblinor beneath their feet. What rare news 
came fi'om Johnston, far from cheering ; all hope in- 
deed of succor quite cut off. Ammunition almost ex- 
pended. The lines of the besieger contracting daily ; 
his approaches getting closer, his sharpshooters more 
accurate; his sap-rollers steadily rising over the hills 
that Vicksburg had proudly declared impassable. 
Every day some new battery opening from an unex- 
pected quai-ter ; every day the position detected from 
which to-moiTow still another battery would sm-ely 
begin its tire. To crown all, after a few more con- 
tractions of the coil, another mighty assault would 

* " General Taylor is sent by General E. Kirby Smith to cooperate 
witb you from the west bank of the river, to throw in supplies, and to 
cross with his force, if expedient and practicable." — Johiston to Pern- 
l)erton, June 2'2d. 



372 JIILITAKY HISTORY OF 

bring the enemy immediately beneatli the walls, 
wlien, covered by tlieir works, and more numerous 
than the besieged, the assailants, in every liuman 
proljabillty, would storm the town, and all the un- 
utterable horrors to which fallen cities are exposed, 
might come upon the devoted fortress. 

Even if the gamson held out, it was only to pro- 
lono' its miseries : starvation must come at last. The 
privations and exposures of the men were telling on 
their strength and sj)ii'its. The miasmatic exhala- 
tions of the swamps, rising through the liot atmos- 
phere of June, enYelo2:)ed and penetrated their weary 
ti'ames, exhausted by the long series of disastrous 
battles, and protracted marches, and incessant biv- 
ouacs; debilitated, too, by the alternate fevers of 
anxiety and the still more terrible chills of despair. 
Their numbers were reduced by casualties, but far 
more by disease. Thousands were tossing and groan- 
ing in the hospitals, with none of the delicacies and 
little of the attention that the sick require; Avhile 
those in the trenches were hardly better oif. Foi-ty- 
seven long days and nights they lay there \\itliout 
intermission, for Pemberton had not men enough to 
relieve his commands. Scorched by the sun, drenched 
l)y the rain, begrimed with dirt, unable to wash tlieir 
liodies or their clothes, for water was far off, and time 
more precious still; pinched with hunger, anxious 
every moment for tlieir lives, these weary but heroic 
i-ebels defended the citadel, whose fall, they believed, 
would be the fall of their confederacy. Those who 
fought them hardest could not and did not fail to 
recognize their splendid gallantly, and thorough de- 
votion to an unrio-hteous cause. 

Perhaps, to some among them, the suffering was 



ULYSSES S.GEANT. 373 

rendered bitterer by the recollection of its needless- 
ness. Had tlipy but remained true to tlieir country, 
these trials had not come. The simple soldier might 
have been sharing the joys of home with tender wife 
and prattling child ; or the eager youth, telling the 
oft-told tale to some bashful but lingering girl, in the 
very haunts where now his dreams were disturbed 
by the thunder of hostile cannon, or the horrid scream 
of the shell — ^had they only not rebelled. 

But the sufferino; was not all on the side of the 
besieged. The long marches and exposures, and the 
bloody battles had been shared by the national troops, 
as well. They were unused to the dampness of the 
Southern night and the heats of the Southern day ; 
they were, it is true, inspired by the recollection of 
their victories, and the confidence of eventual success, 
which was felt by soldiers as well as commanders, but 
their labors in the trenches were incessant, their 
watchings continuous, their hardships not few. Food 
was plenty, but water scarce ; and the men dug wells 
among the hills. The picket duty was hard, and the 
sharpshooters wei-e kept constantly on the alert.'^ 

jSTothing, however, wearied the patience or de- 
pressed the hope of the commander. On the 23d of 
May, the day after the unsuccessful assault, he said : 
" There is no doubt of the fall of this place, ulti- 
mately;" and, on the 24th, to Halleck: "The enemy 
are now undoubtedly in our grasp. The fall of 
Vicksburg, and the capture of most of the garrison, 
can only be a question of time." Without a particle 

* Tlio sharpshooters occupied positions behind the chimneys left 
standing -where houses had been destroyed ; or, sometimes, shrouded 
themselves in the abundant Spanish moss that hangs from the Southern 
trees; concealed in this, they remained in the branches all day, like 
leopards waiting to bring down their prey. 



374 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

of \Yliat is ordinarily called eDtliusiasm, lie yet was 
tlie most confident man in Ms army. On the 3d of 
June, he said : " Tlie apj)roaclies are gradually nearing 
tlie enemy's fortifications. Five days more .should 
plant our batteries on their parapets. Tlie best of 
health and spirits prevail among the troops." On the 
IGth: " Every thing j^rogresses well here. I am for- 
tifying at Haine's bluif, to make my j)Osition certain, 
but I believe I could go out with force enough to 
drive the rebels from between the two rivers." On 
the 26th, he reported the exj^losion of the mine in 
Logan's front, and said : " The fight for it has been 
incessant, and thus far we have not been able to es- 
tablish batteries in the breach. Expect to succeed. 
.... I will use every effort to learn any move John- 
ston may make, and send troops from here to coun- 
teract any change he may make, if I can." On the 
27tli, he rej)orted that Johnston expected ten thou- 
sand reenforcements from Bragg. " They are expected 
next week. I feel strons; enouo-li as-ainst this in- 

O CD CD 

crease, and I do not despair of having Vicksburg be- 
fore they arrive. This latter, however, I may be dis- 
appointed in." On the 30th of June, after the siege 
had lasted more than forty days, he WTote : " The 
troops of this command are in excellent health and 
spirits. There is not the slightest indication of de- 
spondency, either among ofiicers or men." To Banks, 
on this date, he said, evidently contemplating speedy 
success: "Should it be my fortune, general, to get 
into Vicksburg while you are still investing Port 
Hudson, I ^A'ill commence immediately shij^ping 
troops to you, and will send such number as you 
may indicate as being necessary." 

This confidence, however, was built upon deter 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 375 

mination. It was a knowledge of his own traits and 
his own acts tliat made liim so secure. He was one 
day riding around his lines, and stopped for water 
at the house of a rebel woman, who liad remained 
mthin her shattered walls, not changing her disloyal 
sentiments. She asked Grant, tauntingly, if he ex- 
pected ever to get into Vicksburg. '' Certainly," he 
replied. " But when ? " " I cannot tell exactly when 
I shall take the towm, hut / mean to stay here till 1 
do^ if it tahes me thirty years^ The Avoman's heart 
seemed to fail her at the reply. Apparently, she had 
hoped that her friends might be able to tire out the 
besieo-ers, even if they could not drive them off; but 
this waiting thirty years, if necessary, was a greater 
persistency than she had contemplated. 

His orders to subordinates completely express this 
side of Grant's character, and reveal the means by 
which he accomplished his results. To Dennis, on 
the west bank of the Mississippi, he said, on the 13th 
of June : ^' Drive the enemy from Eichmond. lleen- 
force Mower all you can, and send him to do it." 
This is the entire dispatch. To McClernand, June 
loth: "Should the enemy attempt to get past your 
left, with the view of forming a junction with John- 
ston's force, he must be defeated AVe should hold 

and fight the enemy wherever he presents himself, 

from the extreme right to your extreme left " In 

the same dispatch, but on another subject, he said : 
" This is given only as a general plan, to be adopted 
•under certain circumstances. The movements of an 
enemy necessarily determine counter-movements " — a 
principle that Grant never forgot, either in his in- 
structions to others, or in his own plans of l)attle or 
campaign. 



376 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

To Parke, on the IStli, he said: ''I want tlie 
work of intrenching your position pushed with all 
dispatch ; be ready to receive an attack, if one should 
])e made, and to leave tlie troops free to move out, 
should the enemy remain where lie is." To Ord, on 
the 19th: "Get batteries as well advanced. as possi- 
ble, during the day and night/' To Parke, when that 
commander was ordered to join Sherman : " An at- 
tack is contemplated, evidently by way of Bear 
creek, and tliat within two days. Move out four 
brigades of your command to support your cavalry, 
and olistruct tlieir advance as near Black river as 
possible, until all the forces to spare can be brought 
against them. Travel with as little baggage as pos- 
sible, and use your teams as an ordnance and supply 
train, to get out all you may want from the river. . . . 
Move out early to-morrow morning, or sooner if you 
can." To Dennis : " An attack upon you is not at 
all impossible. You will therefore exercise unusual 
vigilance in your preparations to receive an attack. 
Keep your cavalry out as far as possible, to I'eport 
any movement of the enemy, and confer witk Admiral 
Porter, that tkere may be unanimity in your action." 
To Parke : " Certainly, use the negroes, and every 
thing within your command, to the best advantage." 
To Ilerron : " Be ready to move with your division 
at the shortest notice, witli two days' cooked rations 
in their haversacks." To McPherson : " There is in- 
dication that the enemy will attack within forty-eight 
liours. Kotify McArthur to Ije ready to move at a 
moment's notice, on Sherman's order. The greatest 
vigilance will be required on the line, as the Vicks- 
burg garrison may take the same occasion for an at- 
tack also." 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 377 

To McPlierson, on tlie 23d : " Have your forces in 
readiness for any action." To Ord : " The utmost 
vigilance should be observed in watching the cross- 
ings of the Big Black." To Sherman, on the 25th : 
" Should you discover a change of plans on his (John- 
ston's) part, counteract it." To a junior officer, on a 
certain occasion : " Use every effort to effect the ob- 
ject of the expedition. Should they retreat, and 
vour force prove sufficient to compete with them, fol- 
low them as long as there is a hope of capture." To 
Ord, on the 26th: "Keep Smith's division sleeping 
under arms to-night, ready for an engagement. There 
should be the greatest vigilance on the whole line." 
Again : " Hold your trooj^s in readiness to threaten 
an assault, to keep the enem}^ from massing on Mc- 
Pherson." And again : " Notify General Lauman to 
be in readiness all night," To Washburne : " Make 
the detail with reference to the competency of the 
colonel who will command the expedition. He must 
be a live and active man." To Ord, on another oc- 
casion: "Prepare to march this evening." This is 
the whole dispatch.'^ 

By the 1st of July, tlie approaches in many places 
had reached the enemy's ditch. At ten different 
points. Grant could put the heads of regiments under 
cover, within distances of from five to one hundred 
yards of the rebel works, and the men of the two 
armies conversed across the lines. The hand-to-hand 
character of the i-ecent fighting showed that little 



* It is unnecessary to call the attention of a military reader to the 
clearness of these dispatches. A distinguished officer, who had wide 
experience in studying and obeying confused dispatches, declared that 
there never was any difficulty about knowing what Grant meant ; a 
child could understand his orders. 



378 anLiTARY histoey of 

fui'tlier progress could be made by digging alone, and 
Grant accordingly determined to make the final as- 
sault on the morning of the 6th of July. Orders 
were issued to prepare the heads of approaches for 
the easy debouche of troops, to widen the main ap- 
proaches so that the men could move easily by fours, 
and to prepare planks and sand-bags filled with 
pressed cotton, for crossing ditches. 

Johnston was moving up at the same time. On 
the nio'ht of the 1st, lie encaniDed between Browns- 
ville and the Big Black river, and, on the 3d, sent 
word to Pemberton, that about the Ttli of the month, 
an attempt to create a diversion would be made, to 
enable the garrison to cut its way out." This attack, 
however, was never made. The movement to Bro^^Tis 
ville was the last operation undertaken for the relief 
or the defence of Vicksburg. 

On the 22d of June, Pemberton had suggested to 
Johnston that the latter should make propositions to 
Grant to pass the garrison out, "with all its arms and 
equipages;" but Johnston replied: "Negotiations 
with Grant for the relief of the garrison, should they 
become necessary, must be made by you. It would 
be a confession of weakness on my part, ^^'hich I 
ought not to make, to propose them. When it be- 
comes necessary to make terms, they may be con- 
sidered as made under my authority." 

On the 1st of July, therefore, Pemberton hav- 
ing become satisfied that the time liad arrived when 
he must either capitulate or evacuate the city, ad- 
dressed the following communication to each of his 
four division commanders, Stevenson, Forney, Smith, 

* This dispatch did not reach Pemberton till the 10th of July, 
when both he and the messenger were ijrisoners. 



ULYSSES S. GEA^'T. 379 

and Bowen : " Unless the siege of Vicksburg is icaised, 
or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary, 
very shortly, to evacuate the place. I see no pros- 
pect of the former, and there are many great if not 
insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. You 
are, therefore, requested to inform me, wath as little 
delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops, 
and their ability to make the marches and undergo 
the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evac- 
uation." 

Two of these officers recommended a suiTender, 
and the others declared the chances were that an at- 
temj^t at evacuation would not succeed ; accordingly, 
on the morning of the 3d of July, Pemberton dis- 
patched the following letter to Grant : 

" I have the honor to propose to you an armistice 
of — hours, with a view to arranging terms for the 
capitulation of Yicksburg. To this end, if agreeable 
to you, I Avill appoint three commissioners, to meet a 
like number to be named by yourself, at such place and 
hour as you may find convenient. I make this prop- 
osition to save the further effusion of blood, which 
must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling 
myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet 
indefinite period. This communication will be hand- 
ed you, under a flag of truce, by Major-General John 
S. Bowen." 

The white flag was hoisted at about ten o'clock in 
the morning. Hostilities in that quarter ceased at 
once, and Bowen and Colonel Montgomeiy, an aide- 
de-camp of Pemberton, were soon seen wending their 
way from the works of Yicksburg towards the na- 
tional liues. The rebel soldiers instantly became ex- 
cited, conjecturing that a surrender was contemplated ; 



380 MELITAEY HISTORY OF 

but, to counteract tliis, a story was circulated tliat 
Pemberton was sending' to ask Grant's permission for 
the removal of the sick and wounded to some point 
outside the lines. Bowen was received by General 
A. J. Smitli, and expressed a strong desire to con- 
verse with Grant ; this, however, was not allowed ; 
lie then suggested that it would be well if Grant and 
Pemberton could meet. Grant, therefore, sent a ver- 
bal message that, if Pemberton wished to see him, an 
interview could be had between the lines, in McPher- 
son's front, at three o'clock that afternoon. The 
written reply to Pemberton was as follows : 

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing 
an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of ar- 
ranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, 
to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood 
you propose stopping by this course can be ended at 
any time you may choose, by the unconditional sur- 
render of the city and garrison. Men who have 
shown so much endurance and courage as those now 
in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an 
adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with 
all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not fo- 
vor the proposition of appointing commissioners to 
arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no 
terms other than those indicated above." 

At three o'clock in the afternoon, Pemberton pro- 
ceeded to the front, accompanied by Bowen and Colo- 
nel Montgomery. AVith Grant were Generals Ord, 
McPherson, Logan, and A. J. Smith, and several mem- 
bers of Grant's staff. The two commanders met un- 
der a tree on a hillside, within two hundred feet of 
the rebel line. The works on both sides were crowd- 
ed with unarmed men, lying on their faces, or hanging 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 381 

over tlie parapet, and looking eagerly on. The day was 
sultry ; there was no I'aln, but the clouds hung heavily 
down, as if to watch the interview. The loud-mouthed 
cannon held their peace, and the strange cessation of 
artillery and musketry fire made the silence oppres- 
sive. Tlie two generals sliook hands, and Pemberton 
inquired what terms of caj^itulation would be allowed 
him. Grant rej)lied, "Those that had been expressed 
in his letter of the morning ; " whereupon Pemberton 
haughtily declared, " If this were all, the conference 
might terminate, and hostilities be resumed imme- 
diately." '* Very well," said Grant, and turned away. 

But General Bo wen then proposed that two of 
tlie subordinates present should retire for consulta- 
tion, and suggest such terms as they might think 
proper for the consideration of theii' chiefs. Grant 
had no objection to this, but would not consider him- 
self bound by any agreement of his subordinates. He 
must himself decide what terms ^vere to be allowed. 
Smith and Bowen accordingly went a little way 
apart, while Grant and Pemberton walked up and 
dowm, between the parapets, conversing. After a 
few minutes, all returned to the tree of rendezvous, 
and Bowen proposed that the rebels should march 
out of Yieksburg with the honors of war, carrying 
theii' muskets and field-guns with them, Init leaving 
their heavy artillery. Grant smiled at this proposal, 
which was promptly rejected. After some discus- 
sion, it was then ao-reed that Grant shouhl send his 
terms to Pemberton before ten o'clock that night, 
and the interview was at an end, having lasted a 
little more than an hour. Hostilities were not to be 
resumed until the correspondence had terminated. 

Grant returned to his quarters, and, for the only 



382 MTLITAEY HISTOEY OF 

time in his life, lield what might be called a council of 
war. He sent for all his corps and division generals 
on the city fi'ont, and received their opinions as to 
the terms -which should be allowed to Pemberton. 
"With one exception (General Steele), they suggested 
terms that Grant was unwolling to sanction, and 
their judgment was not accepted. The following 
letter was written instead, and forwarded to Pem- 
berton : 

" In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, 
I A^•ill submit the following proposition for the sur- 
render of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. 
On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march 
in one division as a guard, and take possession at 
eight A. sr. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made 
out, and paroles signed by officers and men, you will 
1)0 allowed to march out of our lines, the officers 
taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and 
the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. 
The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, 
but no other property. If these conditions are ac- 
cepted, any amount of rations you may deem neces- 
sary can be taken from the stores you now have, and 
also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. 
Thirty wagons also, counting two horse or mule 
teams as one, will be allowed to transport such arti- 
cles as cannot be carried alono^. The same conditions 
will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and 
soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The 
paroles for these latter must be signed, however, 
^vhilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll 
of prisoners." 

By the tei-ms of a cartel, then existing between 
the national and rebel authorities, all officers and 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 383 

men of either army, captured or surrendered at any 
point in tlie entire theatre of war, were to be de- 
livered up to their respective authorities within ten 
days after capture ; those taken east of the Allegha- 
nies, at Kichmond, and those west, at Vicksburg. At 
these places they were to be exchanged, or paroled 
until exchano-ed. Grant was therefore oblio-ed to 
parole and discliarge his prisoners * 

Pembei-ton submitted Grant's letter to a council 
of general officers, all of whom, except Baldwin, rec- 
ommended acceptance of the propositions it contained ; 
and, late at night, the following reply was made : " I 
have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 

• Wae Dbpaktsten-t, Adjtjtakt-Gext.ral's Office, ) 
"Washingtos, September 25, 136-2. S 
General Orders, Ko. 142. 

The following is tlic cartel under which prisoners are exchanged in 
the existing war with the Southern states : . . . . 

Article 1. It is hereby agreed and stipulated that all prisoners of 
war held by either party, including those taken on private armed ves- 
sels, known as privateers, shall be discharged ui^ou the conditions and 
terms following : . . . . 

Abticle 4. All prisoners of war to be discharged on parole, in ten 
days after their capture, and the prisoners now held, and those here- 
after to be taken, to be transported to the points mutually agreed 
upon, at the expense of the capturing party 

Article 7. All prisoners of war now held on either side, and all pris- 
oners hereafter taken, shall be sent with all reasonable dispatch to A. 
M. Aiken's, below Dutch Gap, on the James river, Virginia, or to 
Vicksburg, on the Mississippi river, in the state of ^Mississippi, and 
there exchanged, or paroled until such exchange can be effected 

Was Depaktment, ADJCTAST-GESEP.At,'s Office, i 
■Washikgton, July 3, 1S63. j 
General Orders, yo. 207. 

The attention of all persons in the military service of the United 
States is called to Ai-ticle 7 of the cartel agreed upon on the 22d of 
July, 18G3, and published in General Orders Xo. 142, September 25, 
18G2. According to the terms of this cartel, all captures must be re- 
duced to actual possession, and all prisoners of war must be delivered 
at the places designated, there to be exchanged, or paroled until ex- 
change can be effected. 



384 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

communication of this date, proposing terms of capit- 
ulation for this garrison and post. In the main, your 
tenns are accepted; but, injustice both to the lionor 
and spirit of my troops, manifested in the defence of 
Yicksburg, I have to submit the following amend- 
ments, which, if acceded to by you, will j^erfect the 
aoreement between us. At ten o'clock a. m. to-mor- 
row, I propose to evacuate the works in and around 
Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison 
under my command, by marching out with my colors 
and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, 
after Avhich you will take possession. Officers to re- 
tain their side-arms and personal property, and the 
rights and proj)erty of citizens to be respected." 

Tliis was received after midnio;ht. The answer 
was immediate, and in these words : " I have the 
honor to acknowledge tbe receipt of your communi- 
cation of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you 
cannot be acceded to in full. It mil be necessary to 
furnisb every officer and man with a parole signed 
by himself, which, with the comj^letion of the roll of 
prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I 
can make no stipulations with regard to the treat- 
ment of citizens and tbeir private property. While I 
do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance 
or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any 
restraint by stipulations. The property which offi- 
cers will be allowed to take with them will be as 
stated in my proj^osition of last evening : that is, offi- 
cers will l)e allowed their jirivate baggage and side- 
arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you 
mean by your proposition for each brigade to march 
to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and 
stack amis at ten o'clock a. m., and then return to the 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 385 

inside and there remain as prisoners until properly 
paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no 
notification be received of your acceptance of my 
terms by nine o'clock a. m., I shall regard tbem as 
having been rejected, and sliall act accordingly. 
Should these terms be accepted, white flags should 
be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my 
troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon 
your men." 

The following from Pemberton concluded the cor- 
respondence: "I have the honor to acknowledge the 
receipt of your communication of this day, and in re 
ply, to say that the terms proposed by you are ac- 
cepted." 

Meanwhile, as soon as Grant had received Pem 
berton's first communication, he had given Sherman 
directions to march out against Johnston, the moment 
the surrender should be consummated. "There is 
but little doubt," he said, on the 3d, " but the enemy 
will surrender to night or in the morning. Make 
yoiu' calculations to attack Johnston and destroy 
the road north of Jackson." Again, on the same 
day : " 1 have dii-ected Steele and Ord to be in readi- 
ness to move as you suggested, the moment Yicks- 
buro- is surrendered. I want Johnston broken up as 
eftectually as possible. You can make your own ai-- 
rano-ements, and have all the troops of my command 
except one corps." 

Durino- that nioht, Grant sent instructions to 
Ord and McPherson to put discreet men on picket, 
and allow them to communicate to the enemy's pick- 
ets the fact, that in case of surrender, both officers 
and men would be paroled, and allowed to return to 
theii- homes. A close watch was kept lest any should 



386 jinjTAEr history of 

attempt to escape on Herron's front, and no more de- 
serters were received. 

At ten o'clock of Saturday, tlie 4tli of July,* the 
anniversary of American independence, the gan-ison 
of Vicksbure marched out of the lines it had defended 
so Ions:, and stacked its arms in front of the con- 
querors. All along the rebel v^orks they poured out, 
io gray, through the sally-ports and across the ditches, 
and laid down their colors, sometimes on the very 
spot where so many of the besiegers had laid down 
their lives ; and then, in sight of the national troops, 
who were standing on their own parapets, the rebels 
returned inside the works, prisoners of war. Thirty- 
one thousand six hundred men were surrendered to 
Grant. Among these were two thousand one hundred 
and fifty-three officers, of whom fifteen Avere gen- 
erals, f One hundred and seventy-two cannon also 
fell into his hands, J the largest captiwe of men and 
material ever made in war. § 

* " K it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the 
day for surrender ? the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that 
day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foes, I 
knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, on the 4th 
of July, into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their 
national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted 
from them at any other time." — PenibertorC s report. 

t The number actually paroled was twenty-eight thousand eight 
hundred and ninety-two ; in addition to these, seven hundred and nine 
refused to be paroled, and were sent north as prisoners ; many hundreds 
died in the hospitals before the paroling could be completed, and 
over a thousand escaped, or concealed themselves, or, disguised as 
citizens, avoided being paroled. 

\ There were one hundred and five field-jneces captured at Vicks- 
burg, and sixty-seven garrison-guns. During the previous campaign, 
seventy-four guns were taken, of which twenty-five were heavy pieces, 
captured at Grand Gulf and naiue's bluff, making a total of two hun- 
dred and forty-six cannon captured during the campaign and siege. 

§ " A spectacle took place on the following day unparalleled in mod- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 387 

Logan's division was one of those wliicli liad ap- 
proached nearest the rebel works, and now was the 
first to enter the town. It had been heavily engaged 
in both assaults, and was fairly entitled to this honor. 
The Forty-fifth Illinois infantry marched at the head 
of the column, and placed its battle-torn flag on the 
court-house of Vicksburg. 

Grant rode into the town, with his staff, at the 
head of Logan's division. The rebel soldiers gazed 
curiously at their conqueror, as he came inside the 
lines that had resisted him so valiantly, but they paid 
him no sign of disrespect. He went direct to one of 
the rebel headquarters ; there was no one to receive 
him, and he dismounted and entered the porch, where 
Peml)erton sat with his generals ; they saluted Grant, 
but not one offered him a chair, though all had 
seats themselves. Neither the rank nor the reputa- 
tion of their captor, nor the swords he had allowed 
them to wear, prompted them to this simple act of 
courtesy. Pembertou was especially sullen, both in 
conversation and behavior. Finally, for very shame, 
one of the rebels offered a place to Grant. The day 
was hot and dusty ; he was thii-sty from his ride, and 
asked for a di-iuk of water. They told him he could 
find it inside ; and, no one showing him the way, he 
groped in a passage until he found a negro, who gave 
him the cup of cold water only, which his enemy 
had almost denied. AYlien he retiu-ned, his seat 
had been taken, and he remained standing during 
the rest of the interview, which lasted about half 
an hour. 

ern tear/are, and sufficient to have turned the strongest head. On that 
memorable morning the garrison of Ulm, thirty thousand strong, with 
sixty pieces of cannon, marched out of the gates of the fortress to lay 
down its arms." — Alison's Histart/ of Europe, chap. xL 



388 MILITAKY HISTOEY OF 

Pemberton now requested Grant to supply the 
gamson with rations; to tliis he immediately con- 
sented, and inquired how many would be needed. 
"I have thirty-two thousand men," was the reply; 
and, for the first time, the victor was aware of the ex- 
tent of his victory. He had not imagined the garri- 
son to be greater than fifteen or twenty thousand 
men. But he expressed no surprise. 

Grant afterwards rode to the wharf, and exchanged 
congratulations with Admiral Porter on the flagship, 
but returned to his old camp at dark. His quarters 
were not removed into Vicksburg until the 6tli. 

On the night of the 4th, he announced his capture 
to the government, in these words : " The enemy sur- 
rendered this morning:. The onlv terms allowed is 
their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a 
great advantage to us at this moment. It saves, 
probably, several days in the capture, and leaves 
troops and transports ready for immediate service. 
Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on 
Johnston, to drive him from the state. I Mill send 
troops to the relief of Banks, and return the Ninth 
army corps to Burnside." He also notified Banks of 
the capture of Vicksburg, and, a few days afterwards, 
offered to send him an army corps of " as good troops 
as ever trod American soil ; no better are found on 
any other y 

The men of the two armies afliliated at once. The 
rebels were fed, and treated with great kindness, and 
appreciated the consideration of their victors. Rebel 
and national soldiers were often seen walking arm- 
in-arm; they felt that they were countrymen, for 
all the strife. Seven hundred of the garrison re- 
fused to be paroled, preferring to be sent north as 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 389 

prisoners. Pemberton protested against tliis, and 
wanted Grant to compel tliese men to return to the 
Southern aimy, but Grant tliouglit liis soldiers could 
be better employed than in forcing men back into tlie 
ranks of the rebellion. Pemberton also wanted 
Grant to allow liim arms for a few of Lis troops, so 
that they might guard the others on their march to 
the interior, as, otherwise, many might desert. This, 
however, was exactly what Grant desired, and he de- 
clined assisting Pemberton to guard the paroled 
prisoners on their way home. 

In a week, the paroles were completed, and on 
Saturday morning, July 11th, about half an hour 
before noon, the rebel garrison took up its line of 
march. As they reached the fortifications, each man's 
name was called and checked off on the rolls. Na- 
tional troops were placed as guards on both sides of 
the road, for some distance beyond the intrench- 
ments ; and, in all the bitterness of defeat, the pris- 
oners marched by. All that had passed was as noth- 
ing to this. Amid the thickest storm of battle, there 
had always been the expectation of succor or success; 
while they lay on the weary picket, or in the hot 
trenches, they had still hoped on, though hope was 
long deferred. But now all hope was gone ; tlie 
rebel yell of defiance,* so often raised in battle, oj)- 
posed to the national cheer, miglit not be heard ; 

* Those who ever heard either of these battle-cries never mistook 
them afterwards. The national troops always cheered, the rebels al- 
ways yelled. The very terms, " cheer " and " yell," were adopted by 
both armies, and writers on either side discriminate thus between 
them. The rebel yell was usually given in advance of a charge, or at 
the moment of making or receiving it ; the national cheer more often 
after victory. One was used to produce, the other to annoimce suc- 
cess. 



390 ]\riLITAEY HISTORY OF 

their willing liands no longer grasped familiar weap- 
ons ; the standards, under which they had fought so 
proudly, were in the keeping of then* conquerors. 
Large tear-drops fell on many a weather-beaten face, 
and ever and anon they paused, and, turning back, 
took one last look at the city they had striven so 
hard to retain.* The national army gazed on in si- 
lence; proud as was the sight to them, exultant as 
were the emotions with which they contemplated a 
spectacle that repaid them a thousand-fold for all their 
toils, and wounds, and sufferings, they yet could not 
but pity the humiliation of their foes. No insulting 
taunt was heard, no cheer of triumph nor mocking 
cannon saluted the ears of the departing prisoners.f 
Silently and sadly they marched on, and, in a few 
hours, Vicksburg was again free from the taint of 
treason. 

The parallel between Ulm and Vicksburg is prin- 
cipally in results. Napoleon had twice as many men 
as Mack in his great campaign, while the rebels had 
twice as many men as Grant, when the latter crossed 
the Mississippi ; although, at the close of the siege. 
Grant's numbers were more than equal to those of 
Pemberton and Johnston combined. Napoleon's 
achievement was accomplished solely by his own 
splendid strategy and the amazing stupidity of his 
antagonist; there was not a battle fought in the 
Uhu campaign. Grant won his results by fighting 

* See parai)lik't of Abrams. 

t Grant's orders were : " Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here 
to-morrow. Tliey -will be authorized to cross at the railroad-bridge, 
and move from there to Edward's ferry, and on by way of Raymond. 
Instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, 
to make no ofl'ensive I'emarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of 
ranks after they have j)assed." 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 891 

as well as by strategy, aided, doubtless, by Peml^er- 
ton's repeated blunders ; but be fought five battles, 
and made two assaults, and prosecuted a siege for 
over forty days, before be opened the gates of Vicks- 
burg. Besides tbis, Napoleon's army w^as composed 
of veterans, tbe pride of France, inspirited with long 
success, selected and controlled by bimself alone. 
Grant's men, on tbe contrary, were volunteers, many 
of tbem entirely raw, all sent to bim by others ; and, 
instead of moving fresh from a camp like that of Bou- 
logne, the Army of the Tennessee had spent months 
amid the swamps and fevers of the Mississippi ; while 
its enterprise w^as derided as hopeless, and its leader 
declared incompetent by half the Korth. The abso- 
lute captures at the fall of the two cities were, how- 
ever, not dissimilar. Napoleon took thirty thousand 
prisoners, and sixty guns; Grant, as has been seen, 
nearly thirty-two thousand men, and a hundred and 
seventy cannon. In each case the prisoners were 
paroled. Napoleon, sun-ounded by a numerous and 
magnificent staff, witnessed the march of the imperial 
troops as they defiled before him to lay down their 
arms. Grant was not present when his prisoners 
marched out of Yicksbui'g, and only saw Peniberton 
when it was necessaiy to arrange the terms of the 
capitulation, or on other indispensable business. 

Halleck's first dispatch to Grant, after the fall 
of Vicksburg, was a rebuke and a counteiTuand. 
"July 8th. I fear your paroling the prisoners at 
Vicksburg, without actual deliveiy to a propei 
agent, as required by the seventh article of the 
cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and 
that these men will immediately be placed in the 
ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case else- 



392 3IILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

where. If these prisoners have not been allowed to 
depart, you will retain them until further orders." 
The countermand, however, came too late ; the pris- 
oners had ali'eady left Vicksburg. The entire gar- 
rison, officers and men, had been paroled not to take 
up arms against the United States until exchanged 
by the proper authorities ; teims which Mere really 
more favorable to the government than an uncon- 
ditional surrender, as Grant thus secured his troops 
and transports for immediate use, and saved the ex- 
pense of subsisting thirty thousand prisoners. Had 
he acted otherwise, the movement as-ainst Johnston 
could not have been so promptly undertaken, and all 
the steamers on the Mississip23i would have been 
occupied for weeks, conveying the prisoners else- 
where. Besides this, Grant hoped to demoralize the 
whole interior country still in rebellion, by spreading 
this dispirited mass of men among the yet uncon- 
quered remainder. Having treated them well after 
capture, he believed that they would lose heart and 
hate together, and that the leaven of their disaffection 
might leaven the whole lump of treason. 

The consequences of this victory were not long de- 
layed. On the 8th of July, Port Hudson surrendered. 
As soon as its commander, General Gardner, heard 
of the fall of Vicksburg, he sent a communication 
to Banks, who was besieo-ino* him : " Havins; re- 
ceived information from your trooj^s that Vicksburg 
has been surrendered, I make this communication to 
ask you to give me the official assurance whether this 
is true or not ; and if true, I ask for a cessation of. 
hostilities with a view to the consideration of terms 
for surrendering this place." Banks thereupon for- 
warded to Gardner a copy of Grant's dispatch an- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 393 

nouncing the capture of Vicksburg, and Gardner at 
once proposed tlie surrender of Poi-t Hudson and its 
garrison. This event took place the next day. The 
attempted confederacy was thus cut in twain, and, in 
the forcible lansruas^e of Lincoln, the Father of Waters 
rolled " un vexed to tlie sea." 

On the nio-ht of the 4th, Ord and Steele were 
moved out to join Sherman, and that commander, 
with about forty thousand men, set out to retrace the 
route along: which Grant had led his soldiers from 
Jackson to the Mississippi. Champion's hill and the 
Bio- Black brido-e were the fittin^^ landmarks for the 
march. " The route travelled by your corps, on com- 
ing to Vicksburg," said Grant, " is exactly the route 
they will travel back. They came by Black Kiver 
bridge, Edward's station, and Champion's liilL That 
is the route they now go." 

The instructions to Sherman were : " I want you 
to drive Johnston fi'om the Mississippi Central rail- 
road. Destroy the bridges as far north as Grenada 
with your cavalry, and do the enemy all the harm 
possible." Again : " Make youi- calculations to attack 
Johnston and destroy the road north of Jackson. I 
cannot say w^here you will find the most effective 
places to strike. I would say, move so as to strike 
Jackson or Canton, whichever might seem most de- 
sirable." 

On the 4th, Sherman was informed : " The orders 
■^Tdl be made as you suggest, the moment Vicksburg 
is ours. Ord and Steele have both been notified to 
move, the moment Vicksburg falls. I will let you 
know, the moment Pemberton's answer arrives. I 
have no suggestion or orders to give. I want you to 
drive Johnston out in youi- own way, and inflict on 



394 MTLITAEY HISTORY OF 

the enemy all tlie punishment you can. I will sup- 
port you to the last man that can be spared." 

It was the night of the 5th, before all of SheiTQan's 
force reached the Bio; Black river. Brido-es were 
constructed at once, and on the 6th, the troops were 
all across. On the 7th and 8th, they marched by 
separate roads to Clinton. The weather was intensely 
hot, the dust stifling, but the enemy made no serious 
opposition to their j)rogress. Evidence accumulated 
at every step that Johnston, with four divisions of 
infantry, and a large cavalry and artillery force, was 
now falling back on Jackson. He reached that place 
on the 7th, and on the 9th, Sherman came up to the 
familiar ground. 

The works had been strengthened since May, and 
the lines extended so as to reach the Pearl river, both 
above and below Jackson. 'No sooner did Sherman 
become satisfied that the rebels had taken refuQ-e in 
the place, than he determined to hold them there, 
while, with cavalry and light columns of infantry, he 
fulfilled one part of Grant's orders, destroying the 
railroad north and south, not only for the present, 
but for all future operations ; at the same time, he 
meant to work gradually around by one flank or the 
other, threatening to cross Pearl river, and operate on 
the enemy's only line of communication with the 
rear. Ord was given the right, Steele the centre, and 
Parke the left of the line: Lauman was now with 
Ord, and Sooy Smith, of Washburne's command, with 
Parke. Both the wiuo- commanders were instructed 
to approach the Pearl river. The work of railroad 
destruction went on vigorously, while regular para- 
pets of earth and cotton were constructed in front of 
the lines. It was no part of the plan to assault the 



ULYSSES S. GRAIO'. 395 

enemy's fortifications, but skirmisliers were pushed 
close up, and cannonading Avas continuous. 

At first, Johnston hoped tliat the scarcity of water 
would compel Sherman to assault, but when he found 
that Sherman would not gi*atify this hope, he tele- 
graphed to the rebel president that it was impossible 
to stand a siege. " If the enemy will not attack, we 
must, or, at the last moment, withdraw. AVe cannot 
attack seriously without risking the army." Brisk 
skirmishing and light cannonading continued for 
several days; and on the 12th, an aifair occurred in 
which Lauman's division only was engaged; it re- 
sulted in the loss of nearly five hundred men to Sher- 
man, and was occasioned by Lauman's misinterpreta- 
tion of his orders. On the lath, both flanks of the 
army extended to the Pearl river, and Sherman sent 
back for ammunition for a siecre. On the 12tli and 
13th, three thousand rounds of ammunition were 
thrown into Jackson, and on the 14th, Johnston tele- 
graphed that he should be comj^elled to abandon the 
place. " It would be madness to attack." 

Meanwhile, Sherman sent out expeditions to the 
right and left, destroying the railroads in every direc- 
tion — cars, locomotives, turn-tables, and shops, as well 
as tracks and bridges — and driving ofl:' various bodies 
of cavalry. Some of his troops travelled as far as 
sixty miles, marking their whole route with devasta- 
tion. The parapets and rifle-pits, in fi-ont of Jackson, 
were strengthened, to be ready for a general attack, 
as soon as the ammunition train should an-ive from 
the rear. This did not reach camp till late in the 
night of the 16th, too late to distribute the ammuni- 
tion. Information of its apj^roach was obtained by 
Johnston during the 16th, and he at once determined 



39G MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

to evacuate the place. All niglit, Sherman heard the 
sound of wagons, but nothing that indicated evacua- 
tion, for the picks and shovels were at work till 
midnight; but, at dawn of day, it became evident 
that the enemy had withdrawn across the Pearl river. 
The rebels had burned all the bridges in retreating, 
and placed loaded shells and torpedoes on the roads 
leadino; out from the river. All the material of war 
had been removed, in advance of the retreat, by means 
of the railroad running east. 

Sherman was convinced that pursuit across a 
country ninety miles in extent, destitute of water, 
and under the intense heat of a July sun, would 
be more destructive to his own command than 
fruitful in results; he therefore determined not to 
follow Johnston auy farther. He remained two or 
three days completing the work of destruction, and 
on the 20th, sent part of his force back to Yicksburg. 
Two days more were spent in attempting to relieve 
the condition of the inhabitants, whose homes had 
been ruined by the war, and whose supplies were ut- 
terly exhausted by the demands of two hostile armies. 
Sherman shared his stock of provisions freely with 
them ; and, with Grant's approval, issued orders for 
the distribution of two hundred barrels of flour and 
one hundred barrels of pork. On the 23d, he moved 
to Clinton, where ao-ain the utter exhaustion of the 
provisions of the country compelled him to supply 
the hospitals of the enemy, as well as the country 
people. Supplies for Ave hundred people for thirty 
days were left here, in charge of responsible citizens, 
who pledged themselves that these provisions should 
be kept sacred to the use of the impoverished inhab- 
itants. On the 24th, he moved to Champion's hill, 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 397 

and on the 25tb, recrossed the Big Black river, and 
once more went into camp near Vicksburg. 

On the 4th of July, the great mass of troops em- 
ployed on this expedition were in the trenches before 
Vicksburg, where for two months they had been toil- 
ing under a hot sun in close and stifling rifle-pits. 
Without stopping to enjoy for a moment the great 
success which there had crowned their labors, they 
marched again, in heat and dust, for fifty miles, ^vith 
no water, save that they found in muddy creeks, or 
cisterns already once exhausted, or in the surface- 
ponds, which the enemy in his retreat had purposely 
tainted with dead cattle and hogs. They crossed the 
Big Black river on bridges of their own constniction, 
and then had to deal with an army under a leader 
of great renown — an army specially formed to raise 
the sieire of Vicksbursj, little inferior to Sherman's in 
infantry or artillery, and far superior to his m cavalry 
They drove Johnston fifty miles, and left him in full 
retreat ; they destroyed the great arteries of travel 
which alone could enable him to reassemble troops 
and molest Grant's possession of the Mississippi ; and 
they so exhausted the country through which they 
passed that no army could exist there again, during 
that season, without hauling all its supplies. Tlie 
campaign was a fitting supplement to the conquest 
of the Mississippi, and, indeed, was necessary to per- 
fect the achievements of Grant. 

Shei-man's whole lose was less than a thousand 
men. He took more than that number of piisoners ; 
and Johnston lost, according to his own account, 
during the siege alone, seventy-one killed and five 
hundred and four wounded, besides large numbers 
by desertion and straggling. 



398 MILITAEY HISTOET OF 

The result of the entire Vicksburg campaign was, 
the defeat of the rebels in five battles outside of 
Vicksburg, the occupation of Jackson, and the caj^ture 
of Vicksburg and its garrison and munitions of war; 
a loss to the enemy of forty thousand prisoners, at 
least twelve thousand killed and wounded, and thou- 
sands of stragglers, who were never collected and re- 
organized; in all an army of sixty thousand soldiers.* 

* The records of tlie commissary-general of prisoners show a total 
of forty-two thousand and fifty-nine prisoners captured during the 
Vicksburg campaign, after the 1st of May. As Grant lost in that time 
nearly nine thousand men in killed and wounded, it is fair to suppose 
that Pemberton and Johnston, so repeatedly and disastrously beaten, 
lost twelve thousand. Any one who has seen war is aware how small 
an estimate six thousand is for the stragglers in an unsuccessful cam- 
paign. The calculation is simple. 

42,000 Prisoners. 

12,000 Killed and wounded. 
6,000 Stragglers. 



60,000 Total 
This estimate is proof of Pemberton's force at the beginning of the 
campaign. He surrendered thirty-two thousand men at Vicksburg; 
three thousand were captured at Champion's hill; nearly two thousand 
at the Big Black bridge, and at least two thousand others at Port 
Gibson and Raymond, and during the campaign and siege; while 
those who escaped with Loring, from Champion's hill, could not have 
been fewer than four thousand. 

32,000 Surrendered at Vicksburg. 
3,000 Captured at Champion's hill. 
2,000 " " Big Black bridge. 

2,000 " " Port Gibson, etc. 

4,000 Loring. 
10,000 Killed and wounded in Pemberton's command. 
3,000 Stragglers. 



50,000 Total. 
There can no longer be a doubt that many rebel officials persis- 
tently and designedly misstated the numbers and losses in their armies. 
Doubtless, in this, they persuaded themselves that the end justified 
the means. But the j)ossession of the records of both parties to the 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 399 

A large amount of public property, consisting of rail- 
roads, locomotives, cars, steamers, cotton, etc., fell into 
Grant's liancls, and mucli was destroyed to prevent 
its capture; wliile arms and munitions of war for a 
hundred thousand men departed from the rebellion 
forever. 

Grant's loss in the entire series of battles and as- 
saults, including the casualties of the siege, was 
twelve hundi'ed and forty-three killed, seven thou- 
sand and ninety-five wounded, and five hundred and 
thirty-five missing ; total, eight thousand eight hun- 
dred and seventy-three. Of the wounded, many were 
but slightly hurt, and continued on duty ; many more 
required but a few days or weeks for their recovery : 
not more than half of the wounded were perma- 
nently disabled. 

When this success became known, the satisfoction 
of the government was supreme, and the joy of the 
loyal people knew no bounds. On the 13th of July, 
the President ^^Tote the following characteristic and 
mao'nanimous letter to Grant : 

" My dear General : I do not remember that you 
and I ever met personally. I write this now as a 
grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable 
service you have done the country. I wish to say a 
word further. "When you first reached the vicinity 
of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you 
finally did — march the troops across the neck, run 

contest, makes tbe foct plain. In this very instance, Pemberton stated, 
in his official report, that his eflfective strength, at the beginning of 
the siege, was eighteen thousand five hundred men ; and play 14) that 
his whole available force, at the time of the battle of Champion's hill, 
■was sixteen thousand in the field, while seven thousand eight hundred 
were left to hold Vicksburg. He lost at least fifteen thousand men 
after this, and had thirty-two thousand to surrender, two months later. 



400 MIUTAEY HISTOET OF 

the "batteries with the transports, and thus go below ; 
and I never had any faith, except a general hope that 
you knew better than I, that the Yazoo pass expedi- 
tion and the like could succeed. When you got be- 
lo^v and took Poii: Gibson, Grand Gulf and vicinity, 
I thought you should go down the river and join 
General Banks; and when you turned northward, 
east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I 
now wish to make a personal acknowledgment that 
you were right and I was wrong." 

Halleck was almost equally generous in his praise 
of a campaign which he had once disapproved. The 
following: letter reflects as much credit on the writer 
as it can possibly confer on the recii^ient : " Your re- 
port, dated July 6th, of your campaign in Mississippi, 
ending in the capitulation of Vicksburg, was received 
last evening. Your narration of the campaign, like 
the operations themselves, is brief, soldierly, and in 
every respect creditable and satisfactory. In bold- 
ness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of 
routes, these operations will compare most favoraljly 
with those of Napoleon about Ulm. You and your 
army have well deserved the gratitude of your coun- 
try, and it wiU be the boast of your children that 
their fathers were of the heroic army which reopened 
the Mississippi river." 

The grade of major-general in the regular army 
was immediately conferred on the successful soldier, 
and other honors, votes of thanks, and costly gifts 
were showered upon him. The country rang with 
applause, and the victory of Gettysburg occurring on 
the same day, the spirit of the people rose at once 
from the gloom and depression into which it had 
fallen, to an elation and confidence like that it had 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 401 

known after the capture of Donelson. No sucli suc- 
cess, indeed, had slione on tlie national cause in all 
the weary interval of nearly seventeen months. 

The rebellion never fully recovered from the blow 
that was dealt it at Vicksburg ; communication thus 
severed, between the trans-Mississippi region and 
the eastern bank of the mighty river, was never 
again uninterrupted or secure. The demoralized and 
dispirited soldiers who straggled all over the South 
from the captured stronghold, could not be got to- 
gether again as one army ; they were depressed with 
their long series of sufferings, diseased and weakened 
in body and mind, and their depression w^as con- 
tao-ious. The exultin£c confidence the rebels once had 
known did not return, but there came instead a grim 
determination not to lose all. For the contest lasted 
long, and many furious battles were fought after 
Vicksburg fell. 
26 



402 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 



CHAPTER X. 

Grant recommends Sherman and McPherson for promotion — Characteristics of 
American soldiers — Army of the Tennessee — Organization of negro troops — 
Trade with the conquered regions — Grant urges movement against Mobile— 
Halleck disapproves — Grant's army broken up — Condition of troops — ^Feel- 
ing of citizens — Thirteenth corps sent to Banks — Grant visits New Orleans- 
Thrown from his horse — Reenforcements ordered to Rosecrans — A corps sent 
to Rosecrans — Grant ordered to Cairo — Meets the Secretary of War — Pro- 
ceeds to Louisville — Placed in command of Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi. 

IiMSEEDiATELY after the second capture of Jackson, 
Grant recommended both Sherman and McPherson 
for the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army.* 
" The first reason for this," he said, " is their great fit- 
ness for any command that it may ever become neces- 
sary to intrust to them. Second : their great purity of 
character, and disinterestedness in any thing except 
the faithful performance of their duty and the success 
of every one engaged in the great battle for the pres- 
ervation of the Union. Third : they have honorably 

* During tlie entire war, tlic regular and volunteer armies of the 
United States remained distinct organizations, many officers holding 
commissions in botli services. Promotion in the regular army was 
more prized by professional soldiers, because it was permanent, 
while the volunteer organization, it was known, would cease with 
the war. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 403 

won tliis distinction upon many well-fouglit Ijattle- 
fields. The promotion of such men as Sherman and 
McPherson always adds strength to our army." These 
promotions were promptly made. Grant also recom- 
mended other officers for advancement, both in the 
regular array and in the volunteers. The general-in- 
chief was favorable, and most of the recommendations 
were approved. The government, indeed, seemed 
anxious to fully reward all who had been conspicuous 
in the great campaigns wliich resulted in opening the 
Mississippi river. 

This approbation was not confined to corps com- 
manders, nor to officers who were graduates of the 
Military Academy. There were only seven general 
officers in tlie army of the Tennessee who had studied 
their profession at West Point ; * all the others had 
entered the volunteer service without the advantage 
of a military education, or the spur of a lifetime am- 
bition ; they went to war, as the soldiers of the whole 
army did, because the country was in danger. These 
men studied hard in tlie school of experience; Bel- 
mont, Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, and luka were their 
instructors ; their lessons were learned under the eyes 
of Grant and Sheiman and McPherson : and, at the 
fall of Vicksburg, the commanders of divisions and 
brigades, wliether on the march or the battle-field, in 
siege operations or in garrison, were equal to tlie 
emergency. Their practical knowledge of a com- 
mander's duties was gained ; their energy, prompt- 
ness, subordination, and gallantry were qualities 

* Besides Grant, Sherman, and McPherson, these were Ord, who 
commanded the Thirteenth corps after the 26th of June, and Steele, 
Carr, and A. J. Smith, commanding di^■i^ion3; all of whom distin- 
guished themselves, and did good service to the country 



404 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

without wliicL, neitlier their own advancement, nor 
the continued and brilliant successes of the army 
to whicli they belonged, could ever have been at- 
tained. 

The same spirit that animated them extended to 
regimental officers, and even to private soldiers. The 
rank and file, especially, were not fighting for fame. 
They knew that most of them could have no chance 
for promotion. Although, here and there, those who 
distinguished themselves might rise, and did rise, yet, 
doubtless, gallant deeds were constantly done that 
never found a chronicler ; doubtless, undeveloped tal- 
ent lay hidden, during all these campaigns, under 
many a private's coat; doubtless, glory was often 
won, and the costly price not paid. This the soldiers 
knew had been, and felt must be again; yet they 
fought, and marched, and worked, and died, as wil- 
lingly as those to whom the great prizes were the 
incentives. They did this, not only under the stimu- 
latinj? enthusiasm which drove them to the field in 
tlie first days of the war, but in the weary months of 
that long spring of 1863, under the piercing blasts 
and pelting storms of Donelson, and in the scorching 
heats and sickening atmosphere of Vicksburg. With- 
out the excitement of danger, as well as in the very 
presence of quick-coming death, they persisted in 
doing all that was necessary to accomplish the end 
they set out to gain. 

Nor was this simply what every soldier does in 
war. It is not national partiality which declares 
that the combination of traits that made this army 
what it was, and enabled it to do what it did, was 
essentially American. The mingling of stui'dy inde- 
pendence with individual intelligence, of patriotic 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 405 

feeling with practical talent was American. These 
men were not more gallant, nor more devoted than 
the misguided countrymen they fought ; nor do I be- 
lieve tliat their courage or endurance was greater 
than has often been displayed on European fields. 
But it is seldom in the history of war that a race has 
sprung to arms like that which won the l^attles of 
the Union. Not, indeed, a highly-cultivated people, 
but one in whom general education was more widely 
diffused than in any that ever fought. It was the 
appreciation each man had of the objects of the war, 
and his determination to accomplish them ; his intelli- 
gent love for the Union, inspiring an adventurous 
manliness often acquired in the "Western woods and 
on the Indian frontier, and combined with tlie Amer- 
ican practicalness — itself often the result of a frontier 
life — that produced the American soldier. 

That soldier had a devotion and a gallantry which 
equalled any displayed on the most famous fields in 
Avar ; but to these were added a peculiar ficulty of 
applying his intelligence to the every-day means and 
the ordinary events of a campaign or a siege, enabling 
him to persevere amid extraordinary difficulties as 
well as dangers, and, when one means failed to try 
anotlier, and, when all means seemed lacking, to 
create means himself, and with these to achieve vic- 
tory. This quality was conspicuous in the men who 
conquered Vicksburg. This made soldiers and offi- 
cers, and division generals and corps commanders all 
act as one, all cooperate with their chief, hold up his 
hands, cany out his plans, act, indeed, as the body 
of which he was the head ; he, the brain to conceive 
and the will to direct, while they were the means, 
the liml)s and nerves and muscles, to execute. 



406 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

For Grant liimself shared this same combination 
of traits. His military character was thoroughly tlie 
result of American life and American institutions. 
The same devotion to an idea, which was manifest, 
not in Avords nor in enthusiastic expression, but in 
the deeds of every day ; the same intensity of pur- 
pose, that was betrayed more in achievement, even 
than in effort; the practical determination, the self- 
reliance, rather than self assertion ; the heating of the 
iron white-hot, rather than red — to blaze not, but to 
burn more ; all these traits he shared with the sol- 
diers whom he led to victory. He was a fitting chief 
for the Army of the Tennessee. 

His child, almost his creation — bone of his bone 
and flesh of his flesh, growing with his growth and 
strengthening with his strength, sharing his trials, and 
dangers, and difficulties, and victories; his spirit had 
infused it, in return its successes had inspired him, and 
urged him on to greater effort and more complete ful- 
filment. He was to leave that army soon, to assume 
more difficult positions, to direct grander operations, 
but he never for2:ot his old associates. For he still 
commanded them, though further off; he directed 
whither they should march, and where they should 
conquer, as long as they were an army. And amid 
all the varied chances and splendid successes that 
afterwards befell that army, he watched its career 
'with a solicitude that was prompted by the early 
trials and triumphs they had shared together. 

On the 1st of January, 1863, the President had 
issued his proclamation declaring the slaves in the 
rebellious states, with some few exceptions, " thence- 
forward, forever free." Emancipation, however, had 
practically begun with the war : wherever the na- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 407 

tional armies appeared, tlie slaves were really freed. 
The measure of arming the blacks followed hard 
upon that of emancipation, and, in April, the adju- 
tant-general of the aiTuy was sent to the Department 
of the Tennessee, for the purpose of organizing negro 
troops. The proposition, however, met with serious 
opposition from many warm adherents of the national 
cause at the North, and Avas violently discussed even 
in the armies. 

At the outbreak of the rebellion. Grant was not 
an abolitionist.* His object was simply the salva- 
tion of the Union; the question of slavery he re- 
garded as subordinate and incidental, not paramount. 
But slavery was, in his eyes, completely and really 
subordinate; its interests, like all other interests, 
were inconsiderable, in comparison with those of the 
Union ; and when the government determined first 
to free, and then to arm the blacks. Grant was ready 
to cooperate. Like most of the successful soldiers of 
the war, he avoided all political action or even dis- 
cussion ; but, as soon as he received orders to arm 
and organize the slaves, he set about obeying. His 
pui-poses were military, and, from this time, he never 
hesitated to use this means to accomplish his pur- 
poses, as freely as any other that was put into his 
hands. At first, the negroes were employed princi- 
pall}^ in guarding places that had already fallen into 
his hands. He believed, at that time, that they would 
prove more effective for defence than in the open 
field. The influences, whether of race or of their re- 
cent condition, seemed to cling to them in some de- 
gree; and, apparently, they fought better behind 

* Tliose in favor of the abolition of slavery had long been known 
to the United States as abolitionists. 



408 MILITAEr HISTORY OF 

bulwarks. It lias often happened tliat wliite meu 
did the same.* 

On tlie nth of July, he said to the adjutant-gen- 
eral of the army: "I am anxious to get as many of 
tliese negro regiments as possible, and to Lave them 

full, and completely equipped I am particularly 

desirous of organizing a regiment of heavy artillerists 
from the negroes, to garrison this place, and shall do 
so as soon as possible." On the 24th of July: "The 
negro troops are easier to preserve discipline among 
than our white troops, and I doubt not will prove 
equally good for garrison duty. All that have been 
tried have fought bravely." 

The rebels at first refused to recognize black 
troops as soldiers, and threatened that, if captured, 
neither they nor their white officers should receive 
the treatment of prisoners of war ; the former were 
to be regarded as runaway slaves, the latter as 
thieves and robbers, having stolen and appropriated 
slave property. Grant, however, was determined to 
protect all those whom he commanded ; and, when it 
was reported to him that a white captain and some 
negro soldiers, captured at Milliken's bend, had been 
hung, he "wrote to General Kichard Taylor, then com- 
manding the rebel forces in Louisiana: "I feel no 

* On the 9th of August, the President wrote to Grant : " General 
Thomas has gone again to the Mississippi valley, with the view of 
raising colored troops. I have no doubt th^t you are doing what you 
reasonably can upon the same sul)jcct. I believe it is a resource which, 
if vigorously applied now, will soon close this contest. It works 
doubly; weakening the enemy, and strengthening us. We were not 
fully ripe for it until the river was opened. Now, I think, at least one 
hundred thousand can, and ought to be organized along its shores, 
relieving all the white troops to serve elsewhere. Mr. Davis under- 
stands you as believing that the emancipation proclamation has helped 
some in your military operations. I am very glad if this is so." 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 409 

inclination to retaliate for tlie offences of irrespon 
sible persons, but, if it is the policy of any general 
intrusted with the command of troops to show no 
quarter, or to punish with death prisoners taken in 
battle, I will accept the issue. It may be you pro- 
pose a different line of policy towards black troops 
and officers commanding them to that practised tow- 
ards white troops. If so, I can assure you that these 
colored troops are regularly mustered into tlie service 
of the United States. The government, and all offi- 
cers under the government, are bound to give the 
same protection to these troops that they do to any 
other troops." * 

The Secretary of the Treasury, Honorable Salmon 
P. Chase, was strongly in favor of allowing trade to 
be carried on in the conquered regions. On the 4th 
of July, he wrote to Grant : " I find that a i-igorous 
line within districts occupied by our military forces, 
from beyond whicli no cotton or other produce can 
be brought, and within which no trade can be carried 
on, gives rise to sei'ious and to some apparently well- 
founded complaints." The secretary, therefore, urged 
the propriety of "substituting bonds, to be given by 
all persons receiving permits, for the rigorous line 
noAV established ; or, at least, of substituting them 
partially." Grant, however, had always been averse 
to the policy of trading with tlie rebellious states, 
and replied at once: "No matter M'hat the restric- 
tions thrown around trade, if any whatever is al- 

* General Taylor replied that he would punish all such acts, "dis- 
graceful alike to humanity and the reputation of soldiers;" but de- 
clared that officers of the " Confederate states' army " were required to 
turn over to the civil authorities, to be dealt with according to the 
laws of the states wherein such were captured, all negroes captured in 
arms. 



410 JULITAEY HISTORY OF 

lowed, it ^vill "be made tlie means of supplying tlie 
enemy with all they want. Eestrictions, if lived up 
to, make trade unprofitable, and hence none but dis- 
honest men go into it. I will venture that no honest 
man has made money in West Tennessee in the last 
year, whilst many fortunes have been made there 
during that time. The people in the Mississippi val- 
ley are now nearly subjugated. Keep trade out but 
for a few months, and I doubt not but that the work 
of subjugation will be so complete that trade can be 
opened freely mth the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi." He concluded : " No theory of my 
own will ever stand in the way of my executing in 
good faith any order I may receive from those in au- 
thority over me; but my position has given me an 
opportunity of seeing what could not be known by 
persons away from the scene of wai', and I ven- 
ture, therefore, great caution in opening trade with 
rebels." 

Throughout the war these views were urged upon 
the government, whenever there seemed occasion for 
Grant to express an opinion on the subject. He be- 
lieved that trade supxdied the enemy with the means 
of carrying on the war, offered opportunities for spies 
and scouts to obtain contraband information, demor- 
alized the army itself, by inviting officers to pervert 
their positions and introducing among them unprin- 
cipled civilians, and protracted the operations which 
alone could produce the object at Avhich the nation 
was aiming. He was firm in the conviction that only 
military success could end the war, and that, there- 
fore, no political or commercial considerations should 
at any time be paramount to military ones. For 
these reasons, Grant was invariably and inflexibly op- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 411 

posed to any extension of commercial facilities, any 
relaxation of tlie restrictions on trade. 

On the 26tli of July, lie said : " I am very mucli 
opposed to any trade wliatever, until tlie rebellion in 
this pai-t of the country is entirely crushed out. Sec- 
retary Chase difters, however." On the 13th of Au- 
gust : " My opinion is, that all trade with any enemy 
with whom we are at war is calculated to weaken us 
indirectly. I am opposed to selling or buying from 
them whilst war exists, except those within our 
lines." And, on the 26th of August, he addressed 
the Secretary of War : '* K trade is opened under any 
general rule, all sorts of dishonest men will engage 
in it, taking any oath or obligation necessary to se- 
cure the privilege. Smuggling mil at once com- 
mence, as it did at Memphis, Helena, and every other 
place where trade has been allowed within the dis- 
loyal states, and the armed enemy Avill be enabled to 
procure from Northern markets every article they re- 
quire." Notwithstanding these arguments, a lunited 
trade was opened with the rebels, and the conse- 
quences predicted by Grant followed raj^idly. During 
the whole war, he was hamj)ered by the operations 
of civilians, some of them, intent only on their own 
gains, others using trade merely as a cloak, under 
which they could carry on communication with tin* 
enemv. In this matter the 2:overnment never oouhl 
be induced to carry out his views.* 

* " The moment purchasers of cotton arc allowed in the market, 
that moment all the cotton in the Southern states becomes the prop- 
erty of that class of persons who are authorized to sell and receive 
pay. More than half of the cotton now in the South is the property 
of the so-called Southern Confederacy, for their benefit. This, of all 
others, will find its way to market, and will be sold by actual agents 
of the so-called Confederate ffovemment for their benefit. Thus, while 



412 3IILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

On tlie 18tli of July, Grant announced to Halleck 
tlie fall of Jackson and the completion of tlie Vicks- 
burg campaign. In tke same dispatch, he said : " It 
seems to me, now, that Mobile should be captured, 
the expedition starting from Lake Ponchartrain." 
But Halleck had other plans, and, on the 22d, he re- 
]:)lied : " Before attempting Mobile, I think it will be 
best to clean up a little. Johnston should be dis- 
posed of, also Price and Marmaduke, so as to hold 
line of Arkansas river. This will enable us to with- 
draw troops from Missouri. Vicksburg and Port 
Hudson should be repaired, so as to be tenable by 
small garrisons; also, assist Banks in clearing out 
western Louisiana. When these things are accom- 
plished, there will be a large available force to oper- 
ate either on Mobile or Texas. Navy is not ready 
for cooperation ; should Sumter fall, then iron-clads 
can be sent to assist at Mobile." 

This strategy was in accordance with Halleck's 
habit of scattering his forces and energies upon com- 
paratively unimportant objects, leaving the great and 
decisive aims to be accomplished last. He seemed 
unable to aj^preciate the fact, that if the main objects 
of the war were gained, the lesser ones were sure to 
follow; or even the purely military maxim, that 
strategic points of the highest consequence should be 
first secured. Had Grant's suggestion been acted on, 
and a campaign against Mobile promptly authorized, 
before the rebels had time to recover from the stun- 

we are making such efforts to close their ports, we will be opening a 
better market for them. Our money, being always worth a known 
price in New York city, will have a commercial value in Europe. 
This will enable the South to ship at much less risk the means of 
exchange for imported articles, than by sending the bulky article of 
cotton." — Gratit to Mr. Mellen^ Treasury Agent, August 13, 18G3. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 413 

ning effects of the blow dealt them at Vicksburg, the 
only port then closed to national vessels in the Gulf 
of Mexico would undoubtedly have fallen at once, 
and a base have been secured for important opera- 
tions towards the north. It is not improbable that 
the capture of Mobile, at that time, would have short- 
ened the war by a year. But this was not allowed. 

On the 24th of July, Grant renewed his sugges- 
tion : " It seems to me that Mobile is the point de- 
serving the most immediate attention." And, on the 
1st of August, he telegraphed to Halleck: "Mobile 
can be taken from the Gulf Department, with only 
one or two gunboats to protect the debarkation. I 
can send the necessary force. With your leave I 
would like to visit New Orleans, particularly if the 
movement ao;ainst Mobile is authorized." The leave 
was not granted, the movement was not authorized, 
and the golden opportunity was slipping by. Grant 
got restive under this restraint, and, on the 25th of 
September, he returned to the subject : " I am confi- 
dent that Mobile could now be taken, with compara- 
tively a small force. At least, a demonstration in 
that direction would either result in the abandon- 
ment of the city, or force the enemy to weaken 
Bragg's army to hold it." On the 30th, he once 
more urged : " I regret that I have not got a mov- 
able force with which to attack Mobile or the river 
above. As I am situated, however, I must be con- 
tent with guarding territory already taken from the 
enemy. I do not say this complainingly, but simply 
regret that advantasre cannot be taken of so fine an 
opportunity of dealing the enemy a heavy blow." 

Halleck replied to this, on the 11th of October: 
" I regret equally with yourself that you could not 



414 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

Have forces to move on Mobile, but there were cer- 
tain reasons, wliicli I cannot now explain, wliicli pre- 
vented sucli an attempt." The President himself had 
written to Grant on the subject somewhat earlier : 
^'I see by a dispatch of yours that you incline strongly 
towards an expedition against Mobile. This would 
appear tempting to me also, were it not that, in view 
of recent events in Mexico, I am greatly impressed 
with the importance of reestablishing the national 
authority in western Texas as soon as possible. I 
am not making an order, however ; that I leave, for 
the present at least, to the general-in-chief." 

As Grant's views were not accepted, he conformed 
to those of his superiors, and, immediately after the 
fall of Jackson, sent Banks a division of troops num- 
bering four thousand men ; live thousand others were 
ordered to Schofield, to operate against Price, in Ar- 
kansas, and the Ninth corps was returned to Burn- 
side, in East Kentucky. Troops were also sent to 
Natchez, and that place was permanently occupied ; 
large quantities of ammunition and five thousand 
head of cattle, for the rebel armies, here fell into pos- 
session of the national commander ; the latter was a 
serious loss to the enemy. 

The troops which had been engaged in the various 
operations of tlie campaign and siege of Vicksburg 
were now greatly exhausted, and " entirely unfit for 
any duty requiring much marching," but " by select- 
ing any duty of immediate pressing importance," said 
Grant, "it could be done." lie had already sent 
troops and transports to Banks, with which that offi- 
cer "could find no difficulty in keeping the river 
open from Port Hudson down. Above that," said 
Grant, " I will take care of the river." Various ex- 



ULYSSES S. GEATfT. 415 

pedltions were sent out to drive away and break up 
the guerrilla bands tliat infested tlie Mississippi banks, 
and others to destroy the rolling-stock of the rail- 
roads outside of the command. These expeditions 
were all successful, meeting with little organized op- 
position. 

Grant at this time sent supplies of medicine and 
provisions to the rebel sick at Raymond, at their 
own request, and informed Sherman, when families 
had been deprived of all their subsistence by national 
troops, it was only fair the same articles should be 
issued in return. " It should be our policy now," he 
said, " to make as favorable an impression ujDon the 
peoj^le of this state as possible. Impress upon the 
men the importance of going through the state in an 
orderly manner, refraining from taking any thing not 
absolutely necessary for their subsistence while trav- 
elling. They should try to create as favorable an im- 
pression as possible upon the people, and advise 
them, if it will do any good, to make efforts to have 
law and order established within the Union." The 
country in the rear of Vicksburg was full of paroled 
prisoners, swearing that they would not take up arms 
again if they were exchanged. Pemberton was re- 
ported to have but four thousand men left together. 
" The army that was paroled," said one, " was virtu- 
all v dischar2:ed from the rebel service." Thousands 
crossed the Mississippi and went west ; many begged 
a passage to the north, and quite a number expressed 
a strong anxiety to enter the national service ; but 
this, of course, was not allowed. Johnston's army 
also was greatly demoralized, and the men deserted 
by thousands. Even a political movement was started 
by citizens, west of Pearl river, to bring Mississippi 



416 3IILITAEY HISTORY OF 

back into the Union. This state of affairs, however, 
was not destined to last long. 

On the Yth of August, in obedience to orders from 
Washington, Grant sent Ord's entire command, the 
Thirteenth corps, to Banks, and was himself directed 
to cooperate with that commander, by sending a 
small force from Natchez into Louisiana. Banks was 
to ascend the Bed river to Shreveport, and to move 
thence into Texas, or from Natchitoches against Na- 
coo-doches. Grant was informed: "General Banks 
has been left at liberty to select his own objective 
point in Texas, and may deteraiine to move by sea. 
If so, your movement will not have his support, and 
should be conducted with caution. You will confer 
on this matter freely with General Banks. The gov- 
ernment is exceedingly anxious that our troops should 
occupy some points in Texas with the least possible 
delay." ^■ 

On the 30th of August, accordingly, Grant started 
in person for New Orleans, notifying Halleck of his 
departure : " General Banks is not yet off, and I am 
desirous of seeing him before he starts, to learn Ms 

* This anxiety for an early occupation of Texas arose from the hos- 
tility towards the United States, evinced early in the war by the French 
and English governments, and the extraordinary steps taken by those 
governments in consequence. The accordance of belligerent rights to 
the rebels, almost before there was a rebellion, the proposition to me- 
diate between a sovereign state and its insurgent citizens, and, above 
all, the invasion of Mexico with the avowed purpose of reestablishing 
the Latin race in power on the American continent— all these indi- 
cated a complete sympathy on the part of foreign powers with those 
who were seeking the overthrow of the Union, and threatened active 
interference in behalf of the rebellion. It was because of the immi- 
nence of this danger that the American government was so anxious to 
obtain a footing in Texas, which borders on Mexico, and presented 
the only probable avenue through which foreign armies would attempt 
to invade the Union. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 417 

plans and see how I may LeljD him." Sherman was 
next in rank, and Grant proposed, of course, to leave 
him in command ; but Sherman suggested that it 
might facilitate public business if the routine of 
headquarters remained unchanged. During Grant's 
absence, therefore, all orders were issued in his name 
and by his chief of staff, but with the advice and con- 
currence of Sherman. One of tliese orders happened 
to be of importance. Directions were received from 
Halleck for the immediate reenforcement of Steele, 
then commanding the movement in Arkansas, in- 
tended to cooperate with Banks's campaign. General 
Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff, there uj)on consulted 
with both Sherman and McPherson, and John E. 
Smith's division of the Seventeenth corps was sent 
to the assistance of Steele. This was but one amons" 
many instances of the remarkable harmony which 
prevailed in the command. " With such men," said 
Grant, as Sherman and McPherson, 'commandimr 
corps or armies, there will never be any jealousies 
or lack of hearty co6]3eration. Between the two I 
would have no choice, and the army does not afford 
an officer superior to either, in my estimation." 

While at New Orleans, Grant was thrown from 
his horse, at a review, and severely injured. He was 
twenty days confined to one j^osition, and could not 
return to Vicksburg until the 16th of September. 
On the 19th, he wrote: "I am still confined to my 
bed, being flat on my back. My injuries are severe,, 

but still not dangerous I will still endeavor to 

perform my duties, and hope soon to recover, that I 
may be able to take the field at any time I may be 
called upon to do so." He was, however, compelled 
to keep his bed until the 25th of September, and for 
27 



418 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

two montlis afterwards Avas unable to walk without 
tlie aid of crutches. 

On tlie 13tli of SeptemlDer, Halleck telegraphed: 
'' All of Major-General Grant's available force should 
be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tuscum- 
bia, to cooperate with General Rosecrans." Rose- 
crans, with an army of about sixty thousand men, 
was at this time operating in Tennessee and northern 
Georgia, where he had just obtained possession of 
Chattanooga, the most important strategic position 
between Richmond and the Mississippi river ; while 
the rebels, under Bragg, were apparently attempting 
to move west of him through northern Alabama, and, 
by turning the right wing of the national army, to cut 
off all communication with Nashville, the base of his 
supplies. Halleck's dispatch, ordering reenforcements 
from Grant, was delayed ten days on the Mississippi, 
bet^veen Cairo and Memphis. Communication was 
l)y telegraph from Washington to Cairo, and thence 
dispatches were conveyed by steamer to Memphis 
and Vicksburg. The messenger to whom this pack- 
age was intrusted failed to deliver it promptly. 

On the loth, Halleck telegraphed again: "All 
the troops that can possibly be spared in West Ten- 
nessee and on the Mississippi river should be sent, 
without delay, to assist General Rosecrans on the 
Tennessee river Information just received indi- 
cates that a part of Lee's army have been sent to 
reenforce Bragg." This was sent to Hurlbut, in the 
absence of Grant; but, when it reached Vicksburg, 
on the 22d, Grant had returned. lie still kept his 
bed, but instantly directed Sherman : " Order at once 
one division of your army corps to proceed to reen- 
force Rosecrans, moving from here by brigade as fast 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 419 

as transportation can be had." Orders were also is- 
sued to detain all steamers tlien at Vicksburg-, or that 
might arrive there, until a sufficient number should 
be collected for this purpose. The division from Mc- 
Pherson's corps, which had started for Steele, was 
recalled, and ordered to Rosecrans. It w'as already 
aboard transports and on its way to Helena, but a staff- 
officer was dispatched to turn these troops northw^ard ; 
they were directed to move at once to Memphis and 
report to Hurlbut. The last-named officer was in- 
structed to forw^ard not only this division of Mc- 
pherson's corj^s, but two divisions from his oAvn com- 
mand, and whatever troops might return from the 
expedition to Arkansas, which had now" ended. Gen- 
eral Halleck was notified of these movements, and in- 
formed : " Should more trooj)s be required from here 
for Rosecrans, there is sufficient time for orders to 
reach me before transportation can be had." 

Banks had just applied to Gi'ant for another di- 
vision of troops, but he was furnished with a copy of 
Halleck's dispatch, and informed : '' This will neces- 
sarily prevent further reenforcements being sent from 
here to you, until word is heard from the general-in- 
chief: We must make no disposition of troops that 
will endanger tlie success of Mosecransy All of these 
orders were made on the 22d, the day that Halleck's 
dispatch arrived. His orders were received on the 
morning of the 22d; Osterhaus's division of Sher- 
man's corps was then at the Big Black bridge, fifteen 
miles off, but the whole command reached Vicksburg 
during the night of the same day; most of it was 
embarked within twenty-four hours, and all of it was 
sailing up the river, within forty-eight hours from the 
receipt of the order. On the 25tli, Grant wrote: "I 



420 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

am just out of bed, and find tliat I can write only 
witli great difficulty. During tlie twenty days that 
I have been confined to one position on my back, I 
have ap23arently been in the most perfect health, but 
now that I am up on crutches I find myself very 
weak." 

On the same day, Halleck's dispatches of the 13th 
arrived, and Grant replied : " I will now send Sher- 
man to West Tennessee, with two more divisions of 
his corps. This leaves one division of Sherman's 
corps here, but it is replaced by one of McPherson's, 
already above." Sherman was accordingly notified 
to hold his command in readiness to move to the 
support of Rosecrans. It w^as some days before the 
requisite transportation could be obtained, although 
every steamer on the river was again detained for the 
purpose; but, on the 27th, Sherman embarked in 
person for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats, con- 
veying Morgan L. Smith and Hugh Ewings divi- 
sions. Tuttle s division of the Fifteenth corps was 
to remain with McPherson, in exchange for that of 
John E. Smith, which had already started for Mem- 
phis, from Helena, and of which, also, Sherman was 
to assume command. 

As it w^as certain that the rebels would soon be- 
come aware of the movement of Sherman's column, 
and in all probability attempt at once to prevent or 
obstruct it, Grant now ordered McPherson to send 
an expedition to Canton and Jackson. This was de- 
signed to distract the enemy, and threaten other 
points still further east, so that, if possible, all 
the hostile force in Mississippi might be recalled to 
McPherson's front, and the march of Sherman from 
Memphis l)y way of Corinth, Tuscumbia, and Deca- 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 421 

tur left undisturbed.* Slierman was informed of 
tLese operations in his favor. He readied Mempliis 
on the 2d of October, and, by the 4th, his entire com- 
mand had arrived there. 

Meanwhile, the blow which Halleck had foreseen, 
and striven to avert, had fallen heavily. On the 
19th and 20th of September, Rosecrans suffered a 
severe repulse on the Chichamauga river, nine miles 
from Chattanooga, and was compelled to retire into 
the latter place, with a heavy loss of artillery and 
the sacrifice of immense strategic advantages. In 
Chattanooga, he was nearly surrounded by a superior 
rebel army, and his only line of communication al- 
most entirely cut off. On the 29th, Halleck tele- 
graphed to Grant : " The enemy seems to have con- 
centrated on Rosecrans all his available force from 
every direction. To meet him, it is necessary that all 
the forces that can be spared in your department be 
sent to Rosecrans's assistance An able com- 
mander like Sherman or McPherson should be se- 
lected. As soon as your health will permit, I think 
you should go to Nashville, and take the direction 
of this movement. On the 28th, Grant wrote: "I 
am now ready for the field, or any duty I may be 
called on to perfonn." On the 30th, he said : " All I 
believe is now moving according to your wishes. I 
have ten thousand five hundred men to hold the 
river from here to Bayou Sara " (near Port Hudson). 

The same day he said: "I regret that ther^ 
should be an apparent tardiness in complying with 
your orders ; but I assure you that, as soon as your 
wishes were known, troops were forwarded as rapidly 
as transpoi-tation could be procured." To this Hal- 

* For Sherman's route, see Map of the Theatre of War. 



422 MILITAEY HISTOKY OF 

leek replied: "Although the reenforcements from 
your army for General Eosecrans did not move as 
soon or as rapidly as was exj)ected, no blame what- 
ever attaches to you. I know your promptness too 
well to think for a moment that tliis delay was any 
fault of yours." The delay was occasioned by the 
confusion occurring in the transmission of Halleck's 
orders, as already explained. 

In consequence of this confusion, Grant now sent 
a staif-officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, to Cairo, to 
communicate direct with the government, and, on the 
3d of October, the following dispatch was received : 
" Convey, as soon as possible, to General Grant the 
following : ' It is the wisli of the Secretary of War 
that, as soon as General Grant is able to tiike the 
field, he will come to Cairo, and report by telegraph.' " 
Grant replied from Columbus, Kentucky: "Your 
dispatch from Cairo of the 3d, directing me to report 
trom Cairo, was received at eleven thirty, on the 10th. 
Left the same day with staif and headquarters, and 
am here, en route for Caii'o." On the 16th, he tele- 
graphed from Cairo : " I have just arrived, and report 
in pursuance with your instructions of the 3d instant. 
My staff and headquarters are with me." Halleck 
answered: "You will immediately proceed to the 
Gait House, Louisville, Kentucky, where you will 
meet an officer of the War Department with your 
orders and instructions. You will take with you 
your staff, etc., for immediate operations in the field." 
This was received on the 17th, and Grant started im- 
mediately for Louisville, by rail. 

At Indianapolis, he was met by the Secretary of 
War, Honorable Edwin M. Stanton, who brought 
with him from Washington an order creating for 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 



423 



Grant a new command — tlie Military Division of the 
Mississippi ; this was to include all tlie territory be- 
tween the Alleglianies and the Mississippi river, ex- 
cepting such as might be occupied by Banks: the 
three departments of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, 
and the Ohio were all to be subordinate to Grant. At 
this time, Rosecrans was in command of the Depart- 
ment of the Cumberland, and Bm^uside of that of the 
Ohio. The imperative necessity for cooperation be- 
tween these various commands had been made pain- 
fully manifest to the government. Hitherto, each army 
had seemed to have a separate object, and apparently, 
in each department, a campaign was carried on with- 
out reference to the operations of the others. AVithin 
the last few months, indeed, Halleck had striven hard 
to compel Rosecrans to cooperate with Grant, but 
found himself utterly unable to accomplish the task ; 
and it was now determined to cut the knot of Rose- 
crans's obstinacy and insubordination, by giving to 
Grant almost absolute control of the forces and oper- 
ations west of the Alleghanies. The disaster which 
Rosecrans had suffered at Chickamauga hastened 
this decision, and the course suggested by Grant, 
nearly a year before, was at last forced upon the gov- 
ernment — the concentration and combination of all 
the western armies under a single head, and for a sin- 
gle aim. Grant was to be allo^ved to make his own 
campaigns, to use the troops to accom|)lish his own 
purposes. It was a great responsibility to put upon 
him, but there was nothing better to do ; no other 
general had accomplished as much as he ; his past 
successes were the best guaranty for future ones; the 
danger at Chattanooga was imminent, and increasing 
daily; it was necessary to act at once; and trem- 



424 MTLITAKY HISTORY OF 

bliiiglVjCloubtless, but still almost liopefully, tlie great 
trust was committed to liis liancls. 

Tlie Secretary of War brouglit also two other 
orders wliich lie showed to Grant. One of these left 
Rosecrans in his previous command, of the Army and 
Department of the Cumberland; the other relieved 
him. and substituted Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, 
the next in rank in that army. Grant was offered 
his choice of the orders, and did not hesitate a mo- 
ment ; his past experience with Eosecrans made him 
certain that he could get no complete cooperation 
from that officer, and he asked at once for his re- 
moval. The government, indeed, preferred this. Tke 
defeat of Rosecrans had been so disastrous, and its 
results were so alarming, that the confidence felt in 
his talent and military character was shaken, perhaps, 
even more than was deserved. Intense anxiety was 
entertained lest he should abandon Chattanooga, or 
even suiTender his army, now in the closest straits ; 
and Grant's action was fully approved. He was di- 
rected to proceed at once to his new command. 

The Secretary of War accompanied liini as far as 
Louisville ; there both remained a day, discussing the 
situation of aifairs, and Grant gathering the views of 
the government. During this day, the minister re- 
ceived a dispatch from ^Ir. C. A. Dana, his subordi- 
nate * at Chattanooga, intimating that the danger of 
an abandonment of Chattanooga was instant ; that 
Rosecrans was absolutely preparing for snch a move- 
ment. The secretary at once directed Grant to im- 
mediately assume his new command, and to relieve 
Rosecrans l^efore it was possible for the apprehended 
mischief to be consummated. Grant accordingly 
telegraphed to Rosecrans and Thomas, from Louis- 

* Afterwards Assistant Secretary of War, 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 425 

ville, assuming command of the military division. 
He sent also, at the same time, an order assigning 
Thomas to the Department of the Cumberland. On 
the 19th of October, he started, by rail, for Chatta- 
noosra. 



426 AULITARY mSTORY OF 



CHAPTER XL 

Natural features of Chattanooga — Strategical importance — Relations to East 
Tennessee — Ciiickaraauga campaign — Defeat of Rosecrans — Retreat into 
Chattanooga — Abandonment of Lookout mountain — Investment of Chatta- 
nooga — Sufferings of Army of the Cumberland — Hooker sent west to support 
Rosecrans — Burnside's movement into East Tennessee — Difficulties of sup- 
ply — Grant starts for Chattanooga — Directions to his three armies — ^Arrival 
at Chattanooga — Thomas's magnanimity — Lookout valley — Brown's ferry — 
Plan of operations to recover Lookout valley — Seizure of Brown's ferry- 
March of Hooker from Bridgeport — Battle of Wauhatchie — Repulse of reb- 
els — Lookout valley secured — Communication reopened — Elation of soldiers 
— Further difficulties in supply — Sherman's march from Memphis — Long 
lines of communication — Sherman's magnanimity — Grant hurries Sherman — 
Alarming situation of Burnside — Anxiety of government — Grant's calmness 
— Longstrect moves against Burnside — Grant's counter-plan — Dispatches of 
Grant to Halleck and Burnside — Thomas ordered to attack Bragg — Thomas 
not ready — Movement postponed till Sherman's arrival — Great anxiety about 
Burnside — Road from Nashville to Decatur opened — Supplies ordered to 
Burnside by Cumberland river — Difficulties of Sherman's route — Critical 
condition of Grant's armies — Extent of his operations — Halleck still anxious 
about Burnside — Grant impresses on Burnside necessity of holding out — 
Confidence of Burnside — Arrival of Sherman at Bridgeport — Reconnoissance 
by Grant, Sherman, and Thomas — Orders issued for battle of Chattanooga. 

The Cumberland inouiitains constitute tlie natural 
boundary between wliat are called tlie cotton states 
— tlie semi-tropical region of the American Union — 
and tlie vast grain-growing plains of Kentucky and 
Tennessee. Several important ranges cluster iust 
where the three great states of Tennessee, Georgia, 
and Alabama approach nearest to each other; the 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 42*7 

mountains crowding close, as if to watch tlie scene 
wliere tlie destinies of mountains and states were 
both to be decided. From some of the highest points 
in this vicinity the territory of seven different states 
can be distinctly seen. Here, also, the Tennessee 
river breaks through from the east, hemmed in at 
times on every hand, but making the mountains give 
it room, and, forcing its way in a hundred windings, 
until, at last, it eludes or overcomes eveiy barrier, 
and finds a passage to more western fields. 

At one of the most abrupt of all its angles, the 
hills recede so as to leave an open but uneven space, 
not more than five or six miles square, bounded on 
the north by the Tennessee, begirt on eveiy side 
with rugged peaks, and guarded on the west by a 
grim and almost perpendicular height, that rises di- 
rectly from the water s edge jnore than two thou- 
sand feet. This point w^as once the boundary and 
the barrier of the Indian country. The southern 
limit of the field is known as Missionary ridge, called 
so by the Indians, who allowed the missionaries to 
pass no further ; a gorge in the mountains, opening 
south, is stiU named Rossville gap, after the famous 
Cherokee chief, John Ross ; while the lofty crest that 
looks out over the rugged valley was called Chatta- 
nooga — the Eagle's Nest. The whole region was a 
mighty bulwark, covering one of the most important 
avenues for access to the South, between the Missis- 
sippi and the Atlantic coast. 

Away, at the centre of the continent, these pre- 
cipitous heights, this lonely valley, and this tortuous 
stream seemed the very spot wdiere the eagles might 
buUd their nests, and the aborigines pitch their 
camps, secure from the intruding step of the white 



428 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

man. But, first, tlie Tennessee river itself tempted 
tlie adventurous pioneer ; and, wlien tlie tide of trade 
and the growth of the republic could no longer be 
staj^ed, even the mountains were forced to open their 
gates. A railroad must be built, connecting the Mis- 
sissippi with the Atlantic, and the only route through 
these almost inaccessible hills was along the valley 
of the Tennessee. Then, the South must be connect- 
ed with its brother North; and the line of travel 
stretched out from Mobile, and all the gi-eat railways 
from the interior of the cotton region, from Mississip- 
j)i, and Georgia, and Alabama, and South Carolina, 
centred at Atlanta, and reached up along one line, 
through ridges and ranges, penetrating them by tun- 
nels when Nature aftbrded no pathway, until, under 
the shadow of the Chattanooga mountain, the junc- 
tion witb the great eastern line was formed. Where 
the railroads from Memphis and Charleston and 
Richmond and Nashville and Atlanta meet, a town 
S2:)rang up, of course, and was named from the moun- 
tain at whose base it was built, Chattanooga; while 
the acclivity itself now received an English name, and 
was henceforth known as the Lookout mountain. 

When the rebellion broke out, it was at once per- 
ceived by military men that Chattanooga must be- 
come one of the important strategic positions of the 
war. The great railway lines converging here af- 
forded the rebels immense opportunities for concen- 
trating and supplying their armies — opportunities 
which were seized and enjoyed to their full extent. 
Connecting the extreme eastern and the western por- 
tions of the would-be confederacy, tliese roads enabled 
its authorities, again and again, to move troops with 
facility and promptness from one part of the theatre 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 429 

of war to aDotlier, at some critical moment ; and, for 
years, they furnished the principal route by which 
the eastern armies received their revenues of grain 
and beef, from the prolific regions of Georgia, Florida, 
and Alabama. In a word, they became interior strat- 
egic lines for all important military operations, and 
were absolutely vital to the interests of the rebellion. 
As long as the rebels held Chattanooga, these lines 
were secure ; ^vhen it passed into national hands, all 
this internal communication ceased, or was rendered 
infinitely more difficult, and the door was thrown 
open for an advance into the very heart of the so- 
called Confederacy. 

But, there was still another consideration which 
made possession of this region important to the na- 
tional cause. The inhabitants of the mountain coun- 
try were strongly loyal; like mountaineers all over 
the world, their love of liberty and independence and 
republicanism was intense. Their rough hillsides 
and sterile soil w^ere unfitted for slave-labor, and the 
institution whicli was the origin and cause of the re- 
bellion had never flourished among these beetling 
clifi*s, nor in the rugged valleys that lay between. 
The masses all through East Tennessee and West 
Virginia, in the western part of North Carolina, and 
the northern portions of Georgia and Alabama, were 
never false to the Union. They were hunted by 
rebel mobs and proscribed by rebel authorities, were 
persecuted and driven to caves, imprisoned, starved, 
tortured, put to death, but remained firm in their al- 
legiance. It was a sacred duty of the government to 
go to the rescue of these people, as well as its plainest 
policy to reestablish among them the authority, which, 
it was asserted, the whole South w^as so anxious to 



430 MILITAEY HISTOEY OP 

overthrow. Here would be a nucleus for loyalty, 
here was a population ready to defend and support 
and assist the national armies, instead of what was 
found everywhere else at the South, one determii^ed 
to oppose and obstruct and betray. 

Chattanooo-a was in the heart of this reacion and 
in the midst of this population. Its possession would 
protect these people, and secure these advantages. 
Next after Richmond, the great political focus of the 
rebellion, and Vicksburg, that fortress and menace of 
the Mississippi valley, Chattanooga loomed up before 
the nation and the military authorities, as absolutely 
indispensable to success, and, Avhen once gained, the 
foundation and forerunner of final victories. 

As early as Januar}^, 1862, McClellau, then gen- 
eral-in-chief, wrote to Buell, who was in command in 
Kentucky : " There are few things I have more at 
heart than tlie prompt movement of a strong column 
into Eastern Tennessee. . . . My own general plans 
for the prosecution of the war make the speedy occu- 
pation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway, mat- 
ters of absolute necessity." And again : " Interesting 
as Nashville may be to the Louisville interests, it 
strikes me that its possession is of very secondary im- 
portance, in comparison with the immense results 
that would arise from the adherence to our cause of 
the masses in East Tennessee, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, northern Georgia and Alabama — results 
that I feel assured would ere Ion 2: follow from the 
movement alluded to." 

No positive movement, however, was made in this 
direction, until after tlie evacuation of Corinth, in 
May, 1862, when Ilalleck sent Buell, with more than 
foi-ty thousand men, across the states of Alabama and 



ULYSSES S. GRAKT. 431 

Tennessee, to Chattanooga. But, Bracfg starte<l for 
the same point, nearly as soon as Buell, and, Ly a 
series of skilful manoeuvres, compelled that general 
to fall back to the Oliio ; after months of marching 
and fiirhtino*, Buell "was further from his 2:<*«d than 
when he set out from Corinth, and, accordingly, was 
relieved. Rosecrans then took command of the Army 
of the Cumberland, with Chattanooga still as tlie ob- 
jective point, He manoeuvred from summer till win- 
ter, and from January again until June, fighting the 
battle of Murfreesboro on the first days of 18G3, when 
the national troops were left in possession of the field ; 
but, thereafter, he remained immovable for months. 

While Grant was operating behind Vicksburg, he 
had urged that Rosecrans should be directed to make 
some movement in his favor, to distract the enemy, 
and. at least prevent the troops of Bragg, who was in 
front of Rosecrans, from being sent to reenforce John- 
ston.""" But, although he was greatly superior to 
Brasfsr in numbers, Rosecrans refused to budge, f 
When Halleck gave him orders to advance, he held a 
council of war, and replied that it was a military 
maxim not to fio-ht two decisive battles at the same 
time. So Bragg was depleted and Johnston reen- 
forced, and the siege of Vicksburg prolonged. When 
Vicksburg fell, the reljels of course brought back to 
Bragg the troops that they were no longer able to 
use in front of Grant.J They were good strategists. 
Havinix fewer forces and resources than the govern- 



* See page 227. 

t See Ilalleck's report, as gcneral-in-chief, for 1863. 

+ The fact of these movements was shown conclusively at the time, 
by the reports of prisoners, as well as by scouts and spies from the va- 
rious national armies. 



432 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

ment, they earlier learned to husband and concen- 
trate the means which were at their command. 

On the 24th of June, Roseerans finally started 
from Murfreesboro, with about seventy thousand 
effective men ; * Bragg was still in his front witli an 
inferior force, and retreated before him. Roseerans 
crossed the Tennessee at Stevenson, and marched 
south among the mountains, threatening to isolate 
Bragg, who was thus compelled to follo\v. The 
Ai-my of the Cumberland was absolutely thrust be- 
tween Bragg and Geoi'gia, and, unless intercepted, 
would have surrounded tlie rebel general, who had 
fallen back to Chattanooga. In order to prevent this 
disaster, Bragg was obliged to give up the prize 
of the campaign, having been faii'ly outgeneralled. 
Chattanooga was occupied by the national troops, 
on the 9th of September. 

Bragg, however, meant that this occupation should 
he temporary only, and having been largely reeuforced, 
determined to give battle to Roseerans. The rebel 
ai-my was now at least sixty thousand strong; f while 
that of Roseerans was reduced to about forty-five thou- 
sand eflective men.J The Army of the Cumberland 

* Rosecrans's strength when he started for Chickamauga was 
probably seventy thousand men ; but he was obliged to leave garri- 
sons at the various towns he took, as well as to guard the railroads as 
he advanced. This sjjeedily reduced his moving column. 

t On the 31st of August, 18G3, Bragg's effective strength was ofli- 
cially rcj^orted as forty-five thousand and forty-one men. This did 
not include Longstreet's corps, which, on the 20th of October, was re- 
ported at fifteen thousand "two hundred and twenty-one (effective), nor 
Buckner's, which numbered nine thousand two hundred and seven ; both 
of these forces participated in the battle of Chickamauga, so that Bragg's 
active force in that battle must have been fully sixty tliousand men. " 

t No formal return of the troops engaged under Roseerans in this 
battle was made to the adjutant-general's office. One was compiled 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 433 

liad been widely separated in tlie movements tliat pro- 
cured possession of Chattanooga. It was composed of 
tliree corps, under Major-Generals Tliomas, McCook, 
and Crittenden. Crittenden held Chattanooga, while 
the other corps were moving east and south, through 
the mountains, separated by intervals of nearly 
twenty miles ; the extreme right of Rosecrans was 
forty miles from the left of his army, with almost im- 
penetrable mountains between. While in this posi- 
tion, he was threatened by Bragg, but got his forces 
together at Chickamauga creek by the 19tli of Sep- 
tember, although with infinite difficulty. Here Bragg 
attacked, and after two days' fighting, succeeded iu 
piercing the national centre, and demolishing the right 
wing of the army. Rosecrans himself hurried to Chat- 
tanooga, to prepare for its defence, and McCook and 
Crittenden also left the field. But Thomas held on, 
and althougli the whole bulk of the rebel army was 
now precipitated upon his single corps,* in the hope 
of getting between him and Chattanooga, Bragg was 
unable to accomplish this object, and finally aban- 
doned the attempt. In the battle of Chickamauga, 
Rosecrans lost thirty-six cannon, and more than six- 
teen thousand men. But for the gallantry and de- 

for me, from other returns, to cover this date, according to wliicb Rose- 
crans had over eighty-two thousand men present ; deducting one- 
third, the usual allowance for sick, extra-duty men, etc., would leave 
about sixty thousand. This statement, however, must be inaccurate, 
as it conflicts with the returns of Thomas, made a month later, and 
with the positive recollection of various officers of rank, Avhu would 
have been likely to know. 

* Major-Gencral Gordon Granger came upon the field with a divis- 
ion of about five thousfuid men, during the battle, and went at once, 
without orders, to the critical point, where his troops were of great use 
in resisting the onslaught of the rebels. His numbers are included in 
the estimate of forty-tive thousand men as Rosecrans's strength in this 

fight. 

28 



434 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

termination of Thomas and Ms command, the army 
would have been absolutely destroyed, and Chatta- 
nooga lost. The position, However, was saved. 

But the position alone. When Rosecrans dis- 
covered tlie extent of his misfortune, he deter- 
mined, if possible, to hold Chattanooga, but tbought 
himself unable to do more. The whole army was at 
once withdrawn into the town, and, in two days, a 
formidable line of works was thrown up, so close 
that some of the houses were left outside. Missionary 
ridge, immediately south and east of Chattanooga, 
is about four hundi*ed feet high, and three miles 
from the Tennessee. This was instantly occupied 
by Bragg, who followed Thomas rapidly on the 
21st. Lookout mountain, on the west, is twenty-two 
hundred feet high, and about three miles off. It is a 
rugged, narrow ridge, a hundi-ed and fifty miles long, 
but not more than a mile or two across. Its north- 
ern and eastern front looks down on Chattanoosra, 
while on its western side lies a narrow valley, hardly 
two miles wide, the bed of Lookout river. Still west 
of this valley, Raccoon mountain rises, another lofty 
and Avooded ridge, reaching far off into Alabama. 
The Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, by which 
all supplies were brought to the national army, runs 
along the southern bank of the Tennessee, and imme- 
diately under the Lookout mountain, then crosses the 
entrance to Lookout valley, and turns south and west 
towards Stevenson. 

This valley and mountain, in an evil hour, Rose- 
crans determined to abandon. lie supposed that it 
would be impossible to maintain communication with 
the troops that were stationed there, and of course 
impossible for troops to exist without communication 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 435 

and supplies. Bragg was already closing around 
Mm in a semicircle; and, unmindful or neglectful of 
its extreme importance, Kosecruns withdrew the force 
on Lookout mountain. From that moment the Army 
of the Cumberland was besieged. The rebels in- 
stantly occupied the point so unwisely yielded, per- 
ceiving it to be the key to the w^hole position ; they 
placed batteries so as to command the railroad and 
the river; they seized the railroad itself, and all 
suj)plies W'Cre at once cut off. Rosecrans could only 
maintain communication with Nashville, by wagon- 
ing sixty miles over the rough mountain-roads, and 
through the rugged gaps on the north side of the 
Tennessee. The country there is as impracticable as 
on the southern side. Walden's ridge is steep and 
wild ; there is but one road, and that circuitous and 
bad. The route was from Chattanooga to Anderson, 
from Anderson back again to Jasper, and from Jas- 
per to Bridgeport. Thence the railroad was open to 
Nashville. To supply an army of forty thousand 
men by such a route, for any length of time, was an 
impossibility; and there seemed no other possible 
mode. 

Brao-cr's line now extended from the river above 
the town to the river again below, so that Chatta- 
nooga w^as practically invested. Securely seated on 
Missionary ridge, the rebel general w\atched everj' 
movement of the national army, and from the point 
of Lookout mountain, threw shells into Rosecrans's 
camp. He fortified himself upon the hills, and his 
outworks reached a mile from their base, where the 
pickets of the two armies were within hail of each 
other ; both di'a^\iug water from Chattanooga creek. 
After the first few davs, the roads on the north side 



436 MILITARY IIISTOEY OF 

of the Tennessee became so bad, by reason of thy 
fall rains, that it was impossible for the supply-trains 
from Bridgeport to cross the mountains. The whole 
command was put on half rations; three thousand 
wounded soldiers * lay in the camps and hospitals, 
suffering and dying from lack of proj^er sustenance ; 
forage for the animals could not be procured, and ten 
thousand mules and horses died in and around Chat- 
tanooga. All officers were reduced to half an allow- 
ance of forage for a single horse ; all the ai-tillery- 
horses Avere sent back to Bridgeport, over the moun- 
tain, one-third dying on the road. Eetreat itself thus 
became impossible, unless the artillery was aban- 
doned. Every few days, between the rain-storms, an 
attempt would l^e made to get a supply-train through ; 
but Bragg sent a cavalry expedition around, over 
Walden's ridge, north of Chattanooga, and cut off a 
train bringing medical supplies and stores for the 
wounded, and another with ordnance stores. The 
stock of ammunition, after this, was just large enough 
to supply each man for one more battle — not half the 
ordinary allowance for an army. 

And here the Army of the Cumberland lay, in 
the hot sun and chilly nights of September, and un- 
der the heavy rains of autumn; without sufficient 
food, with few tents, half supplied with ammunition ; 
the camp-streets filled with dead and dying animals ; 
with few blankets, and no extra clothing, for when 
Roseci-ans started on his campaign he expected it to 

* About nine thousand national soldiers Lad been wounded at the 
battle of Chickamauga. There was no water on the battle-field, and 
the wounded were all taken six miles to the reai-, to Crawfish sprino-s 
where they were laid on the uround, as near the spring as j^ossible. 
The enemy broke through, near here, and capture<l thousands of these, 
'onable to defend themselves. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 437 

be a sliort and successful one, and ordered the men 
to take but one blanket apiece, and no overcoats. In 
tke battle and fligbt, blankets were thrown aside ; 
and after Chattanooga was besieged, it was a ques- 
tion whether food could be procured ; there was no 
thought of brinoins: blankets over the mountain-roads. 
The enemy only refrained from attacking because he 
thought his prey already caged.* It was unnecessary 
to assault and lose life in the attempt to take what 
was secure. All Brairo; had to do was to wait, and 
Chattanooo;a would Ml without a battle ; starvation 
would soon reduce the besieged, and retreat or reen- 
forcement was impossible. This was the situation of 
the Army of the Cumberland, when Grant took com- 
mand of it, on the 19th of October, 1863. No other 
of the national armies was reduced to such straits 
during the war. 

But Chattanooga was only the centre of Grant's 
new front ; his operations must necessarily extend to 
Bridgeport, aboiit thirty miles to the right, where 
the railroad from Nashville strikes the Tennessee, 
and formed his solitary line of communication with 
the North; while, on the left, the whole region 
watered by the Tennessee was to be defended. This 
important valley is forty or fifty miles wide, and runs 
in a southwesterly direction, ft-om Virginia through 
East Tennessee. Above Chattanooga, the river itself 
formed one of the main defences of the national 
forces, in fact, the ditch to their fortifications, for their 
line was established behind it. Holding the Tennes- 

* "These dispositions faithfully sustaiucd, insured the enemy's 
speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, for want of food and forage. Pos- 
sessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which rcen- 
forcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruc- 
tion was only a question oiiime.''''— Bragg' s Report. 



438 :military history of 

see and its branches, they effectually closed the rich 
valley to the rebels, who were greatly in need of its 
abundant supplies of grain and beef, and who, be- 
sides, had more than once issued through this sally- 
port on devastating raids, as far north even as the 
Ohio. Chattanooga, therefore, was an immense bas- 
tion at the centre of Grant's line, flanked on one side 
by the Tennessee valley, and on the other by the 
mountains of northern Georgia and Alabama. In its 
front, but a hundred and fifty miles south, lay At- 
lanta, at the junction of as many important railroads 
as Chattanooga; and, covered by Atlanta, were Sel- 
ma, with its arsenals, Montgomery, with its great 
stores of cotton, Macon, Mobile, and all the rich cen- 
tral valley that extends from the Cumberland moun- 
tains to the Gulf of Mexico. 

On the 23d of Sej^tember, immediately after the 
defeat of Rosecraus, Halleck detached the Eleventh 
and Twelftli corps from the Army of the Potomac, 
and sent them by rail, under command of Major- 
General Hooker, to protect Rosecrans's railroad line 
of communication between Bridgeport and Nashville. 
These troops, however, were not ordered fui'ther than 
Bridgeport, as their presence at Chattanooga would 
only have increased the embarrassment of those who 
could not themselves be fully supplied. The Army 
of the Cumberland, therefore, knew that two corps 
of national troops lay within fifty miles, but unable 
to afford them succor; indeed, that the arrival of 
reenforcements would only aggravate their diffi- 
culties. 

At this time, Major-General Burnside was in com- 
mand of the Department of the Ohio, which included 
Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. Early in August, 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 439 

he liad been directed to begin a campaign in East 
Tennessee, and cooperate with the movements of Rose- 
crans ; and, before the Ninth corps was returned to 
him by Grant, Burnside had taken the field, moving 
by three roads, upon Kingston and Knoxville. On 
the 2d of September, he seized Knoxville, a hundred 
and ten miles from Chattanooga, where the Tennes- 
see river, the railroad, and many important country 
roads converge. Possession of the entire region of 
East Tennessee, from Cumberland gap to Loudon, 
was speedily secured, without any heavy fighting. 
Burnside was then ordered to concentrate his troops 
on the Tennessee, west of Loudon, and to connect 
with Rosecrans. This junction was repeatedly urged 
upon him by Halleck, but although the Ninth corps 
joined him by the 1st of October, the movement was 
never made. Burnside was threatened by a rebel 
force in West Virginia, and replied that he thought 
the cooperation with Rosecrans unnecessary. After 
Chickamauga, the enemy pushed a column into East 
Tennessee, driving Burnside back as far as Loudon. 

On the 20th of October, Halleck ^vrote to Grant, 
at lengtli, informing him of the objects aimed at in 
the movements of Rosecrans and Burnside, and of the 
measures directed by himself in order to attain those 
objects. "Your difficulty," he said, "will not be in 
the want of men, but in the means of supplying them 

at this season of the year If you reoccupy the 

passes of Lookout mountain, wliich sliould never 
have been given up, you will be able to use the rail- 
road and river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. 
This seems to me a matter of vital importance, and 

should receive your early attention A\Tiatever 

measures you may deem proper to adopt und^r exist- 



440 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

ing circumstances, will receive all possible assistance 
from the aiitlioiities at Washington." This promise 
of cooperation and siip]30i*t, from the government and 
the general-in-chief, was kept to the letter, in the oper- 
ations which ensued. 

Grant himself, however, never asked for rein- 
forcements. He was accustomed to state his condition 
fully, and then to leave it for his superiors to decide 
whether they would supply' his wants. I have not 
been able to find a single request from him for troops, 
unless he had been previously directed to state his 
needs. If, after he had made known his condition 
and plans, the government did not see fit, or was un- 
able to supply him further, he went to work with 
whatever means he had, and did the best he knew 
how. But there never had been any lack of material 
assistance, when it was possible to be bestowed; 
and, as has been seen, the moral suppoit afforded him 
had almost always been cordial. Halleck seldom 
frustrated any of Grant's schemes, and never did 
more than, as commanding officer, he had a perfect 
right to do. When he did interfere, it was doubtless 
with good intentions, and supposing his own judg- 
ment to be better than that of his subordinate. His 
judgment, indeed, was often at fault, but the patriot- 
ism of his motives was unquestioned by Grant. From 
this time, however, the chief deferred to the judg- 
ment of his successful subordinate. 

At the same time that Grant telegraphed to 
Thomas the order to assume command of the De- 
partment of the Cumberland, he sent him the fol- 
lowing dispatch from Louisville: "October 10, 11.30 
p. M. Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be 
there as soon as possible." Thomas replied at once : 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 441 

" I will hold the town till we starve ! " — an answer 
worthy of the soldier whose individual energy had 
infused his own corps, and saved an entire army from 
annihilation, at the battle of Chickamauga. 

On the morning of the 20th, Grant started fi*om 
Louisville, by rail. lie arrived at ISTashville the 
same night, and, at half-past eleven, he telegi'aphed 
to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville : " Have you 
tools for fortifying ? Important j^oints in East Ten- 
nessee should be 25ut in condition to be held by the 

smallest number of men, as soon as possible I 

will be in Stevenson to-morrow night, and Chatta- 
noosra the next nio^ht." From Nashville, he also tele- 
graphed to Admiral Porter, at Cairo : " General Sher- 
man's advance was at Eastport, on the loth. The 
sooner a gunboat can be got to him the better. Boats 
must now be on the way from St. Louis, with sup- 
plies to go up the Tennessee, for Sherman." Of 
Thomas, he asked : " Should not large working-parties 
be put upon the road between Bridgej)ort and Chat- 
tanooo^a, at once ? " At Stevenson, he met Kosecrans, 
who had received the order relieving him, and was 
now on his way to the North. Their interview was 
short ; but Rosecrans was cordial, and volunteered in- 
formation about the condition of affairs. At Bridge- 
port, Grant telegraphed for the commissary of sub- 
sistence at Nashville, to " send to the front, as speed- 
ily as possible, vegetables for the army. Beans and 
hominy are especially required." 

From this point, the party started by horse, for 
Chattanooga : the roads were almost impassable, by 
reason of the rain, which rolled in toiTcnts, sometimes 
a foot deep, down the sides of the mountain. Great 
precipices rose and descended on either hand; the 



442 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

ground was slippery, aud tlie liillsides were strewn 
vriih the wrecks of wao-ons, and tlie carcasses of ani- 
mals tliat liad fallen over the bluffs, or died on the 
road. Frequently, the whole party had to dismount 
and lead their horses across difficult places ; and 
Grant, who was still lame and suffering, was carried 
in the arms of soldiers, over the spots unsafe or im- 
possible to cross on horseback. At Jasper, there was 
a halt, and, from there, he telegraj^hed to Burnside, by 
way of Louisville and Lexington: "Every effort 
should be made to increase your small-arm ammuni- 
tion to five hundred rounds per man, and artillery to 
five hundred rounds." And thus the crippled com- 
mander travelled to the fi'out, by steam and horse, and 
carried in the arms of his soldiers; telegraphing to 
Halleck, and to Sherman, to Porter, and to Thomas, and 
to Burnside, on the way ; attending to the supplies, and 
directing the movements of his three armies ; order- 
ing vegetables to Chattanooga, and ammunition to 
Knoxville, seeming gunboats to protect Sherman, and 
directing working-parties to remake Thomas's roads. 

A\Tien the party reached Chattanooga it was 
just dark. The rain still fell in torrents; they 
were cold, and hungry, and di-enched, and tired; 
the rebel lines absolutely enclosed the national 
camp, and Lookout mountain, like a gigantic jailer, 
stood guard below the town, preventing all egress by 
the beleaguered army. The officers and soldiers they 
met were downcast, if not desponding ; hemmed in 
on every side by the enemy, whose pickets came so 
close upon their own ; without the possibility either 
of holding out much longer, or of escaping through 
the impassable defiles in their rear ; a river at their 
back, in case tliey were attacked, and short supplies 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 44:3 

of ammunition ; in front, a rebel force larger than tlieir 
own, fortified on wliat seemed imi^regnalde ridges, 
and mountains formed by Nature to resist assault. 
Theii- strength and spirits were de^^leted by tlie lack 
of food ; they could not use artillery, for the horses 
were all dead or sent away ; and they could not even 
be reenforced, for, with no means of supplying them- 
selves, it was worse than mockery to send more troops 
to consume the scanty rations that ^^'ere now doled 
out. The gloom of that night seemed impenetrable. 

Grant went at once to Thomas's headquarters, and 
at half-past nine p. :^r. on the 23d, he telegraphed to 
Halleck : '' Have just arrived. I will write to-mor- 
row. Please approve order placing Sherman in com- 
mand of Department of the Tennessee, with head- 
quarters in the field." This request was promptly 
acceded to, and Sherman was placed in Grant's old 
command. Thomas behaved with great magnanim- 
ity; he said there had been rumors that an inde- 
pendent command was intended for him when Kose- 
crans should be relieved, but that he would not have 
accepted it ; he thought it should be given to Grant, 
or to some one else whose name w\as connected with 
success. The arrangement that had been made, how- 
ever, giving him the Army of the Cumberland, but 
making Grant supreme, was perfectly satisfactory. 

That night. Grant learned that Thomas had al- 
ready ordered the concentration of Hooker's command, 
at Bridgeport. This was with a view to securing the 
Tennessee river, and the main wagon-road on its 
northern bank, between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. 
At present, this road was commanded by rebel sharp- 
shooters, and unsafe even for couriers. The next 
morning, Grant rode out in company with Thomas 



444 ]\IILITART HISTORY OF 

and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer 
of the Department of the Cumberland, and made a 
reconnoissance on the north side of the river and at 
the mouth of Lookout valley, as well as of a crossing 
of the Tennessee, known as Brown's ferry. 

A bend in the Tennessee, just below Chattanooga, 
shapes the northern shore into a singular peninsula, 
called Moccasin point, from its resemblance to an In- 
dian moccasin. This point runs out immediately un- 
der Lookout mountain ; and, at its narrowest part, 
about three miles below the mouth of Lookout 
creek, Brown's ferry is situated. Moccasin point was 
still in the hands of the national army, but the oppo- 
site bank, from Chattanooga creek to Kelly's ferry, 
was occupied by the rebels. A sharp range of hills, 
whose base is washed by the Tennessee, extends along 
the southern shore, below the mouth of Lookout river, 
and is broken at Brown's ferry by a narrow gorge, 
through w^hich a road runs to Kelly's ferry, on the 
western side of Raccoon mountain. The valley be- 
tween this rido;e and the Baccoon mountain is nar- 
row, and a lodgment effected there would seriously 
interrupt the communications of the enemy up Look- 
out valley, as 'well as give complete command of the 
Kelly's ferry road. Now, from Kelly's ferry to Bridge- 
port, the river was free from the rebels. The ridge 
was thinly picketed, and tlie valley apparently unoc- 
cupied l)y any large force of the enemy. It seemed, 
therefore, quite practicable to take by surprise what, 
if strongly defended, could not have been carried by 
assault. 

It was proposed that Hooker should concentrate 
at Bridgeport, and move east, while a force from Chat- 
tanooga, cooperating, was to establish a bridge across 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 445 

the river at Bro\\Ti's ferry, and seize the lieiglits on 
tlie soiitliern side, thus giving Hooker an open road 
to Chattanooga, wlien his forces should arrive in Look- 
out valley. As the rebels held the north end of Look- 
out valley with a brigade of troops, as well as the 
road leadino; around the foot of the mountain from 
their main camp in Chattanooga valley, they would 
have had but little difficulty in concentrating a suffi- 
cient force to defeat Hooker and drive him back. To 
prevent this, the seizure of the range of hills at the 
mouth of Lookout valley, and covering the Brown's 
ferry road, was deemed of the highest importance. 
By the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and 
Brown's ferry, and of the north bank of the river 
across Moccasin point, a shorter line could be secured 
to reenforce the troops in Lookout valley, than was 
afforded to the rebels by the narrow and tortuous 
road around the foot of Lookout mountain. 

Accordingly, Grant directed that Hooker should 
cross, at Bridgeport, to the south side of the Tennes- 
see, with all the force that could be spared from 
guarding the railroad in his rear, and move along tlie 
main wagon-road, by way of Whitesides, to Wauhat- 
chie, in the Lookout valley. Major-General John M. 
Palmer, commanding a division of the Fourth corps, 
in the Army of the Cumberland, was moved to a posi- 
tion opposite Chattanooga. From there, he was to 
march by the Jasper road, the only practicable route 
north of the Tennessee, to a point on the north bank, 
opposite Whitesides ; then, to cross to the south 
side and hold the road passed over by Hooker. 
In the mean time, and before the enemy could be ap- 
prised of the intention, a force under W. F. Smith 
was to be thrown across the river, at Brown's ferry. 



446 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

and to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Look- 
out valley, covering the Kelly's ferry road. 

In these operations, the absolute necessity of gain- 
ing some means of supporting the army was the first 
and paramount consideration with Grant. This, every 
one saw, must demand the first attention. Every 
one also saw that the means now to be attempted 
was that which promised relief, if relief was to be 
secured at all. In case of success, the river would be 
open from Kelly's ferry to Bridgeport, and the road 
on the north side clear ; so that either steamboats or 
wagons could be used to bring up supplies. Rose- 
crans had contemplated some movement of this sort, 
and had ordered a pontoon bridge to be prepared, but 
had been content with such remote preliminaries.* 
Smith, too, had suggested the plan, which, however, 
suggested itself to every soldier ; Halleck had pro- 
posed it, and Thomas had determined on it, and even 
given some directions in the matter, before Grant ar- 
rived. "When Grant visited the ferry, the importance 
of the position was at once evident to him, and, that 
day, he issued positive orders for the movement. 

Smith was instructed to make all necessary ar- 
rangements for the expedition which was to effect a 
lodgment at Brown's ferry. Four thousand men were 
detailed, and the force to throw the bridge was organ- 
ized on the 24th, the day of Grant's reconnoissance ; 
the pontoon bridge was ready in two days more ; and 
Smith, meanwhile, examined the ground ^vith his 
brigade commanders, and gave the, requisite orders. 
Eighteen hundred men, under Brigadier-General Ila- 
zen, were to embark in boats, and pass down the 

* Rosccrans liad begun the construction of a steamboat, to be used 
in case the river was ever reopened. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 447 

river about nine miles, seven of wliicli would be un- 
der fire of tlie rebel pickets. Tliis risk was taken ra- 
ther than launch the pontoons near the ferry, because 
the boats would move more rapidly than intelligence 
could be carried by the infantry pickets of the enemy ; 
and, although the rebels might be alarmed, they could 
not know where the landing was to be attempted, 
and therefore coald not concentrate with certainty 
against the landing. 

By sundown on the 2Gth, all Avas ready. The 
night was dark and foggy, and at three a. m., on the 
27th, sixty pontoon boats, each containing thirty 
armed men, floated quietly fi'om Chattanooga. The 
current was so strong, that there was no need of oars, 
and by keeping well under the opposite shore, they 
passed the rebel pickets undiscovered ; then rounded 
the foot of Lookout mountain, and landed on the south 
side of the river, at Brown's ferry. Here, a volley was 
fired by the rebel pickets, who had now taken the 
alarm ; some sliglit skirmishing ensued, but, by five 
o'clock, Smith had seized the hills covering the feny, 
without the loss of a man killed, and but four or five 
wounded. The remainder of the troops and the ma- 
terial for a bridge were moved, by the north bank 
of the river, across Moccasin point to Brown's ferry, 
without attracting the attention of the enemy; and, 
before day dawned, the whole force was ferried to the 
south bank of the stream, and the almost inaccessible 
heights rising from Lookout valley, at its outlet to 
the river, were secured. The men carried axes, to be 
used in cutting an abatis for defence, as soon as the 
ridge was gained ; and, in two hours, the command 
was sufficiently protected to withstand any attack 
likely to be made. As soon as the last of the troops 



448 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

were over, tlie bridge was begun, and, by ten o'clock, 
an excellent pontoon bridge was laid, thus securing 
tlie end of the desired road nearest tlie enemy's forces, 
and a shorter line than the rebels could have, by 
which to move reeuforcements, if a battle became 
inevitable. Positions were taken, from which the 
troops could not have been driven except by vastly 
superior forces ; and artillery was placed to command 
the roads leading, around Lookout mountfjn, to the 
enemy's camps in Chattanooga valley. 

On the morning of the 26th, Hooker crossed the 
Tennessee, by the pontoon bridge at Bridgeport, with 
the greater part of the Eleventh corps, under Major- 
General Howard, and a portion of the Twelfth corps, 
under Brigadier-General Geary. He took up his line 
of march along the railroad, by way of Whitesides to 
Wauhatchie. The rebel pickets fell back as he ad- 
vanced ; and, marching along the western base of 
Kaccoon mountain, he finally descended throuo-h a 
narrow gorge into Lookout valley, leaving troops to 
protect the passes along the route. As the column 
emerged into the valley, its advance was arrested by 
an irregular fire of musketry ; but Hooker at once 
deployed his troops, and all 023position ceased, the 
enemy flying before him. The rebels now detected 
the movement, fi'om their signal-stations on Lookout 
mountain, and threw shells into the column as it 
marched below. This, however, caused no serious 
interruption ; and Hooker kept on down the valley. 
He met no further resistance; and at six o'clock, 
P.M., on the 2Sth, the command was halted for the 
night, and went into camj:) within a mile of Brown's 
ferry. Howard had the advance, and, as it was ne- 
cessarv to hold both the roads to Kelly's ferry, Geary 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 449 

was encamped at Wauliatcliie, about three miles from 
the position occuj^ied by Howard's corps. 

The rebels, however, were fully aware of the con- 
dition of affairs in Chattanooga, and of the necessity 
for Grant's establishing a new and sliorter line of suj:)- 
plies. They knew, also, the importance, to themselves, 
of keeping him from this line ; and, when it was sud- 
denly snatched from them, in a manner they had never 
dreamed of, an attempt w\as instantly made to regain 
possession of the vital jDoiut. The night after Hooker's 
arrival, Longstreet's corps attacked him in force.* 
The battle began at one o'clock, with a fierce assault 
on Geary, at Wauhatchie. Howard was at once 
directed to move his nearest division to the support 
of Geary. He moved promj)tly ; but, before reaching 
Geary, found a rebel force strongly posted on a range 
of hills on the left, which commanded his line of 
march. His second division soon came uj), and an 
assault was made in the night, against these hills. 
They were steep and wooded, and entirely unknown 
to the national soldiers; but Howard scaled them 
under a heavy fire, and carried them by storm, cap- 
turing many prisoners. Tlie rebels had already be- 
gun to build works on the summit, evidently intend- 
ing to hold the position permanently. 

Geary, meanwhile, had been fighting for three 
hours, without assistance, and, although at one time 
almost envelo^^ed on three sides, finally succeeded in 
completely repelling the assault on his front. The 
moon shone fitfully into the valley, and the com- 
mands could often distinguish each other only by 

* The rebel prisoners universally stated that all of Longstreet's 
corps was engaged. I have no other authority for the statement, as 
no rebel report of this battle is in possession of the government. 
29 



450 ]\[ILITAEY HISTOKY OF 

tlie flaslies of their fire-arms. The strange echoes of 
the cann'jii among the hills, and the muttering of 
musketry from every quarter, alarmed the teamsters 
of Geary's wagon-train, who deserted their mules, 
and in the darkness and noise, the animals became 
more friditened than their drivers ; they soon broke 
loose, and, with their tackle dangling and rattling 
about their heels, rushed in a body directly towards 
the enemy. This augmented the confusion of the 
rebels, who supposed it to be an attack of cavalry, 
and their rout was rendered inglorious by the assist- 
ance of a pack of mules. 

By four o'clock, the battle was over, and the ene- 
my repelled at every point. Hooker had nearly ^ 
seven thousand men engaged ; his loss was four hun- 
dred and sixteen, in killed and wounded ; he took 
more than a hundred prisoners. Geary buried one 
hundred and fifty-three rebels, on his front alone ; 
but the whole loss of the enemy is not certainly 
known.f The heights which had been carried by 
Howard were fortified at once, and the entire position 
made secure against any further assault. Hooker, 
thereafter, remained undisturbed. Flanked as he was 
by mountain and river, on either hand, it was useless 
for the rebels to repeat the attempt at surprise. 
Every advantage they could hope for in an assault, 
they had already enjoyed at Wauhatchie— the night, 
the surprise. Hooker unfortified, and unfamiliar with 
the country ; and yet they had fidled ; while, in case 
of another effort, Grant had a shorter line by which 

* Hooker's force was ten thousand one hundred and eightj", present 
for duty ; but not all of this was engaged. 

t Hooker estimates Longstreet's loss at fifteen hundred. I have no 
means of verifying or disputing this. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 451 

to reenforce liis subordinate, than the rebels them- 
selves possessed around the base of the mountain. 
The fate of Lookout valley was decided. 

The force which had started for Whitesides, un- 
der command, of Palmer, reached its destination at 
the appointed time, and took up the position intended 
in the original plan of the movement ; so that two 
good lines were now secured, by which to obtain sup- 
plies from the railroad at Bridgeport ; namely, the 
main wagon-road by way of Whitesides, Wauhatchie, 
and Brown's ferry, a distance of twenty-eight miles ; 
and the Kelly's ferry and Brown's ferry road, by 
use of which, and of the river from Bridgeport to 
Kelly's ferry, the distance for wagoning was reduced 
to eight miles. 

The road to Nashville was thus opened in five 
days after Grant's arrival at the front, and the com- 
mand rescued from all immediate danger. The rebel 
authorities were greatly chagrined at this achieve- 
ment, and their newspapers were full of lamentations. 
Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Lookout mountain 
only a week before, and feasted his eyes with the 
sight of the national army, shut up among the hills, 
like an animal ready for slaughter; and now, at a 
single stroke, the prey had been snatched from his 
grasp. The door for relief was opened, and, from a 
besieged and isolated army, the force in Chattanooga 
had suddenly become the assailant. It was Bragg 
who was now on the defensive. Not only were sup- 
plies of rations and ammunition brought in, but two 
corps had been added to the strength of the national 
army, and Hooker threatened the rebel position on 
Lookout mountain. Horses and ammunition were 
hurried at once to Chattanooga; steamboats were 



452 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

constantly conveying stores from Bridge]3ort to Kel- 
ly's ferry, and full rations were speedily issued once 
more. 

The army felt as if it had been miraculously re- 
lieved. Its S23irit revived at once ; the depression of 
Chickamauga was shaken off, and the unshackled 
giant stood erect. The soldiers saw that they had a 
commander who could perceive and relieve their ne- 
cessities. They became buoyant and hopeful, and 
the very men ^vho had dragged themselves sick and 
half-despairing around their camps only two days be- 
fore, were now quite ready, at Grant's command, to 
assault the rebels on Missionary ridge. On the 28th, 
Grant said: "If the rebels give us one week more 
time, I think all danger of losing territory now held 
by us will have passed away, and preparations may 
commence for active operations." 

But, although the immediate emergency was met 
at Chattanooga, there were still other and instant 
needs which required the attention of the new com- 
mander. Ilis military division reached from JSTatchez 
to Knoxville, more than a thousand miles, and in- 
cluded two hundred thousand soldiers. Burnside's 
army, numbering nearly twenty-five thousand men, 
was more than a hundred miles from any navigable 
river by "which it could be supplied, and still further 
from a railroad. He needed rations and ammunition 
and clothing at once, and the problem of providing 
these was difficult. They were ordered from St. 
Louis, u-p the Mississippi and the Ohio livers, to the 
mouth of the Cumberland, and thence, convoyed by 
gunboats five hundred miles, up the Cumberland to 
Big South folk ; there Burnside was to meet them, 
and transport them, in wagons, a hundred miles 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 453 

further, to tlie ffont of operations in East Tennessee. 
This varied and complicated business was superin- 
tended directly by Grant. He first ordered the 
stores, on Burnside's demand ; then wrote to Admiral 
Porter for the gunboat convoy; then instructed Burn- 
side when and where to meet the supplies, and all the 
while was urging his subordinates to greater dili- 
gence, in order to secure the speedy transportation 
of material, without which he could not even begin 
his triple campaign. 

For, while Thomas was to be relieved from the 
danger which threatened to engulf his army at Chat- 
tanooga, and Burnside was to be made ready to pro- 
tect East Tennessee, and cooperate in the strategy 
which should direct the Army of the Cumberland, 
Sherman was marching across the continent, four 
hundred miles, from the Mississippi valley. He 
started from Yicksburg on the 27th of September, 
and arrived at Memphis on the 2d of October. It 
was then his duty to conduct the Fifteenth army 
corps, and such other troops as could be spared from 
Hurlbut's command, to the support of Rosecrans, 
marching by way of Corinth, Tuscumbia, and Deca- 
tur, to Athens, Alabama. During this long and te- 
dious marcli, he was to look to Rosecrans for no 
supplies, and was, therefore, obliged to repair the 
raiboad fi'om Memphis east, as he advanced: so 
Halleck had ordered. But, when Grant assumed 
command of the military division, he at once ordered 
supplies from St. Louis to meet Sherman at Eastport, 
on the Tennessee. These were sent up the river on 
transports. Grant requesting Admiral Porter to con- 
voy the steamers which conveyed them. 

Durino- all these campaigns, the national forces 



454 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

were operating amidst a hostile jDopulatioii. At this 
stage of the war, the rebellious spirit was rampant 
over almost the entire South ; and, even when armies 
were conquered and territory was occuj^ied, partisan 
bands were formed, which constantly threatened the 
long lines by which the national armies were obliged 
to advance. Guerillas and sharpshooters infested the 
rivers and roads on every I'oute. The railroads in 
rear were torn up, bridges were destroyed, steam- 
boats were burned or attacked, whenever they touched 
the shore ; and no difficulty, that beset the loyal com- 
manders during the war, was more constant or more 
momentous than that of protecting their extended 
lines of supply. As they penetrated further into the 
rebellious region, these difficulties increased, so that 
success itself seemed to enhance their dangers ; and 
now, when Grant's three armies had advanced many 
hundred miles from their bases, into a region bitterly 
hostile to the government, ever}^ mile of that advance 
had to be guarded, while his supplies of food and 
clothing and ammunition were pushed on. But when 
Sherman's advance reached Eastport, he found that 
Grant's prevision had secured supplies. 

The same remarkable relations which had so lons^ 
existed between Grant and his great subordinate 
were displayed at this juncture, as they had been on 
every otlier occasion when their display was proper, 
during the war. When Grant sent Sherman north, 
from Yicksburg, he said : " I hope you will be in time 
to aid in ixivinic the rebels the worst, or best thrash- 
ing they have had in this war. I have constantly 
had the feeling that I shall lose you from this com- 
mand entirely. Of course I do not object to seeing 
your s])here of usefulness enlarged, and think it 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 455 

sliould have been enlarged long ago, lia\ing an eye 
to the public good alone. But it needs no assurance 
from me, general, that, taking a more selfish view, 
while I would heartily apj)rove such a change, I 
would deeply regret it on my owu account." Grant, 
at this time, supposed that Sherman was to relieve 
Kosecrans of the command of the Army of the Cum- 
berland ; and, although Ilalleck had previously inti- 
mated that Grant himself might be sent to Nashville, 
this apparent substitution of his subordinate gave 
him no pain. His only regret was in parting with 
his friend and faithful coadj utor.'' 

At Memphis, however, Sherman heard that Grant 
also had been ordered north, and, -with the wonderful 
imselfishuess he had always manifested towards his 
chief, he wrote, on the 14th of October, nearly a week 
before the Military Division of the Mississippi was 
created : " Accept the command of the great army 
of the centre ; don't hesitate. By your presence at 
Nashville you will unite all discordant elements, and 
impress the enemy in proportion. All success and 
honor to you ! " And again, on the 15th : " I am very 
anxious you should go to Nashville, as foreshadowed 
by Halleck, and chiefly as }0U can harmonize all con- 
flicts of feeling that may exist in that vast crowd. 
Rosecrans and Burnside and Sherman, with their 
subordinates, would be ashamed of petty quarrels, if 
you were behind and near them, between them and 
Washington. Next, the union of such armies, and 
the direction of it, is Avorthy your ambition. I shall 
await news fi-om you with great anxiety." 

At one or two points on the route, Sherman had 

* In fact, Grant bad not been ordered to send Sbcrman in person, 
but preferred to place bim tbus in tbe May of advancement. 



456 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

encountered severe opposition ; not enoiigli to over- 
throw him, or really turn him from his course, but 
([uite enough to dehiy him seriously. Rebel forces 
were assembled at various stations, and, at Colliers- 
ville, Mississippi, a heavy attack w^as made on the 
body of troops wdth which Sherman himself was 
moving. This, however, was repulsed ; a bridge was 
built over Bear creek, and at Tuscumbia, whither 
Sherman sent Blair's division in advance, still another 
rebel force was dispersed. Skirmishing continued all 
along the route, but, about the middle of October, 
Sherman struck the Tennessee, at Eastport, where the 
river is nearly a mile wide. The gunboats Grant had 
asked for, and a coal-barge, at first were used for fer- 
riage ; but, in a day or two, the steamers also arrived 
with rations, and, as the various detachments of the 
army came up, they were successively fed, and ferried 
across. 

Up to this time, Sherman had literally obeyed the 
instructions of Halleck, and pushed forward the re- 
pairs of the railroad in his rear. But, after assuming 
command, on the 19th of October, Grant's first orders 
to Sherman were : " Increase to the greatest possible 
strength your moving column, and, at the same time, 
secure your communications to your base of supplies. 
Communicate with Steele, and urge the necessity of 
his sending you the division of Kimball, of the Six- 
teenth corps." Sherman was also ordered to bring 
forward the troops at Paducah, and any that could 
be spared from guarding the line of railroad from 
Memphis to Corinth : " Assign them to strengthen 
divisions already at the front," On the 24th, the day 
after he arrived at Chattanooga, Grant telegraphed to 
Sherman : " Drop every thing east of Bear creek, and 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 457 

move witli your entire force towards Stevenson, until 
you receive further orders, Tlie enemy are evidently 
moving a large force towards Cleveland, and may 
break throu2:li our lines and move on Nashville, in 
which event your troops are the only forces at com- 
mand that could beat them there." The dispatch was 
sent by a messenger, who floated down over the Mus- 
cle shoals, in the Tennessee river, landed at Tuscum- 
bia, and was sent on to Sherman, at Inka. He re- 
ceived the order on the 27th, and instantly proceeded 
to obey. 

In compliance mth Halleck's previous instruc- 
tions, Blair had been advanced as fiir as Tuscumbin, 
on the south side of the Tennessee, repairing the rail- 
road ; but, " dropping every thing," Sherman now re- 
versed this column, and turned all his troops to East- 
port, the only place where he could cross the Tennes- 
see. The work of crossing was pushed with all the 
vigor possible, and on the 1st of i^ovember, Sherman, 
in person, passed to the head of the column, at Flor- 
ence, leavino; Blair to follow with the rear di\'ision. 
Grant now ordered Tuttle's division, of McPherson's 
corps, to be sent forward to report to Sherman. De- 
lays were occasioned by the destruction of bridges 
across the Elk river, and long detours were made; 
for there was not time either to ferry, or to build new 
bridges ; and, on the 5th, Grant again dispatched to 
Sherman : " Leave Dodge's command " (of Hurlbut's 
corps) " at Athens, until further orders, and come 
with the remainder of your command to Stevenson, or 
until you receive other instructions." Again, on the 
7th : " The enemy have moved a great part of their 
force from this front towards Burnside. I have to 
make an immediate move from here towards their 



458 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 

lines of communication, to bring tliem back if possi- 
ble. I am anxious to see your old corps liere at the 
earliest moment." A\Tien Sherman reached Fayette- 
ville, he received still further instructions : " Come 
on to Stevenson and Bridgeport, with your four divi- 
sions. I want your command to aid in a movement 
to force the enemy back from their present position, 
and to make Bui'nside secure in his." He proceeded 
at once Avith his four divisions, along different roads, 
and, on the 13th, at night, arrived at Bridgeport. 
From that point, he immediately telegraphed his ar- 
rival to the commanding general, and was summoned 
in person to Chattanooga. 

This urgency of Grant had been caused by the 
movements of Bragg. As soon as the rebel general 
discovered that his negligence had allowed Grant to 
secure communications with Nashville, he turned his 
attention towards Burnside, who was isolated among 
the mountains aud rivers of East Tennessee, a hun- 
dred miles from Chattanooga. Bragg held tlie rail- 
road as far as Loudon, and, of course, had a much 
shorter line than Grant, for communication with East 
Tennessee ; he fii'st moved one division, under Steven- 
son, as far as Cleveland and Sweetwater. At the 
same time, Halleck, who had always felt the greatest 
uneasiness about Burnside, telegraphed to Grant that 
the rebels liad sent a corps of twenty thousand or 
twenty-five thousand men into East Tennessee, b}^ way 
of Abingdon, Virginia. " As Burnside will be obliged 
to move all his forces uj) the valle}-, you must guard 
against Bragg's army getting into East Tennessee, 
above Chattanooga." But, Grant had alread}" fore- 
seen this emergency, and replied : " I have sent ordei-s 
to Sherman to move east towards Stevenson, leaving 



ULYSSES S. GRAXT. 459 

every tiling unguarded, except Ly tlie cavalry of tlie 
Army of the Cumberland, east of Bear creek. The 
possibility of tlie enemy's breaking tlirougli our lines 
east of tliis, and present inability to follow lilm from 
here, if he should, is the cause of this." 

The rebel movement from Abingdon proved not 
to be important, but that from Bragg was more 
threatening; the column dispatched to Cleveland and 
towards Loudon was promptly reported to Grant, who 
announced it to Halleck, on the 1st of November, and 
at the same time remarked : " At present, lack of for- 
age and provisions entirely precludes the idea of mov- 
ino- from here, in that direction ; but I w^ill endeavor 
to make an advance up Lookout valley, and threaten 
the enemy from here, in front, at the same time, to 
force a return of these troops. If Sherman gets here," 
he said, " before the enemy disturbs Burnside's posi- 
tion, I think I will be able to make him take a re- 
spectful distance south of us." 

At the same time, he infonned Halleck : '' Steam- 
ers ply regularly between Kelly's ferry and Bridge- 
port, thus nearly settling the rations and forage 
question." This, however, did not satisfy the gen- 
eral-in-chief, who telegraphed the next day : '' I have 
serious fears about concentrating more troops near 
Chattanooga, lest they perish for want of supplies. 
This matter requii'es the most serious consideration." 
He was anxious about Burnside, too, and said : 
"Burnside cannot receive any more troops in East 
Tennessee, and has great a])prehensions about feed- 
ing his present army." Grant, however, had already 
given orders to open the road from Nashville to De- 
catur, and soothed the fears of his chief by informing 
him : " A portion of Sherman's command will remain 



460 ]\[rLITAEY HISTORY OF 

on the Nasliviile and Decatur road, till tliat is fin- 
ished. With two roads from Xashville, I think there 
can be no difficulty about supplies." He now di- 
rected Burnside to collect all the stores he could 
from the country, and the loyal Tennesseans gladly 
brouo-ht in corn, and beef, and foras-e. 

The rebels, meanwhile, were not idle. On the 3d 
of November, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, one of 
the ablest officers of the enemy, and who at this time 
commanded the most famous corps in Bragg's army, 
was summoned to a council of war, where he received 
instructions to move his command at once against 
Burnside. Accordingly, on the morning of the 4th, 
lie marched to Tyner's station, there to take cars for 
Sweetwater. His orders were, to drive Burnside out 
of East Tennessee, or, if possible, to capture or de- 
stroy him.""' Longstreet's effective force was a little 
more than fifteen thousand men, besides Wheeler's 
cavalry, perhaps five thousand strong ; f eighty guns 
were also ordered to accompany him. The rebel 
leaders were confident of success. On the 11th, 
Longstreet said to Bragg, from Sweetwater : " There 
are many reasons for anticipating great results from 
the exjDedition against General Burnside's army. His 
force should not be allowed to escape without an 
effort to destroy it. Witli the balance of my corj^s, 
or any good marching division, I think we may make 
a great campaign." Bragg, however, refused to give 
Longstreet more than the t\vo divisions of Hood and 

* See ^Vppendix, for Bragg's instructions to Longstreet entire. 

t Longstreet reported bis cfTective strength as about fifteen thou- 
sand. On the 31st of August, Wheeler's cavah-y numbered ten thou- 
sand six hundred and twenty-two effective men. Wheeler stated in 
his report that he took with him on this campaign, "portions of five 
brigades." 



ULYSSES S. GEA^'T. 461 

McLa'ws, altlioiigli fclie corps commander begged Lard 
for an increase, and said: " I think you greatly over- 
estimate the enemy's force at and around Chatta- 
nooga. I have seen the force every day for the time 
it lias been here, and cannot tJdnJc it exceeds your 
force^ xvitliout Stevenson^s division^ 

But these arguments were urged in vain, and 
Longstreet finally remarked : " As my orders were to 
drive the enemy out of East Tennessee, or if possible 
capture him, I determined that the only possible 
chance of succeeding in either or both, was to move 
and act as though I had a sufficient force to do either. 
I endeavored, therefore, to Mo as I should have done, 
had the twenty thousand men that I asked for been 
given me." 

Owing to some of the thousand delays and disap- 
pointments of war, although this force started 
promptly from Missionary ridge, on the 4th of No- 
vember, it was unable to leave Sweetwater, until the 
13th of the month. Grant, however, was instantly 
informed of the movement, and, on the Vth, he tele- 
graphed to Halleck: "In addition to the forces 
threatening Burn side from the east, there is but 
little doubt that Longstreet is moving to join them. 
I have ordered Thomas to attack the north end of 
Missionary ridge, and, when that is carried, to 
threaten or attack the enemy's line of communica- 
tions between Cleveland and Dalton. This move- 
ment will be made by Monday morning. I expect 
Shei-man will reach Huntsville to-day." Cleveland 
and Dalton are on the railroad l)etw?en Tennessee 
and Georgia. 

As early as the 26th of October, three days after 
his arrival at the front. Grant had foreseen the chance 



46:i JMILITAKV lliSTUKV OF 

of such a movement as the enemy had now under- 
taken, and telegraphed to Burnside : " Do you hear 
of any of Bragg's army threatening you from the 
southwest ? Thomas's command is in bad condition 
to use, for want of animals of sufficient strength to 
move his ai-tillery, and for want of rations. If you 
are threatened with a force beyond what you can 
compete with, efforts must be made to assist you. 
Answer." On the 28th, he said to Burnside: "It is 
particularly desirable that all the territory you now 
have should be held ; but, if any portion must be 
given up, let it be to the east, and keep your army 
so that it and Thomas's army can support each other. 
It is better that you should be forced from the east- 
ern end of the valley than from the west. Thomas 
is in no condition to move from his present position." 
On the 31st, three days before the movement was 
suggested to Longstreet, Grant informed Burnside : 
" It is reported, on the authority of a Union man, that 
a large force of Bragg's army is moving towards 
you." Again, on the 1st of November : " Should the 
enemy break through below Kingston, move in force 
to Sparta and McMinnville, and hang on to him with 
all your force, and such as I can send you from Bridge- 
port and Stevenson, until he is beaten and turned 
back." On the 5th, Longstreet's movement having 
actually begun the day before, Grant said to Burn- 
side : " I will endeavor, from here, to brino; the ene- 
my back from your right flank as soon as possible. 
Should you discover him leaving, you should annoy 
him all you can with your cavalry, and in fact with 
all the troo23S you can bring to bear. Shennan's ad- 
vance will be at Bridgeport about Monday next. 
Whether Thomas makes any demonstration before 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4G3 

Ills arrival, will depend upon advices of the enemy's 
movements." 

On the 7th, the orders were issued to Thomas to 
attack Bragg's army. " The news," said Grant, " is 
of such a nature, that it becomes an imperative duty 
for your force to draw the attention of tlie enemy 
from Burnside to your own front. I deem the best 
movement to attack tlie enemy to be, an attack on 
the northern end of Missionary ridge, ^vitli all the 
force you can bring to bear against it; and, when 
that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if possi- 
ble, the enemy's line of communication between Dal- 
ton and Cleveland. Rations should be ready to issue 
a sufficiency to last four days, the moment Missionary 
ridge is in our possession ; rations to be carried in 
haversacks. Where there are not horses to move the 
artillery^ mules must he taken from the teams ^ or 
horses from amhulances / or^ if necessary^ officers 
dismounted^ and their horses taJcen. Immediate pre- 
parations should be made to carry these directions 
into execution. The movement should not be made 
a moment later than to-morrow mornino;." On the 
same day, Grant said to Burnside : " I have ordered 
an immediate move from here to carry Missionary 
ridire, and to threaten or attack the railroad between 
Cleveland and Dalton. This must have the effect to 
draw the enemy back from your western front." 

But Thomas announced that he had not horses to 
move his artillery, and declared himself entirely and 
absolutely unable to move, until Sherman should 
airive to cooperate. Grant was, therefore, forced to 
leave Burnside to contend against superior forces, 
until the arrival of SheiTuau with his men and means 
of transportation. In the mean time, reconnoissances 



464 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

were made and plans matured for operations ; dis- 
patches were sent to Sliermau, informing Lim of tlie 
movement of Longstreet, and of the necessity of his 
immediate presence at Chattanooga. Grant, however, 
did not desj^air, and said, at this juncture : " Although 
a large force has gone up the Tennessee valley that 
may annoy us, I feel that a decisive movement of the 
enemy must prove a disaster to them." 

Nevertheless, Thomas's delay was a great disap- 
pointment. A prompt movement on the part of that 
commander would undoubtedly have had the effect 
to recall Longstreet ; but, now, it was possible that 
the troops sent into East Tennessee might succeed in 
overthrowing the occupation which was so important. 
The greatest possible anxiety existed for the safety 
of Burnsiile. He was so far off, and so inaccessible, 
that he might be cut off and surrounded, or perhaps 
destroyed, before he could be relieved. Longstreet 
could reach him, long before assistance could get to 
Knoxville fi'om Grant's army ; indeed, tliere was no 
way whatever of sending reinforcements to Burn- 
side, and no possibilit}' of supplying them, if they 
were sent. It was not known how large a force 
Longstreet had taken with him, but supposed that 
his whole corps of twenty thousand men had started, 
as well as Wheeler's cavalry ; besides which, Steven- 
son's di\asion of the rebel army had certainly been at 
Cleveland, for more than a week, in advance. In ad- 
dition to all this, indications were not wanting that 
a large force was moving from Virginia, on the left 
flank of the Army of the Ohio, ^vhich thus seemed 
likely to be overwhelmed. 

The government felt even an acuter anxiety, in 
this matter, than Grant ; partly, because Grant was 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4G5 

always sanguine, amid the greatest difficulties and 
dangers; and partly, perhaps, because tlie authorities 
at Washington had an especial distrust of Burnside. 
It was not a year since the battle of Fredericksburg, 
and the memoiy of that disaster was still fresh with 
the general-in-chief. The dispatches from the Presi- 
dent and from Halleck alike indicate the greatest 
alarm, lest Burnside should be destroyed, or even 
surrender. Grant at once sent a staff-officer to East 
Tennessee, to learn exactly the condition of affairs, 
and to impress his own vie^vs and wishes upon the 
commander of the Army of the Ohio. 

Meanwhile, he was vigorously at work, repairing 
and reconstructing railroads and bridges, ordering 
and forwarding supplies, first to one and then to an- 
other of his wddely-separated departments. A\Tien 
the line was first opened from Brown's ferry, he said 
to Thomas : " Tlie steamer Point of Kocks should by 
all means be got down to Brown's ferry, before mom- 
ino-, even if a house has to be torn down to get the 
necessary fuel." He directed the superintendent of 
military railroads, to send " thirty, and, if possible, 
more cars through to Stevenson and Bridgeport, daily, 
loaded with rations. The road should be run to its 
utmost capacity." The chief commissary of subsist- 
ence, at St. Louis, was asked : " Have you sent any 
stores via river, to Nashville ? I wish you to send all 
you can, while the river is navigable." On the 3d, 
he said again to the manager of the railroad : " Com- 
plaints are made of stores not coming fost enough 
over Louisville and Nashville road. If stores do not 
come up the Cumberland in steamers, the Louisville 
road must send at least forty car-loads of provisions 
daily, besides quartermaster's stores." 

30 



466 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 

There was a deficiency of steamers aud of locomo- 
tives, and, accordingly, Grant said to Burnside : "If 
you have any steamers, I think you had better pro- 
tect the pilot and engine from sharjD-shooters, by case- 
mating with oak plank, and send them down here ; " 
while, to McPherson, now in command at Vicksburg, 
he said : " Send Tsathout delay, via the Tennessee 
river to Danville, Tennessee, all the locomotives at 
Vicksburg, with the exception of two, and all the 
cars, with the exception often. Let the locomotives 
and cars be the best you have. They are requu-ed 
for immediate use." To Anderson, the railroad su- 
perintendent : " There are now six bridges at Louis- 
\alle, belonging to government, ready made, that can 
be brouo-ht forward. I have ordered three locomo- 
tives and all the cars, but ten, from the southern road, 
Vicksburg ; " and again : "Those ordered by Colonel 
Parsons, for Memphis, can also come. There are 
more cars now on the West Tennessee roads than are 
required." 

But all this was not sufficient, and, on the 4th, 
Grant declared : " The road from Nashville to De- 
catur will have to be put in running order." Sher- 
man was ordered to leave Dodge's division, of Hurl- 
but's command, at Athens. " I have given directions 
for putting the railroad from Nashville to Decatur in 
running order. That road is now only guarded to 
Columbia, and the force left by you will have to 
guard the balance, with the aid of Thomas's com- 
mand, until further arrangements can be made." 
Sherman was informed, however : " It is not my in- 
tention to leave any portion of your army to guard 
roads in the Department of the Cumberland, when an 
advance is made." At the same time, Grant ordered 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4G7 

the discontinuance of the railroads and telegraphs be- 
tween Memphis and Columbus, in order to avail him- 
self of the material on the roads, and, especially, of 
the troops who were compelled to guard them. 

He contemplated supplying all three of his armies 
from Chattanooga, when the concentration should 
take place, and said to Burnside : " With the Nash- 
ville and Decatur road built, and full possession of 
the river, you can be supplied by this line. It will 
be impossible, however, for a single-track railroad to 
supply your army and this. I mil telegraph imme- 
diately, to find if rations can be sent up the Cumber- 
land." Three hundred thousand rations of salt meat, 
and a million of all other rations, were, accordingly, 
directed to be sent, in barges, towed by light-draught 
steamers, up the Cumberland, to the Big South fork, 
Admiral Porter promising to send gunboats to con- 
voy them. Every exertion was made to hasten the 
transportation of these supplies. " Make any order," 
said Grant to his adjutant-general, at NashviUe, 
"make any order necessary to secure this result in 
the promptest manner." At the same time, he re- 
peated his injunctions to Anderson : " It is of vast 
importance that the railroad from Nashville to Deca- 
tur should be opened as soon as possible. Make 
contracts with different bridge-builders, so as to get 
this work done in the shortest possible time. Extra 
bridizes should also be in readiness at all times, to 
replace any that may be destroyed. Keep me ad- 
vised of what you do in this matter." 

On the 7th, he got word from Shcnnan, and tele- 
graphed at once, to send a train loaded with provi- 
sions for him, to Fayetteville : " General Sherman will 
reach Fayetteville, to-moiTow, without any thing to 



468 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

eat. See the shipping commissary, and direct Lim to 
secure transportation, and send one hundred thousand 
rations to-morrow mornins;." He watched over Sher- 
man carefully, not only providing supplies to meet 
him along the route, and sending him ferry-boats with 
which to cross the Tennessee, and requesting Admiral 
Poi*ter to order up gunboats to protect the crossing, 
but even studying and directing the routes by which 
he wished Sherman to march. On the 10th, he in- 
structed that commander : " I learn that, by the way of 
Xewmarket and Maysville, you will avoid the heavy 
mountains, and find abundance of forage. If a part 
of your command is now at Winchester and a part 
back, that portion behind had better be turned on 
the Newmarket route." 

It was important indeed to him that Sherman 
should arrive in good condition, and as speedily as 
possible. He could not move Thomas, the wheels 
of whose cannon were heavy and held him fast; 
Bui'nside could not be relieved until Sherman came 
up ; and the completion of the design which Grant 
had entertained ever since his arrival at Chattanooo;a, 
was also necessarily deferred, till the Army of the 
Tennessee should be present. Then, the general of 
the three armies meant to make them cooperate, in 
a movement which should realize the advantaofes 
which Chattanooga had so long promised to the na- 
tional armies. He wanted to convert it into a base 
for offensive operations ; to drive off the enemy wdio 
ventured to threaten him from Lookout mountain 
and Missionary ridge ; and, not only to relieve Burn- 
side, but to throw open the door for grander opera, 
tions into the interior of Georgia. All this he was 
waiting and planning to do. He deemed it nothing 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 469 

tliat be should have lifted the Army of the Cumber 
land out of the sloughs and straits in which he 
found it struggling ; he chafed at being confined by 
hostile mountains and impassable rivers ; he was all 
unused to these defensive lines. 

But Thomas's artillery must be furnished with 
horses ; and Burnside, instead of moving offensively, 
was himself threatened with destruction. And, what 
was most tantalizing of all, the opportunity, Avhich a 
confident enemy had offered to his watchful antag- 
onist, could not be seized. Bragg had dared to de- 
tach an entire coi-ps from his army, in the very face 
of Grant ; and Grant, beholding this blunder, could 
not avail himself of the chance. This galled him ; he 
was anxious indeed for Burnside, but still more anx- 
ious lest Sherman should not arrive in time to take 
advantage of Bragg's foolhardiness. Every day it 
seemed as if Sherman must arrive; every day he 
feared lest Longstreet might return. Pent up behind 
the mountains, like a lion in its cage, he watched the 
weakness of his prey, almost within his grasp ; and yet, 
chained by necessities that would not let him strike, 
he could only wait till those necessities were past. 

Yet Sherman was doing splendidly. There was 
no thouccht of censure for him. lie had steamed four 
hundred miles, and was now marching four hundred 
more, along a hostile country. Fighting, skirmishing, 
brid'T-inor rivers, wading^ creeks, climbing mountains 
building railroads, the army that had taken Vicks- 
hurcr hurried to the relief of its old commander; 
ready to come at his call, anxious to fight again un- 
der his banners: while the Army of the Cumberland, 
conscious of its real courage and soldierly qualities, 
and aware that it had never yet been able to win all 



470 MILITAEY HISTOFcY OF 

the reuown wliieh it had faii'ly earned, was waiting 
for tlie moment to show these men from the further 
West, that it too could achieve victories and conquer 
difficulties. Eastern troops also were gathering, un- 
der the command of this captain from Illinois. Two 
corps from the Army of the Potomac had abeady 
watered with their blood the Western battle-fields ; 
their mettle had been tried at Wauhatchie, and in 
the depths of the forest and of the night, they had 
resisted surprise and scaled the unfamiliar hills. 

The continent shook with the tramp of advancing 
armies. Bridges were built in Eastern cities, for these 
soldiers to march over; engines were brought from 
Western towns, to transport their supplies. The 
greatest rivers of the republic — the Tennessee, and 
the Cumberland, and the Mississippi, and the Ohio — 
were crowded with steamers bringing clothes and 
shoes to those who were wearing out their garments 
in mighty marches ; and ammunition and food to re- 
place what liad already been expended in the cam- 
paigns for Cliattanooga. Over half the territory in 
rebellion, tlirough these great mountain-ranges, and 
by the side of these rushing streams, along the deso- 
lated corn-fields, and amid the startled recesses of pri- 
meval forests, the bustle and the stir of war were rife. 
Two hundi'ed thousand soldiers were concentrating 
from the East and the West, either in motion for this 
one battle-field, or guarding its approaches, or bring- 
ing up supplies, or waiting anxiously for those who 
were, with tliem, to fight the battle of Chattanooga. 
And over all these preparations, and all these armies, 
the spii'it of one man was dominant. 

On the 14th of November, Halleck telegraj^hed : 
•' Advices received from East Tennessee indicate that 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 47 1 

Burnside intends to abandon the defence of Little 
Tennessee river, and fall back before Longstreet, tow- 
ards Cumberland gap and tlie npper valley. Long- 
street is said to be near the Little Tennessee, "vvith 
from twenty to forty thousand men; Burnside has 
about thirty thousand in all, and can hold his posi- 
tion ; he ought not to retreat. I fear further delay 
may result in Burnside's abandonment of East Ten- 
nessee. This would be a terrible misfortune, and 
must be averted if possible." To this Grant replied, 
reassuringly: "Burnside certainly can detain Long- 
street in the Tennessee valley, until we can make such 
moves, here, as will entirely free him fi'om present 
danglers. I have asked him if he could hold the 
Knoxville and Clinton line for one week ; if so, we 
can make moves here, that will save all danger in 
East Tennessee. Sherman is now at Bridgeport. He 
will commence moving to-morrow or next day.* .... 
If Burnside can hold the line from Knoxville to Clin- 
ton, as I have asked him, for six days, I believe 
Braoffc will be started back for south side of Oosta- 
naula, and Longstreet cut off" 

On the 16th, Ilalleck telegraphed that Buraside 
was hesitatincr whether to iidit or retreat. " I fear 
he will not fight, although strongly urged to do so. 
Unless you can give him immediate assistance, he 

* " Sherman is now at Bridgeport. lie will commence moving to- 
morrow or next day, throwing one brigade from Whiteside into Tren- 
ton, thus threatening the enemj's left flank. The remainder of his 
force will pass over by Kelly's ferry, evading view from Lookout, and 
march up to the mouth of Chickamauga. Pontoons are made and 
making, to throw across at that point, over which it is intended that 
Sherman's force, and one division of Thomas's, shall pass. This force 
will attack Missionary ridge, with the left flank of Thomas supporting, 
from here. In the mean time, Hooker will attack Lookout, and carry 
it if possible. If Burnside can hold the line," etc. 



472 MILITAEY inSTORY OF 

will surrender his position to the enemy. I have of- 
fered to give him more troops from Kentucky, but he 
says he cannot supply them. Immediate aid from 
you is of vital importance." The reply to this was 
on the same day : " I am pushing every thing to give 
Bui'nside early aid. I have impressed on him in the 
strongest terms, the necessity of holding on to his 
position. Sherman's troops are now at Bridgeport. 
They will march to-morrow, and an effort will be 
made to get a column between Bragg and Longstreet, 
as soon as possible." 

Halleck's distrust of Burnside was not deserved. 
That officer's dispatches all indicate an intention to 
defend himself On the 3d, he said : " The season is 
so far advanced, that I fear there must be great suf- 
fering in this command, unless we are fortunate 
enough to occupy Cleveland, and the line of railroad 
from here to Chattanooga." This did not look like 
falling back. " We will endeavor to check them, if 

they attempt to cross the Tennessee river It is 

clear to me that it will be a hard task to hold East 
Tennessee, with the enemy's forces as they are now 
situated, unless he is constantly occuj^ied by forces 
immediately in his front. There are reports of very 
large bodies of troops concentrating against me, but 
I believe them all exaggerated." Burnside, indeed, 
was always sanguine ; his fault was rather to under- 
rate difficulties, and to overestimate his own powers 
or means of conquering them, than to be cowed by 
what opposed him. He was more likely to risk too 
much, than to withdraw. 

On the 12th, he said: "AVe will endeavor to 
hold in check any force that comes against us, until 
Thomas is ready This country certainly ought 



rLYSSES S. GRANT. 473 

to be lielcl, if possible, until Tlioma3 can force the 
enemy back." Just at this time, the telegraph lines 
were cut between Grant and Biirnside, so that com- 
munication was interrupted for a day or two ; it was, 
however, soon renewed. Burnside now held as far 
east as Bull's gap, and, south of that, he picketed the 
Tennessee river, from Washington to Kingston. His 
main force was stationed between Kingston and 
Knoxville, and all the country south of the Holston 
was occupied. " The command," said Burnside, " is 
in good health and spirits; very shoi-t of clothing, 
and on quarter rations of every thing but meat and 
bread. By running the mills in our possession, we 
keep a few days' supply of flour on hand, and have 
plenty of beef cattle. Unless our forces succeed in 
getting the railroad from Bridgeport to this place, we 
will probably suffer very much during the winter, 
even if we are able to keep possession of the country. 
We are threatened by a considerable force of the 
enemy on each flank, but I have no serious apprehen- 
sion of immediate trouble." 

On the 13th, he informed Grant that Longstreet 
was certainly on the Tennessee, opposite Loudon, 
with Wheeler's cavalry, and intending to cross the 
river. Burnside, accordingly, proposed to concentrate 
his forces and fall back, so as to draw Longstreet as 
far as possible from Bragg. " If we concentrate in 
the neighborhood of Loudon," he said, " the enemy 
will have the advantage of being able to reenforce 
from the rear ; whereas, if we concentrate near this 
place" (Knoxville), "not only the present force of 
the enemy, but all reenforcements would have to 
march forty miles" (from Loudon) "before fighting.* 

* The rebels held the railroad as far as Loudon. 



474 MILITAIJI IIISTOEY OF 

Sliould lie cross either ris^er, and move to attack us in 
tliis neighborliood, lie will he so far from the main 
body of Bragg's army, that he cannot be recalled in 
time to assist it, in case Thomas iinds himself in con- 
dition to make an attack, after Sherman gets up." 

On the 14th, Grant telegraphed him : " Sherman's 
advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force 
will be ready to move from there, by Tuesday at fui^- 
thest. If you can liold Longstreet in chec\ until lie 
gets up^ or^ hy shirmisliing and falling haclc^ can avoid 
serious loss to yourself^ and gain time^ I will he ahle 
to force the enemy hach from liere^ and jylace a force 
between Longstreet and Bragg tliat must inevitaMy 
malce tlie former talce to the mountain-])asses hy every 
availahle road^ to get to his siijp'plies?' Sherman 
would have been here before this, but for high water 
in Elk river, driving him some thirty miles up that 
river, to cross." On the same day, he again telegraphed 
to Burnside : " Can you hold the line from Knoxville 
to Clinton, for seven days ? If so, I think the whole 
Tennessee valley can be secured from present dan- 
ger." And again, at ten o'clock that night : " It is of 
the most vital importance that East Tennessee should 
be held. Take immediate steps to that end. Evac- 
uate Kingston, if you think best. As I said in a pre- 
vious dispatch, I think seven days more will enable 
us to make such movements as to make the whole 
valley secure, if you hold on that time." On the 15th, 
he said again : " I do not know how to impress on 
you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee, in 
strong; enou^rh terms. Hold on to Knoxville, and 
that portion of the valley which you will necessarily 

* Tlie -whole campaign which followed could hardly be better de- 
scribed than it was thus mapped out in advance. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 



47^ 



possess, liolding to tliat point. Should Longstreet 
move Lis wliole force across tlie Little Tennessee 
river, an effort sliould be made to cut his pontoons 
on tlie stream, emn if it sacrificed half tlie cavalry of 
the Ohio army. By holding on, and placing Long- 
street between tlie Little Tennessee and Knoxville, 
lie sliould not be allowed to escape with an army ca- 
pable of doing any thing this ^vinter. I can hardly 
conceive the necessity of retreating from East Ten- 
nessee. K I did so at all, it would be after losing 
most of the army. I xoHl not attempt to lay out a line 
of retreat. I would harass and embarrass progress 
in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that tlie 
Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist tlie 
onivard progress of the eneimjr 

On the 17th, he said : " I have not heard from you 
since the 14:th. What progress is Longstreet mak- 
ing, and what are your chances for defending your- 
self ? Sherman's forces have commenced their move- 
ment from Bridgeport, threatening the enemy. This 
alone may turn Longstreet bach, and if it does not, 
the attack Avill be prosecuted until we reach the 
roads over which all their supplies have to pass, 
while you hold East Tennessee." Later on the same 
day: "Your dispatch received. You are doing ex- 
actly what appears to me to be right. I want the 
enemy's progress retarded at every point, all it can 
be, only giving up each place when it becomes evi- 
dent that it cannot longer be held, without endan- 
gering your force to capture. I think our movements, 
here, must cause Longstreet's recall ^vithin a day or 
two, if he is not successful l)efore that time. Shennan 
moved this morning from Bridgeport, with one diW- 
sion. The remainder of his command moves in the 



476 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

morning. There will he no lialt until a severe hattle 
is foiigld., or tLe railroads cut supplying tlie enemy." 

On the night of the 14th, Sherman took the first 
boat from Bridgeport for Kelly's feny, and rode into 
Chattanooga on the 15th, reporting to Grant. He 
then learned the part assigned to him in the coming 
drama; and, on the 16th, he rode out in company 
with Grant, Thomas, and other officers, to the hills 
on the north bank of the Tennessee, from which could 
be seen the camps of the enemy compassing Chatta- 
nooga, and the line of Missionary ridge, with its east- 
ern terminus on Chickamauga creek, the point which 
Sheiman was expected to take, and hold, and fortify. 
A mighty amphitheatre, where the actors were nearly 
ready to assume their parts, with distant mountains 
for spectators, while cloud-capped hills, and valleys 
shrouded in mist that was lifted to display the move- 
ments of armies, formed the stage. 

All in Chattanooga were impatient for action ; the 
apprehension for Burnside's safety had become acute, 
and the long expectation of Sherman's arrival was 
at last almost painful. The Army of the Tennes- 
see had marched from Memphis, and been pushed as 
fast as the roads and the distance would permit ; it 
was fatigued with its extraordinary exertions ; many 
of the troops were shoeless ; but Sherman saw enough 
of the condition of men and animals in Chattanooga, 
to inspire him with renewed energy. He returned 
at once to Bridgeport, to bring up his army, rowing a 
boat himself from Kelly's ferry. 

On the 18th, Grant telegraphed to Halleck : "Dis- 
patches from General Burnside received at ten p. m. 
yesterday. Troops had got back to Knoxville. Sher- 
man's advance reached Lookout mountain to-day. 



ULYSSES S. GRA^^T. 477 

Movements will progress, threatening enemy's left 
flank, until forces can be got up, and thrown across 
the river to attack their right flank and Missionary- 
ridge. A battle or a falling back of the enemy is 
inevitable, by Saturday, at the furthest. Burnside 
speaks hopefully." 

That day, the written orders were issued to Sher- 
man and Thomas, for the battle of Chattanoojja. 



478 JnLITAEY HISTORY OF 



CHAPTEK XII. 

Reconnoissances — Orders for battle of Chattanooga — Anxiety of government 
for Bumside — DifBculties and delays of Slierman — Battle-field of Chatta- 
nooga — Movement of Granger and Palmer — Capture of Orchard knoll — Ad- 
vance of Thomas's line — Preparations for bridging the Tennessee — Arrival 
of Sherman at North Chickamauga — Seizure of mouth of South Chicka- 
mauga — Laying of pontoon bridge — Crossing of Sherman's army — Arrival 
of Howard — Sherman moves on Missionary hills — Seizes first heights— In- 
trenches — Position of rebels on Lookout mountain — Position of Hooker — 
DiflBculty of ascent — Seizure of base — Ascent of mountain — Battle on moun- 
tain — Capture of mountain — Thomas connects with Hooker — Grant's dis- 
patches on night of 24th — Rebels evacuate Lookout point — Position of 
troops on 25th — Sherman's battle-ground — Sherman's assaults — Bragg rc- 
enforces against Sherman — Weakening of rebel centre — Assault on rebel 
centre — Thomas's troops scale Missionary ridge — Rebel centre pierced— 
Missionary ridge carried — Rout of rebels — Large capture of men and gims — 
Hooker turns rebel left — Further captures — Rebel flight to Chickamauga — 
Sheridan's pursuit to Mission mills — Rebels withdraw from front of Sherman 
— Grant pushes out on 2Gth — Demoralization of rebels — Pursuit to Ringgold 
— Battle-field of Ringgold — Rebel resistance — Final retreat of rebels — Pur- 
suit discontinued — Destruction of railroads and stores — Return of Thomas's 
command to Chattanooga — Sherman ordered to the Hiawassee — Summary of 
losses and gains — Character of battle of Chattanooga — Results, 

Grant had fully reconnoitred the country opposite 
Chattanooga, and north of the Tennessee, as far east 
as the mouth of the South Chickamauga ; he had thus 
discovered that good roads existed from Brown's ferry 
up the river, and back of the first range of hills oppo- 
site Chattanooga, out of view of the rebel positions. 
Troops, crossing the bridge at Brown's ferry, could 



ULYSSES S. GRANT, 4Y9 

be seen, and tlieir numbers estimated, by the enemy ; 
but, as soon as they passed in rear of the hills, Brairg 
must be at a loss to know whether they were moving 
to Knoxville, or were held on the north side of the 
river, for further operations at Chattanooga, It was 
also known that the north end of Missionary ridge 
was imperfectly guarded; and, tliat the left bank of 
the Tennessee, from the mouth of South Chickamauira 
creek westward, to the main rebel line in front of 
Chattanooga, was watched by a small cavaliy picket 
only. These facts determined Grant's plan of opera- 
tions. As his main object was to mass all the forces 
possible against Missionary ridge, converging towards 
its northern end, which covered Chickamauga station, 
Bragg's depot of supplies. Grant finally deemed it 
best to countermand Hooker s attack on Lookout 
mountain, and bring most of the troops intended for 
that operation, to the other end of the line. 

The instructions to Thomas were in these words : 
"All preparations should be made for attacking the 
enemy's j)Osition on Missionary ridge, by Saturday 
morning, at daylight The general plan is for Sher- 
man, with the force brought with him, strengthened 
by a division from your command, to effect a cross- 
ing of the Tennessee river, just below the mouth of 
the Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by 
artillery from the heights of the north bank of the 
river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and 
to secure the heights" (Missionary ridge) "from the 
northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, be-* 
fore the enemy can concentrate against him. You 
will cooperate with Sherman. The troops in Chatta- 
nooga valley should all be concentrated on your left 
flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend for- 



480 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

tifications on the riglit and centre, and a movable 
column of one division, in readiness to move wherever 
ordered. This division should show itself as threat- 
eningly as possible, on the most practicable line for 
making an attack up the valley. Your effort, then, 
will be to form a junction with Sherman, making 
your advance well towards the northern end of Mis- 
sionary ridge, and moving as near simultaneously 
with him as 2:)ossible. The junction once formed, 
and the ridge carried, connection will be at once es- 
tablished between the two armies, by roads on the 
south bank of the river. Further movements will 
then depend on those of the enemy. 

" Lookout valley, I think, will be easily held by 
Geary's division, and what troops you may still have 
there, of the old Army of the Cumberland. How- 
ard's corps can then be held in readiness to act, either 
with you at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It 
should be marched, on Friday night, to a position on 
the north side of the river, not lower down than the 
jSrst pontoon bridge " (at Chattanooga) ; " and then 
held in readiness for such orders as may become 
necessary. All these troops will be provided with 
two days' cooked rations, in haversacks, and one hun- 
dred rounds of ammunition, on the person of each in- 
fantry soldier. . . ." 

A copy of these instructions was forwarded to 
Sherman, for his guidance, and he was also infonned : 
" It is particularly desirable that a force should be 
got through to the railroad, between Cleveland and 
Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communica- 
tion with the south; but, being confronted by a 
large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell 
how this is to be effected, until the result of our first 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 481 

effort is known." Givant always refused to hamper 
eitlier himself or his subordinates with complicate*! 
plans of battle, in advance. lie knew too well the 
constant and unexjoected chances of war, and had 
too often availed himself of these, to do more than 
direct the positions and opening movements of his 
troops. He got his machinery in order, and touched 
the springs ; but, after that, he expected to guide its 
action by the light and aid of events, as they oc- 
curred. 

As soon as Sherman reached Bridgeport, he set 
about moving his army to the front. As Bragg 
seemed to be looking for an attack on his left flank, 
Grant attempted to confirm this notion, and ordered 
Sherman to march his leading division direct from 
^ATiiteside to Trenton. From there, its position was 
advanced each day, the old camp-fires being kept up 
at nio-ht, and new ones built wlien the command 
rested, so as to give the appearance of concentratmg 
a large force in that direction. A portion of the 
division even ascended the western slope of Lookout 
mountain. The remainder of Sherman's force was 
ordered to pass over a new road just made, from 
Whiteside to Kelly's ferry ; this was concealed from 
the rebels, and it was hoped they Avould suppose 
that Sherman's w^hole force was moving up Lookout 
valley. 

On the 21st, Halleck telegraphed that dispatches 
from Tennessee, east of Knoxville, contained rumors 
that Burnsidewas surrounded. "At any rate, we 
have no communication with him. The President 
seems very anxious that some immediate move shouhi 
be made for his relief. You, however, as fully un- 
derstand the exigencies of the case as any one here 

31 



482 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 

possibly can. Longstreet's force may be larger tlian 
was supposed." Communication witli Burn side was, 
indeed, quite cut off ; Grant knew, from other sources 
than Halleck, that fio-htino; had besrun in East Ten- 
nessee, and that Burnside had been driven into 
Knoxville, and attacked there ; but this was all he 
could learn. 

Troops had been moving night and day, ever 
since Sherman's arrival at Bridgeport, but the bridge 
of boats at Brown's ferry was frail, and, although it 
was used without the intermission of an hour, Sher- 
man's passage was slow. The roads from the ferry 
to Chattanooga were greatly cut up, as well as en- 
cumbered with the wagons of other troops, stationed 
along the road ; but on the afternoon of the 20th, 
Sherman reached Hooker's headquarters, and there 
met Grant's orders for a general attack on the follow- 
ing day. It was simply impossible for him to obey. 
Only one division, John E. Smith's, was in position. 
Ewing was still in Trenton, and the other two were 
toilino; alons: the miserable roads from Shell-mound 
to Chattanooga. No troops were ever in better con- 
dition or labored harder to fulfil their part. But 
Sherman was obliged to notify Grant of the impossi- 
bility of performing it, and the attack was again j)Ost- 
poned. 

To Ilalleek, Grant said: "I ordered an attack 
here, two weeks ago, but it was impossible to move 
artillery ; " and, now, Thomas had to borrow teams 
from Sherman, in order to move a portion of his ar- 
tillery to the places where it was to be used. Sher- 
man had used almost superhuman efforts to get up, 
and still was delayed ; and Thomas could take only 
about one gun with each battery. " I have never 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 483 

felt," said Grant, " such restlessness "before, as I have 
at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of 
the Cumberland. The quartern! aster-ireneral states 
that the loss of animals here will exceed ten thousand. 
Those left are scarcely able to carry themselves." 

It looked, indeed, as if Burnside was to be lost. 
These unavoidable delays and difficulties still chained 
Grant to his position, v^hile the Army of the Ohio 
had begun the battle for its existence. The supplies 
that had at last reached Kashville, for Burnside, 
were stopped, as they might never be needed : 
" General Burnside is now engaged with the enemy. 
You need not start the clothing for him, until the re- 
sult is known." . . . . " The rations for General Bum- 
side could not be sent, now, even if there was water 
enough in the Cumberland, until the result of present 
movements by Longstreet is known. I think it bet- 
ter, therefore, to let the boats now loaded, discharge 
and return." 

On the 20th, Grant wi'ote to Shemian : " To-mor- 
row morning, I had first set for your attack. I see 
now it cannot possibly be made then ; but can you 
not get up for the following morning ? Order Ew- 
ino" down " (from Trenton), " immediately, fixing the 
time for his starting so that the roads and bridges 
may be full all the time. Every eftbrt must be made 
to get up in time to attack, on Sunday morning." 

A heavy rain-storm occurring on the 20th, and 
lasting all of the 21st, still further delayed Slierman. 
On the 21st, he got his second division over Brown^s 
feiTy bridge, and Ewing was up from Trenton ; but, 
the bridge broke repeatedly, and delays occurred 
which no human sagacity could have prevented or 
foreseen. All labored, night and day ; and, on Sun- 



484 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

day, wliile Sherman was bringing up Lis troops, be- 
hind the hills on the north side of the Tennessee, 
Thomas, in order to conceal the real nature of this 
movement, brought Howard's corps, which had come 
up from Lookout valley in advance of Sherman, 
across into Chattanooga. This was done that the 
rebels might suppose the troops at Brown's ferry 
were reenforcing Chattanooga. Howard, accord- 
ingly, crossed on Sunday, and took up a position in 
full view of the enemy, who, from his commanding 
position on Missionary ridge, looked down on all of 
the movements in the valley. Those, however, which 
affected him most closely, Avere made behind the 
hills. The operations of this day, at Chattanooga, 
were like those scenes in a play, which fill up the 
time and distract the attention of the audience, while 
preparations for the real climax are going on in the 
rear. 

At this crisis, Brigadier-General Wilcox, who 
was in the eastern part of the Tennessee valley, dis- 
patched to Grant that he too was in trouble, threat- 
ened by movements from Virginia, and unable to get 
orders or aid from Burnside, his immediate command- 
er. Grant replied, on the 20th: "If you can com- 
municate with General Burnside, say to him that our 
attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If 
successful, such a move will be made as, I think, will 

relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold out If you 

receive no further instructions from General Burn- 
side, follow those he has given you. Eetreat should 

not be allowed Can you not concentrate your 

forces and raise the siesre at Knoxville ? " 

Once more, on the 21st, Grant was obliged to say 
to Thomas : " I have just received a report of the 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 485 

position of Slierman's forces. The rain, last night, 
has thrown them back so much, that it will be im- 
possible to get into position for action to-raorro\v^ 
morning. He W'ill be up, however, against all 
calamities that can be foreseen, to commence on Mon- 
day morning." But the very elements conspired to 
protract Grant's anxiety. The heavy rains caused a 
rise in the Tennessee, and the bridges at Chattanooga 
and Brown's ferry were swept away; and, on the 2 2d, 
yet once more. Grant said to the commander of the 
Army of the Cumberland : '' The bridges at Brown's 
ferry being dowm to-day, and the excessively bad 
roads since the last rain, will render it impossible for 
Sherman to get up either of his remaining two divi- 
sions, in time for the attack to-morrow morning. 
You can make vour arrangements for this de- 

lay." 

In his dispatch to Sherman, on this day. Grant 
said :".... Let me know, to-morrow, at as early an 
hour as you can, if you will be entirely ready for 
Tuesday morning." At this juncture, he violated 
militaiy etiquette, and sent a dispatch direct to 
Wood, who commanded a division in Sherman's 
army : " You must get up with your force to-morrow^, 
without fail. Pass the wagon-train, and leave it to 
follow Avith rear-guard. If you cannot get up \\ith 
your artillery, come without it, leaving it to follow. 
I will expect the head of your column at Brown's 
ferry, by ten a. m. to-moiTOw, without tail." 

But there proved to be compensations for all this 
anxiety and all these postponements. On the night 
of the 22d, a deserter came in from tlie rebel army, 
and reported that Bragg was falling back from Mis- 
sionary ridge. Grant had received a letter from 



48 G MILITARY HISTOEY OF 

Bragg, on the 20tli, wliicli seemed to coiToborate 
this : " As tliere may still be some non-combatants 
in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that 
prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." 
The artifice was too palpable : no general would so 
ostentatiously notify an antagonist of his intention 
to attack. But the news brought by the deserter 
precipitated the battle that had been trembling on 
the verge so long. Grant was unwilling to allow 
Bragg to withdraw in good order ; and, early on the 
morning of the 23d, he instructed Thomas to " ascer- 
tain at once the truth or falsity of this report. If 
Bragg is really falling back, Sherman can commence 
at once laying his pontoon trains " (at the mouth of 
the South Chickamauga), " and we can save a day." 
Thomas, accordingly, directed a demonstration, in or- 
der to drive in the rebel pickets, and develop the 
enemy's real line. 

Four streams empty into the Tennessee, near 
Chattanooga, bounding and dividing what was des- 
tined to be the battle-field. Lookout creek was 
near the extreme right of Grant's line, and west of 
Lookout mountain ; about half a mile east of the 
mountain, runs Chattanooga creek ; then, Citico 
creek, some two miles further east ; and, away at the 
northern end of Missionary ridge, the South Chicka- 
mauga. Still north and east of this, but on the north 
side of the Tennessee, the North Chickamauira min- 
gles its waters with those of tlie great stream which 
receives all the affluents of this region. Missionarv 
ridge runs nearly north and south, and these vari- 
ous currents, breaking tli rough its gorges or those of 
Lookout mountain, flow north and west. The course 
of the North Chickamauga, however, is directly oppo 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 487 

site to that of the rivers on the south side of the Ten- 
nessee. 

Thomas's line, in front of Chattanooga, readied 
from the Chattanooga creek to the Citico, and was 
about a mile out from the town. It had been ren- 
dered formidable, during the two months which had 
elapsed since the defeat of Rosecrans ; advantage had 
been taken of various hills in Chattanooga valley ; 
and, at the hig^hest and most advanced point on the 
line, a stronir redoubt had been erected, called Fort 
Wopd. Twenty-two heavy guns were in position 
along this line. The rebel pickets in front of Fort 
Wood came into close contact with the national out- 
guards, and nearly a mile beyond them, was the first 
rebel line.* 

In obedience to Grant's instructions, Thomas 
ordered Major-General Gordon Granger, command- 
ing the Fourth corps, to form his troops, and advance 
directly in front of Fort Wood, and thus develop the 
strength of the enemy. Major-General Palmer, com- 
manding the Fourteenth corps, was directed to sup- 
port Granger's right with Baird's division, refused 
and in echelon ; and Johnson's division, of the same 
corps, was held under arms, in the intrenchments, in 
readiness to reenforce at any point. Howard's corps 
was formed in mass, behind the centre of Granger. 

* Grant often rode out on the picket line, and once was on the 
eastern bank of Chattanooga creek, when a party of rebel soldiers 
were drawing water on the other side. They wore blue coats ; and, 
thinking they were his own men, Grant asked them to whose command 
they belonged. They answered, " Longstreet's corps;" whereupon 
Grant called out : " What are you doing in those coats, then ? " The 
rebels replied: "Oh! all our corps wear blue." This was a fact, 
which Grant had forgotten. The rebels then scrambled up on their 
own side of the stream, little thinking that they had been talking 
with the commander of the national army. 



488 JULITAEY HISTOEY OF 

The two divisions of Granger's command, Sheridan * 
and Wood's, were accordingly formed in front of 
Fort Wood, Sheridan on the right, AVood on the left, 
with his left extending nearly to Citico creek. The 
formation was complete by two p. m. 

At an early hour, the heavy guns in Fort Wood 
and the smaller works, began to wake the echoes of 
the valley; the national cannon on Moccasin point 
also opened on the enemy, who replied from the top 
of Lookout mountain, and from his formidable line 
along the crest of Missionary ridge. The idlest 
looker-on in Chattanooga could perceive that the 
long-expected drama was about to open, and the day 
be made historical. 

At a given signal. Granger moved forward into the 
plain, in front and on the right of Foil; Wood. The 
fog that had lain in the valley all day was lifted, 
and the rays of the sun glanced back from twenty 
thousand bayonets. The superb pageant went on, 
under the eyes of curious crowds on Missionary 
ridge ; but the trooj^s moved with such j^recision, 
that the enemy mistook their evolutions for a parade. 
The rebel pickets leaned on their muskets, and quietly 
watched the advance of Thomas's battalions. This 
unmeant deception was heiglitened by the troops 
remaining nearly half an hour in jDOsition, and in full 
view of the rebel army, before they received the 
final order to advance. x\t last, a dozen shots of the 
national skiimishers scattered the rebel pickets, who 
fled in haste through a strip of timber, lying between 
the open ground and some secondary eminences, oi' 
which the first line of rebel rifle-pits was built. 

* Major-General P. H. Sheridan, who in this battle, for the first time, 
fought a division iminediatelv under the eve of Grant. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4S0 

Wood followed rapidly, directly towards the front, 
driving, not only tlie rebel pickets, but their reserves. 
A heavy fire of musketry was poured upon the ad- 
vancing troops as they entered the strip of woods ; 
but they fell rapidly upon the grand guards stationed 
on the first line of Bragg's rifle-pits, captiu'ed about 
two hundred men, and secured themselves in their 
new positions, before the enemy had sufficiently re- 
covered from his surprise to attempt to send reen- 
forcements from his main camj? on the ridge. Sheri- 
dan now moved up rapidly on Wood's right, and in 
fifteen minutes, the rebels had abandoned their whole 
advanced line : nothing remained to them west of 
the ridge, but the rifle-pits at its foot. This secured 
to Grant a mound of some importance, known as 
Orchard knoll, and a low range of hills running 
south, about half way between Chattanooga and 
Missionary ridge. These points were fortified dur- 
ing the night ; breast-works were erected, and 
artillery was put in position ; strong pickets were 
thrown out to the front, and Howard's corps was 
moved up, in line with Granger's left, and his position 
also fortified. Twenty thousand men of the national 
army were thus in line of battle, a full mile in ad- 
vance of the outposts which, at noon of that day, 
had been occupied by the enemy. One hundred and 
eleven men had been killed or wounded ; perhaps as 
many of the enemy fell,* and over two hundred pris- 
oners were left in Thomas's hands. 

But the eftect of this day's fighting cannot be 
measured by the casualties. The enemy had been 
driven from his front line of intrenchments ; his 

* I have beea unable to find any rebel report of the losses on this 
day. 



490 jnLITAKY HISTORY OF 

prestige was sliaken ; Ms demoralization was begun ; 
while, on tlie other hand, a wonderful confidence was 
diffused throughout the Army of the Cumberland, 
which had met once more and driven back its 
earliest antagonist ; the spot on ij:s escutcheon was 
already cleared ; and the men lay down upon their 
arms, anxious for the renewal of the combat, when 
their old and splendid reputation should be fully 
redeemed. Until nightfall, the cannon on Missionary 
ridge vied with the artillery of Fort Wood ; but at 
last the uproar ceased, and the great hosts slept 
calmly among the hills. 

The report of the deserter was evidently not in- 
tended to deceive: but he had mistaken Brag^o-'s 
movements. Buckner's division had gone to join 
Longstreet on the 2 2d, and another had started, but 
was brought back in consequence of this attack."^ 

Meanwhile, Sherman was still laboring up amid 
almost impassable difficulties. His rear division, 
Osterhaus's, was entirely cut off by the broken 
bridge; but Grant ordered him to go into battle 
^vith the other three, suj^ported by Jefferson C. 
Davis's division, of the Fourteenth corps, which was 
sent to Sherman, from TJiomas's army. Osterhaus, 
being detained on the south side of the Tennessee, 
was ordered, unless he could get across by eight 
o'clock on the morning of the 2-ii\\, to report to 
Hooker, who was instructed, in this event, to attack 
Lookout mountain, as contemplated in the original 
plan. All these various orders emanated from Grant. 
Sometimes, merely verbal instructions were given by 
him to Thomas or Sherman ; but no movement of a 

* See General B. R. Johnson's (rebel) report of operations of Buck- 
ner's division. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 491 

division was made, during the campaign, wliicli was 
not expressly dii'ected by tlie commander of tlie 
triple army. He was on every part of the field, at 
the immediate front; and from Fort AVood, the 
highest point in the national fortifications, had 
watched the assault of Granger's corps. lie was so 
frequently exposed to fire, that great anxiety was felt 
for his safety. 

At last, on the night of the 23d, Sherman's third 
division arrived opposite the moutli of the South 
Chickamauga, about four miles above Chattanooga. 
Davis's division was waiting for him on the north 
bank of the Tennessee, where the crossing was to be 
effected. Pontoons were necessary for bridging the 
river here; and, as it was intended to occupy the 
north bank of the Soutli Chickamauga, that stream 
also must be bridged, as well as the Tennessee. The 
South Chickamauga is a hundred and eighty feet 
wide, with a sluggisli current ; and the Tennessee, at 
the point designated for crossing, is fourteen hundi-ed 
feet across. At this time, there was, in tlie whole 
Department of the Cumberland, only one bridge- 
train, and that was scattered from Bridgeport to 
Chattanooga. Saw-mills, however, were kept run- 
ning night and day; and boats were collected or 
made, and brought up through the woods, not ex- 
posed to the view of the enemy at any point on the 
route. 

By Friday night, November 20th, a liuii<lrcd and 
sixteen pontoons were hidden in jf^orth Cliickamauga 
creek, whicli empties into the Tennessee, five miles 
above the mouth of the South Chickamauga. This 
stream oftered suck facilities for launching the boats, 
that it was determined to put the pontoons in the 



492 MILITAKY HISTOKY OF 

water there, and float them down, loaded witli sol 
diers, to the point of crossing — a quicker and quieter 
operation than that of launching tliem. at the place 
of passage. The creek was cleared of snags, and all 
tlie citizens of tlie vicinity were put under strict 
guard, to prevent the transmission of information to 
the enemy. The remainder of the bridge material 
was packed behind the river ridge of liills, and 
witkin four hundred yards from the place of crossing, 
entirely concealed from the rebels.* Seven hundred 
and fifty oarsmen were selected from the two armies ; 
and these, witli Giles A. Smitk's brigade, were placed 
at tke head of Sherman's column, and marcked, 
under cover of the hills, to the mouth of tke Nortk 
Ckickamauga. 

Before midnigkt of tke 28d of ]^ov ember, tke 
pontoons were loaded witk tkii-ty armed men eack ; 
and at two o'clock on tke morning of tke 24tk, tke 
wkole fleet, carrying Giles Smitk's brigade, pusked 
carefully out of tke ISTortk Ckickamauga, and tken 
drojiped silently down tke Tennessee. So perfect 
were tke arrangements, tkat even tke national pickets 
along tke bank of tke river did not know wken tke 
boats kad passed. Floating quietly by tke rebel 
sentinels, before dayligkt they reached their destina- 
tion, a point just above tke moutk of tke Soutk 
Chickamauga. A small force tken jumped ashore, 
and advancing rapidly, captured the enemy's out- 
guard, twenty in number, before the rebels were 
aware of the presence of a foe. Smitk tken pusked 

* All tlxe engineer operations during tliis entire campaign were 
under the direction and personal supervision of Brigadier-General W. 
F. Smith, whom Grant had promoted to be chief engineer of the Mili- 
tary Division of the Mississippi. 



U-LYSSES S. GRAIfT. 493 

rapidly below the mouth of the Chickanitaiiga, dis- 
embarked the rest of his brigade, and dispatched the 
pontoons back for other loads. The remainder of 
Morgan L. Smith's division was quickly ferried 
across, that of John E. Smith following. The men 
at once set to work intrenching themselves, with the 
industry of beavers ; and, by daylight, two divisions, 
of about eight thousand men, were landed on the 
south bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a 
good tete de pont. 

As soon as day dawned, the building of the 
brid(>-e bef^-an. The rise in the river had increased 
its width, and there were not boats enough for more 
than one brids-e across the Tennessee. Pontoons 
had to be taken from the ferry, as fast as they were 
needed for the bridge ; but a steamer was also sent 
up from Chattanooga, which assisted in carrying 
troops across. All these operations took place under 
cover of an artillery force from Thomas's army, 
posted on the northern shore, and the horses for 
which had been furnished by Sherman.* Sherman's 
batteries were first brought up to the point of cross- 
ing, and the horses then detached and sent back to 
bring up Thomas's artillery; after which, the same 
horses were again harnessed to their own guns, and 
made ready to join the advance of Sherman. 

Fourscore boats were plying back and foiih 
across the swollen stream, each one carrying from the 
northern to the southern shore, from thirty-five to 
forty soldiers. The pontoon bridge already stretched 
half way across the river, and the engineers were 
beo-innino- work on the southern end. Forty pieces 

o o 

* Brisaclier-General J. M. Brannan, Thomas's chief of artillery, had 
charge of all the artillery operations of importance in this battle. 



494 3IIL1TARY HISTOEY OF 

of artillery * ranged along the northern bank, some 
on the hills, and others at the edo^e of the stream, 
guarded the crossing; and ten thousand soldiers 
were massed on either shore, waiting to march, or to 
cross. A column was still coming up over the west- 
em hills, and the troops from the North Chicka- 
mauga, having protected the pontoon fleet while it 
lay hidden in that distant stream, were also advan- 
cing to the rendezvous. Sherman stood at the centre 
of the bridge, directing its completion. Just at this 
moment, Howard appeared in person ; having come 
up with three regiments from Chattanooga, along the 
southern bank of the Tennessee. The last boat of 
the bridge was being placed in the centre of the 
stream, as Howard amved and introduced himself, 
across the slight gulf which yet intervened. Sher- 
man was on the northern end, gesticulating and 
talking eagerly, as was his wont ; and, as soon as the 
boat was put in its place, he sprang across and shook 
the hand of Howard. The junction between the 
Ai'mies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland was 
formed. 

At twenty minutes past twelve, the bridge was 
complete; that across the Chickamauga had been 
finished a little while before, giving communication 
with the regiments left on the northern shore. Soon 
after mid-day, Sherman's thii'd division was on the 
south side of the Tennessee, with men, horses, and 
artillery; and the whole command was ready to 
attack the Missionary hills. By three o'clock, a bri- 
gade of cavalry (Long's) had crossed both bridges, 
and was on its march to cut the rebel communication 
with Chickamausra station. 

* Ten batteries. — See Brannan's report. 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 495 

At one p. M., Slierman marclied from the river in 
three columns, in echelon ; the left under Morgan L. 
Smith, was the column of direction, and followed 
substantially the course of Chickamauga creek; the 
centre, John E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the 
centre, at full brigade intervals, moved to the right 
and rear ; and the right, under Ewing, was in column 
at the same distance to the right and rear, prepared 
to deploy to the right, on the supposition that an 
enemy would be met in that direction. Each head 
of column was covered by a good line of skirmishers, 
with supports. A light di'izzling rain prevailed, and 
the clouds hung low, covering Sherman's movements 
from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout 
Mountain; for, fi*om Hooker's position at Wauhat- 
chie to the mouth of the ^N'orth Chickamauga, a dis- 
tance of thirteen miles, was now one battle-field. 

Sherman soon gained the foot hills ; his skirmish- 
ers pushed on up the foce of the hill, followed by 
their supports; and by half-past three p. m., the 
desired point was reached, without loss. A brigade 
of each division was pushed up rapidly, to the top 
of the hill ; and the enemy, for the first time, seemed 
aware of the movement. He oj^ened with artillery, 
but too late, for Sherman was already in possession. 
Several guns were soon dragged up the steep accliv- 
ity, and answered the rebel defiance. The enemy's 
skirmishers made one or two ineffectual dashes, and, 
about four, a sharp engagement ensued with musketry 
and artillery ; but, at last, the rebels drew off, leaving 
Sherman to fortify what he had gained. He had 
possession of two high points, with a deep depression 
immediately in his front, between him and the hill 
over the tunnel, which w^as his chief objective point. 



496 MILITAEY HISTOKY OF 

Until now, lie had supposed that Missionaiy ridge 
was a continuous hill, but this aperture intervening 
was sure to cost him dear to cross. A brigade of 
each division was left on the hill ali'eady gained, one 
closed the gap to Chickamauga creek, two were 
drawn back to the base of the hill, in reserve; and a 
division on the right was extended down into the 
plain. Sherman's line thus crossed the ridge in a 
general direction, facing southeast. 

The Army of the Cumberland, having done, on 
the 23d, what Grant had intended should be done on 
the 24th, was now in advance of the movements of 
Sherman. Thomas, therefore, simply bettered and 
strengthened his position during Tuesday, and 
pushed the Eleventh corps forward, across Citico 
creek, and along the south bank of the Tennessee. 
Howard had some fisfhtino;, but none of a serious 
character; and, before night, he connected Sherman's 
new position with the main army at Chattanooga ; a 
brigade was left for this purpose with. Sherman, and 
Howard himself returned to his own corps, further 
to the right. The next day he reported to Sherman, 
and remained under his orders durins; the J'est of the 
campaign. 

As night closed in, Sherman ordered Da\ns to 
keep one of his brigades at the bridge ; another close 
up to Sherman's main position ; and still another 
intermediate. Thus they passed the night, heavy 
details being kept at work in the intrenchments on 
the hill. The thick mist that had overspread Look 
out, and rolled in immense masses up the river, had 
gi'adually filled the entire basin of Cliattanooga ; 
80 that Shennan, while slowly extending his lines to 
the right, till at last they came into communication 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 407 

witli tl\e left wing of Howard's corps, liad 1)een 
veiled entirely from tlie watcliful eyes of friend and 
foe. But, during the niglit, tlie clouds cleared away, 
and a cold frost filled the air; the sky was bright, 
and his camp-fires now revealed both to the enemy 
and to the army in Chattanooga, that Sherman was 
in position on Missionary ridge. 

But, while these important operations had been 
going on all day on the left, others full as interesting 
were transpiring on Lookout mountain. Since the 
battle of AVauhatchie, Hooker had remained in 
Lookout valley, with the Eleventh and a part of the 
Twelfth corps, opposite the left of the rebel line. 
The Eleventh corps, however, as has been seen, had 
been ordered to the national left, on the 2 2d; and 
Osterhaus's division was to have followed. But, when 
it was finally found impossible to rebuild the bridge 
at Brown's ferry, in time for Osterhaus to cross, 
Hooker was instructed to attack the point of Look- 
out mountain, as had been originally intended. His 
command, now, consisted of Osterhaus's division of 
the Fourteenth corps, Cruft's of the Fourth, and 
Geary's of the Twelfth; making an aggregate of 
about ten thousand men. No one of these divisions 
had ever fought near the others. Geary was from 
the Army of the Potomac, Cruft from the Army of 
the Cumberland, and Osterhaus from the Arm}' of 
the Tennessee. 

At this time, the enemy's pickets formed a con- 
tinuous line alons: the rio-ht bank of Lookout creek, 
with his reserves in the valleys, while the main rebel 
force was encamped in the hollow, half way up tlie 
slope of the mountain. The summit itself was held 
by three brigades of Stevenson's division ; and these 

32 



498 MnJTAEY HISTORY OF 

were comparatively safe, as the only means of access 
from the west, was by trails allowing tlie passage 
of but a single man at a time, and these trails were 
held, at the top, by rebel pickets. On the Chatta- 
nooga side of the mountain, which is less precipitous, 
a good mountain-road exists, communicating with 
the summit by zigzag lines. Hooker believed, if he 
could gain this road, the rebels must evacuate their 
position, as it was their only line of communication 
with Bragg. 

The ascent of the mountain is steep and thickly 
wooded; beetling crags peer out all over its sides 
from the masses of heavy foliage, and, at the summit, 
a lofty palisaded crest rises perpendicularly, as many 
as sixty or eighty feet. On the northern slope, about 
midway between the summit and the Tennessee, a 
plateau of open and arable land belts the mountain. 
There, a continuous line of earthworks had been 
thrown up ; wliile redoubts, redans, and rifle-pits 
were scattered lower down the acclivity, to repel 
assaults from the direction of the river. On each 
flank were epaulements, walls of stone, and abatis ; 
and, in the valley itself, at the foot of the mountain, 
long lines of earthworks, of still greater extent. 
The entire force, for the defence of the mountain, 
consisted of six brigades, or about seven thousand 
men. 

Hooker's camps were all on the western side of 
Lookout creek, at the base of Raccoon mountain. 
Geary's division, supported by Whitaker's brigade 
of Cruft's division, was ordered to proceed up the 
valley, cross the creek near Wauhatchie, and then 
march down, sweeping the rebels from the right 
bank of the stream. The other brigade (Grose's) 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 409 

from the Fourtli corps, was to seize and repair the 
bridge across Lookout creek, just below tlie rail- 
road ; while Osterhaus was to march up, from Bro\\ii's 
feiTy to the place of crossing, and then support the 
movement of Geary, or furnish support for the bat- 
teries. 

Grose advanced promptly to the bridge, di'ove 
the enemy away, after some slight skirmishing, and 
set about repairs. The rebels were attracted by these 
operations, and did not observe the movements of 
Geary, which were also concealed by a heavy mist 
that overhung the mountain. Geary, therefore, 
crossed the creek at eight o'clock, captured the entire 
picket of forty-two men stationed to defend it, and 
commenced to climb directly up the mountainside. 
At this very moment, the rebels could be seen from 
the valley, filing down from their camps on the 
northern side of the mountain, and moving into their 
rifle-pits, to resist the movements of Grose. Oster- 
haus now came up, and skirmished briskly for a 
while. By eleven o'clock, the bridge was completed ; 
Osterhaus's artillery was in excellent position, and 
the rebel force at the foot of the hill either fled, or 
was killed or captured. 

Simultaneously with these operations, the troops 
of Geary were pushing up the mountain ; his right 
passed directly under the muzzles of the enemy's 
guns on the smnmit, climbing over ledges and bould- 
ers, up hill and down, dislodging the enemy wher- 
ever he attempted to make a stand. Finding them- 
selves vigorously pushed by a strong column on 
their left and rear, the rebels began to fall back ; but 
their resistance was obstinate. Wood and Grose, by 
this time, had crossed Lookout river, and joined the 



500 JULITAEY HISTORY OF 

left of Geary, as he foced down tlie valley ; and the 
"wliole line pressed on, over obstacles of the most ex- 
traordinary character. It was twelve o'clock, when 
Geary's advance rounded the peak of the mountain, 
and emerged on the plateau of open land where the 
I'ebel fortifications were strongest. 

The whole column now coming up. Hooker's line 
was extended from the base of the palisade rock on 
his right, to the foot of Lookout, near the mouth of 
Chattanooga creek. The countiy, here, was so rugged 
that the fighting was in reality only skirmishing, but 
continuous fire was kept up for hours. After two or 
three sharp conflicts, the plateau was cleared, and 
tlie enemy driven from his walls and pits, near the 
only house on the mountain-side. At two o'clock, 
operations were arrested by the darkness. The 
clouds, which had hovered over and enveloped the 
summit, and favored the movements of Hooker, had 
been gradually settling, lower and lower, and from 
the moment that the peak of the mountain was 
rounded, it was only from the rattle of musketry, and 
the flashes of fire through the clouds, or the occa- 
sional glimpses of lines and standards, as the fog rose 
or fell, that those in the valley could trace the prog- 
ress of the battle. At four. Hooker informed his 
immediate superior, that liis line was impregnable, 
and commanded the enemy's defences with an enfilad- 
inc: fire. Lookout mountain was earned. 

At a quarter-past five, direct communication was 
opened with Chattanooga, and Carlin's brigade, from 
the northern valley, was sent to Hooker's support. 
Carlin had to cross Chattanooga creek, and did not 
eftect the junction without serious fighting, but finally 
reported to Hookei', and was assigned to duty on the 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 501 

left of his line. TLiis, on the night of the 24th, the 
national forces maintained one unbroken line, Avitli 
open communications from the north end of Lookout 
mountain, through Chattanooga valley, to the farther 
end of Missionary ridge. 

Still, the firing continued in the night, on the 
mountain. The rebels, at dark, had not left the top- 
most crest, and their signal-light on the extreme 
summit, waving to and fro, revealed to the luckless 
chief on Missionaiy ridge the extent of his calamity. 
Every now and then, splutteiing discharges of mus- 
ketry, mutfled by distance, could be heard in the val- 
ley, and tierce jets of flame, like those once seen on 
Sinai, seemed to issue from the mountain-side. The 
long lines of camp-iires marked the advance or re- 
treat of the combatants, and cries of defiance or 
suffering came down from the clouds, as if super- 
natural armies were contending in the air. But, 
finallv, all the noise of battle ceased ; the wounded, 
writhing in pain, and the sentinels walking their 
rounds, were almost the only ones not reposing from 
the fatigues and excitements of the day, and an unu- 
sual quiet settled over the whole long line. 

The generals, however, had little time for repose. 
At midnight, Sherman got his orders from Grant to 
attack the enemy at dawn, and notice that Thomas 
also would attack right early. Hooker was in- 
structed to advance in the morning, and endeavor to 
intercept the rebel retreat from the mountain ; if, in- 
deed, the enemy should not have already Avithdrawn. 
In that event, Hooker was to move on the Rossville 
road, carry the pass at Rossville, and operate on the 
enemy's left and rear. To AVilcox, on the night of 
the 24th, Grant said : " Fighting has been go- 



502 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

ing on here for two days ; and, as soon as possible, I 
shall send a force up the valley, sufficient to relieve 
Burnside, if he holds out. If you can communicate 
this fact to him, do so." 

At half-past five, on the 24th, Grant telegraphed 
to Washington : " The fight to-day progressed favor- 
ably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary ridge, 
and his right is now at the tunnel, and left at Chicka- 
mauga creek. Troops from Lookout valley carried 
the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern 
slope and point, high up. Hooker reports two thou- 
sand prisoners taken, besides Avhich, a small number 
have fallen into our hands, from Missionary ridge." 
The President replied, in person, to this, on the 
morning of the 25th : " Your dispatches as to fight- 
ing on Monday and Tuesday, are here. Well done. 
Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." Hal- 
leck also telegraphed : " I congratulate you on the 
success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burnside 
is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove 
fatal. I know that you will do all in your power to 
relieve him." 

During the night of the 24th, the rebels evacu- 
ated Lookout mountain, crossing Chattanooga creek, 
burning the bridges, and retreating, by Bossville gap, 
to Missionary ridge. When the fog rose, nothing 
was to be seen in the valley, but the deserted and 
burning camps of the enemy. On the summit, the 
national flag was waving; the Eighth Kentucky vol- 
unteers had been foremost to reach the crest, and dis- 
played their colors there at sunrise. Hooker ordered 
two regiments to hold the mountain, and, at ten 
o'clock, his main column, with Osterhaus leading, 
was on the march for Kossville, and sweeping across 



ULYSSES S. GRAl^T. 503 

Chattanooga valley, now abandoned by the enemy. 
The destiiiction of the bridges delayed him, however, 
for four hours, and Thomas was not to attack until 
Hooker got into position. 

The morning of the 25th of November broke raw 
and cold, but the sun shone Ijrilliantly from a cloud- 
less sky, and the great battle-field was all disclosed. 
To the north and east, was the railroad junction of 
Chattanooga, which gave the position so much of its 
value ; the roads by which Grant sought communica- 
tion with Burnside, and those along which the rebel 
general was drawing his supplies. Behind the na- 
tional forces, the impetuous river made its tortuous 
way, never for a mile pursuing the same course ; 
while the Cumberland mountains and Walden's 
rido-e formed the massive backs-round. Grant's main 
line faced south and east, towards Missionary ridge, 
now not a mile away. Lookout mountain, on the 
national right, bounded the view. Hooker marching 
down its sides, and through the valley of Chatta- 
nooga creek, to Rossville gap. Sherman had gained 
the extreme left of the ridge, but immense difficulties 
in his front were yet to overcome ; and, all along the 
crest, w^ere the batteries and trenches tilled with 
rebel soldiers, in front of the Army of the Cumber- 
land. Bragg's headquarters were plainly visible, on 
the ridge, at the centre of his now contracted line, 
while Grant's own position was on the knoll that had 
been wrested from the rebels, the day before. From 
this point, the whole battle-field was displayed ; trees, 
houses, fences, all landmarks in the valley had been 
swept away for camps ; and the t\\o antagonists, 
each from his high position, looked down upon the 
board where the great game was playing. Thomas, 



504: IMILITAEY HISTORY OF 

and various of tlie corps and division generals of the 
Army of tlie Cumberland, were witli Grant, on Or- 
chard knoll. 

Before dawn, Sherman was in the saddle, and, 
attended by his staff, rode to the extreme left of his 
position, near Chickamauga river, and thence up the 
hill which he had seized the day before. In the dim 
light of morning, the line of attack lay before him, 
towards Missionary ridge, his wings supporting him 
on either flank ; but quite a valley yawned between 
his trooj^s and the next hill of the series. This next 
hill presented steep sides, the one to the west par- 
tially cleared, but the other covered with the native 
forest. Tlie crest was narrow and wooded. The 
further point of the hill was held by the rebels, with 
a breastwork of logs and fresh earth, the breastwork 
filled with men ; and, on a still higher hill, beyond 
the tunnel, the enemy was seen in yet greater force. 
From the last-named point, the rebels had a plun- 
ging fire on the hill in dispute. The gorge between, 
through which several roads as well as the railroad 
tunnel pass, could not be seen from Sherman's posi- 
tion ; but it formed a natural place of arms, where 
the enemy covered his masses, to resist the con- 
templated movement of turning his right and en- 
dangering communication with his depot at Chicka- 
mauga. 

The sun had already risen before the prepara- 
tions were complete, and the bugle sounded forward. 
The three brigades of Cockrell, Alexander, and Light- 
l)urn were to hold the hill already gained, as a key- 
point ; Corse, with as much- of his brigade as could 
operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack from 
the right centre; Morgan L. Smith was to move 



ULYSSES S. GRAiS^T. 505 

along the east base of Missionary ridge ; and Loomis, 
in like manner, along the west base, snj^ported by 
two reserve brigades, under John E. Smith. 

The assaulting force advanced in a deployed line, 
preceded by strong skinnishers, and moved up the 
face of the hill to the very rifle-pits of the enemy. 
About eighty yards from the rebel intrenchments, 
was a secondary ridge, Avhich was gained at once, 
and firmly held. The extreme end of the rebel ^vork 
was also carried, and a strong point made, on the 
crest of the nearest ridge. Sherman then pressed his 
attack to within pistol-shot of the main rebel line, 
and advanced his left division, under Morgan L. 
Smith, so as to cut off the enemy from the railroad 
bridge to Chickamauga; but no further advantage 
was secured. The contest was close, lasting several 
hours ; ground was given and lost, but the first posi- 
tion was all that was attained. Neither, however, 
could the most determined efforts of the enemy dis- 
lodge the national troops from the important point 
they had gained. Persistently, stubbornly, and well, 
they fought. Corse was wounded at ten o'clock. 

Sherman, at this time, threatened not only the 
right flank of the enemy, but his rear and stores at 
Chickamauga station; and Grant's real object was 
completely gained, for Bragg was forced to weaken 
his centre to support the rebel right.* Column 

* General Sherman told me that he did not consider the hill for 
which he fought on Xovcmber 23d, as very important i n itself, and there- 
fore used only three regiments, in the original attack ; but he made as 
much noise and show as he could, to alarm Bragg for the safety of 
that flank, and of the railroad bridge, just in rear. Ills effort was, to 
induce Bragg to detach as much as possible from the centre, and so to 
■weaken that, which Sherman knew, from Grant, would be the critical 
point of the battle. It was, at fii-st, supposed that Bragg, finding Sher- 
man on the end of Missionary ridge, would at once draw from his centre, 



506 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

after column of the rebels was soon streaming tow- 
ards Sherman ; gun after gun poured a concentric 
fire from every hill and spur that gave a view of his 
ground. But Loomis and Corse's commands pressed 
forward ; and, as the right of the assaulting column 
became exposed, the two brigades of John E. Smith 
were sent to its support. They moved over an open 
field, on the mountain-side, and under a hea^y fire of 
musketry and cannon, close up. to the works of the 
enemy. The crest was so narrow that they neces- 
sarily occupied tlie Avest face of the hill, and, there, 
for some time, they lay, partially covered from fire. 
Their right, however, rested near the head of the 
ravine; and the enemy took advantage of this. 
Having massed in great strength, at the tunnel 
gorge, he moved a large force, under cover of the 
ground and the thick buslies, and suddenly appeared 
on the rifrht and rear of Smith's command. Un- 
expectedly attacked from this quarter. Smith fell 
back across the open field, about two hundred yards, 
but formed in good order, on the edge of the tim- 
ber ; while the column which had attacked him was 
speedily driven back to its own intrenchments, by 
the assaulting column proper. This occurred at 
about' three o'clock in the afternoon. 

Grant was watching the progress of the fight 
from Orchard knoll, and, seeing the danger to which 
Sherman was exposed, lie now ordered Baird's divi- 
sion, of the Fourteenth coi-ps, to support the extreme 
left; but Sherman sent word that he had all the 

to attack vehemently on the right ; but this Bragg did not do ; and then 
Grant ordered Sherman to attack Bragg, which evidently produced 
the same effect — weakening the enemy's line, and fiicilitating Grant's 
real object — to break the rebel centre. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 507 

force necessary, and Baird was put in position on 
Thomas's left. Baird, accordingly, marclied by the 
flank, in front of Fort Wood, to take position on 
Howard's right. This movement was plainly per- 
ceived by the enemy, and impressed him with the 
idea that Grant's main assault was to be made on 
the rebel risfht ; a massive column of Braii^ix's forces 
soon was seen to move northward along the crest of 
the rids^e, resriment after res-iment filinsj towards 
Sherman. 

Meanwhile, the day was waning, and Thomas's 
attack, which was to relieve Sherman, had not been 
made. Grant looked eagerly for the advance of 
Hooker, moving north along the ridge, with his left 
in Chattanooga valley and his right thrown east of 
the ridge. This approach was to be the signal for 
stormins: the rido-e, at the centre, with Thomas's 
columns. But Hooker was necessarily detained in the 
construction of the bridges over Chattanooga creek. 

Grant had marked the movement of the rebel col- 
umns towards his left, and instantly perceived his 
opportunity. Bragg was attempting the most diffi 
cult manoeuvre that can be executed in war. He 
was weakening his centre and making a flank move- 
ment in the presence of an enemy. Grant meanwhile 
had got information from Hooker, and was satisfied 
that he must be on his way from Kossville, although 
not vet in s'vAit. He determined to order the 
assault. 

At first, he simply directed Thomas to order the 
advance ; but, seeing the corps commanders near 
him, Grant repeated to them in person the command. 
Thomas's force now consisted of four divisions, un- 
der Johnson, Sheridan, Wood, and Baird. A double 



508 MILITAET IIISTOEY OF 

line of skirmisliers was thrown out, followed in easy 
supporting distance by the whole force. The orders 
were to cany the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary 
ridge ; and, when this was done, to re-form the lines, 
in the rifle-pits, with a view to carrying the top of 
the ridsre. 

o 

The ground immediately in front was open tim- 
ber ; then, a smooth and open plain ; the distance, to 
the first line of the enemy's rifle-pits, varying from 
four hundred to nine hundred yards. Next, was a 
steep ascent of about five hundred yards, to the top 
of the rido^e, the face of which was ru2:2:ed and cov- 
ered with fallen timber. About half way up the 
hill, or two hundred and fifty yards from the fii'st 
rifle-pits, was a second but imperfect line of works ; 
and, last of all, the rifle-pits on the crest. 

The two corps had been restless and eager all 
day, and the instant that Grant gave the second 
order. Granger and Palmer moved their forces down 
the slope of the hill where they had been posted, 
and across the lower ground to the left. They 
marched steadily on, under a tremendous fire of 
artillery from the ridge; and emerging from the 
timber, took up the double quick, dashing over the 
open plain, and at the enemy's first line, with a mass 
of glistening bayonets that was irresistible. The 
four divisions reached the foot of the ridge almost 
simultaneously ; not a gun was fired, but the bayo- 
nets fairly blazed in the bright afternoon sun ; * and 

* I asked General Sheridan how he accounted for the ease with 
which the first line of rifle-pits was carried. He said that he hap- 
pened to be in advance of his own line as it charged, and, looking 
back, was impi'essed with the terrible sight presented by the mass of 
approaching bayonets. The men were on a run, and the line had be- 
come almost a crowd ; and the rebels appeared unable to resist the 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 509 

as tlie line came closer and closer, the rebels flunof 
themselves prostrate in the trenches, and the national 
troops rnslied over. A thousand prisoners at once 
were ordered to the rear, and hurj-ied back across tlie 
open plain, croucliing from the fire of tlieir own com- 
rades on the crest. Others retreated rapidly up tlie 
hill. 

At this time, according to orders, there should 
have been a halt, but the men were uncontrollable; 
shouts of triumph rang along the line, and everywhere 
the troops began to climb the mountain, waiting for 
no further orders. The rebel fire now chano-ed from 
shot and shell to canister and musketry, and the men 
lay on their faces to avoid the storm, working their 
way thus up the front of the mountain. Com- 
manders could not order back the troops who were 
step by step ascending, in this way, and fast ap- 
proaching the second line of rifle-pits.* First, one 
flao: would be advanced a few feet, then another was 
thrust forward on a line with this, each striving for 
the advance. As many as five or six color-bearers 
were successively shot down, carrying a single flag; 
but, at last, all along the ridge, the colors were planted 
on the second line. 

Thirty pieces of artillery now opened on the 
assailants with direct, plunging, cross, and enfilading 
fires; and a storm of musketry, from the still well- 
effect upon their imagination or their nerves of this waving, glittering 
mass of steel. 

* When they had got a third of the way up. an aide of Granger's 
ordered one of Sheridan's brigades down the hill, in conformity with 
the original plan; but Sheridan soon came up, and saw that the flags 
were advancing steadily, and that two of his brigades were still mount- 
ing the hill. He at once ordered back the troops which had begun 
to descend. " When I saw those flags going up," he said, " I knew 
we should carry the ridge, and I took the responsibility." 



510 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

filled rifle-pits on tlie summit, was flung into tlieir 
very faces. But not a break was seen in all tlie line ; 
neither the toil of the ascent that exhausted tlieir 
strength, nor the fire of the enemy that thinned their 
ranks, retarded them. Steadily, rapidly, on they 
pushed, the enemy in desperate flight before them ; 
until at last the tide reached the hio-hest crest, 
poured over the works, and carried the hills simulta- 
neously at six different points, so close upon the 
rebels that crowds were captured in the very 
trenches. Whole regiments threw down their arms ; 
others fled headlong down the eastern slope, the na- 
tional soldiers not waiting to reload their pieces, but 
driving the enemy with stones. Artillerists were 
bayoneted at their guns, and the cannon were cap- 
tured before they could be removed or destroyed. 
The very pieces which a moment before had been 
thundering against the national army, were turned 
at once uj)on the rebel line, enfilading it right and 
left, and rendering it perfectly untenable. It was 
fifty-five minutes since the troops had left theii' places 
on the plain.* 

Such had been the strength of Bragg's posi- 
tion, that he entertained no doubt of his ability to 
hold it against far superior numbers, and had made 
every disposition for this purpose. " It was a posi- 
tion,'' he said himself, " Avhich a line of skirmishers 
ought to have maintained against any assaulting 
column." Tliose Avho reached the crest were in a 
condition of exhaustion from the great physical exer- 
tion in climbing, which alone ought to have rendered 

* Sheridan lost, in this charge, eleven hundred and seventy-nine 
men, and one hundred and twenty-three officers, out of a force of six 
thousand. This was nearly half the loss in Thomas's command. 



ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 511 

the enemy irresistible. Bragg, indeed, at first 
tbouglit that the attack had been repulsed ; and was 
riding along the ridge, congratulating his troops, 
when intelli2:ence was brous^ht him that the line was 
broken on the right, and the national troops had 
actually crowned the ridge. He proceeded at once 
to the rear of the broken line, to rally his retiring 
soldiers, and return them to the crest ; but the dis- 
aster was too great to be repaired. At the same 
moment, the rebel general learned that his extreme 
left had also given way, and that his position was 
almost surrounded. 

A second line was immediately ordered to be 
formed in rear, where, by the efforts of Bragg's staff, 
a nucleus of stragglers had been created, upon which 
he hoped to rally the fugitives ; but firing was again 
heard in the direction of the left, and another divi- 
sion came tumblins: in: the entire rebel left was 
routed and in raj^jid flight. Every effort that could 
be made by Bragg and his staff availed but little ; 
the guns were abandoned by the infantry supports ; 
a panic had seized both oflicers and men, and each 
seemed merely struggling for his own personal safety. 
Orders were given for Hardee on the right, and 
Breckinridcre ou the left of the rebel line, to retire 
their forces upon the depot at Chickamauga. It was 
now near night, and, fortunately for Bragg, the coun- 
try and roads in his rear were familiar to him, and 
equally unknown to his pursuers. His routed left 
made its wav back in s^reat confusion, but the other 
portions of his command still offered opposition.* 

* Sec Appendix, for Bragg's report in full, from which all my 
statements in regard to the rebel movements and condition are taken 
almost verlatim. 



512 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

After halting a few moments, to reorganize tlie 
troops, who had become somewhat scattered in the 
assault, Sheridan pushed forward in pui'suit. Bragg 
himself had barely escaped capture, and his disorgan- 
ized troops, with a large wagou-train and several 
pieces of artillery, could be distinctly seen, flying 
through the valley below, within a distance of half a 
mile. Sheridan pressed on, to capture the prize. 
About a mile in rear of Missionary ridge, the road 
runs along another high and formidable hill, on 
which the enemy had posted artillery, supported by 
a heavy force of infantry. The men, however, charged 
again, clinging to the face of the mountain, as they 
had done a few hours before, on Missionary ridge. 
Meanwhile, Sheridan sent regiments on either side to 
flank the enemy. It was now dark, and, just as the 
head of one of these columns reached the summit of 
the hill, the moon rose from behind, and a medallion 
view of the column was disclosed, as it crossed the 
disk of the moon, and attacked the enemy. Out- 
flanked on right and left the rebels fled, leaving the 
coveted artillery and trains. Those who escaped cap- 
ture were driven across Chickamauo-a creek, where 
they burned the bridges, almost while they passed. 

Wood and Baird were more obstinately resisted, 
by reenforcements from the rebel right, and continued 
flghting till darkness set in, slowly but steadily driv- 
ing the enemy before them. 

In the mean time. Hooker had completed his 
bridges, crossed the Chattanooga, and moved north, 
i:>arallel with the ridge; Osterhaus on his right, 
Geary on the left, and Cruffc having the centre. The 
rebels had selected for their line of defence, in front 
of Hooker, the breastworks thrown up by the na- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 513 

tional troops in tlieir retreat from Chickamauga ; 
but, sucli was the impetuosity of Hooker's advance, 
that their front line was routed before an opportu- 
nity was allowed even to prepare a determined resist- 
ance. The bulk of the rebel left now sought refuge 
behind a second line, and thence was ao-ain driven 
out, till the flight became almost a runnino- one. As 
he moved upon Eossville, Hooker eucountei-ed a di- 
vision under Stuart, which was attempting to escape 
towards Greysville ; but, some of this force, finding 
their retreat threatened in that quarter, retii-ed in 
disorder towards their own rio-ht, alons: the crest of 
the ridge ; there they were met b}' another portion 
of Hooker's command, and driven by these troops 
into the very face of Johnson's division, of Palmer's 
corps, by whom they were nearly all made prisoners. 
Thus, with the centi-e pierced, and the left wing 
rolled in, the whole rebel army was in inextricable 
confusion. 

Grant rode up at once on the ridge, to direct 
the pursuit, and himself followed, for a mile or two, 
beyond the hills which so long had obstructed his 
armies. But, the near approach of night, and igno- 
rance of the roads, prevented any further effective 
movements, except by Sheridan, who pushed as for 
as Mission mills, seven miles. The business of the 
day, however, was ended, and the troops went into 
bivouac, with, cheers which were caught up by other 
troops, and carried along the ridge for miles, until lost 
in the distance. Chickamauija was aveni:jed. 

As soon as the resistance on Thomas's left was 
overcome, the enemy, of course, abandoned his posi- 
tion near the railroad tunnel, in front of Sherman, 
who, hoAvever, did not know, until night closed in, 

33 



514 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

that tlie troops in Cliattanooga had swept across 
Missionary ridge and broken the enemy's centre. 
Pursuit was then ordered by him, at once. Morgan 
L. Smith was directed to feel the tunnel, wliich was 
found vacant, save by the rebel and national dead, 
who lay stark and still, commingled. Davis's reserve 
was ordered to march at once to the pontoon bridge, 
across the Chickamauga, at its mouth, and push for- 
ward for the depot. Howard had been posted to 
connect Sherman's left with Chickamauga creek. 
He was now ordered to repair an old broken bridge, 
about two miles up the Chickamauga, and to follow 
Davis at four a. m. on the morrow, while the Fif 
teenth corps was to march at daylight. 

All of the strong positions of Lookout mountain, 
Chattanooga valley, and Missionary ridge were thus 
in Grant's possession, together with forty rebel can- 
non, and six thousand prisoners. Success had been 
complete on every part of the field. In Sherman's 
front the results had not been so brilliant, but it 
was simply because of the stubborn fight made there, 
that the rebels massed upon him, weakening their 
left and centre, and giving Grant the coveted ojipor- 
tunity. That night, Grant wrote to Sherman : " No 
doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which 
Thomas's troops carried Missionary ridge, this after- 
noon, and can feel a just pride, too, in the part taken 
by the forces under your command, in taking, first, 
so much of the same range of hills, and, then, in at- 
tracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to 
make Thomas's part certain of success. The next 
thiuo; now will be to relieve Burnside." 

To Wilcox, the same night, he said : " The great 
defeat Bragg has -sustained in the three days' battle 



ULYSSES S. GEANT. 515 

terminating at dusk this evening, and a movement 
which I will immediately make, I think, will relieve 
Burnside, if he holds out a few days longer. I shall 
pursue Bragg, to-morro^v, and start a heavy cohimn 
up the Tennessee valley the day after." 

At seven o'clock. Grant was aide to report to the 
general -in-chief: "Although the battle lasted from 
early dawn until dark this evening, I believe I am 
not j)remature in announcing a complete victoiy over 
Bragg. Lookout mountain-top, all the rifle-pits in 
Chattanooga valley, and Missionary ridge entire, have 
been carried, and are now held by us. I have no 
idea of findino; Brairsf here to-morrow." A half hour 
later, he dispatched again : " I have heard from 
Burnside, to the 23d, when he had rations for ten or 
twelve days, and expected to hold out that time. I 
shall move a force from here, on to the railroad be- 
tween Cleveland and Dalton, and send a column of 
twenty thousand men up the south side of the Ten- 
nessee, without wagons, carrying four days' rations, 
and taking a steamer loaded with rations, from whicli 
to draw, on the route. If Burnside holds out until 
this force gets beyond Kingston, I think the enemy 
will fly, and with the present state of the roads, 
must abandon almost every thing. I believe Bragg 
will lose much of his army by desertion, in conse- 
quence of his defeat in the last tliree days' fight." 
On the 26th, Halleck replied to Grant's announce- 
ment of success : " I congratulate you and your army 
on the victories of Cliattanooga. This is truly a day 
of thanksQ-ivino;." 

To Sherman, on the night of the 2r)tli, Grant 
said: "My plan is to move your forces out 
gradually, until they reach the railroad between 



516 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

Cleveland and Dalton. Granger will move up the 

south side of the Tennessee We will push 

Bragg with all our strength, to-morrow, and try if 
we cannot cut off a good portion of his new troops 
and trains. His men have manifested a strong 
desire to desert for some time past, and we will now 

give them a chance Move the advance force on 

the most easterly road taken by the enemy." The 
same night, Thomas was ordered : " You will start a 
strono; reconnoissance in the morninor at seven a. m., 
to ascertain the position of the enemy. If it is ascer- 
tained that the enemy are in full retreat, follow them 
with all your force, except that which you intend 
Granger to take to Knoxville Four days' ra- 
tions should be got up to the men, between this and 
morning, and also a supply of ammunition. I shall 
want Granger s expedition to get off by the day after 
to-morrow." 

On the morning of the 26th, accordingly, Sher- 
man advanced by way of Chickamauga station ; 
and Thomas's force (Hooker and Palmer) moved on 
the x\tlanta road towards (Irevsville and Rina;- 
gold, while Granger's conmiand retm^ned to Chatta- 
nooira, -with instructions to hold itself in readiness 
for orders to reenforce Burnside. Grant was with 
the pursuing column ; but, on the night of the battle, 
Thomas returned to Chattanooga, and did not rejoin 
his troops. By eleven a. m., Jefferson C. Davis, of 
Sherman's command, arrived at Chickamauga depot, 
just in time to see it in flames. He entered Avith 
one l)rigade, and found the enemy partially in- 
trenched, on the hills beyond the depot. This force, 
however, was soon driven away. The depot pre- 
sented a scene of desolation such as war alone ex- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 517 

liiljits. Corn and meal in liuge burning piles, broken 
wagons, abandoned caissons, rifled guns with tlieir 
carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, balks, chesses, 
all one mass of flame and destruction. Halting a 
short time only, the column passed on, over a road 
lined with the wrecks of the retreating anny. Just 
as the head of the division emerged from a dark and 
miry swamp, it encountered the rear-guard of the 
enemy. The fight was sharp, but night closed in so 
dark that Sherman could not advance. Grant came 
up with Sherman's column here. 

Hooker, meanwliile, had arrived at Chickamauga 
creek, and found the bridge destroyed; his j)ontoons 
were not up, and it was three o'clock before the regi- 
ments could beo:in to cross ; the officers swam their 
horses, and the artillery and ambulances were left 
behind, to follow as soon as practicable. Palmer, 
who now reported to Hooker, was sent to Greysville, 
by the Lafayette road, and the rest of the command 
proceeded to Ringgold, Cruft's division leading. 
Palmer came up with the rear of the enemy, on the 
road from Greysville to Ringgold, and captured three 
pieces of artilleiy, with a small number of prisoners. 
Cruft also advanced, and took possession of the 
Chickamauga hills, on whose sides the abandoned 
camp-fires of the enemy were brightly burning. It 
was now ten o'clock, and Hooker went into bivouac, 
his artillery not having yet arrived. 

llingo-old was five miles oft', and the pursuit was 
renewed at daylight, Osterhaus in the advance. Evi- 
dences of the precipitate flight of the rebels were 
everywhere apparent; the road was strewn with 
caissons, wagons, ambulances, arms and ammunition, 
abandoned in the huny and confusion of flight, and 



518 IVnLITAEY HISTOEY OF 

before the east fork of Chiekamauga creek was 
reached, a large number of prisoners had been taken. 
Soon the advance came up with the camps that had 
been occupied the night before, by the rebels ; here, 
also, the fires of the bivouac were still ablaze. The 
ford, and a bridge south of Ringgold,- were both held 
by rebel cavalry. These discharged their pieces, 
and quickly gave way before a handful of Hooker's 
men, who pursued them closely into the town. 

Clebui'ne's division was covering the retreat of 
Hardee's corps, of the rebel army, and had aiTived at 
the west bank of the East Chiekamauga, at ten o'clock 
on the night of the 26th. At this point he had to 
ford the river; it was nearly waist-deep, and the 
night was freezing cold, so the crossing was post- 
poned until morning. But, in the night, Cleburne 
received orders to take a strong position in the gorge 
of the mountain, and attempt to check the advance 
of Hooker. The main rebel force had just passed 
through Ringgold, sorely pressed, the animals ex- 
hausted and the men demoralized. Regimental and 
company formations were destroyed, and many of the 
men had thro^vn away their arms. 

Ringgold is a place of two or three thousand in- 
habitants, and stands on a plain between the East 
Chickamauo:a river and the rano-e of hills kno^vn as 
Taylor's ridge ; it is on the Western and Atlantic 
railroad, and about twenty miles southeast of Chat- 
tanooga. Taylor's ridge runs north and south, and, 
immediately back of the town, is a break in the 
ridffe, wide enou2:h to admit the raih'oad, a wai^'on- 
road, and a tributary creek of the Chiekamauga. The 
creek hugs the southern side of the gorge, and the 
wagon-road and railroad run close to the bank of the 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. HI 9 

stream. The ridge rises abruptly on either hand, 
four or five hundred feet, and at its western moutli 
the gap widens to the breadth of a hundred yards, 
leaving room for a patch of level wooded land, on 
either side of the roads. The gap is about half a 
mile long, and the plain in the rear is so cut up by 
the windings of the stream, that three bridges or fords 
have to be crossed, in the first half-mile beyond, on 
the Dalton road. 

Cleburne had been ordered to use the great natu- 
ral advantages presented by this gap, to clieck the 
pursuit of the national army, till the trains and rear 
of the main column could get well advanced beyond 
the entanglements, on the other side of the ridge. 
He accordingly posted some of his troops on the 
mountain-top ; and, behind the fringe of trees at its 
base, four short lines were formed across the gap. 
Skirmishers were thrown out as far as the creek, and 
a battery was placed in the mouth of the gap, 
screened by wittered branches built up in front of 
the guns ; a ravine near by sheltered the artillerists. 
Cleburne had over four thousand bayonets. 

The rebel line of skirmishers was feeble, and 
Hooker deployed a l)rigade, under cover of the em- 
bankment of the railroad. Soon, a brisk musketiy-fire 
began between the skirmishers. The rebel cavalry at 
once retreated through the gap on a trot, and the 
valley in front was clear of Cleburne's troops ; but, 
close in rear of the ridge, an immense wagon-train 
was still struggling through the fords of the creek, 
and the deeply cut up roads leading to Dalton. 
Cleburne's division was the only barrier between 
the train and the eager advance of the pursuing 
army. 



520 JIILITARY HISTORY OF 

Sliortly after eiglit o'clock a. m., altliougli his 
artillery Lad not yet arrived, Hooker moved kis line 
of battle np, under cover of tke skirmisk fire. Tke 
troops advanced witk decision and celerity, but soon 
became exposed to tke rebel artillery, and, after five 
or six rapid disckarges, the rigkt was compelled to 
retire. Tke left, kowever, continued to advance, and 
made a keavy attack on tke ridge. Four regiments 
were detacked kalf a mile to tke left, to ascend tke 
kill, and turn tke enemy's right. As they were 
tkrown forward, tke rebels appeared in force on tke 
crest, kaving detected tke movement. Four otker 
regiments were tken tkrown still furtker to the left, 
but tkey also found a large force ready to receive 
tkem. Vigorous attacks were made by botk these 
columns, but tke advantage of position was too great 
to overcome. One column took skelter in a depres- 
sion on the side of the ridge, about fifty paces in rear 
of its most advanced position ; and several renewed 
attempts were made to carry the ridge, botk sides 
figkting keroically. Tke rebels tkrew rocks from 
tkeir kigher position, and in this way sometimes 
loiocked the assailants down the ridge. 

Finding himself entirely unable to accomplish his 
purj^ose. Hooker at last desisted from the attack, and 
determined to await the arrival of his artillery. He 
could not, kowever, witkdraw, witkout becoming 
still more exposed, and tke men remained in tkeir ad- 
vanced positions on the mountain-side ; but it was 
deemed imwise to bring up any more troops until 
the artillery should arrive, as the slaughter would 
have been great, witkout the possibility of inflicting 
on the enemy a loss at all comparable with that re- 



ULTSSES S. GRANT. 521 

ceivecl. The rebels tlirew up slight defences, and 
some desultory fighting occurred, near the mouth of 
the gap, but without important results. 

Between twelve and one o'clock, tlie artillery 
came up, not having been able to cross the west fork 
of the Chickamauga, until eight o'clock that day. A 
section of howitzers was at once brouo-ht to bear on 
the enemy, in front of Hooker's right, and enfiladed 
the gap ; another section was assigned to silence the 
rebel battery ; and troops and ai-tillery ^vere sent to 
gain the heights on the southern side of the river, 
which would give a plunging fire on the enemy in 
the gorge. 

Just as the artillery was opening, Grant arrived 
on the field. He at once sent orders to Sherman to 
move down a force on the east side of the ridge, and 
turn the enemy's position. " It looks as if it will be 
hard to disloclo-e them." But the rebels did not wait 
for this new disposition to be concluded ; the artil- 
lery had opened with marked eftect, the enemy's guns 
were hauled to the rear, his troops seen moving, and, 
before one o'clock, Cleburne was in full retreat. 
One brigade of Hooker pursued across the mountain, 
and others followed tlirough the gap. The rebels 
attempted to burn the bridges, but were speedily 
driven away, and the fires were extinguished. Three 
pieces of artillery and two hundred and tliirty 
prisoners were captui'cd. Hooker's loss was sixty- 
five killed, and three hundred and seventy-seven 
wounded; only al)Out half of the latter so severely 
as to go into hospital. In the early part of the bat- 
tle, a few of his wounded had fallen into the enemy's 
hands, but they were soon recaptured. One hundred 
and thirty rebels were left dead on the field; Cle- 



522 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 

burne, however, reported only twenty killed, a hun- 
dred and ninety wounded, and eleven missing. But 
the rebels secured the escape of their train, which 
was all they were fighting for. 

Sherman had resumed his march at daylight, and, 
at Greysville, came up with Palmer's corps. The 
roads, in advance, were filled with as many troops as 
they could accommodate, and, in obedience to Grant's 
order, Sherman now turned east, to break up all com- 
munication between Brao-o- and Lono-street. Howard 
was directed to move to Parker's gap, and thence to 
Red Clay, and destroy a large section of the railroad 
connectino' Dalton and Cleveland. This work was 
completely performed, that day, and Davis's division 
was moved up close to Ringgold, to be ready to 
assist Hooker, if need should arise. About noon, 
Sherman got a message from Hooker, saying that he 
had had a pretty hard fight, and wanted Sherman to 
come up and turn the position of the enemy. How- 
ard, however, by moving through Parker's gap to 
Red Clay, had already turned Ringgold; but, of this, 
neither Grant nor Hooker was as yet aware. So, 
Sherman rode on to Ringgold, and found the rebels 
had already fallen back to Tunnel hilL The enemy 
was out of the valley of the Chickamauga, and on 
ground where the waters flow to the Coosa. He was 
driven from Tennessee. 

Grant now directed the pui'suit to be discontin- 
ued, and, at one p. m., he dispatched to Thomas: 
" Direct Granger .... to start at once, marching as 
rapidly as possible to the relief of Burnside." Had 
it not been for this im^^erative necessity of relieving 
Burnside, Grant would have pursued the demoralized 
and retreating enemy, as long as supplies could have 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 523 

been found in tlie country. But, his advices were 
that Burnside's supplies could only last till tlie 3d ot 
December. It was already getting late to afford the 
necessary relief; so, Grant directed Hooker to hold 
the position he then occupied, until the night of the 
80th, but to go no further south at the expense of a 
iischt. Sherman was instructed to march to the rail- 
road crossing of the Iliawassee, to protect Granger's 
ilank until he should get across that stream ; and to 
prevent further reenforcements being sent, by that 
route, into East Tennessee. 

A reconnoissance was made by Hooker, in the 
direction of Tunnel hill, the rebel line of retreat ; 
and caissons, wagons, dead and dying men were 
found strewn along the way, to a horrible extent. 
The reconnoitrino; force returned on the nio-lit of the 
27th, and then went into bivouac. The railroad at 
Ringgold was thoroughly destroyed, for a distance of 
two miles ; also, the depot, tannery, mills, and all the 
military material. On the 29th, Palmer returned to 
Chattanooga, with his command, and the prisoners 
taken at fiinggold. On the oOth, the enemy sent a 
flag of truce to Hookers advanced position at 
Catoosa, requesting permission to bur\' the rebel 
dead and care for the wounded, abandoned in the 
flight from Ringgold ; during that day and the next, 
the remaining infantry and cavalry of Hooker's com- 
mand left Ringgold; Geary and Cruft to return to 
their old camps, in Lookout valley, and Osterhaus, 
to encamp near Chattanooga. 

On the 28th, the Fifteenth corps destroyed the 
railroad absolutely and effectually, from a point half- 
way between Greysville and Ringgold, back to the 
Georgia state line; and, on the 29th, Howard's com- 



524 MILITARY mSTO'RY OF 

mand, witli two divisions of tlie Fifteentli corps and 
Davis's division, moved by different mountain-gorges, 
and all met at Cleveland, where they again set to 
work destroying tlie railroad. On tlie SOtli, Sher- 
man's army marched to Charleston, Howard ap- 
proaching so rapidly that the rebel force there evacu- 
ated in haste, leaving the bridge only partially dam- 
aged, and large loads of flour and provision fell into 
the hands of the national soldiers. 

Grant's losses, in these battles, were seven hun- 
dred and fifty-seven killed, four thousand five hun- 
dred and twenty-nine wounded, and three hundred 
and thirty missing ; total, five thousand six hundred 
and sixteen. The enemy's losses were fewer in 
killed and wounded, owing to the fact that he was 
protected by intrenchments,* while the national sol- 
diers were without cover. Grant captured six thou- 
sand one hundred and forty-two prisoners, forty 
pieces of artillery, sixty-nine artillery carriages and 
caissons, and seven thousand stands of small-arms ; 
by far the greatest capture, in the open field, which 
had then been made during the war. 

The battle of Chattanooga was the grandest ever 
fought west of the Alleghauies. It covered an extent 
of thirteen miles, and Grant had over sixty thou- 
sand men engaged. Hooker's force amounted to 
about ten thousand ; Sherman's, including Howard's, 
to over twenty thousand ; and Thomas's command 
included aJmost thirty thousand soldiers. The rebels 

* The rebel losses were reported at tlu'ce hundred and sixty-one 
killed, two thousand one hundred aod eighty Avounded, and four 
thousand one hundred and forty-six missing. This statement is cer- 
tainly inaccurate in one particular, as Grant captured two thousand 
more men than the rebels reported missing. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 525 

numbered only forty-five tliousand men,* but tliey 
enjoyed immense advantages of position on every 
part of tlie field, and, according to all tlie rules of tbe 
military art, a strong defensive position is equivalent 
to five times an equal number of assailants. 

At Vicksburg, it had been the strategy, at 
Shiloh, the hard fighting, but, at Chattanooga, it 
was the manoeuvring in the presence of the enemy 
that brought about the result ; aided, of course, in 
the highest possible degree, by the gallantry of the 
soldiers, without which the greatest of generals is in 
fact unarmed. Few battles have ever been won so 
strictly according to the plan laid dovra ; certainly, 
no battle, during the war of the rebellion, was 
earned out so completely according to the pro- 
gramme. Grant's instructions in advance would 
almost serve as a history of the contest. Changes 
Avere indeed made in the orders; but, before 
the battle began, the original plan was resumed. 
Hooker w^as to draw attention to the right, to seize 
and hold Lookout mountain ; Avliile Sherman, attack- 
ing Missionary ridge on the extreme left, was still 
fuiiiher to distract the enemy ; and, then, when reen- 
forcements and attention should be drawn to both 
the rebel flanks, the centre was to be assaulted by 
the main body of Grant's force under Thomas. 
Every thing happened exactly as had been foreseen. 

* On the lOtb of December, Bragg reported fifty-eight thousand 
seven hundred and fifty-five men present, of whom forty-three thousand 
and ninety-four were " effective." Of these, however, ten thousand six 
hundred and twenty-two (effective) belonged to Wheek-r's cavalry ; 
and "portions of five brigades" of Wheeler were with Longstreet. 
Still, the six thousand prisoners, to say nothing of the killed and 
wounded and stragglers, would bring up Bragg's numbers, on the days 
of the battle, to at least those stated in the text. 



526 MTLITAEY HISTOEY OF 

Disturbed, at tTie start, by tlie continuous marsL ai- 
ling of vast forces beneath his very eye, Bragg seemed 
to have lost all ordinary sagacity ; and, on the night of 
the 22d of November, absolutely sent Buckner's divi- 
sion to Longstreet, who was lustily calling for aid, in 
East Tennessee. A second division had even started 
on the morning of the battle, but was recalled, by 
the movement of the 23d. Still, Bragg appeared con- 
fused by the manifold manceuvres of Grrant. He 
knew of the arrival of Sherman, one of whose divi- 
sions had been advanced far up Lookout valley ; he 
saw the crossing at Brown's ferry, but doubtless 
hoped that the rains and the rise in the river, and 
the consequent destruction of the bridges, would 
delay any rapid operations of his antagonist. Losing 
sight, too, of Sherman, as soon as that commander 
crossed at Brown's ferry, it was impossible to know 
whether he had been sent to the aid of Burnside, or 
was detained for an assault at Chattanooga. Bragg 
must have finally concluded that the Army of the 
Tennessee had gone on to Knoxville ; on no other 
supposition can the subtraction from his own force 
of two divisions, at this critical juncture, be accounted 
for. 

But, the very next day, occurred the operations 
which resulted in the capture of Orchard knoll. 
Grant heard of the dispatch of Buckner's force, and 
immediately attacked Bragg's centre, lest the whole 
rebel army should escape. He thus brought back one 
of the departing divisions, while the other got off 
just far enough to be out of reach of recall, during the 
crisis of the next two days. The rebel chief became 
still more bewildered, and the sight of the immense 
masses moving in the valley below them, affected the 



ULYSSES S. GRAin'. 527 

imaginations and depressed tlie spirits of his sol- 
diers.* The very openness of the display was a proof 
of audacity, that confounded them. 

Bra2:Qr had now to decide whether or not he 
would maintain both flanks with equal deteiTuina- 
tion. Lookout mountain, it is true, commanded the 
river, and was the key to all operations on the rebel 
left ; but, Missionary ridge, at its northern extremity, 
covered his base and line of supplies. The demon- 
stration of the 23d boded an attack, and he must 
make his election, in case the attack occurred. If he 
decided to hold Chickamauga, he must yield the 
mountain, and throw his whole force between the en- 
croaching wing of Grant's army and the southern 
raib'oad. If he gave the preference to Lookout, then 
the railroad in his rear, and the depot of his supplies, 
must be abandoned. In tliis emergency, he acted 
with indecision, and weakened his left, without suffi- 
ciently strengthening the right ; withdrawing one 
division (Walker's) from Lookout, on the night of 
the 23d, but leaving still six brigades on the moun- 
tain ; enough to make a struggle on the left that 
could only end in failure, while he did not add 
enouo;h. to his ri^jht to make that flank secure. He 
probably could not bring himself to admit that Look- 
out mountain must really be al )andoned ; he could 
not acknowledo-e to himself and his armv, that he 
was now really on the defensive, before the antago- 
nist whom he had threatened so long. 

But the o:reat drama went on. Sherman airived 

* " They had for two clays confronted the enemy marshalling bis 
immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their siijht such a 
superiority in numbers, as may have intimidated weak minds and un- 
tried soldiers." — Bragg's Report. 



528 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

from beliind Waldeu's ridge, at tlie apj^oiDtecl cross- 
ing of the Tennessee ; bridges were built like magic, 
and the army passed on to its position. Meanwhile, 
Hooker s veterans scaled tke lofty peak that domina- 
ted over all the landscape, and, all day, they held in 
their front the six brigades so much needed else- 
where. Sherman's assault began, and was so deter- 
mined and at so critical a point, that Bragg tlirew 
battalion after battalion to resist tke Arni}^ of the 
Tennessee. That army was indeed resisted, was 
unable to make its way ; but this was accomplished 
only by the sacrifice of all that Bragg was fighting 
for. The rebel centre, as Grant had foreseen, was 
weakened to save the right ; and then, the whole 
mass of the Army of the Cumberland was precipita- 
ted on the weakened point ; the centre was pierced, 
the heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga 
won. Hooker threw his soldiers, flushed with success, 
on the left of Bras;":, and rolled in that flank, and 
nothing but rout remained. 

In all these operations, the enemy had been com- 
pelled to do his part almost as if under Grant's con- 
trol Braofs: had no choice of movements left him : 
he ^\■as forced to weaken his left ; he was forced 
afterwards to defend Mmself on the riglit ; he was 
forced to make tbe very opportunity at his centre 
which Grant desired. And, although this battle had 
not been planned according to any immutable de- 
sign, nor the commanders directed by any orders 
that ^vere irreversible, yet each event proceeded 
regularly according to the calculation ; each subordi- 
nate carried out his part exactly as he had been 
ordered ; eacli army, brought from a distance, came 
upon the spot intended, crossed a river, or climbed a 



ULYSSES S. OH ANT. 529 

mouutain, at the precise nionieiit ; aud even the un- 
expected emergencies of the fight contributed to the 
result, as if anticipated and arranged. In tliis re- 
spect, Chattanooga was one of the most notable bat- 
tles ever fought. 

There were, however, other considerations which 
rendered it extraordinary. Not only was it one of the 
grandest spectacles in modern war ; not only was it 
so peculiar in plan and development, and so impor- 
tant in results, but it had a remarkably fortunate 
effect upon the armies engaged. Three hosts com- 
bined: one, coming from the valley of the Mississip- 
pi, loaded with laurels ; another, fresh from the 
famous fields of the Potomac; and the third was the 
great Army of the Cumberland, whose foot was on its 
native hills, but which, through two long years that 
it had been struggling for this veiy advantage, had 
met with only incomj^lete success. Once or twice, 
after bloody battle, it had indeed remained master of 
the field, but the full advantages of victory it had 
never reaped ; for, although it had really won Chat- 
tanooga, the possession of the prize had remained in- 
secure ; the fruits of its labor had been turned into 
ashes before they could be enjoyed. But, now. For- 
tune's bandage seemed to have fallen from her eyes, 
and she distributed rewards with an impartial hand. 
The Eastern troops had carried the most conspicuous 
position on the field, and won a strange and i)ic- 
turesque renown, forever associating their names 
with the mighty mountain that stands at the gate 
of the South ; the AVestern army had fought harder 
and longer, and with less brilliant results than either 
of the others, but, by its persistent gallantry, had 
rendered possible the great success of tlie day ; while 

34 



530 MILITAET HISTOKY OF 

it was fitly reserved for the Army of the Cumber- 
land to Min the crowning victory over its old enemy, 
to carry the heights that had confronted it so long, 
and, in sight of Chickamauga, to accomplish that 
which Chickamauga had disastrously delayed. 

For, the way was now thrown open to Atlanta, and 
all the rich country in its rear ; the very heart of the 
rebellion was laid bare ; the great bulwark of the 
would-be Confederacy was broken down, was become, 
instead, a sally-port for the national armies ; the 
rebel hosts, that had stood in the way, were thrust 
aside, and Chattanooga, thenceforth, was as terrible 
a menace to rebellion, as in times past it had been 
defiant to loyalty. 



ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 531 



CHAPTER XIII. 

Knoxville still in danger — Granger sent to Burnside — Granger moves reluctantly 
— Sherman sent to Burnside — Sherman moves with vigor — Burnside falls 
back before Longstreet — Battle at Campbell's station — Retreat to Knoxville 
—Defences of Knoxville — Siege of Knoxville — Aid from loyal Tennesscans — 
Longstreet determines to assault — Strength and position of Fort Sanders — 
Assault of Fort Sanders — Repulse of Longstreet — Approach of Sherman — 
Raising of siege — Retreat of Longstreet — Burnside sends Sherman back to 
Biawassee — Parke's pursuit of Longstreet — Burnside relieved by Foster — 
Results of entire campaign — Congratulations of President — Thanks of Con- 
gress — Miscalculation of B\irnside — Battle of Bean's station— Success of 
Longstreet — Longstreet winters in Tennessee — Disappointment of Grant — 
— Grant proposes movement against Mobile — Bragg relieved by Hardee — 
Furloughing of veterans — Grant's visit to Knoxville — Impossibility of win- 
ter campaign — Germ of Meridian raid — Distribution of forces for winter — 
Sherman sent to Vicljsburg— Grant's plan for ensuing year — Mobile and At- 
lanta objective and intermediate points — Sooy Smith's orders — Sherman's 
march from Vicksburg— Seizure of Meridian— Destruction of railroad— Fail- 
ure of Smith to cooperate — Sherman returns to Vicksburg— Smith retreats 
to Memphis— Results of Meridian raid— Cooperation of Thomas— Johnston 
in command of rebel army — Movements in East Tennessee — Grant ordered 
to Washington. 

But the task that liad been set for Grant was 
even yet not fiiUy performed. Bragg had indeed 
been driven back, and Chattanooga made secure, but 
Burnside was still threatened by a redoubtable force, 
and the capture of Knoxville was imminent. On the 
28th of Novenil)er, Grant returned from the front, to 
Chattanooga, and found that Granger's corps had not 
yet started for the relief of Burnside. A whole day 



532 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

had tlius been lost, when every Lour was invaluable, 
and Grant at once liurried off to Knoxville tbe reen- 
forcements so much needed there. 

Meanwhile, Major-General John G. Foster had 
been sent from Washington, to supersede Burnside, 
and went direct to Cumberland gap, where there 
were about three thousand national soldiers. He 
could not, however, approach nearer to Knoxville, 
now so closely besieged. On the 28th, Grant tele- 
graphed to Foster : " The Fourth corps, Major-Gen- 
eral Granger commanding, left here to-day, with 
orders to push with all possible speed through to 
Knoxville. Sherman is already in motion for Hia- 
wassee, and will go all the way, if necessary. . . . Com- 
municate this information to Burnside, as soon as 
possible, and at any cost ; with directions to hold to 
the very last moment, and we shall not only relieve 
him, but destroy Longstreet." The next day, he 
wrote to Granger, at length: ". . . . On the 23d in- 
stant, General Burnside telegraphed that his rations 
would hold out ten or twelve days ; at the end of 
this time, unless relieved from the outside, he must 
surrender or retreat. The latter will be an impossi- 
bility. You are now going for the purpose of reliev- 
ino; this i>;arrison. You see the short time in which 
relief must be afforded or be too late, and hence the 
necessity for forced marches. I want to urge upon 
you, in the strongest possible manner, the neces- 
sity of reaching Burnside in the shortest possible 
time " 

But Gransrer moved Avith reluctance and com- 
plaint, and, on the 29th, Grant said to Sherman : 
" Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I 
have lost all faith in his energy and capacity to 



ULYSSES S. GKAXT. ;j33 

mana2:e an ex2:)edition of the importance of this one. 
I am inclined to think, therefore, that I sliall have to 
send you. Push, as rapidly as you can, to the Ilia- 
wassee, and determine for yourself what force to take 
with you from that point. Grancrer has his corps 
Avith him, from which you will select, in conjunction 
with the forces now with you. In plain words, you 
will assume command of all the forces now movinsr 
up the Tennessee." 

At the same time, he sent a disjiatch, in dupli- 
cate, to the officer in command at Kingston ; one 
copy was to be let " fall into the hands of the enemy, 
without fail." The other " you must 2:et to General 
Burnside, at all hazards, and at the earliest possible 
moment." The dispatch was in these words : " I con- 
gratulate you on the tenacity with which you have 
thus far held out against vastly superior forces. Do 
not be forced into a surrender by short rations. 
Take all the citizens have, to enable you to hold out 
yet a few days longer. As soon as you are relieved 
from the presence of the enemy, you can replace to 
them every thing taken from tliem. AVithin a few 
days you will be relieved. There are now three col- 
umns in motion for your relief. One, from here, 
moving up the south bank of the river, under Sher- 
man ; one from Decherd, under Elliott,* and one from 
Cumberland gap, under Foster. These three col- 
umns will be able to crush Longstreet's forces, or 
drive them from the valley, and must all of them be 
within twenty-four hours' march of you, l)y the time 
this reaches you, supposing you to get it on Tuesday, 
the 1st instant." 

* The movements of Elliott were delayed, and had no efTect upou 
the subsequent operations. 



584 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

Sliennan had hardly entered the town of Charles- 
ton, when he received Grant's letter of the 29th, 
directing him to take command of all troops moving 
to the relief of Burnside. Seven days before, the 
Fifteenth corps had left its camps on the other side 
of the Tennessee, with two days' rations, andstrij)ped 
for the fight ; with but a single blanket or coat 
apiece, from the commander down to the private sol- 
dier. They had no provisions, save what they gath- 
ered on the road ; a poor supply for such a march. 
But, twelve thousand of their brethren were belea- 
guered in the mountain town of Knoxville, eighty 
miles away ; relief was needed, and within three days ; 
and no man murmured. 

Til at night, Howard repaired and planked the 
railroad bridge, and, at daylight, the army passed the 
Hiawassee, and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. 
On the 1st of December, Sherman sent word to Gran- 
ger, who was a day in advance, and had arrived at 
Decatur, that he must strike across to Philadelphia, 
with his command, and form a junction there. On the 
2d, the army moved rapidly north towards Loudon, 
twenty-six miles further. The cavalry passed to the 
head of the column, in order to save, if possible, a 
pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee, at that place ; 
but, a rebel brigade with artillery in position pre- 
vented this, and darkness closed in, before the infan- 
try arrived. The rebels, however, deserted the place 
in the night, destroying the pontoons, and running 
three locomotives and forty-eiglit cars into tlie Ten- 
nessee ; they also abandoned four guns and large 
stores of material, which Howard seized at daylight. 
But the river is seventeen hundred feet across, at 
Loudon, and the bridge was gone. Sherman was 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. .535 

forced to turn liis column east, and trust to Burn- 
side's bridge at Knoxville. 

Only one day remained of the time wlilcli Burn- 
side Lad promised to hold out, and it was now all- 
important that he should be notified of Sherman's 
approach. A cavalry force under Long was, there- 
fore, ordered to start at once, and to ford the Little 
Tennessee, and push into Knoxville, at whatever cost 
of life or horse-flesh. The distance was forty miles, 
and the roads execrable. 

Before dawn, the cavalry was off, and at daylight, 
the Fifteenth corps turned from Philadeli)liia to the 
Little Tennessee, at Morgantown, expecting to find a 
ford. But the river was too deep, and tlie water 
freezing cold ; the width was two hundred and forty 
yards. A bridge was indispensable. There were no 
pioneers, and only such tools as axes, picks, and 
spades ; but a bridge was constructed, with crib- 
work and trestles made of the houses of the late 
town of Morgantown ; and, by dark, of December 
4th, troops and animals were passing. The Fifteenth 
corps was across before daylight ; but the bridge 
broke, and Granger's corps ^vith Davis's division was 
left on the western side. 

At this juncture, word was received from Burn- 
side. On the 14th of November, the bulk of his 
force was distributed between Kingston, Knoxville, 
Loudon, and Lenoir. He now knew, certainly, that 
Longstreet's corps was moving up against him ; he 
had conferred with General "Wilson, of Grant's staff, 
and with Mr. Dana, of the War Department, whom 
Grant had sent to him for this purpose ; and decided 
that he could better carry out Grant's views, by draw- 
ing Longstreet further away from the rebel army 



536 3IILITAr.Y HISTORY OF 

at Cliattauooga, tlian by checking liim at Loudon. 
Early on the morning of the 15th, therefore, Burn- 
side "withdrew from Loudon, and fell back leisurely 
in the direction of Knoxville, the trains being sent in 
advance. That night, lie encamped at Lenoir ; on 
the 16th, he again started for Knoxville, by way of 
Campbell's station. But, by this time, Longstreet 
had crossed the Tennessee, on a pontoon bridge 
brought up to Loudon ; and, taking a shorter road, 
which Burnside ought to have held, endeavored to 
reach Campbell's station first, and thus cut off the 
national forces from Knoxville. Burnside had, with 
him, only about five thousand troops, and, making a 
forced march, he succeeded in reaching Campbell's 
station first ; and at once took steps to hold the forks 
of the roads, while the trains passed on. A serious 
fight occurred here, the rebels numbering at least ten 
thousand men ; and Burnside was driven back about 
a mile, but no other damage was sustained. He held 
the important point, and most of his wagons were 
secured. His loss, in killed, wounded and missing, 
was about three hundred. That of the rebels is not 
known.* During the night, tlie national troops fell 
back, to Knoxville, fourteen miles; but Longstreet 
did not advance until daylight. 

A line of works was at once established at Knox- 
ville ; and the troops were called in from all the sur- 
rounding country. Of these, however, many were 
raw, and many others were simply loyal Tennesseans, 
without organization or discipline, who crowded in to 
defend their mountain fortress. The defensive line 
extended from the Holston river on the left, across 

* Longstreet does not mention his losses in this battle, in his official 
report. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 537 

the railroad, to the river again, on the right. De- 
tached works were also built on the hills on the 
southern side of the Holston. The rebel front ex- 
tended only on the north side of the Holston, though 
Lougstreet's cavalry made excursions to the rear of 
the town. The enemy, however, could not move 
across the Holston, without exposing his own line of 
communication with Loudon. Still, Burnside was 
practically besieged. His force was now about 
twelve thousand effective men, exclusive of the loyal 
Tennesseans, who amounted to at least three thou- 
sand more. Before the end of the siege, Longstreet 
had between twenty and twenty-three thousand men, 
including cavalry. 

Many of the citizens and farmers, who had been 
driven in by the enemy, volunteered to work in the 
trenches, and did good service; while those who, 
from disloyalty, were disinclined, were compelled to 
the unwelcome task. The negroes were particularly 
willing, during the entire siege. All the beef-cattle 
and hogs belonging to the commissary department, 
and many belonging to citizens, were driven into the 
town, Avhere they were slaughtered and salted. Or- 
ders were issued reducing the rations; and, within 
three or four days, the issue of small rations was 
entirely discontinued ; * the supply being so small 
that it was necessary to reserve it exclusively for 
the hospitals. All useless animals were killed and 
thrown into the river, to save forage. Efforts were 
made to collect forage and supplies, along the French 
Broad river and the Seviersville road, whicli remained 
open to the besieged ; and loyal farmers sent «lo^vn 

* The essential part of a ration is meat ami brca<l ; whatever else is 
issued is called the mall ration, though no such name is known to the law. 



538 3IILITARY HISTOEY OF 

the river, on flats, large amounts of grain and meat, 
under cover of the dense fogs which prevailed at 
night, at that period. Nothing else saved the garri- 
son from absolute want. 

By the 20th of November, the line was in such 
condition that entire confidence was felt by both 
commander and troops in their ability to hold it. 
Every possible means of strengthening the defences 
was still, however, resorted to. Creeks were dam- 
med, and the back water from them created for- 
midable ditches, in front of a large portion of the 
line ; abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and wire entanglements 
were constructed, wherever necessary. A pontoon- 
bridge across the Holston facilitated all of Burnside's 
movements ; and when the rebel cavalry, above, 
floated rafts down the Holston, to break this bridge, 
the engineers biult a boom which effectually defeated 
the attempt. Longstreet, meanwhile, did nothing 
but establish his own line, make reconnoissances, feel 
Burnside's force, and fight various skirmishes. More 
than a week elapsed without any movement of im- 
portance, excej)t a feeble attempt to gain the heights 
on the southern side of the river, which was easily 
repulsed. During this time, Burnside continued to 
strengthen his fortifications ; especially a work at 
the northwest angle of his line, known as Fort San- 
ders. His problem was simple. He had only to 
hold out until his fate was decided at Chattanooofa. 
There, the battle was to be fought which should save 
or destroy the Army of the Ohio. 

Longstreet, at last, got word from Bragg, that 
Grant was about to attack him, on Missionary ridge. 
After this, two brigades of cavalry reenforced Long- 
street, from the rebel command in the eastern part of 



ULYSSES S. GliANT. 539 

tlie valley; and, on the 27tli, two l^rigades of Buck- 
ner's force reached liim from Bragg's army. Tlien, 
rumors came tliick, to the rebel leader, of a battle at 
Chattanooga, and, finally, reports that Bragg had 
fallen back to Tunnel hill. Longstreet at once 
determined to assault the works of Knoxville. He 
considered, that in the event of Bragg's defeat, the 
only safety for the i-ebels was to achieve success in 
Tennessee. His generals protested, and wished to 
withdraw towards Virginia; but Longstreet was 
firm, and said : " Our only safety is in making the 
assault upon the enemy's position. ... It is a great 
mistake in supposing that there is any safety for us 
in going to Virginia, if General Bragg has been de- 
feated, for we leave him at the mercy of his victors ; 
and, with his army destroyed, our own had better be 
also, for we must not only be destroyed, but dis- 
graced. There is neither safety nor honor in any 
other course than the one which I have already 
chosen and ordered." In this magnificent spirit, 
which it is impossible not to admire, even in an 
enemy, Longstreet ordered an assault on Fort San- 
ders.'^' 

This fort stood on high ground west of Knoxville, 
between the Holston river and the raih'oad. The 
location had been originally selected by the rebels, 
but a new work was^ perfected, after tlie national 
occupation, by the efibrts of the engineers ; and 
named after a gallant ofticer who fell on the second 
day of the siege. Fort Sanders was chosen as the 

* Longstreet's correspondence, both with Bragg and with his in- 
feriors, breathes everywhere the truest soldierly spirit, and makes one 
regret that so fine a nature should have been enlisted in an unworthy 
cause. 



540 -UILITAEY IIISTOKY OF 

point of attack by Longstreet, because success, here, 
involved tlie destruction, if not the capture, of Knox- 
ville ; wliile, to assault any wliere else, would leave 
Lis line of communication exposed to counter-attack. 
Besides this, Burnside had a double line of works 
extending from the fort to the Holston ; and, on the 
north side of the town, the dammius: of the creeks 
and consequent overflow had rendered the country 
impracticable. So, although Foii; Sanders was in 
reality the strongest point on Burnside's line, it also 
offered great advantages to the attacking party. 

At dark, on the 28th, the rebel line of sharpshoot- 
ers was advanced to within rifle-rano-e of the national 
line, and ordered to sink rifle-pits during the night, 
in this advanced position, so that, all along the line, 
the enemy might engage on an equal footing with the 
besieged, while the columns were making the assault 
on the fort. Sixty or seventy prisoners fell into the 
hands of the rebels, before morning ; and, this, with 
other developments, made the besieged fully aware 
that an assault was contemplated. Preparations 
were accordingly made to resist. 

At about half-past six, a. x., on the 29th, the enemy 
opened a furious artillery fire on the fort ; the national 
batteries remained silent, the men quietly awaiting 
the assault. The fort was so protected by traverses, 
that only one man was injured during this heavy fii'e. 
Two comjianies of the Second Michigan infantry were 
stationed in the ditch, at the salient, to pick off the reb- 
els ^vhen they approached. In about twenty minutes, 
the cannonading ceased, and a fire of musketry was 
opened by the enemy ; at the same time, a heavy col- 
umn, which liad been concentrated durinir the niirht, 
charged on the bastion, at a run. Great numbers 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 541 

fell, in passing over tlie entanglements ; Lut the weight 
of the column was such as to force forward the ad- 
vance ; and, in two or three minutes, it had reached 
the ditch and attempted to scale the pai-apet. The 
Michigan soldiers, in the ditch, at once ran back on 
each side of the salient ; and the national guns opened 
on the rebels with triple rounds of canister; while 
the infantiy either shot or knocked back with their 
muskets, all tliose whose heads appeared above the 
parapet. The forces placed on the flanks of the fort 
had also a cross-fii-e on the ground over which the 
enemy approached. 

The rebels, in utter confusion, strove to return, 
but the fii'st column of attack was speedily reenforced 
by a second, which pushed up to the foi-ts as desper- 
ately as the other. It also was driven. back, and with 
equal slaughter. Most of those who reached the ditch 
were killed, or mortally wounded; and such as could 
not retreat, surrendered; of these last, as many as 
five hundred. Only one rebel got over the parapet 
alive. The ground between the fort and the rebel 
line was strewm with the dead, and the wounded 
crying for help ; and, after the repulse was fully estab- 
lished, Burnside tendered to the enemy a flag of 
truce, for the purpose of burying the dead and caring 
for the wounded. The rebels lost over a thousand 
men," and Burnside only thirteen. 

In this assault, Longstreet had at first three bri- 
gades actually engaged, and, subsequently, a fourth ; 
besides the two brigades of Buckner's division, ^vliich 

* I have bccu obliged to take my estimate of rebel losses from 
Burusidc's report, as Longstreet's contains no statement of Lis losses. 
The description of the assault is made up from both reports, between 
which there is no discrepancy. 



542 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 

were in support, but not actually put into battle. 
These were, however, exposed to the artillery fire 
from the fort. Burnside's force was two hundred and 
twenty men, and eleven guns. The infantry was 
composed of portions of the Seventy-ninth New York 
and the Second Michigan volunteers, under Brigadier- 
General Ferrero ; the artillery, consisting of Benjamin's 
light battery, Second United States artillery, and a 
part of Buckley's volunteer battery, was commanded 
by Lieutenant Samuel Benjamin, who in reality in- 
spired and directed the whole defence of the fort. The 
coolness of the men, however, was admirable. To 
this, in a great measure, was due the remarkable dis- 
parity in losses. The rebels were obliged to advance 
about t\YO hundred and fifty yards, without cover; 
and tlie defendants waited until they were absolutely 
at the ditch, before deliverins: fire. All the ensrineer 
operations, during the siege, were under the charge of 
Captain (now Brevet Brigadier-General) O. M. Poe.* 
About half an hour after the repulse, Longstreet 
received a dispatch from ]\Ir. Jefi:erson Davis, the 
pretended rebel president, announcing the defeat of 
Bragg, and directing Longstreet to cooperate with the 
retreating columns from Chattanooga. He at once 
ordered his trains to be put in motion for Loudon, so 
that his army might follow as soon as possible, to 
rejoin Bragg. But, getting reports, soon after, of an 
advance of national troops from Cleveland, to interrupt 
this junction, Longstreet recalled his trains, and deter- 
mined to continue the siege, until heavy" reenforce- 

* Captain Poe was assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel (now Brevet- 
Brigadicr-General) O. E. Babcock, captain of engineers, who, although 
on duty as iuspector-general, performed important service as en- 
gineer. 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 543 

ments should arrive for Burnside. He reasoned that 
Grant would tlius be obliged to desist from the pur- 
suit of Bragg, in order to save Knoxville; and lie 
reasoned vrelh 

On the 1st of December, Grant's dispatch to 
Burnside, wliicli had been intended to fall into Lone:- 
street's hands, was captured by the rebel scouts, and 
the enemy thus got information of tlie advance of 
Sherman. Lon2:street himself was now cut off from 
all supplies, and driven to subsist off the countr}-. 
The rebel command at Loudon was at once ordered to 
fall back on Knoxville. 

On tlie 2d, Burnside got information of Sherman's 
approach ; and, the same day, Longstreet determined 
to abandon the sieo-e, and retreat in the direction of 
Virginia; his trains were put in motion on the 3cl, 
to cross the Holston, at Strawberry plains ; and, on 
the nigbt of the 4th, the troops withdrew from the 
Tvest side of Knoxville, and marched around to the 
east side, where they took up a line of march along 
the north bank of the Holston. This movement was 
unmolested by Burnside, and ^vas made in remark- 
ably good order. 

Sherman, meanwhile, had repaired the bridge at 
Morgantown, and marched to Marysville; Howard 
constructinc: a brids^e out of the rebel waj^ons left at 
Loudon, over whicli he crossed his men. On the 5th, 
all the heads of columns communicated, at ^larysville, 
where Shennan received word from Burnside that 
Longstreet had raised the siege, and was in full retreat 
to Virginia. Sherman had previously sent the follow- 
ing note to Burnside, who was his senior : " Marj'S- 
ville, December 5, 1863. I am liere, and can bring 
twenty-five thousand men into Knoxville to-morrow ; 



544 :^riLiTAET histoey of 

but Longstreet having retreated, I feel disposed to 
stop, for a stern cliase is a long one. But I will do 
all that is possible. Without you specify that you 
want troops, I will let mine rest to-mon-ow, and ride 
to see you " 

On the 6th, accordingly, Sherman rode over to 
Burnside's headquarters, ordering all his troops to 
halt, exce]3t the two divisions of Granger, which were 
directed to move forward to Little river, and Granger 
to report in person to Burnside, for orders. 

Burnside declared that he needed nothino- from 
Sherman but Grano;er's command, which had been 
originally designed to reenforce him ; and suggested 
that Sherman should return to the Hiawassee, with 
the rest of his army, lest Bragg should take advan- 
tage of the absence of so large a force, to assume the 
offensive."' Accordingly, having seen Burnside move 
out of Knoxville, in pursuit of Longstreet, and Gran- 
ger move in, Sherman put his own command in mo- 

* Major- General W. T. Shekman, commanding, etc. 

Ge^^eral: I desire to express to you and your commanci, my most 
hearty thanks and gratitude, for your i^romj^tness in coming to our 
relief during the siege of Knoxville; and I am satisfied your ai> 
proach served to raise the siege. 

The emergency having passed, I do not deem for the ijresent any 
other portion of your command, but the corps of General Granger, 
necessary for operations in this section ; and, inasmuch as General 
Grant has weakened the force immediately with him, in order to re- 
lieve us, thereby rendering the position of General Thomas less secure, 
I deem it advisable that all the troops now here, save those command- 
ed by General Granger, should return at once to within sujiporting 
distance of the forces in front of Bragg's army. 

In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank you and your 
command for the kindness you have done us. 

I am, general, very respectfully. 

Your obedient servant, 

A. E. BURNSIDE, 
Major- General commanding. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 545 

tlon to return. His approach had served to raise the 
siege. 

On tlie morning of the 7th, the commands of 
Potter and Manson started out in pursuit of Lono-- 
street, under Major-General Parke, Burnside's chief 
of staff; and, on the 10th, Foster arrived at Knox- 
ville, from CumherLand gap. On the 11th, he 
assumed command of the Department of the Ohio. 
Burnside left Knoxville, on the 12th, for Cincin- 
nati. 

On the 8th, the President sent the followin<r dis- 
patch to Grant : " Understanding that your lodg- 
ment at Chattanooga and at Knoxville is now secure, 
I wish to tender you and all under your command 
my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for 
the skill, courage, and perseverance, with which you 
and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that 
im23ortant object. God bless you all." 

And so, at last, the work was really achieved. 
The occupation and liberation of Tennessee were 
accomplished ; the whole rebel line was driven back ; 
the rebel communication between the Atlantic and 
the Mississippi forever broken ; the mountains and 
rivers which had been the fortress and defences of 
the would-be confederacy were captured or turned ; 
the fertile plains, which had yielded it supplies, 
were converted into granaries for the government ; 
the besie2:ed towns were relieved ; the endaniicered 
armies rendered in their turn formidable to the 
enemy ; and the loyal j^opulation of East Tennessee 
made henceforth safe from the persecutions of dis- 
loyalty. 

Again the nation's heart was lifted up in hope 
and gratitude. On the 7th of December, the Presi- 

35 



546 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

dent issued a proclamation, recommending all loyal 
people to assemble in their places of worship, and 
return thanks to God for this great advancement of 
the national cause. On the l7th of the same month, 
Congress unanimously voted a resolution of " thanks 
to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, and the officers 
and soldiers who have fought under his command, 
during this rebellion ; " and a gold medal ^vas struck, 
which it was provided that the President should pre- 
sent to Grant, "in the name of the people of the 
United States of America." Grant declared, in his 
official report, that "the Armies of the Cumberland 
and the Tennessee, for their energy and unsurpassed 
braveiy in the three days' battle of Chattanooga, 
their patient endurance in marching to the relief of 
Knoxville; and the Army of the Ohio, for its mas- 
terly defence of Knoxville and repeated repulses of 
Longstreet's assaults upon that place, are deserving 
of the gratitude of their country;" a meed which 
their country did not fail to bestow. 

Grant had given all his generals in East Tennes- 
see repeated and positive ordei's to drive Longstreet's 
army completely out of the state. His whole plan 
was, either to annihilate that command, or to place 
it where it could do no further mischief to any part 
of his military division. On the 30th of November, 
he said to Foster, then at Cumberland gap : " If 
Longstreet is retreating up the valley, would it not 
l)e well to strike for Abingdon ? " To Sherman, on 
the 1st of December, he wrote : " When you start 
upon your return to this place, after it is known that 
East Tennessee is cleared of all formidable bodies of 
the enemy," etc. To Foster, on the 2d : " Sherman 
will reach Knoxville to-morrow, or the day following. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 547 

His force is large, and Longstreet must retreat baton' 
it, without much fi<2;]itin2:. I do not see how his 
route can be any other than up tlie valley. You 
will, no doubt, be able to inflict a heavy blow upon 
his retreating column." Again, on the Gth, to Fos- 
ter : " Instruct your cavaliy to follow Longstreet to 
the last minute. It is not necessary that they should 
attack the main force, but follow up the rear, hasten 
the retreat, pick up stragglers, and destroy the road 
as far east as possible. If your troops can get as tar 
as Saltville " (in Virginia) " and destroy the works 
there, it will be an immense loss to the enemy." 
And on the 8th, to Sherman : " Keep your troops in 
the valley of the Tennessee, until it seems clear that 
the enemy have entirely aT)andoned the state." To 
Foster, on the 12th: "Drive Longstreet to the far- 
thest point east you can." And on the 14th : "Do 
all you can to harass the enemy and drive him as far 
to the east as possible." Verbal instructions to the 
same effect were sent to Burnside, by a staff officer. 

But Burnside miscalculated entirely the needs of 
his own command, and the intentions and abilities 
of the enemy. Supposing that Longstreet would 
evacuate the state, he sent Sherman back to the 
Hiawassee, retaining only Granger's command, f<^r 
pursuit of Longstreet; and the opportunity for de- 
stroying that commander was lost. Longstreet was 
too able, not to perceive the mistake of his antago- 
nist ; and, before the mistake could be rectified, the 
mischief was irremediable. Sherman moved back 
towards Chattanooga, under the instructions of Burn- 
side; and, on the Tth, after three days' delay, Parke 
was sent out after the fleeing enemy. 

Longstreet had Ijeen ordered, some days before, to 



548 3IILITARY niSTOEY OF 

send back Wheeler's cavalry to Bragg's army ; but, 
at the moment of raising tlie siege, he judged it un- 
safe to obey ; finding, however, that he was not hard 
pressed, he dismissed his cavalry, on the 8th, to 
Georgia, and marched himself for Rogersville. His 
column reached that place on the 9th. Here, he dis- 
covered that the resources of the country were abun- 
dant to subsist him for the winter, and sent out his 
trains to collect provisions. Receiving discretionary 
orders, he, next day, recalled one brigade of Wheeler's 
cavalry. On the 12th, he learned that a portion of 
Burnside's force had returned to Chattanooga, and that 
a small body of troops, principally cavalry, was scat- 
tered between Rutledge and Bean's station ; Parke's 
main force being as far off as Blain's cross-roads, twenty 
miles. He, accordingly, fell upon the national cavalry 
at Bean's station, with a superior force, and compelled 
it to retreat, handling it roughly, and capturing a 
wagon-train loaded with supplies. The troops were 
thus subjected to the mortification of retreat, at the 
very moment when they sliould have been pushing 
the enemy into Virginia. Parke's advance fell back 
as far as Blain's roads. 

Lono-street then moved to the south side of the Hoi- 
ston, at Russelville, and ordered his command to make 
shelters for the winter. The country was rich, abound- 
ing in grain and meat. The rebels had suffered 
greatly for want of rations and forage, and nothing 
more fortunate for them could have occurred, than 
that this corps should remain in East Tennessee. 
There, all winter, Longstreet did remain, threatening 
Foster, and subsisting off of a population for the most 
part loyal. His position occasioned great anxiety to 
the government and to Grant. It rendered posses- 



rLTSSES S. GEANT. 549 

sion of Knoxville, if not insecure, at least less certain; 
and the season, Avliicli is extremely inclement among 
these mountains, was now too far advanced fur further 
military operations. It was useless to send other 
troops to Knoxville, as the advantage that had been 
lost could not be regained, before spring ; and the 
rebels were left with this fulcrum for movements 
whenever the campaign of next year should begin. 
The retention of Sherman's column a week or two 
longer in East Tennessee would, undoubtedly, have 
obviated this disarrangement of Grant's plans.'^' 

On the 'Tth of December, Grant announced: "It 
may now safely be assumed that the enemy are driven 
fi'om the front, or, at least, that they no longer threaten 
it in formidable numbers." He, therefore, that day, 
renewed his suggestion of a campaign against Mol )ile. 
"The country south of this is extremely mountainous, 
affording but little for the support of an army ; the 
roads are bad, at all times, and the season is so far 
advanced that an effective campaign from here, this 
winter, may be looked upon as impossible. Our sup- 
plies and means of transportation would not admit 
of a very early campaign, if the season did. ... I pro- 

* On the 20tli of January, Grant said to llallcck : " It was a jrrcat 
oversigbt, in the first place, to have ever permitted Longstreet to come 
to a stop within the state of Tennessee, after the siege was raised. 
My instructions were full and complete on this subject. Sherman was 
sent with forces sufficient alone, to defeat Longstreet ; and, notwith- 
standing the long distance the troops had marched, proposed to go on 
and carry out my instructions in full. General Bumside was sanguine 
that no stop would be made by the enemy in the valley. Sherman 
then proposed to leave any amount of force Bumside thought might be 
necessary to make his position perfectly secure. He deemed two divis- 
ions ample. ... I write this now particularly to show that the latter 
named officer " (Sherman) " is in no wise to blame for the existing state 
of affiiirs in East Tennessee." 



550 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

pose, with tlie concurrence of liiglier autliority, to 
move by way of Kew Orleans and Pascagoula, on 
Mobile. I would hope to secure that place, or its in- 
vestment, by the last of January." 

The government, however, did not see fit to author- 
ize the movement, and Grant himself ceased to urge 
it, when he discovered tliat Longstreet was likely to 
winter in Tennessee. On the 17th, he said : " I feel 
deeply interested in moving the enemy beyond Salt- 
vills, this winter, so as to be able to select my own cam- 
paign in the spring, instead of liaving the enemy dictate 
it for me." This was in harmony with the constant 
habit and purpose of Grant. In all his campaigns, 
he strove to take the initiative ; experience had taught 
him that thus he was far more likely to succeed ; but, 
before his experience began, he had acted on the same 
principle; his instincts prompted this coui'se. His 
philosophy, like that of most men, was in accord with 
his character and temperament, and, 2~)robably, as 
much the result of these as the product of thought or 
experience. At Paducah, Belmont, Donelsou, Vieks- 
burg, and Chattanooga, he had been able to act on 
this plan ; at Shiloh, Corinth, and luka, the enemy 
had taken the initiative. In the first cases, success 
amply confirmed his views ; and, in the latter, the 
added difiiculties which the course of the rebels im- 
posed, were fully as strong corroboration. 

Immediately after the battle of Chattanooga, 
Bragg was relieved from the command of his anny, 
and temporarily succeeded by Lieutenant-General 
Hardee. It is a little singular to remark how often 
this fate befell the rebel commanders who were op- 
posed to Grant. In diff'erent parts of the theatre of 
war, he had been met by Floyd, Pillow, Buckner, 



ULYSSES S. OllANT. Ijol 

Van Dorn, Price, Pembertoii, and Bragg ; every one 
of whom was either superseded soon after an impor- 
tant battle, or captured. The parallel was destined 
not to cease at Chattanooga. 

During the autumn and winter of 18G3, the terms 
of service of most of the volunteer troops exi)ired ; 
and, in order to induce the men to reenlist, large 
bounties were offered them, and a furlough of sixty 
days. The consequence was, that a very large propor- 
tion renewed their engagement with the government ; 
but the immediate effect experienced by commanders 
in the field was unfavorable. The great deduction 
made from their forces, by the furloughing, reduced 
the effective strength, sometimes, ten or twenty 
thousand men at a time, in a single army. Grant, 
commanding so many armies, was of course propor- 
tionately hampered by w^hat, however, was sure to 
be a benefit in the end. Still, the season for active 
operations, except at the extreme south, was in reality 
past. 

About Christmas, Grant went in person to Knox- 
ville, to inspect the country and the command, and 
intending to take such steps as would effectually drive 
out Longstreet from the valley. lie found, however, 
a large part of Foster's command suffering for clotli- 
in<^, especially shoes; so that not more than two- 
thii'ds of the men could be taken in any advance. 
The weather was extremely inclement, and many of 
the troops stood in line with only a blanket to cover 
their nakedness. The difficulties of supplying the 
command were so prodigious that great suffering 
ensued. Ko railroad could be built under two months, 
at soonest ; the fall in the rivers frequently interfered 
with the transportation of supplies ; and, now, that the 



552 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

roads Lad become well-nigli impassable, by reason of 
snow and ice, to send reenforcements would only be 
to put more men on insufficient rations. Under these 
circumstances, Grant made only such changes in the 
position of troops as would place Foster nearer the 
rebels, Avhenever he should be in a condition to move, 
and as would open to the national foi'ces new fora- 
ging-grounds, at the same time reducing those of the 
enemy. " Troops, " he said to Halleck, " must depend 
for subsistence on what they can get from the country, 
and the little we can send from Chattanooga. " 

Soon after this, Foster was relieved from duty at 
his own request, an old wound received in the Mexi- 
can war having reopened; and Major-General John M. 
Schoiield was, at Grant's desire, appointed to the 
command of the Department of the Ohio. Schofield, 
however, did not arrive at Knoxville till the 9th of 
February. 

On the 11th of December, Grant wrote to McPher- 
son, who had been left in command at Vicksburg : 
" I shall start a cavalry force through ^Mississippi, in 
about two weeks, to clean out the state entirely of all 
rebels. " This was the germ of what has been known 
as the Meridian raid. On the 23d, he said to Halleck : 
" I am now collecting as large a cavalry force as can 
be spared, at Savannah, Tennessee, to cross the Ten- 
nessee river, and cooperate with the cavalry from 
Hurlbut's command, in clearing out entirely the 
forces now collecting in West Tennessee, under For- 
rest. It is the design, that the cavalry, after finish- 
ing the work they first stai-t upon, shall push south, 
through East Mississippi, and destroy the Mobile 
road, as far south as they can. Sherman goes to Mem- 
phis and Vicksburg, in person, and will have Gre- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 553 

nacla visited, and sucli other points on tlie Mississippi 
Central railroad as may require it. ... I want the state 
of Mississippi so visited tliat large armies cannot trav- 
erse there, this winter. " 

The force which Sherman had hrouglit from Vicks- 
burg, was now distributed, under Logan, between Ste- 
venson and Decatur, guarding tlie railroad, while 
Dodge's division, of Hurlbut's command, was posted 
west of Decatur and along tlie line of the Xasliville 
and Decatur road. Sherman in person started for 
his new campaign. Howard's corps and Davis's 
division having been returned to the Army of the 
Cumberland, tlie Eleventh and Twelfth corps were 
ordered to guard the railroad from Nashville to 
Chattanooga ; the Fourteenth corps w^as left at Chat- 
tanooga; and Granger's force remained all winter, 
stretched out between Cleveland and Knoxville. 

On the 13th of January, Grant returned from his 
toui' to Knoxville, by way of Cumberland gap and 
Lexington, to ISTashville, where his headquarters were 
now established. On the 15th, he said to Halleck: 
" Sherman has gone down the Mississippi to collect, at 
Vicksburg, all the force that can be spared for a 
separate movement fi*om the Mississippi. He will 
probably have ready, by the 2-4th of this month, a 
force of twenty thousand men I shall direct Sher- 
man, therefore, to move out to Meridian, with his 
spare force, the cavalry going from Corinth ; and de- 
stroy the roads east and south of there so eti'ectually, 
that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them 
during the rebellion. He will then return, unless 
opportunity of going into ]\rol)ile with the force he 
has, appears perfectly plain. Owing to the large 
number of veterans furloughed, I will not be able to 



554 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

do more, at Chattanooga, than to threaten an advance, 
and try to detain the force now in Thomas's front. 
Sherman will he instructed, whilst left with these 
large discretionary powers, to take no extra hazard of 
losing his army, or of getting it crippled too much for 
efficient service in the spring. " 

The same letter contained an exposition of Grant's 
plan of campaign for the following spring. " I look 
upon the next line for me to secure to be that from 
Chattanooga to Mobile; Montgomery and Atlanta 
being the important intermediate points. To do this, 
large supplies must be secui^ed on the Tennessee 
river, so as to he independent of the railroad from 
here'''' (Nashville)'' to the Tennessee^ for a consider- 
aJjle length of time. Mobile would be a second base. 
The destruction which Sherman will do to the roads 
around Meridian will be of material importance to us, 
in preventing the enemy fi^om drawing supplies from 
Mississippi, and in clearing that section of all large 
bodies of rebel troops. ... I do not look upon any 
j)oints, except Mobile in the south, and the Tennessee 
liver in the north, as presenting practicable starting- 
points from which to operate against Atlanta and 
Montgomery." * 

The oTand movements dictated to Sherman, months 

* Grant then went on to say : '• Tboy are objectionable as starting- 
points, to be all under one command, from the fact that the time it 
will take to communicate from one to the other will be so great. But 
Sherman or McPherson, either one of whom could be intrusted with 
the distant command, are officers of such experience and reliability, 
that all objections on this score, except that of enabling the two 
armies to act as a unit, would be removed." Further and interesting 
discussions occurred, at this time, between Grant and the general-in- 
chicf, relative to Banks's Red river campaign, ihen in contemplation, 
and to the operations east of the Allcghanios. But I omit these subjects 
Bt present, as they pertain so closely to the themes of a future volume. 



ULYSSES S. GEA^'T. 000 



afterwards, and by him so grandly executed, Mere 
already marked out by the chief for liimself, thus 
lonq: in advance. 

A copy of this letter was sent to Sherman, witli 
the remark: " The letter contains all the instructions 
I deem necessary in your present move .... Nearly 
all the troops in Thomas's and Dodge's command, 
having less than one year to serve, have reenlisted, 
and many of them have been furloughed. This, -with 
the fact that Loni?street's force in East Tennessee 
makes it necessary for me to keep ready a force to 
meet them, ^vill prevent my doing much more than 
is indicated in my letter to General Ilalleck. I will 
have, however, both Dodge and Logan ready, so that, 
if the enemy should weaken himself much in front, 
they can advance. " 

On the 19th, Thomas also was informed of Sher- 
man's contemplated movement, and of the probability 
that no active operations in East Tennessee would 
be undeiiaken before the opening of spring. " To 
cooperate wdth this movement," said Grant, ''you 
want to keep up the appearance of preparation for an 
advance from Chattanooga. It may be necessary 
even to move a column as far as La Fayette. . . . 
Logan will also be instructed to move at tlie same 
time what force he can from Bellefontaine towards 
Eome. AVe will want to be ready at the earliest 
possible moment in the spring, for a general advance. 
I look upon the line for this aimy to secure, in its 
next campaign, to be that from Chattanooga to 
Mobile; Atlanta and Montgomery being the impor- 
tant intermediate points." 

The complicated movements of Grant's three 
armies now reached over an extent of more than a 



556 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

thousand miles. Thomas, at the centre, was confront- 
ing Johnston, Schofield was baLancing Longstreet ; and 
in order to distract the rebels, and thus relieve East 
Tennessee, as well as to secure the safety of the con- 
templated movement into Georgia, during the ensuing 
spring, Sherman was ordered to advance into the 
interior of Mississippi, hundreds of miles from either 
of the armies that were cooperating with liim. 

Brigadier-General William Sooy Smith was at this 
time placed in command of seven thousand cavalry, 
at Memphis, and ordered to move out by the 1st of 
February, marching by way of Pontotoc, Okalona, 
and Columbus junction, to Meridian, a distance of 
two hundred and fifty miles ; Sherman instructed Lira 
to disregard all minor objects, but to destroy rail- 
roads, bridges, corn not wanted, and to strike quick 
and well every enemy that should offer opposition. 
He was to reach Meridian by the 10th of February. 
Sherman himself was to move at the same time, with 
four divisions of infantry and artillery, on the road 
from Vicksburg to Meridian, one hundred and fifty 
miles. 

Sherman left Vicksburg, on the 3d of February, 
with two columns under Hurlbut and McPherson; 
he reached Jackson on the 5th, after continuous skir- 
mishing for eighteen miles, driving a force estimated 
at twelve thousand soldiers, under Loring and French. 
This command was marching to form a junction at 
Jackson* with Lee's cavalry, supposed to be four 
thousand strong ; but the rapidity of Sherman's move- 

* All my statements of tlie rebel strength and movements, as -well 
as of Sherman's operations, during the Meridian raid, are taken from 
Sherman's report. I have seen no rebel official report of the cam- 
paign. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 557 

ment prevented tlie junction. He then pushed on at 
once, by the direct road to Meridian ; the enemy's cav- 
alry hanging on his flanks, but giving him no concern. 
About twenty miles from Meridian, the road was 
obstructed with fallen timber, in order to afford the 
rebels time to cover the removal of raih'oad property 
from Meridian. Sherman at once left his trains^ 
guarded with good escorts, and pushed on, over all 
obstructions, straight for the Ocktibbeha, where he 
found the bridge already burning. A gin-house, near 
by, supplied material for a new bridge, and at half 
past three p. m. on the 14th, he entered Meridian with 
but little opposition. The retreat of the rebels was 
covered by their cavalry. The rolling-stock had 
been removed to Selma, or Mobile. 

Sherman could not have overtaken the enemy, 
before reaching the Tombigbee river, and, in fact, 
was willing to gain his point without battle, at so 
great a distance from the Mississippi, where the care 
of the wounded would have so taxed his ability to 
provide for them. He, therefore, rested his army, on 
the 15th, and, on the 16th, began a systematic and 
thorough destruction of the railroads centering at 
Meridian. Axes, crowbars, sledges, claw^bars, ^vere 
used, with fire ; and the depots, storehouses, arsenals, 
hospitals, oflices, hotels, and cantonments of Meridian 
were soon no more. For five days, ten thousand men 
were enf^ao-ed in this work. Sixty miles of railroad 
were destroyed, on the north and east of the town, 
ties burned and iron bent; and on the south and 
west, fifty-five miles. Sixty-one bridges and culverts 
were burned ; also six thousand feet of trestle-work 
across a swamp. Twenty locomotives, twenty-eight 
cars, and three saw-mills were destroyed. The enemy 



558 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

could not use tliese roads to the same advantage 
a2:ain, durino; tlie war.* 

The rebels had crossed the Tombigbee, and were 
in great alarm lest Sherman intended a march 
on Mobile. His numbers were magnified ; and. 
Admiral Farrao-ut, at the same time makins: a dem- 
onstration against the forts at the entrance of 
Mobile harbor,f immense excitement was produced. 
Two brin-ades were sent from Mobile to the Tom- 
bigbee, and a force was withdrawn from Johnston's 
army, in front of Thomas. Never before had a na- 
tional army penetrated so far into the interior of 
the so-called confederacy. The places that had 
fancied themselves perfectly secure were entirely 
exposed, and the inmost lines of communication of 
the rebels were attacked and destroyed. Still, Sher- 
man had moved without a base, and the rebels had 
great hopes of being able to cut him ojQT, if he pro- 
ceeded further. Thus far, his force had been too large 
for them to have any hope of withstanding it ; but, 
if he advanced, they determined to bring troops 
from all parts of their territory, and, if possible, de- 
stroy him. 

He did not give them the chance; but, on the 
20tl], ordered McPherson to march slowly back on the 
main road ; whilst he himself proceeded northward, 
with Hurlbut's column, to feel for Sooy Smith, who 
had failed to make the junction ordered. Sherman 
marched as far as Union, and then sent a cavaliy force 

* In 18C5, the time consumed liy the enemy in wagoning around 
those breaks, detained Hood, at Florence, nearly a month ; giving 
Thomas time to bring his reenforcoments up from every point, even 
from Missouri ; and thus materially aided in the great success 
achieved at Nashville. 

+ This demonstration was made at the request of Sherman. 



ULYSSES S. GEAXT, 559 

of three regiments, under Colonel Winslow, to scour 
the whole reo-ion in search of Smith. On the 23(1, 
the two infantry columns came together, at Ilills- 
boro, after which, they marched, by separate roads, 
to tlie Pearl river. On the 2Gth, they bivouacked at 
Canton, to which place Winslow had l)een directed 
to lead Sooy Smith's command. AVinslow was tliere, 
but had got no tidings of Smith. The rebels had not 
troubled Sherman, on the march from Meridian to 
Canton, and, on the 28th, he rode into Yicks])nrg. 
His arai}^ remained at Canton till the 3d of March. 

Smith had not started from Memphis till tlie 11th 
of Februar}', a delay which Sherman pronounced un- 
pardonable ; he advanced only as far as West Point, 
and turned back on the 22d, before a force inferior to 
his own ; his orders having been peremptory to fight 
any cavalry he met. His march back to Memphis 
w^as too rapid for a good effect, and he was closely 
followed by Forrest's cavalry, before wdiom he had 
retreated at West Point. He reported having de- 
stroyed thirty miles of railroad, and great stores of 
cotton and corn ; also the capture of two hundred 
prisoners and three thousand horses ; but he entirely 
failed to accomplish the oV)ject of liis expedition, or to 
satisfy his commanders.* His losses were not re- 
ported, but were probably slight. 

Sherman, however, had di'iven the enemy out of 
Mississippi, destroyed the only remaining railroads 
in the state, the only roads by which the rebels could 
maintain an army in i\[ississippi, or threaten the 

* Sherman dismissed Smith's part of the operation with these 
words : " General Smith had not started from Memphis at all, till the 
11th of February, had only reached West Point, and turned back on 
the 2'2d, the march back to Memphis bein^ too rapid for a good 

effect." 



560 MILITAEr HISTORY OF 

national forces on the main river. He had subsisted 
his army and animals chiefly on the rebel stores, 
brought a^vay four hundred prisoners and five thou- 
sand negroes, about a thousand white refugees, and 
three thousand animals. He had marched between 
three hundred and fifty and four hundred and fifty 
miles, in the shortest mouth of the year, and his 
men were in better condition and health than when 
they started from Vicksburg. His losses were 
twenty-one men killed, sixty-eight wounded, and 
eighty-one missing. 

On the 24th of January, Grant got permission to 
visit St. Louis, where his eldest son was lying dan- 
gerously ill. He was directed, however, by the Sec- 
I'etary of War, to retain direct command of all his 
forces, and communication both with them and with 
the government, during his absence from the front. 
On the 24th, he was at Chattanooga, and gave orders 
to Thomas, and to Logan, who was at Scottsboro, 
Alabama, to keep up a threatened advance on Eome, 
with the view of detaining as large a force of the 
enemy as possible in their fronts, and thus favor the 
operations of Sherman. " It is not expected to move 
forward at this time, but the movements of the 
enemy might change this." ... To Logan he said : 
" Should General Thomas inform you, at any time, 
that he is going to make a reconnoissance to the 
front, and ask you to move in tlie cooperation, do so, 
without waiting further orders from these headquar- 
ters. KejDort the fact, however." 

Thomas moved out on the 29th, and caused the 
enemy, now commanded by Joseph E. Johnston, 
who had succeeded Hardee, to fall back from Tunnel 
hill. On the 1st of February, it was learned that a 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 561 

whole division and a brigade liad been sent from 
Jolinston, in the direction of Mobile. On the 5th, 
Grant was back at Nashville ; and, the next day, re- 
ceiving reports that two divisions from Johnston had 
been sent to Longstreet, he directed Thomas to send 
at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division, 
into East Tennessee. Logan was also ordered to 
hold himself in readiness to move, with all the force 
in his command that could be spared. Schofield was 
now in command of the Department of the Ohio, and 
Grant at once informed him of these preparations, 
and that he wanted " to drive Lono-street out imme- 
diately, so as to. . . . prepare for a spring campaign 
of our own choosing, instead of j)ermitting the enemy 
to dictate it for us." At the same time, he wi'ote : 
" We will have some sharp fighting, in the spring, 
and, if successful, I believe the war will l)e ended 
within the year." 

Further news from Schofield decided Grant that 
it would be unadvisable to make the contemplated 
campaign against Longstreet. The reasons for this 
change in his plan were suggested by Foster, who re- 
turned home by way of Nashville, and urged them 
uj^on Grant. Scholield's possession of that portion 
of East Tennessee now held, was perfectly secure ; 
and the condition of the loyal j^eople within the 
rebel lines could not be much improved, even by a 
change, for they had already lost all. If Grant sent 
an overwhelming force against Longstreet, the enemy 
would simply fall back towards Virginia, until he 
could be reenforced or take an impregnable position. 
The country was exhausted, and all the national sup- 
plies would have to be carried, from Knoxville, the 
whole distance advanced ; so that, whether the ob 
36 



562 MILITARY HISTORY OF 

ject of the expedition was accomplislied or not, the 
troops must advance rapidly, and return soon ; Long- 
street could then retui^n with impunity, on the heels 
of the national column, at least as far down the 
valley as he could supply himself from the road 
in his rear. Schoiield ao-reed in these views of Fos- 
ter ; and Grant, thinking the reasons sufficient, gave 
orders to suspend the movement. He directed, how- 
ever, that the troops should be turned against Dal- 
ton, which he hoped to gain and hold, as one step 
towards a spring campaign. 

On the 12th, accordingly, Thomas was ordered to 
" make a formidable reconnoissance towards Dalton, 
and, if successful in driving the enemy out, occupy 
that place and complete the railroad up to it, this 
winter. Start at the earliest practicable moment." 
On the 17th, Grant said again to Thomas : "Make 
your contemplated movement, as soon as possible." 
And, on the 18th : "By all means, send the expedi- 
tion. I think it of vast importance it should move 
as early as possible, for the eifect it will have in favor 
of Sherman, and also on aftairs in East Tennessee. I 
regret you cannot go." On the 21st: "Do your 
troops move to-morrow ? It is important that at 
least a demonstration be made, at once." 

On the 25th, he telegraphed to Halleck: "Thom- 
as's forces left Chattanooga, last Monday, to demon- 
strate against Dalton, to prevent forces being sent 
from there against Sherman. Our troops have Tun- 
nel hill." Longstreet, at the same time, made a retro- 
grade movement, and Schofield started immediately 
in pursuit. On the 25th, Thomas reported to Grant, 
from Tunuel hill: "Davis and Johnson" (two of 
his division commanders) " occupy the pass at Buz- 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 563 

zard's roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their 
front, who outnumber them in artillery. It is not pos- 
sible to carry the place by assault. Palmer made the 
attempt to turn it yesterday with Baird's and Graft's 
divisions, but was met by an equal force, and in an 
equally strong position as at Buzzard's roost. After 
expending nearly all his ammunition, he retired, dur- 
ing the nigbt, to Catoosa platform. Our transpor- 
tation is poor and limited. We are not able to carry 
more than sixty rounds per man. Artillery-horses 
so poor that General Palmer could bring but sixteen 
pieces. The country is stripped entirely of subsist- 
ence and forage. The enemy's cavalry is much 
superior to ours. Prisoners taken yesterday report 
that a portion of Cleburne's division *....! will 
wait the developments of this day, and advise you 
further." 

To this, Grant sent the following reply : " It is 
of the highest importance that the enemy should 
be held in full belief that an advance into the heart 
of the Soutb is intended, until the fate of Sherman 
is fully known. The difficulties of supplies can 
be overcome by keeping your trains running be- 
tween Chattanooga and your position, . . .'' Thomas, 
accordingly, remained in force near Dalton, as long 
as lie could supply himself On the 29th, Grant 
reported to Halleck : " lie is back now to Dalton, 
where he hopes to be able to haul supplies until 
the railroad can be completed to him." Schofield 
could not follow Lonsjstreet further than Straw- 
berry plains, because every step took him from 

* The MS. here is imperfect. Probably the worJs " has returned " 
should be supplied. 



564 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 

his supplies, wliile Longstreet was falling back on 
his. 

On the 2d of March, Grant got word through 
rebel sources of Sherman's success, but not of his re- 
turn ; and, on the 3d of March, Grant was ordered to 
\Yashington. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 565 



CHAPTER XIV. 

Military situation early in 1864 — Political situation — Need of one real head to 
the army — Grant made lieutenant-general — His predecessors in that grade — 
Action of the government — Grant's quiescence — Instructions to Sherman^ 
Private correspondence between Grant and Sherman — Dispatches from Hal- 
leck — Journey to Washington — Arrival — ^Presentation of commission — 
Speeches of President and of Grant. 

Eaely in 1864, the civil war in America had 
readied one of its most important crises. The politi- 
cal and the militaiy situation of affaii's were equally 
grave. The rebellion had assumed proportions that 
transcend comparison. The Southern people seemed 
all swept into the current, and whatever dissent had 
originally existed among them, was long since, to 
outside apprehension, swallowed up in the maelstrom 
of events. Ten states resisted with all their force, 
civil and military, and apparently with the additional 
armament of unanimity and popular enthusiasm, the 
whole streno'th of the national jrovernment. Xew 
Orleans, the greatest city of the would-be Confed- 
eracy, had, indeed, early fallen into the hands of the 
government ; but Mobile, Wilming-ton, and Charles- 
ton, the next three commercial towns of importance, 
although blockaded and besieged by sea, held out as 
bravely and as stubbornly as ever. The Mississippi 



566 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

had been opened to national vessels, though hardl\ 
yet to national trade, and the severest blow the rebel 
lion had sustained was undoubtedly dealt when 
Vicksburg fell. Still, the snake, if scotched, was not 
killed ; it had been cut violently in twain, but the 
severed ]3arts retained each a convulsive life, while 
the more important portion, though shorn of its 
strength and resources, seemed to have lost none at 
all of its vitality. Kentucky and Tennessee, although 
in the possession of national forces, were yet debata- 
ble ground, and suffered all the ills of border terri- 
tory in time of civil war ; and Grant, ordered to the 
command of the entire reo-ion between the Missis- 
sippi and the Alleghanies, had checked the advance 
of Bragg, it is true, but even he had not yet driven 
the great rebel army of the West fixr beyond the 
northern boundaries of Georgia ; for Johnston, the 
successor of the unlucky Bragg, still confronted the 
most formidable force that the government could 
accumulate in all its Western territory, and Long- 
street occasionally threatened to assume the offensive 
in East Tennessee. 

In the Eastern theatre of war, no real progress 
had been made during three disastrous years. The 
first Bull Run early taught the nation that it had to 
contend with skilful, brave, and determined foes. 
Then came McClellan's labors in the oro-anization of 
an army, and his sad campaign on the Eichmond 
Peninsula; after this, the still heavier reverses of 
Pope's career — heavier, because they followed so close 
on the heels of earlier defeats. Antietam saved the 
North from the perils of invasion, but, although a 
positive victory, it had only negative results. Fred- 
ericksburg and Chancellors ville were ]30sitive enough, 



ULYSSES S. GKANT. 567 

but made terrible drafts on tlie endurance of tlie 
nation, as well as on the life-blood of its soldiers. 
Gettysburg again stayed tlie tide of invasion ; and, 
on the soil of tlie Northern states, a battle was fouglit, 
in the third year of the war, on whose result dej^ended, 
for three long summer days, the fate of the second 
city in the laud. This hardly seemed like the easy 
progress that had been anticipated for the national 
arms. Gettysburg sav^ed Washington and Philadel- 
phia; but even this victory had not resulted in the 
destruction of Lee ; for, in the succeeding January, 
the rebel chief, with undiminished legions and auda- 
city, still lay closer to the national capital than to 
Richmond ; and Washington was in nearly as great 
dano^er as before the first Bull Run. 

Halleck, succeeding McClellan in the ostensi- 
ble command of all the armies, if he really exercised 
supreme control, had failed. It seemed as if, when 
successes* came, they were oftener the result of blind 
courage on the part of the troops, than of brilliant 
combinations on the part of their commanders ; and 
that the victories of a great general in one theatre 
of operations were sure to be neutralized by the dis- 
asters of an unsuccessful one on the other side of the 
continent. Success, it was evident, could only come 
from greater unity of plan and greater concentration 
of effort. The veriest tyro, or the stupidot critic, 
could see that all the strength of the national armies 
must be made cooperative, and that tins had never 
yet been done. The need of one head, of a master- 
mind, to perceive and to do, to grasp all the varied 
necessities, to control all the varied operations, to 
evolve order out of chaos, to make generals and 
armies and marches and l)attles all tend to tlie ac- 



568 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 

complisliment of one great and decisive object, this 
need was universally felt and acknowledged. But 
tLere was no such Lead ; no sucli master-mind con- 
trolled the military policy. 

It is not to be denied that the spirit of the 
nation was sorely tried by all these misfortunes. Po- 
litical dissensions were rife, and those in oj)position to 
the administration did not fail to exao-o-erate the dis- 
asters in the field. Accusations of political or personal 
interference with the movements of troops and the 
dispositions of generals, abounded, and were listened 
to by many; the frequent changes in important 
commands gave color to such charges, and were cer- 
tainly discouraging ; a large number of the political 
sympathizers with the administration were personally 
hostile to the President, or to members of his govern- 
ment ; a presidential election was at hand, and even 
the jDresence of a terrible and still uncertain civil 
war, was insufficient to calm the outcries of par- 
tisans or suppress the aspirations of place-seekers. It 
was said that in the very cabinet of the President, 
cabals and dissensions found j)lace; that he had his 
rivals among his own ministers; while, among his 
generals, whether off duty or on, not one of promi- 
nence but was mentioned, in some quarters, as the prob- 
able successor of the head of the government. The 
grave questions of the rights of states and the freedom 
of the person, of the abolition of slavery, and of 
finance, as well as those of a purely military character, 
were violently debated all over the North; great 
anxiety was felt as to the ability or disposition of 
the country to continue the supply of its resources ; 
the draft was unpopular, and the temper of foreign 
nations unfavorable, if not hostile. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 5G9 

It was true, tlie Soutli must he approaching 
exhaustion, but its devotiou and heroism seemed to 
supply the lack of all resources. It is true, the nation 
was really as determined as ever, but all these con- 
sideratious that have been mentioned, were gloomy 
in their character, and seemed to defer indefinitely 
the wished-for consummation. 

Under these circumstances, a bill was introduced 
in the House of Representatives, by the Honorable 
Elihu B. Washburne, to revive tlie grade of lieuten- 
ant-general in the armies of the United States, with 
the idea of conferring this rank upon Grant, and giving 
him command of all the military forces of the countr}'. 
The proposition was debated for several months, 
but finally, on the 26th day of February, 18G4, it re- 
ceived the sanction of both Houses of Congress. On 
the 1st of March, the President approved the bill, 
and nominated Grant to the office ; and on the 2d, 
the Senate confirmed the most irapoi-tant appoint- 
ment ever made in America, 

By this bill it was provided that " the grade of 
lieutenant-general be, and the same is hereby, revived 
in the Army of the United States of America ; and 
the President is hereby authorized, whenever he 
shall deem it expedient, to appoint, by and w iih the 
advice and consent of the Senate, a commander of 
the army, to be selected during war, from among 
those officers in the military service of the United 
States, not below the grade of major-general, most 
distinguished for courage, skill, and ability; and who 
being commissioned as lieutenant-general, shall be 
authorized, under the direction of the President, to 
Gomuiaml tlie armies of tlie United States. " 

Grant had but two predecessors in this exalted 



f 

570 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 

rank. In 1798, the grade was created for "Wash 
ington, who held it but one year; and upon his 
death, it was discontinued, but conferred by brevet, 
in 1855, upon Major-General Winfield Scott. 

The government had neither favored nor opposed 
the bill. During the long debate, its influence had 
been entirely passive. Apparently, the administra- 
tion had become convinced that, in purely military 
matters, it was better for civilians not to attempt to 
interfere ; and, the terrible responsibility thus sought 
to be laid on a sinsfle man, neither the President nor 
his cabinet assisted to impose. They simply left the 
matter in the hands of the representatives of the 
people, and these, after full consideration, decided by 
a majority that raised the measure entirely out of the 
domain of politics.* 

Grant himself used no influence, wrote no line, 
spoke no word to bring about the result. I was with 
him while the Tjill was being debated, and spoke to 
him more than once on the subject. He never mani- 
fested any anxiety or even desire for the success of 
the bill; nor did he ever seem to shrink from the 
responsibilities it would impose upon him. If the 
country chose to call him to higher spheres and more 
important services, whatever ability or energy he pos- 
sessed he was willing to devote to the task. If, on the 
contrary, he had been left at the post which he then 
held, he would not have felt a pang of disappointed 
pride. 

The Honorable Mr. Washburne said of him, during 
the debates on the bill : " No man with his consent 
has ever mentioned his name in connection with any 

* The vote in the House of Representatives, where the bill origi 
nated, was one hundred and seventeen to nineteen. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 571 

position. I say wliat I know to he tnio, when I al- 
lege that every promotion he Las received since he 
fii'st entered the service to put down this rel)ellion, 
was moved without his knowledge or consent. And 
in regard to this very matter of lieutenant-general, 
after the bill was introduced and his name mentioned 
in connection therewith, he wrote me, and admonished 
me that he had been highly honored by tlie govern- 
ment, and did not ask or deserve any thing more in 
the shape of honors or promotion ; and that a success 
over the enemy was what he craved above everything 
else ; that he only desired to hold such an influence 
over those under his command, as to use them to the 
best advantage to secure that end." 

On the 3d of March, Ilalleck sent the following 
dispatch to Grant : " The Secretary of War directs 
that you will report in person to the War Depart- 
ment, as early as practicable, considering the condi- 
tion of your command. If necessary, you will keep 
up telegraphic communication with your command, 
while en route to Washington." The next day Grant 
stai-ted for the capital. 

At the same time he sent instructions to Sher- 
man, now on his return from Meridian. That com- 
mander was directed to use the negro troops, as far 
as practicable, to guard the Mi>^sissippi river ; and, 
adding to this element what he deemed necessary for 
the protection of the river, to assemble the remainder 
of his command at Memphis. " Have ihom in readi- 
ness to join your column on this front, in the spring 
campaign." This was with a view to the movement 
against Atlanta and Mobile, which, notwithstanding 
his promotion. Grant still intended to lead in person. 
This operation had now been fi-equently explained 



572 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 

by liim to liis staff. It was his plan, at this time, to 
fight his way to Atlanta, and then, holding that place 
and the line between it and Chattanooga, to cut loose 
with his army, either for Mobile or Savannah, ^vhich 
ever events should designate as the most practi- 
cable objective point. He meant to concentrate Sher- 
■" man, Thomas, and Sehofield's armies for this purpose, 
and entertained no doubt whatever of entire success. 
When he started for Washington, it was his firm in- 
tention to return to Chattanooga, and, while he re- 
tained control of all the armies, to lead in person 
those which moved towards the sea. On the 3d of 
March, he said to Sherman, " I am ordered to Wash- 
ington ; but as I am directed to keep up telegraphic 
communication with this command, I shall expect, in 
the course of ten or twelve days, to return to it." 

I carried these instructions to Sherman, and with 
them, also, the following extraordinary private letter : 

Dear Shekjian, — Tlie bill reviving the grade of 
lieutenant-general in the Army has become a law, and 
my name has been sent to the Senate for the place. 
I now receive orders to report to Washington imme- 
diately, in person, which indicates a confirmation, or a 
likelihood of confirmation. I start in the morning to 
comply with the order. 

" Whilst I have been eminently successful in this 
war, in at least gaining the confidence of the j)ublic, no 
one feels more than I, how much of this success is due 
to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth 
of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been 
my good fortune to have occupying subordinate po- 
sitions under me. 

" There are many officers to whom these remarks 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 573 

are a2:)plicable to a greater or less degree, propoi-tion- 
ate to their ability as soldiers; but ^vllat I want i^, 
to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the 
men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for 
whatever I have had of success. 

" How far your advice and assistance have been 
of help to me, you know. How far your execution 
of whatever has been given to you to do, entitles you 
to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as 
well as I. 

" I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, 
giving it the most flattering construction. 

"The word you I use in the plural, intending it 

for McPherson also. I should write to him, and 

Avill some day, but starting in the morning, I do not 

know that 1 will find time just now. 

" Your friend, 

"U. S. GRANT 

" Major- GeneraV 

Sherman received this letter near Memphis, on 
the 10th of March, and immediately replied : 

" Dear Gej^eral, — I have your more than kind 
and characteristic letter of tlie 4th instant. I will 
send a copy to General McPherson at once. 

"You do yourself injustice, and us too much 
honor, in assigning to us too large a share of the 
merits which have led to your high advancement. 
I know you approve the fi'iendship I have ever 
professed to you, and will permit me to continue, 
as heretofore, to manifest it on all proper occasions. 

"You are now Washington's legitimate successor, 
and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation ; 



574 MnJTAKY HISTORY OF 

"but, if you can continue, as Heretofore, to be your 
self, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will 
enjoy through life the respect and love of friends 
and the homage of millions of human beings, that 
will award you a large share in securing to them 
and their descendants a government of law and 
stability. 

*'I repeat, you do General McPherson and my- 
self too much honor. At Belmont, you manifested 
your traits — neither of us being near. At Douelson, 
also, you illustrated your whole character. I w^as 
not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate 
a capacity to influence you. 

" Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was 
almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical 
elements that presented themselves at every point; 
but that admitted a ray of light I have followed 
since. I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and 
just, as the great protot^q^e Washington — as unselfish, 
kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be — ^but 
the chief characteristic is the simple faith in success 
you have always manifested, which I can liken to 
nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the 
Saviour. 

"This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and 
Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your 
best preparations, you go into battle without hesi- 
tation, as at Chattanooga — no doubts — no reserves; 
and I tell you, it was this that made us act with 
confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you 
thought of me, and if I got in a tight place you 
would help me out, if alive. 

" My only point of doubt was, in your knowledge 
of grand strategy, and of books of science and his 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 575 

tory ; but, I confess, your common-senso suoiiis to 
liave supplied all tliese. 

" Now, as to the future. Don't stay in Wasliing- 
ton. Come West : take to yourself the whole Mis- 
sissij^pi valley. Let us make it dead-sure — and I tell 
you, the Atlantic slopes and Pacific shores will fol- 
low its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live or 
die with the main trunk. We have done much, but 
still much remains. Time, and time's influences, are 
with us. We could almost afford to sit still, and let 
these influences work. 

" Here lies the seat of the coming empire ; and 
from the AYest, when our task is done, we will make 
short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the im- 
poverished coast of the Atlantic. "' 

" Your sincere friend." 

Before Grant reached Washington, he received 
the following magnanimous dispatch from the man 
whom he was about to supersede : " The Secretaiy 
of War directs me to say that your commission as 

* On the 29tli of December, Sbcrman had written to Grant : " In 
relation to the conversation wc had in General Granger's office, the day 
before I left ISTashville, I repeat, j'ou occupy a position of more power 
than Halleck or the President. There are similar instances in Euro- 
pean history, but none in ours. For the sake of future generations, 
risk nothing. Let us risk — and when you strike, let it be as at Vicks- 
burg and Chattanooga. Your reputation as a general is now far 
above that of any man living, and partisans will manoeuvre for your 
influence ; but, if you can escape them, as you have hitherto done, you 
will be more powerful for good than it is possible to measure. You saiil 
that you were surprised at my assertion on this point, but I repeat that 
from what I have seen and heard here, I am more and more convinced 
of the truth of what I told you. Do as you have heretofore done, pre- 
serve a plain military character ; and let others manoeuvre as they will, 
you ^vill beat them, not only in fame, but in doing good in the closing 
scenes of this war, when somebody must heal and mend up the breacbea 
made by war." 



576 MILITAET HISTORY OF 

lieuteD ant-general is signed, and will be delivered to 
you, on your arrival at tlie War Department. I sin- 
cerely congratulate you on tliis recognition of your 
distinguislied and meritorious services." His journey 
to Washington was made as rapidly as possible, and 
by special trains ; but wherever the people knew of 
his approach, they thronged around the railway sta- 
tions in prodigious crowds ; cheering, and struggling 
to catch a glimpse of the new commander of their 
armies. 

On the 8th of March, he arrived at the capital, 
where he had never spent more than one day before. 
The President had never seen his face, and the Secre- 
tary of AVar had met him, for the first time, at Louis- 
ville, in the October preceding. 

At one o'clock, on the 9th of March, Grant was 
formally received by the President, in the cabinet 
chamber. There were present all the members of his 
cabinet, Major-General Halleck, general-in-chief, two 
members of General Grant's staff,* the President's 
secretary, a single member of Congress, and Grant's 
eldest son, who had been with him at Jackson, and 
Vicksburg, and at Champion's hill. 

After Grant had been j^resented to the members 
of the cabinet, Mr. Lincoln read the following words : 
" General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what 
5'OU have done, and its reliance upon you for what 
remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are 
now presented, -with this commission constituting 
you lieutenant-general in the Anny of the United 
States. With this high honor, devolves upon you, 
also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country 
herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. 

* Brigadier-General Rawlins and Licuteuant-Coloncl Comstock. 



ULYSSES S. GRANT. 577 

I scarcely need to add, that, witli wluit I here speak 
for the nation, goes my own hearty personal con- 
currence." 

Grant read, from a paper, this reply : " Mr. Presi- 
dent, I accept the commission, with gratitude, for 
the hijzli honor conferred. With the aid of the noble 
armies that have fought in so many fields, for our 
common country, it 'n^ ill be my earnest endeavor 
not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the 
full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on 
me ; and I know that if they are met, it will be 
due to tkose armies, and above all, to the fiivor of 
that Providence which leads both nations and men." 
37 




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APPENDIX TO CHAPTEE I. 



CORRESPONDENCE IN RELATION TO THE BATTLE OF BELMONT 

St. Louis, Xovcmber 1, 1861. 
General Graxt, commanding at Cairo : 

You are hereby directed to bold your wbole command ready 
to march at an hour's notice, until further orders ; and you will 
take particular care to be amply supphed with transportation 
and ammunition. You are also directed to make demonstra- 
tions with your troops along both sides of the river towards 
Charleston, Norfolk, and Blandville, and to keep your columns 
constantly moving back and forward against these places, with- 
out, however, attacking the enemy. 

Very respectfully, etc., 

CIIAUNCEY McKEEVER, 

Assistant Adjutant- General. 



St. Loiis, Kovemier 2, 18G1. 
To Brigadier- General Grant : 

Jeff Thompson is at Indian ford of the St. Franyois river, 
twenty-five miles below Greenville, with about three thousand 
men. Colonel Carlin has started with force from Pilot Knob. 
Send a force from Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point to assist 
Carlin in driving Thompson into Arkansas. 
By order of 

Major- General FREMONT. 
C. McKEEVER, 

Assistant Adjutant- General. 



580 APPENDIX. 

Headquarters, District Southeast Missouri i 
Cairo, November 3, 1861. \ 

Colonel R. J. Oglesby, commanding, etc., 

Bird^s Point, Missouri : 

You will take command of an expedition, consisting of your 
regiment, four companies of the Eleventh Illinois, all of the 
Eighteenth and Twenty-ninth, three companies of cavalry from 
Bird's point (to be selected and notified by yourself), and a 
section of Swartz's battery, artillery, and proceed by steam- 
boats to Commerce, Missouri. From Commerce you will strike 
for Sikeston, Mr. Cropper acting as guide. From there you 
Avill go in pursuit of a rebel force, understood to be three thou- 
sand strong, under Jeif Thompson, now at Indian ford, on the 
St. Francis river. 

An expedition has already left Ironton, Missouri, to attack 
this force. Should they learn that they have left that place, it 
will not be necessary for you to go there, but pursue the enemy 
in any direction he may go, always being cautious not to fall 
in with an unlooked-for foe, too strong for the command under 
you. 

The object of the expedition is to destroy this force, and the 
manner of doing it is left largely at your discretion, believing 
it better not to trammel you with insti-uctions. 

Transportation will be furnished you for fourteen days' ra- 
tions and four or five days' forage. All you may require out- 
side of this must be furnished by the country through which 
you pass. In taking supplies, you will be careful to select a 
proper officer to press them, and require a receipt to be given, 
and the articles pressed accounted for in the same manner as if 
purchased. 

You are particularly enjoined to allow no foraging by your 
men. It is demoralizing in the extreme, and is apt to make 
open enemies where they would not otherwise exist. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Brigadier- General. 

Headquarters, District Southeast Missouri, i 
Cairo, November 5, 18G1. S 

Brigadier- General C. F. Smith, commanding, etc., 
Paducah, Kentucl-y : 

In pursuance of directions from headquarters. Western De- 
partment, I have sent from here a force of about three thou- 



APPENDIX. 581 

sand men, of all arms, towards Indian ford, on the St. Francis 
river, and also a force of one regiment from Cape Girardeau in 
the same direction. 

I am now, under the same instructions, iitting out an expe- 
dition to menace Belmont, and will take all the force proper to 
spare from here, pi'obably not more tliaii three thousand men. 

If you can make a demonstration towards Columbus at the 
same time with a portion of your command, it would probably 
keep the enemy from throwing over the river much more force 
than they now have there, and might enable me to drive those 
they now have out of Missouri. The principal point to gain is, 
to prevent the enemy from sending a force to fall in the rear of 
those now out fi'om this command. I will leave here to-mor- 
row night, and will land some twelve miles below. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Brigadier- General commanding. 

Cairo, November (,, 1861. 
Colonel R. J. Oglesbt, commanding expedition : 

On receipt of this, turn your column towards New Madrid. 
When you arrive at the nearest point to Columbus, from whicli 
there is a road to that place, communicate with me at Bel- 
mont. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Brigadier- General. 

Cairo, Xiwanhcr fi, 1861. 
Cohnel "W. H. L. Wallace, Bird's Point, ^fissouri : 

Herewith I send you an order to Colonel Oglesby, to change 
the direction of his column towards Xew Madrid, halting to 
communicate with me at Belmont from the nearest )">nir ,,u 
his road. 

I desire you to get up the Charleston expediti<»ii ordcnil 
for to-morrow, to start to-night, taking two days' rations with 
them. You will accompany them to Charleston, and get 
Colonel Oglesby's instinictions to him by a messenger, if prac- 
ticable, and when he is near enough you may join him. For 
this purpose you may substitute the remainder of your regi- 
ment in place of an equal amount from Colonel Marsh's. The 
two davs' rations carried with vour men in haversacks will en- 



582 APPENDLX. 

able you to join Colonel Oglesby's command, and there yon 
will find rations enough for several days more should they be 
necessary. You may take a limited number of tents, and at 
Charleston press Avagons to carry them to the main column. 
There you will find sufficient transportation to release the 
pressed wagons. 

U. S. GRANT, 

Brigadier- General. 



On board Steamer Belle of Memphis, \ 
Xovemhcr 1, 1861, 2 o'clock a. m. ) 
Special Order. 

The troojis composing the present expedition from this 
place will move promptly at six o'clock this morning. The 
gunboats will take the advance, and be followed by the First 
brigade, under command of Brigadier-General John A. Mc- 
Clernand, composed of all the troops from Cairo and Fort 
Holt. The Second brigade, comprising the remainder of the 
troops of the expedition, commanded by Colonel John Dough- 
erty, will follow. The entire force will debark at the lowest 
point on the Missouri shore, Avhere a landing can be effected in 
security from the rebel batteries. The point of debarkation 
will be designated by Captain "Walke, commanding naval 
forces. 

By order of 

U. S. GRANT, 

Brigadier- General 
John A. Rawlins, 

Assistant Adjutant- General. 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER U 



MAJOK-GENEEAL MoCLELLAN TO MAJOR-QENEEAL HALLECK. 

Headquarters of hie Army, 
WAsniSGTOX, D. C, January 3, 1S6 



Major- General II. W. Hali.eck, 

commanding Department of Jlissouri: 
Gexeral: It is of the greatest imi^ortance that the rebel 
troops in western Kentucky be prevented from moving to the 
support of the force in front of General Bucll. To accomplish 
this, an expedition should be sent up the Cumberland river (to 
act in concert with General Bucll's command), of sufficient 
strength to defeat any force that may be brought against it. 
Tlie gunboats should be supported by at least one, and perhaj)s 
two, divisions of your best infantry, taken from Paducah and 
other points from which they can best be spared ; at the same 
time, such a demonstration should be made on Columbus as 
will prevent the removal of any troo])3 from that place; and if 
a sufficient number have already been withdrawn, the place 
should be taken. It may be well, also, to make a feint on the 
Tennessee river, with a command sufficient to prevmt disaster 
under any circumstances. 

As our success in Kentucky depends in a great raeasnre on 
our preventing reenforcements from joining Buckncr and John- 
ston, not a moment's time should be lost in preparing these 
expeditions. 



584 APPENDED. 

I desire that you give me at once your views in full as to 
the best method of accomplishing oiir object, at the same time 
stating the nature and sti-ength of the force that you can use 
for the purpose, and the time necessary to prepare. 
Very respectfully, 
G. B. MoCLELLAlSr, Major- General commanding. 



MAJOE-GENEEAL HALLECK TO BEIGADIEEGENEEAL GEAKT. 

Headquarters, Department of the Missouri, ) 
St. Louis, January 6, 1862. \ 

Brigadier- General U. S. Grant, Cairo^ III. : 

I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield, 
and in the direction of Murray. Forces from Paducah and 
Fort Holt should meet it and threaten " Camp Beauregard" and 
Murray, letting it be understood that Dover is the object of 
your attack. But don't advance far enough to expose your 
flank or rear to an attack from Columbus, and by all means 
avoid a serious engagement. 

Make a great fuss about moving all your force towards 
Xashville, and let it be so reported by the newspapers. 

Take proper precautions to deceive your own men as well 
as the enemy. Let no one, not even a member of your own 
staff, know the real object. I will send you some forces from 
this place to increase the deception. Let it be understood that 
twenty or thirty thousand men are expected from Missouri, and 
that your force is merely the advanced guard to the main col- 
umn of attack. The object is to prevent reenforcements being 
sent to Buckner. Having accomplished this, you will slowly 
retire to your former positions, but if possible keep up the idea 
of a general advance. Be very careful, however, to avoid a 
battle. We are not ready for that. But cut off detached par- 
ties, and give your men a little experience in skirmishing. 

If Commodore Foote can make a gunboat demonstration at 
the same time, it will assist in carrying out the deception. 

H. W. HALLECK, JIajor- General 



APPENDIX. 585 



TWO LETTERS OF IXSTPvUCTIONS FROM MAJOR-GENERAL HAI.EECK TO 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL GRANT, FOR MOVEMENT AGAINST FORT HENRY. 

IIeadqcartkrs, Department of the Missouri, ) 
St. Louis, January 30, 1862. ) 

Brigadier- General U. S. Grant, Cairo, III.: 

You -will immediately prepare to send forward to Fort 
Henry, on the Tennessee river, all your available force from 
Smithland, Paducah, Cairo, Fort ITolt, Bird's Point, etc. Suffi- 
cient garrisons must be left to hold these places against an 
attack from Columbus. As the roads are now almost im- 
passable for large forces, and as your command is very deficient 
in transportation, the troops will be taken in steamers up the 
Tennessee river as far as practicable. Supplies will also be 
taken up in steamers as far as possible. Flag-Officer Foote 
will protect the transports with his gunboats. The Benton, 
and perhaps some others, should be left for the defence of 
Cairo. Fort Henry should be taken and held at all hazards, I 
shall immediately send you three additional companies of ar- 
tillery from this place. The river front of the fort is armed 
with 20-pounders. It may be necessary for you to take some 
guns of large calibre, and establish a battery on the other side 
of the river. It is believed that the guns on the land side are 
of small calibre, and can be silenced by our tield artillery. It 
is said that the north side of the river, below the fort, is favor- 
able for landing. If so, you will land and rapidly occupy the 
road to Dover, and fully invest the place, so as to cut otf the 
retreat of the garrison. Lieutenant-Colonel MclMierson, U. S. 
Engineers, will immediately report to you, to act as chief en- 
gineer of the expedition. It is very probable that an attempt 
will be made from Columbus to reenforce Fort Henry, also 
from Fort Donelson at Dover. If you can occupy the road to 
Dover, you can prevent the latter. The steamers will give you 
the means of crossing from one side of the river to the other. 
It is said that there is a masked battery opposite the island, 
below Fort Henry. If this cannot be avoided or turned, it 
must be taken. 

Having invested Fort Henry, a cavalry for:-e will be sent 
forward to break up the railroad from Paris to Dover. The 
brido-es should be rendered impassable, but not destroyed. 



586 APPENDIX. 

A telegram from Washington says that Beauregard left 
Manassas four days ago, Avith fifteen regiments for the line of 
Columbus and Bowling Green. It is, therefore, of the greatest 
importance that we cut that line before he arrives. You will 
move with the least delay i^ossible. You will furnish Commo- 
dore Foote with a copy of this letter. A telegraph line will 
be extended as rapidly as possible from Paducah, east of Ten- 
nessee river, to Fort Henry. Wires and operators will be sent 
from St. Louis. 

H. W. HALLECK, Major- General. 



Headquarters, Department of the Missouri, ) 
St. Louis, February 1, 1862. \ 

Brigadier- General U. S. Grant, Cairo ^ HI.: 

You are authorized to withdraw Colonel Ross's regiment, 
Seventeenth Illinois volunteers, from Cape Girardeau for the 
Tennessee expedition as soon as they are wanted. The remain- 
ing forces are sufficient for tliat place. Your requisitions for 
horses, mules, wagons, etc., cannot be filled immediately. By 
using steamers on the river, and as the troops will not move far 
from their supplies and Avater ti-ansportation, much of the 
usual trains can be dispensed with for several weeks. Don't 
cumber up the expedition with too large a train. The object 
is to move rapidly and promptly by steamers, and to reduce 
the place before any large reenforcements can arrive. 

H. W. H ALLEGE, Major- General. 



FIELD ORDER FOR ATTACK ON FORT HEXRT. 

Hfadquarters, District of Cairo, ) 

Camp is Field near Fort Henry, February 5, 1862, S 

General Field Orders, Ko. 1. 

The First division. General John A McClernand command- 
ing, will move at eleven o'clock a. m. to morrow, under the 
guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, and take a position 
on the roads from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson and Dover. 

It will be the special duty of this command to prevent all 
reenforcements to Fort Henry or escape from it. Also, to be 



APPENDIX. 587 

held in readiness to charge and take Fort Henry by storm, 
promptly, on the receijit of orders. 

Two brigades of the Second division, General C. F. Smitli 
commanding, will start at the same hour from the west bank 
of the river, and take and occupy tlie heiglits commanding Fort 
Henry. This point will be held by so much artillery as can 
be made available, and such other troops as in the opinion of 
the general commanding Second division may be necessary for 
its protection. 

The Third brigade. Second division, will advance up the 
east bank of the Tennessee river, as fast as it can be securely 
done, and be in readiness to charge upon the fort, or move to 
the support of the First division, as may be necessary. 

All of the forces on the west bank of the river, not required 
to hold the heights commanding Fort Henry, will return to 
their transports, cross the river, and follow the First division as 
rapidly as possible. 

The west bank of the Tennessee river not having been re- 
connoitred, the commanding officer intrusted with taking pos- 
session of the enemy's works there, will proceed with great 
caution, and such information as can be gathered, and such 
guides as can be found in the time intervening before eleven 
o'clock to-morrow. 

The troops will move with two days' rations of l)rcad and 
meat in their haversacks. 

One company of the Second division, armed with ritlcs, will 
be ordered to report to Flag-Officer Foote, as sharpshooters, 
on board the gunboats. 

By order : U. S. GRANT, Brigadier-General commanding. 



GRAKTS REPORT OF CAPTURE OF FORT HEN'RT. 

\ 



Headqcarters, District or Cairo, 
Fort IIexry, February 6, 1802. 



Captain J. C. Keltox, St. Louis.^ Mo.: 

Enclosed I send you my orders for the attack upon Fort 
Henry. 

Owing to dispatches received from Major-Gencral Ilalleck, 
and corroborating information here, to the effect that the enemy 
were rapidly rcenforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary 



588 APPENDIX. 

that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not aip at 
eleven o'clock last night, when my orders Avere written, there- 
fore I did not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than 
eleven o'clock to-day to commence the investment. The gun- 
boats started the same hour to commence the attack, and en- 
gaged the enemy at not over six hundred yards. 

In a little over one hour all the batteries were silenced, and 
the fort surrendered at discretion to Flag-Officer Foote, giving 
us all their guns, camp equipage, etc. The prisoners taken 
were General Tilghman and staff. Captain Taylor and company, 
and the sick. The garrison, I think, must have commenced the 
retreat last night, or at an early hour this morning. Had I 
not felt it an imperative duty to attack Fort Henry to-day, I 
should have made the investment complete, and delayed until 
to-morrow, so as to have secured the garrison. I do not now 
believe, however, that the result would have been any more 
satisfactory. 

The gunboats have proved themselves well able to resist 
a severe cannonading. All the iron-clads received more or 
less shots — the flag-ship some twenty-eight — ^yithout any 
serious damage to any except the Essex. This vessel received 
one shot in her boilers that disabled her, killing and wounding 
some thirty-two men. Captain Porter among the wounded. 

I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and re- 
turn to Fort Henry with the forces employed, unless it looks 
possible to occupj^ the place with a small force, that could re- 
treat easily to the main body. I shall regard it more in the 
light of an advanced grand guard than as a permanent post. 

For the character of the works at Fort Henry, I will refer 
you to reports of the engineei's, which will be required. 

Owing to the intolerable state of the roads, no transporta- 
tion will be taken to Fort Donelson, and but little artillery, 
and that with double teams. 

Hoping that what has been done will meet with the ap- 
proval of the major-general commanding the department, I 
remain, etc. 

U. S. GRANT, Brigadier- General 



APPE2IDIX. 589 



FIELD OKDER FOP. MARCH TO FOUT DOSElJSOX. 

TlEADQrARTEns, DismicT OF CAinn, ) 

Fort ITKNnr, FJimuini 10, 1862. J 

General Field Orders^ Xo. 7. 

The troops from Forts Henry and Ileiman will lioM thcni- 
selves in i-eadiness to move on "Wednesday, the 12lh instant, at 
as early an hour as practicable. Neither tents nor baijijairc 
will ha taken, except such as the troops can carry. Brigade 
and regimental commanders Avill see that all their men arc su|>- 
plied with forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, 
and two daj's' rations in their liaversacks. Three days' a<ldi- 
tional rations may l»e put in wagons to follow the expeiliti<»n. 
but will not impede the progress of-the main column. 

Two regiments of infantry will remain at Fort Henry, to be 
designated from the First division, and one brigade at Fort 
Heiman, Kentucky, to be designated by General Smith com- 
manding. 

By order of Brigadier- General GRANT. 

JOnX A. 'RX'^Ll^?,, Assistant Adjutant- GiiieraJ. 

SECOND FIELD ORDER FOR MARCH TO FORT D0NEL.-0 v 

Headquarters, District of Cairo, ) 
Fort IIexry, Tennessee, February 10, 1862. J 

General Field Orders^ Xo. 11. 

The troops designated in General Field Orders, No. 7, will 
move to-morrow as i-apidly as possible in the following order: 

One brigade of the First division will move by the Tele- 
graph road, directly upon Fort Donelson, halting for furllier 
orders, at a distance of two miles from the fort. The other 
brigades of the First division will move by the Dover or Kidgc 
road and halt at the same distance from the fort, and throw 
out troops so as to form a continuous line, between the two 
wings. 

The two brigades of the Second division, now at Fort 
Henry, will follow as rapidly as practicable, by the Dover roa<l 
and will be followed by the troops from Fort Heiman. as fast 
as they can be ferried across the river. 

One brigade of the Second division should be thrown into 



590 APPENDIX. 

Dover to cut off all retreat by the river, if found practicable to 
do so. 

The force of the enemy being so variously reported, it is 
impossible to give exact details of attack, but the necessary 
orders will be given on the field. 

By order of Brigadier- General U. S. GRANT, commanding. 

JOHN A. EAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant- General. 



GENERAL BTJCKNEB TO GENERAL GEANT. 

Headquarters, Fokt Dokelson, } 
February 16, 1862. ) 

Sir : In consideration of all the circumstances governing the 
present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the com- 
manding officer of the Federal forces, the appointment of com- 
missioners, to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and 
post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice 
until twelve o'clock to-day. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

S. B. BUCKKER, Brigadier- General 0. S. A. 

To Brigadier- General IJ. S. Grant, 

commanding United States Forces near Fort Donelson. 



ORDER OF GENERAL BUCKNER. 

IIeadquarters, Fort Donelson, ) 
February 16, 1862. ^ 

Major Crosby will take or send by an officer to the enemy 
the accompanying communication to General Grant, and request 
information of the point where further communications will 
reach him. Also inform him that my headquarters will be for 
the pi-esent in Dover. 

Have the white flag hoisted on Fort Donelson, not on the 
batteries. 

S. R. BUCKNER, Brigadier- General. 



APPENDIX. 501 



GEKEEIL GRANT TO GENERAL BUCKNER. 

IlEADQCAnTF.nS, AUMY IN THE FlELP, | 

Fort Donelsox, February 16, 18r>2. J 
General S. B. Buckner, Confederate Army : 

Sir: Yours of this date proposing armistice and appoint- 
ment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just 
received. Ko terms except unconditional and immediate sur- 
render can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon 
your works. I am, sir, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 
U. S. GRANT, Brigadier- General eommanding. 



general BTJCKlfER TO GENERAL GRANT. 

Headqcarters, Dover, Ten.vesske, ) 
February 16, 1862. ) 

To Brigadier- General Grant, United States Army : 

Sir : The distribution of the forces under my command, 
incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the over- 
whelming force under j-our command, compel mc, notwithstand- 
ing the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to 
accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms wliich you pro- 
pose. I am, sir, your very obedient servant, 

S. B. BUCK>rEE, Brigadier- General commanding C. S. A. 



MESSAGE FROM MR. JEFFERSON DAVIS TO HIS CONGRESS. 

Executive Departmest, .}farch 11, 1862. 
To the Spcalcr of the House of Bepresentatins : 

I transmit herewith copies of such official reports as have 
been received at the War Department of the dtCence and tail 
of Fort Donelson. 

They will be found incomplete and unsatisfactory. Instruc- 
tions have been given to furnish further information upon the 
several points not made intelligible by the reports. It is not 
stated that reenforcenients were at any time .".skcd (or; nor is 
it demonstrated to have been impossible to have saved the 
army by evacuating the position ; nor is it known by what 



592 APPENDIX. 

means it was found practicable to withdraw a part of the garri- 
son, leaving the remainder to surrender; nor upon what au- 
thority or principles of action the senior generals abandoned 
resj^onsibility by transferring the command to a junior oiRcer, 

In a former communication to Congress, I presented the 
propriety of a suspension of judgment in relation to the dis- 
aster at Fort Done! son, until official reports could be received. 
I regret that the information now furnished is so defective. In 
tlie mean time, hopeful that satisfactory explanation may be 
made, I have directed, upon the exhibition of the case as pre- 
sented by the two senior generals, that they should be relieved 
from command, to await further orders whenever a reliable 
judgment can be rendered on the merits of the case. 

JEFFERSON DAVIS. 



GEAJTT'S REPORT OF THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 

Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, ) 
Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862. ) 
Brigadier- General Geoege W. CtrLLTiM, 

Chief of Staff] Department of the Missouri: 

I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional surren? 
der, this morning, of Fort Donelson, with twelve to fifteen 
thousand prisoners, at least forty pieces of artillery, and a large 
amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property. 

I left Fort Henry on the 12th instant, with a force of about 
fifteen thousand men, divided into two divisions, under the 
command of Generals McClernand and Smith. Six regiments 
were sent around by water the day before, convoyed by a gun- 
boat (or boats), and with instructions not to pass it. 

The troops made the march in good order, the head of the 
column arriving within two miles of the fort at twelve o'clock ii. 
At this point the enemy's pickets Avere met and driven in. The 
fortifications of the enemy were from this point gradually ap- 
proached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishifig on the 
line. The following day, owing to the non-arrival of the gun- 
boats and reenforcemcnts sent by water, no attack Avas made, 
but the investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy, 
and drawn closer to his works, with skirmishing all day. On 
the evening of the 13th, the gunboats and recnforcements 



APrENDix. 503 

arrived. On the 14lh, a gallant attack was made by Flai;- 
Officer Foote upon the enemy's river batteries with his fleet. 
The engagement lasted probably one hour and a half, and 
bid fair to result favorably, when two unlucky shots dis- 
abled two of the armored boats, so that they were carried back 
by the current. The remaining two were very much disabled 
also, having received a number of heavy shots about tlie pilot- 
houses and other parts of the vessels. After these mishaps, I 
concluded to make the investment of Fort Donelson as perfect 
as possible, and partially fortify, and await repairs to the gun- 
boats. This plan was frustrated, however, by the enemy 
making a most vigorous attack upon our right wing, com- 
manded by Brigadier-General J. A. McClernand, and which 
consisted of his division and a portion of the force under Gen- 
eral L. "Wallace. 

The enemy were repelled, after a closely contested battle of 
several hours, in which our loss was heavy. The ofl5cers suf- 
fered out of proportion. I have not the means of determining 
our loss, even approximately, but it cannot fall fiir short of 
twelve hundred killed, wounded, and missing. Of the latter, 
I understand, through General ]>uckner, about two hundred 
and fifty were taken piisoncrs. I shall retain here enough of 
the enemy to exchange for them, as they were immediately 
shipped off, and not left for recapture. 

About the close of this action the ammunition and car- 
tridge-boxes gave out, which, with the loss of m:iny of the 
field officers, produced great confusion in the ranks. Seeing 
that the enemy did not take advantage of it, convinced me that 
equal confusion, and, consequently, great demoralization, ex- 
isted with him. Taking advantage of this fact, I orden-d a 
charge upon the left (enemy's right) with the division under 
General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed, and 
gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle Lasted 
until dark, and gave us possession of part of the intrenchment. 
An attack was ordered from the other flank after the charge by 
General Smith was commenced, by the divisions under McCler- 
nand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding hour« of exposure 
to a heavy fire in the fore part of the day, was gallantly m.ade, 
and the enemy further repulsed. At the points thus gained, 
night having come on, all the troops encamped for the night, 
feeling that a complete victory would crown their cflbrts at an 
3S 



594 APPENDIX. 

early hour in the morning. Tbis morning, at a very early 
hour, a note was received from General Buckner, under a flag 
of truce, proposing an armistice. A copy of the correspond- 
ence which ensued is herewith enclosed. 

I could mention individuals who especially distinguished 
themselves, but will leave this to division and brigade com- 
manders, whose reports will be forwarded as soon as received. 

Of the division commanders, however, Generals Smith, Mc- 
Clernand, and Wallace, I must do the justice to say that all of 
them were with their commands in the midst of danger, and 
were always ready to execute all orders, no matter what the 
exposure to themselves. 

At the hour the attack was made on General McClernand's 
command, I was absent, having received a note from Flag- 
Officer Foote, requesting me to go and see him, he being unable 
to call on me, in consequence of a wound received the day 
before. 

My staff. Colonel J. D. Webster, First Illinois artillery, 
chief of staff; Captain J. A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant- 
general ; First Lieutenants C. B. Lagow and William S. Hill- 
ycr, aides ; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. McPherson, chief 
engineer, and Colonel John Kiggin, junior, volunteer aide, 
are all deserving of personal mention for their gallantry and 
services. 

For details, see reports of engineers, medical director, and 
commanders of divisions and brigades, to follow. 

TJ. S. GRANT, Br ir/adier- General 



GEANTS CONGEATt-LATOET OEDEE AFTEE THE CAPTUEE OF FOET DON- 

ELSON. 

Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, ) 
Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862. ) 

Oencral Orders, Ko. 2. 

The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratu- 
lating the troops of this command for the triumph over rebel- 
lion gained by their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th inst. 

For four successive nights, without shelter during the most 
inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy 
in large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly 
fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were 



APPENDIX. 'iO') 

added. Without a murmur this was borne, proparcfl at all 
times to receive an attack, and with continuous skirmishinLT l)v 
day, resultino: ultimately in forcincj the enemy to surrender 
without conditions. 

The victory acliieved is not only great in breakinrr down 
rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of 
war ever taken in one battle on this continent. 

Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the 
maps of our united country, and the men who fought the battle 
will live in the memory of a grateful people. 

C. S. GRANT, Major- General commanding. 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTEE UI. 



TELEGRAM FEOM GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT. 

St. Louis, March 1, 1862. 
General U. S. Grant, Fort Henry : 

Transports will be sent to you as soon as possible to move 
your column up the Tennessee river. The main object of this 
expedition will be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear 
creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the connections at Corinth, 
Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that these objects 
be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments of cav- 
alry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid 
movements reach these points from the river without very 
serious opposition. Avoid any general engagement with strong 
forces. It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle. 
This should be strongly impressed upon the officers sent with 
the expedition from the river. General C. F. Smith, or some 
very discreet officer, should be selected for such commands. 
Having accomplished these objects, or such of them as may be 
practicable, you will return to Danville and move on Paris. 
Perhaps the troops seyt to Jackson and Humboldt can reach 
Paris as easily by land as to return to the transports. This 
must depend on the character of the roads and the position of 
the enemy. All telegraph lines which can be reached must 
be cut. The gunboats will accompany the transports for their 



APPENDIX, 597 

protection. Any loyal Tenncssccans, who desire it, may }>o 
enlisted and supplied with arms. 

Competent officers should he left to command the trarrisrin-i 
of Forts Henry and Donelson in your absence. T lia\ e indicated 
in general terms the object of this. 

II. W. IIALLECK, Major- G aural. 



CORRESPOXDENCE BETWEEN GEXEltALS BEAITJEGARD AXD GRANT. 
IlEAPQCARTEnS, ArMT OF Tm: MlS5IS.<!irP!, ) 

Monday, Jpril 8, 1862. ) 

Sir: At the close of the conflict yesterday, my forces beinjr 
exhausted by the extraordinary length of time during -svhich 
they were engaged with yours on that and the preceding day, 
and it being apparent that you had received and were still re- 
ceiving reenforceraents, I felt it my duty to withdraw my 
troops from the immediate scene of conflict. 

Under these circumstances, in accordance with usages of 
war, I shall transmit this under a flag of truce, to ask permis- 
sion to send a mounted party to the battle-field of Shiloh, for 
the purpose of giving decent interment to my dead. 

Certain gentlemen wishing to avail themselves of this to 
remove the remains of their sons and friends, I must request for 
them the privilege of accompanying the burial party ; and in 
this connection, I deem it proper to say, I am asking only what 
I have extended to your own countrymen, under similar cir- 
cumstances. 

General, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genial commanding. 
To Major- General U. S. Grant, commanding 

United States forces near Pittslurg, Tennessee. 

HEADQrARTERS, ArMT IS TnE FlELP, [ 

PinsBrRO, Jpril 9, 1862. ' 

General G. T. BF.\rp.Er.ARD, commanding ConAJtrafc Army 
of the Mississippi, Monterey, Tenn. : 
General: Your dispatch of yesterday ju<t received. Ow- 
ing to the warmth of the weather, I deemed it advisable to 
ha^ve all the dead of both parties buried immediately. Heavy 
details were made for this purpose, and it is now accomplished. 



598 APPENDIX. 

There cannot therefore be any necessity of admitting within 
our lines the parties you desire to send on the grounds asked. 
I shall always be glad to extend any courtesy consistent with 
duty, especially so when dictated by humanity. 
I am, General, very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

U. S. GRANT, Major- General 



GEANT'3 CONGEATULATOEY OEDEB AFTEE SHILOH. 

Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, ) 
Pittsburg, April 8, 1862. ) 

General Orders^ No. 34. 

The general commanding congratulates the troops who so 
gallantly maintained their position, repulsed and routed a 
numerically superior force of the enemy, composed of the flower 
of the Southern army, commanded by their ablest generals, and 
fought by them with all the desperation of despair. 

In numbers engaged no such contest ever took place on this 
continent. In importance of result but few such have taken 
place in the history of the world. 

Whilst congratulating the brave and gallant soldiers, it 
becomes the duty of the general commanding to make special 
notice of the brave wounded and those killed upon the field. 
Whilst they leave friends and relations to mourn their loss, they 
have won a nation's gratitude and undying laurels not to be for- 
gotten by future generations, who will enjoy the blessings of the 
best government the sun ever shone upon, preserved by their 
valor. 

By command of Major- General GRAWT. 

John A. Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

GEITEEAI, GEANT TO GEXEEAL BUELL. 

Headquarters, District of "West Tennessee, ) 
Pittsburg, April 1, 1862. ) 

Major- General D. C. Buell, commanding Army of the Ohio: 

When I left the field this evening, my intention was to oc- 
cupy the most advanced position possible for the night with 
the infantry engaged through the day, and follow up our suc- 
cess with cavalry and fresh troops, expected to arrive during 



APPENDIX. 500 

my last absence on the field. The great fatigue of our men, 
tliey having been engaged in two days' fight, and subject to a 
march yesterday and fight to-oay, -would preclude the idea of 
making any advance to-night without the arrival of the ex- 
pected reenforceraents. My plan, therefore, will be to feel on 
in the morning with all the troops on the outer lines, until our 
cavalry force can be engaged. One regiment of your army will 
finish crossing soon, and a sufficient artillery and infantry sup. 
port to follow them arc ready for a move. 

Under the instructions which I have previously received, 
and a dispatch also of to-day from ^Major-General Ilallcck, it 
will not then do to advance beyond Pea Ridge, or some point 
which we can reach and return in a day. General Halleck will 
probably be here himself to-morrow. Instructions have been 
sent to the different division commanders not included in your 
command, to be ready in the morning either to find if an enemy 
was in front, or to advance. 

U. S. GRANT, Major- General 



GENERAL GBANT TO GENERAL BUELL. 

Headqcarters, District of Wkst Tesxesmi, ) 
PiTTSBcno, April 8, 18C2. ) 

Major- General D. C. BrELL, commanding Army cf the Ohio: 

In making the rcconnoissance ordered for this morning, 
none of the cavalry belonging to your command were directed 
to take part. I have directed, if the enemy are found retreat- 
ing, information will be at once sent to Generals McClcmand 
and Sherman, who will immediately advance with a portion of 
their forces in support of the rcconnoissance. It will not be 
practicable to move artillery. If the enemy are retreating, and 
can be made to hasten across the low land between here and 
Pea Ridge, they will probably be forced to abandon their artil- 
lery and baggage. Will you be good enough to order your 
cavalry to foHow on the Corinth roads, and give two or three 
of your fresh brigades to follow in support ? 

Information has just reached me that the cneray Lave re- 
treated. 

U. S. GB^VNT, Major- General. 



600 APPENDIX. 



GENEEAL GEANT TO GENERAL nALLECK, "WITH TXCLOSUEES FROM 
GENERAL SHERMAN TO GENEEAL GRANT. 

Savanna, April 5, 1862. 
Major- General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Mo. : 

The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at 
different points east. Small garrisons are also at Bethel, Jack- 
son, and Humboldt. The number at these places seems con- 
stantly to change. The number of the enemy at Corinth, and 
within supporting distance of it, cannot be far from eighty 
thousand men. Information, obtained through deserters, places 
their force west at two hundred thousand. One division of 
Buell's column arrived yesterday. General Buell will be here 
himself to-day. Some skirmishing took place between our out- 
guai'ds and the enemy's yesterday and the day before. 

U. S. GRANT, Major- General 



Savanna, April 5, 1862. 
Major- General H. W. Halleck, St Louis, Mo. : 

General Nelson, of Buell's column, has just arrived. The 
other two divisions will arrive to-morrow and next day. Some 
skirmishing took place last night between our advance and the 
enemy, resulting in four wounded, and four or five men and 
two officers (of our side) taken prisoners. The enemy lost 
several killed, and eight prisoners taken. 

U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 



Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, ) 
Savanna, April 5, 1862. ) 

Major-General II. "W. IIalleok;, St. Lovis, Mo. : 

Just as my letter of yesterday, to Captain McLean, Assist- 
ant Adjutant-General, was finished, notes from Generals Mc- 
Clernand and Sherman's Assistant Adjutants-General were re- 
ceived, stating that our outposts had been attacked by the 
enemy, apparently in considerable force. I immediately went 
up, but found all quiet. The enemy took two officers and four 
or five of our men prisoners, and wounded four. We took 



ArPENDIX. <')0l 

eight prisoners, and killed several. Xuniber of the enemy's 
wounded not known. 

They had with them three pieces of artillery, and cavalry 
and infantry. How much, cannot of course be estimated. I 
have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being 
made upon us, but icill be prepared should such a thing take 
place. 

General Nelson's division has arrived. The other two, of 
Buell's column, will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is my 
present intention to send them to Hamburg, some four miles 
above Pittsburg, when they all get here. From that point to 
Corinth the road is good, and a junction can be formed with 
the troops from Pittsburg at almost any point. 

Colonel McPhcrson has gone with an escort to-day to exam- 
ine the defensibility of the ground about Hamburg, and to lay 
out the position of the camps, if advisable to occupy that 

place. 

U. S. GRANT, 'Major- General. 



PrrrsBmo Laspino, Tesskssee^ \ 
April 5, 1802. S 

General Grant : 

Sir,— All is quiet along my lines now. "NVe are in the act 
of exchanging cavalry according to your orders. The enemy 
has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regimente 
of infantry and one battery of artillery about six miles out. I 
will send you in ten prisoners of war, and a report of last 
night's affair, in a few minutes. 

W. T. SIIEPwMAN, BrigadUr-Gfnfral 

Your note is just received. I have no doubt that nothing 
will occur to-day more than some picket-tiring. The enemy is 
saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our 
pickets far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with certainty 
of advantage; and I do not apprehend any thing like an attack 
upon our position. 



602 APPENDIX. 



LETTER FEOM GENERAL SHERMAN TO TEE EDITOR OF THE UNITED 
STATES' SERVICE MAGAZINR— (Published Jantjakt, 1865.) 

Headquarters, Military Diyisiox of the Mississippi. 
Prof. Heney CoppfE, PhiladelpJiia : 

Dear Sir, — In the June number of the United States' Ser- 
vice Magazine, I find a brief sketch of Lieutenant-General IJ. 
S. Grant, in which I see you are likely to perpetuate an error, 
which General Grant may not deem of sufficient importance to 
correct. To General Buell's noble, able, and gallant conduct 
you attribute the fact that the disaster of April 6th, at Pitts- 
burg Landing was retrieved, and made the victory of the fol- 
lowing day. As General Taylor is said in his later days to 
have doubted whether he was at the battle of Buena Vista at 
all, on account of the many tilings having transpired there, ac- 
cording to the historians, which he did not see, so I begin to 
doubt whether I was at the battle of Pittsburg Landing, of 
modern description. But I was at the battles of April 6th and 
Tth, 1862. General Grant visited my division in person about 
ten A. M., when the battle raged fiercest. I was then on the 
right. After some general conversation, he remarked that I 
was doing right in stubbornly op])Osing the progress of the 
enemy ; and, in answer to my inquiry as to cartridges, told me 
he had anticipated their want, and given orders accordingly ; 
he then said his presence was more needed over at the left. 
About two p. M. of the 6th, the enemy materially slackened his 
attack on me, and about four p. m. I deliberately made a new 
line behind McAjfthur's drill-field, placing batteries on chosen 
ground, repelled easily a cavalry attack, and watched the cau- 
tious approach of the enemy's infantry, that never dislodged 
me there. I selected that line in advance of a bridge across 
Snake creek, by which we had all day been expecting the ap- 
proach of Lewis Wallace's division from Crump's Landing. 
About five p. M., before the sun set. General Grant came again 
to me, and after hearing my report of matters, explained to 
me the situation of aflairs on the left, which were not as favor- 
able ; still, the enemy had failed to reach the landing of the 
boats. We agreed that the enemy had expended the furore 
of his attack, and we estimated our loss, and approximated our 
then strength, including Lewis Wallace's fresh division, ex- 



APPEiSDIX. C03 

pected each minute. He then ordcrcil mc to get all things 
ready, and at daylight the next day to assume the offensive. 
That was before General Buell had arrived, but he was known 
to be near at hand. General Buell's troops took no essential 
part in the first day's fight, and Grant's army, though collected 
together hastily, gi'een as militia, some regiments arriving 
without cartridges even, and nearly all hearing the dread sound 
of battle for the first time, had successfully withstood and re- 
pelled the first day's terrific onset of a superior enemy, well 
commanded and well handled. I know I had orders from Gen- 
eral Grant to assume the offensive before I knew General Buell 
Avas on the west side of the Tennessee. I think General Buell, 
Colonel Fry, and others of General Buell's staff rode up to 
where I was about sunset, about the time General Grant was 
leaving me. General Buell asked me many questions, and got 
of me a small map, which I had made for my own use, and told 
me that by daylight he could have eighteen thousand fresh 
men, which I knew would settle the matter. 

I understood Grant's forces were to advance on the right 
of tlie Corinth road, and Buell's on the left ; and accordingly, 
at daylight, I advanced my division by the flank, the resistance 
being trivial, up to the very spot where the day before the bat- 
tle had been most severe, and then waited till near noon fur 
Buell's troops to get up abreast, when the entire line advanced 
and recovered all the ground we had ever held. I know that, 
with the exception of one or two severe struggles, the fighting 
of April Vth was easy as compared with that of April Cth. 

I never was disposed, nor am I now, to question any thing 
done by General Buell and his army, and know that approach- 
ing our field of battle from the rear, he encountered that sick- 
ening crowd of laggards and fugitives that excited his con- 
tempt, and that of his army, wno never gave full credit to 
those in the front line, who did fight hard, and who had, at four 
p. M. checked the enemy, and were preparing tlie next day to 
assume the offensive. I remember the fact the better from 
General Grant's anecdote of his Donelson battle, which ho told 
me then for the first time — that, at a certain period of the bat- 
tle he saw that either side was ready to give way, if the other 
showed a bold front, and he determined to do that very thing, 
to advance on the enemy, when, as he prognosticated, the 
enemy surrendered At four r. m. of April Gth, he thought 



G04 APPEISTDIX. 

the appearances the same, and he judged, with Lewis Wallace's 
fresh division and such of our startled troops as had recovered 
their equilibrium, he would be justified in dropping the defen- 
sive and assuming the offensive in the morning. And, I re- 
peat, I received such orders before I knew General Buell's 
troops were at the river. I admit that I was glad Buell was 
there, because I knew his troops were older than ours, and bet- 
ter systematized and drilled, and his arrival made that certain, 
which before was uncertain. I have heard this question much 
discussed, and must say, that the officers of Buell's army dwelt 
too much on the stampede of some of our raw troops, and gave 
us too little credit for the fact that for one whole day, weak- 
ened as we were by the absence of BuelFs army, long expected, 
of Lewis Wallace's division, only four miles off, and of the fu- 
gitives from our ranks, we had beaten off our assailants for the 
time. At the same time, our Army of the Tennessee have in- 
dulged in severe criticisms at the slow approach of that army 
which knew the danger that threatened us from the concen- 
trated armies of Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg, that lay 
at Corinth. In a war like this, where opportunities for per- 
sonal prowess are as plenty as blackberries, to those who seek 
them at the front, all such criminations should be frowned 
down; and were it not for the military character of your jour- 
nal, I would not venture to offer a correction to a very popular 
error. 

I will also avail myself of this occasion to correct another 
very common mistake, in attributing to General Grant the se- 
lection of that battle-field. It was chosen by that veteran sol- 
dier, Major-General Charles F. Smith, who ordered my division 
to disembark there, and strike for the Charleston railroad. 
This order was subsequently modified, by his ordering Ilurl- 
but's division to disembark there, and mine higher up the Ten- 
nessee, to the mouth of Yellow creek, to strike the railroad at 
Burnsville. But floods prevented our reaching the railroad, 
when General Smith ordered me in person also to disembark 
at Pittsburg Landing, and take post well out, so as to make 
plenty of room, with Snake and Lick creeks the flanks of a 
camp for the grand army of invasion. 

It was General Smith who selected that field of battle, and 
it was Avell chosen. On any other we surely would have been 
overwhelmed, as both Lick and Snake creeks forced the enemy 



APPENDIX. OU.J 

to confine his movement ^o a direct front attack, which new 
troops are better qualified to resist than where the flanks aro 
exposed to a real or chimerical danger. Even tlie divisions of 
that army were arranged in that camp hy (General Smith's or- 
der, my division forming, as it were, the outlying picket, whilst 
McClernand and Prentiss's were the real line of battle, with 
W. H. L. "Wallace in support of the right wing, and Ilurlbut 
of the left ; Lewis Wallace's division being detached. All 
these subordinate dispositions were made by the order of Gen- 
eral Smith, before General Grant succeeded him to the com- 
mand of all the forces up the Tennessee — headquarters, Savan- 
na. If there were any error in putting that army on the 
•west side of the Tennessee, exposed to the superior force of 
the enemy also assembling at Corinth, the mistake was not 
General Grant's ; but there was no mistake. It was necessary 
that a combat, tierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the 
two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as 
any. It was not then a question of military skill and strategy, 
but of courage and pluck, and I am convinced that every life 
lost that day to us was necessary, for otherwise at Corinth, at 
Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resist- 
ance, had we not shown our enemies that, rude and untutored 
as we then were, we could fight as well as they. 

Excuse so long a letter, which is very unusual from me ; 
but of course my life is liable to cease at any moment, and I 
happen to be a witness to certain truths which are now l)egiu- 
ning to pass out of memory, and form what is called historj'. 

I also take great pleasure in adding, that nearly all the 
new troops that at Shiloh drew from me official censure, have 
more than redeemed their good name ; among them, that very 
regiment which first broke, the 53d Ohio, Colonel Appcn, 
Under another leader, Colonel Jones, it has shared every cam- 
paign and expedition of mine since, ia with me now, and can 
march, and bivouac, and fight as well as the best regiment in 
this or any army. Its reputation now is ciual to that of any 

from the state of Ohio. 

I am, with respect, yours truly, 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General 



606 APPEinoix. 



EXTRACTS FROM REPORTS OF GENERALS BUEI.L AND NELSON, AND COLO- 
NELS AMMEN, GROSE, ANDERSON, AND JONES, OF THE BATTLE OF 
6HIL0H. 

" General Nelson arrived with Colonel Ammen's brigade at 
this opportune moment. It was immediately posted to meet 
the attack at that point, and, with a battery of artillery which 
happened to be on the ground and was brought into action, 
opened fire upon the enemy and repulsed him. The action of 
the gunboats also contributed very much to that result. The 
attack at that point was not renewed, night having come on, 
and the tiring ceased on both sides." — General BuelVs Report. 

" At five, the head of my column marched up the bank of 
Pittsburg Landing and took up its position in the road under 
the fire of the rebel artillery, so close had they approached the 
landing. I found a semicircle of artillery totally unsupported 
by infantry, whose fire was the only check to the audacious ap- 
proach of the enemy. The Sixth Ohio and Thirty-sixth Indiana 
regiments had scarcely deployed when the left of the artillery 
was completely turned by the enemy, and the gunners fled from 
their pieces. The gallantry of the Thirty-sixth Indiana, sup- 
ported by the Sixth Ohio, under tlie able conduct of Colonel 
Ammen, commanding Tenth brigade, drove back the enemy, 
and restored the line of battle. This was at 6.30 p. m., and 
soon after, the enemy withdrew, owing, I suppose, to the 
darkness." — General N'elson's Report. 

So much for Buell and Nelson. Now read what their sub- 
ordinates, who were actually engaged, reported : 

"Reaching the top of the bank with the Thirty-sixth Indi- 
ana, General Grant directed me to send the regiment to support 
a battery less than a quarter of a mile from the landing. The 
Thirty-sixth marched promptly, and had been placed in position 
but a few minutes, when the enemy attacked the battery, and was 
repulsed. The enemy continued to assail the battery until the 
close of the day with a large force, but was repulsed by the 
Thirty-sixth with great coolness and gallantry. The Twenty- 
fourth and Sixth Ohio crossed the river as speedily as possi- 
ble, and arriving at the top of the bank, the Twenty-fourth 
was ordered by General Grant to repair to a point one-half 
mile to the right, on a part of the line threatened by the 



APPEISTDIX. 607 

enemy. The Sixth Ohio was held in reserve. During the 
night," etc. — Colonel Ammen^s B.eport. 

" On arriving on the south side of the river, under circum- 
stances that looked discouraging to new troops, my regiment 
was formed (the eight companies ahont fovr hundred strong), 
amid great commotion and excitement. While forming the 
regiment one of my men was killed by a ball of the enemy. 
As soon as formed, I was ordered to advance to support Cap- 
tain Stone's battery, about one hundred and fifty yards dis- 
tant from my place of forming, which was done in tolerable 
order, and as soon as the regiment was in place the firing com- 
menced, and continued until near dark. I there lost another 
man killed, and one icounded. During the first part of the 
night," etc. — Report of Colonel Grose, Thirty-sixth Indiana 
Volunteers. 

" I formed line of battle, under your directions, some two 
hundred yards from the river to support a battery then in 
danger of being charged by the enemy. The regiment laid on 
arms all night," etc. — Report of Colonel Anderson, Sixth Ohio 
Volunteers. 

" We landed at this place about five and a half o'clock, p. m., 
of the 6th, and Avere immediately formed in line of battle on 
the river hill. After the repulse of the enemy at this point, the 
regiment was moved by your direction about three-quarters of 
a mile to the right, and were then ordered by General Grant 
to advance into the woods a short distance, to ascertain, if pos- 
sible, the position of the enemy's lines. Having scoured the 
woods for half a mile to the front, and finding no enemy, and 
the shells from our gunboats falling but a few feet in front of 
us, we halted and remained in position until about midnight." 
— Report of Lieutenant- Colonel Jones, Twenty-fourth Ohio 
Volunteers. 

From all which it will be seen that Grant put two of 
Buell's regiments in support of a battery, and that one of these 
regiments lost two men killed and one wounded ; and that this 
was the amount of fighting done by Buell on the 6th of April. 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V. 



EXTRACT OF A CONFIDEXTIAL OEDEK, ISSUED ON OCTOBEK 21, 1S63, BY 
EDWIN M. STANTON, SECEETAKY OF WAE. FKOM THE WAE DEPARTMENT 
AT WASHINGTON CITY. 

" Ordered, that Major-General McClernand be, and he is 
directed to proceed to the states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, 
to organize the troops remaining in those states and to be 
raised by volunteering or draft, and forward them with all 
dispatch to Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may here- 
after be designated by the General-in-cliief, to the end that, 
when a sufficient force, not required by the operations of Gen- 
eral Grant's command, shall be raised, an expedition may be 
organized under General McClernand's command, against 
Vicksburg, and to clear the Mississippi river and open naviga- 
tion to New Orleans." 

Indorsement: "This order, though marked 'confidential,' 
may be shown by General McClernand to governors, and even 
others, when, in his discretion, he believes so doing to be indis- 
pensable to the progress of the expedition. I add, that I feel 
deep interest in the success of the expedition, and desire it to 
be pushed forward with all possible dispatch, consistently with 
the other parts of the military service. 

"A. LINCOLN." 

In his letter of January 30, 1862, to General Grant, General 
McClernand remarks that the above order of the Secretary of 
War was made " under the personal du-ection of the President." 



APPENDIX. (JQQ 



EXTRACT FROM A LETTER PROM TUE SECRETARY OF WAR TO MA TOP 
GENERAL JOHN A. McCLERNAND, UNDER DATE OCTOBER 29 ,862 

"General: The importance of the expedition on the Mk- 
S1SS1P131 IS every day becoming more manifest, and there will be 
the utmost endeavor, on the part of the Govenimenf, to -ive 
]t aid and strength. "^ 

" In conversing with you, I indicated the importance of a 
coastwise expedition against Texas to aid you, and create a 
diversion of the enemy's force. 

"Major-General Banks is now organizing an expedition for 
that purpose, which will be in condition to cooperate with any 
movement that may be made, after you have succeeded in 
clearing the Mississippi river." 



general Mcclernand to general grant. 

Headquartkrs, Army of the Tennessee, ) 
Post Arkansas, January 16, 1863. ) 
Major- General U. S. Grant, 

commanding Department of the Tennessee: 

Gejteeal,— Your dispatch of the 16th inst. came to hand 
at six o'clock p. M. this day, and I hasten, at the same moment, 
to answer it. 

I take the responsibility of the expedition against Post 
Arkansas, and had anticipated your approval of the complete 
and signal success which crowned it, rather than your condem- 
nation. 

^ In saying that I could not have effected the reduction of 
Vicksburg with the limited force under my command, after its 
repulse near that place under General Sherman, I only repeat 
what was contained in a previous dispatch to you. Trom the 
mornent you fell hack from Oxford, and the purpose of a front 
attack upon the enemy's works near Vicksburg was thus de- 
prived of cooperation, the Mississippi river expedition was 
doomed to eventuate in a failure. 

I had heard nothing of General Banks when I left Mil- 
liken's Bend on the 4th inst. ; and if as i/ou saiy, Port Hudson 
has been made "very strong," it will be some time before he 
39 



610 APPENDIX. 

will be in a situation to receive the cooper^ation of the Missis- 
sippi river expedition, unless he should prone more successful 
than the latter. 

Had I remained idle and inactive at Milliken's Bend with 
the army under my command until now, I should have felt my- 
self guilty of a great crime. Rather had I accepted the conse- 
quences of the imputed guilt of using it profitably and success- 
fully upon my own responsibility. 

The officer who, in the present strait of the country, will 
not assume a proper responsibility to save it, is unworthy of 
public trust. 

Having successfully accomplished the object of this expedi- 
tion, I will return to Milliken's Bend, according to my intention, 
communicated to you in a previous disjDatch, unless otherwise 
ordered by you. Respectfully, your obedient servant, 

JOHN A. McCLEPvN'AND, 

Major- General commanding. 

GENEEAL McCLEENAND TO GENERAL GEANT. 

Headquarters, Abmy of the Mississippi, 
Department of the Tennessee, 
Before Vicksburg, Miss., January 30, 1863. 
Major- General U. S. Grant, 

commanding Department of the Tennessee : 

Your order directing me to move the camp of the Fifly- 
fourth Indiana volunteers outside the limits of the camp hos- 
pital, and to furnish guards for said hosj)ital, is received. 

The officer M^ho brought you a complaint ujDon this subject, 
should not have troubled you, but should have come to me, or, 
having come to you, I think ought, regularly, to have been re- 
ferred to me. 

I denounce his complaint as an act of insubordination. 
Please advise me who made the complaint. 

If I am to be held, responsible for the safety of this camp, I 
must be permitted to dispose of the forces within it as I may 
think proper. The internal organization of the camp, and the 
disposition of its forces, are matters that properly belong to 
me as their immediate commander. 

The Fifty-fourth Indiana was assigni'd to the position, 
coveted by the medical director or hospital surgeon, for strate* 



APPENDIX. 611 

gic reasons, before the camji hospital was located. Those 
reasons are, in part, explained by the correspondence, a copy 
of which is herewith enclosed. Nevertheless, upon the applica- 
tion of the medical director, or rather upon my own sufjges- 
tion, the huts occupied by the Fifty-fourth were vacated by 
them, and assigned for hospital uses, and the regiment ordered 
to encamp as far away as was consistent with strategic con- 
siderations. This they did. 

Still complaint came. The surgeon objected to the neigh- 
borhood of the regiment ; the colonel complained of the inso- 
lence of the surgeon, and stated that his men had voluntarily 
cared for the sick, who had been brought out and left on the 
ground uncared for. I settled the question, as already men- 
tioned, by giving the huts and necessary space to the surgeon, 
and moving the regiment as far away as was considered proper. 

With this statement, it remains for you to decide what 
ought to be done in the premises. The enforcement of your 
order will be the subversion of my authority at the instance 
of an inferior, who deserves to be arrested for his indirection 
and spirit of insubordination. 

And having said this much, general, it is proper that I 
should add one or two other words. I understand that orders 
are being issued from your headquarters directly to army corps 
commanders, and not through me. As I am invested, by order 
of the Secretary of War, indorsed by the President, and by 
order of the President communicated to you by the General- 
in-chief, with the command of all the forces operating on the 
Mississippi river, I claim that all orders affecting the condi- 
tion or operation of those forces should pass through these 
headquarters. Otherwise I must lose a knowledge of current 
business, and dangerous confusion ensue. If different views 
are entertained by you, then the question should be imme- 
diately referred to Washington, and one or other, or both of us, 
relieved. 

One thing is certain : two generals cannot command this 
army, issuing independent and direct orders to subordinate 
officers, and the public service be promoted. 

Your obedient servant, 
JOHN A. McCLEKNAND, Major- General commanding. 



612 APPEliTDIX, 



GENEEAL McCLEKNAlfD TO GENERAL GKA^T. 

Headquarters, Army of the Mississippi, 
Department of the Tennessee, 
Before Yicksburg, January 30, 1863. 
Major- General V). S. Geaxt, 

commanding Department of the Tennessee: 

General Orders, No. 13, is this moraent received. I hasten 
to inquire whether its purpose is to relieve me from the com- 
mand of all, or any jiortion of the forces composing the Missis- 
sippi river expedition, or, in other words, whether its purpose 
is to limit my command to the Thirteenth army corps. 

I am led to make this inquiry, "because, while such seems to 
he the intention, it conflicts with the order of the Secretary of 
War, made under the personal direction of the President, bear- 
ing date October 31, 1862, of which the following is an ex- 
tract : 

" Major-General McClernand is dii-ected to proceed to the 
states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, to organize the troops 

remaining in those states and forward them to 

Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may hereafter be des- 
ignated, to the end that, when a sufficient force, not 

required by the operations of General Grant's command [then 
in "West Tennessee], shall be raised, an expedition may be or- 
ganized, under General McClernand's command, against Yicks- 
burg, and to clear the Mississippi to New Orleans." 

Also, with the order of the General-in-chief to you, dated 
December 18, 1862, of which the following is an extract: 

" It is the wish of the President, that General McClernand's 
corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that 
he shall have the immediate command under your direction.'''' * 

Also, with your communication of the same date, based on 
the preceding order, and giving me command of the expedition ; 
and with your verbal assurance of yesterday, that my relations 
to the forces here would continue undisturbed. 

I repeat that I respectfully ask for an explanation of this 
seeming conflict of authority and orders, that I may be enabled 
to guide my action intelligently. By General Orders, Xo. 22, 
you extend your command as fir west from the Mississippi river 
as your orders may reach. By General Orders, No. 13, you 

* The italics are McClernand's. 



APPENDIX. 613 

cliarge the Tliii-teenth army corps with garrisoning Helena and 
other points south. Is it to be understood that my command 
west of the JSIississippi is coextensive with the purview of 
General Orders, No. 22 ? 

Again, you charge the Thirteenth army corps with garri- 
soning the west bank of the Mississij)pi. Am I to understand 
that I am to act on my own judgment in fixing the number, 
strength, and location of those garrisons, or simply by your 
dii-ections ? 

It is quite obvious that the whole, or a large portion of the 
Thirteenth army corps must be absorbed by these garrisons, 
if the purpose is to afford complete protection to all lawful 
vessels navigating the river ; and thus, while having projected 
the Mississippi river expedition, and having been by a series 
of orders assigned to the command of it, I may be entirely 
withdrawn fi*om it. 

For the reason last stated, and because the portion of the 
Thirteenth army corps taking part in this expedition is very 
much smaller than any other corps of your command, and be- 
cause my forces are here, and those of others have yet to 
come ; why not detach from the latter to garrison the river 
shore, and relieve all those here from liability to that charge ? 
Your obedient servant, 
JOHN" A. McCLERN'A]SrD, Major-General commanding. 

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL McCLERNAND. 

Yocng's Poixt, La., January 31, 1863. 
Major- General J. A. McCleknand, commanding 
TMrteentTi Army Corps: 
The intention of General Order, No. 13, is that I Avill take 
direct command of the Mississippi river expedition, which 
necessarily limits your command to the Thirteenth array corps. 
****** 

I regard the President as Commander-in-chief of the army, 

and will obey every order of his; but as yet I have seen no 

order to prevent my taking immediate command in the field ; 

and since the dispatch referred to in your note, I have received 

another from the General-in-chief of the amiy, authorizing me 

directly to take charge of this army. 

U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 



614 APPENDIX. 



EXERAL MoCLERNAND TO GENERAL GEA2fT. 

Headquarters, Thirteenth Army Corps, ) 
Before YicKSBURG, jPt'S^-Ma/-^/ 1, 1863. ) 

Geijeeal : Your dispatch of this date, in answer to mine 
of yesterday, is received. 

You announce it to be the intention of General Orders, No. 
13, to relieve me from the command of the Mississippi river 
expedition, and to circumscribe my command to the Thirteenth 
army corps ; and undertake to justify the order by authority 
granted by the General-in-chief. 

I acquiesced in the order for the purpose of avoiding a con- 
flict of authority in the presence of the enemy, but for reasons 
set foi'th in my dispatch of yesterday (which, for any thing dis- 
closed, I still hold good) I protest against its competency and 
justice; and respectfully request that this ray protest, together 
with the accompanying jjaper, may be forwarded to the General- 
in-chief, and through him to the Secretary of War, and the 
President. 

I request this not only in respect for the President and the 
Secretary, under whose express authority I claim the right to 
command the expedition, but in justice to myself as its author 
and active promoter. Your obedient servant, 

JOHN" A. McOLERXAND, 

Major- General commanding. 
Major- General U. S. Grant, 

commanding Department of the Tennessee. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK. 

Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee, I 
Before Vicksburg, February 1, 1863. J 

Herewith I enclose you copy of General Orders, No. 13, from 
these headquarters, and the correspondence between General 
McClernand and myself growing out of it. 

It is due to myself to state that I am not ambitious to have 
this or any other command ; I am willing to do all in my power 
in any position assigned me. General McClernand was as- 
signed to duty in this department, with instructions to me to 
assign him to an army coi'ps on the Mississippi river, and to 



APPENDIX. 615 

give him the chief command under my direction. This I 
did ; but subsequently receiving authority to assign the com- 
mand to any one I thought most competent, or to take it myself, 
I determined at least to he present with the expedition. 

If General Sherman had been left in command here, such is 
my confidence in him that I would not have thought my pres- 
ence necessary. But whether I do injustice to General ]McCler- 
nand or not, I have not confidence in his ability as a soldier to 
conduct an expedition of the magnitude of this successfully. In 
this opinion I have no doubt but that I am borne out by a ma- 
jority of the officers of the expedition, though I have not 
questioned one of them on the subject. 

I resj)ectfully siibmit this whole matter to the General-in- 
chief and the President. Whatever the decision made by them, 
I will cheerfully submit to and give a hearty support. 



GEXEKAX McCLEENAND TO GENEEAL GRANT— (Extract.) 

" Jamiary 24. 

..." Great prudence needs to be exercised in detaching 
transports fi-om this fleet to return to Memphis, as the ISIissis- 
sippi river is rising rapidly, and may deluge our troops at any 
time. You will at once perceive the great importance of this 
caution, as it involves the very existence of the army here. . . . 

"Before closing this dispatch, I wish to say that the tran- 
sports ordered back to Memphis should be returned here at the 
earhest possible moment, if the Mississippi river continues to 
rise." 

These letters, it will be remembered, are addressed by a 
subordinate to his commanding ofScer. 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI. 



[I AM indebted to General Sherman for a co-pj of the fol- 
lowing interesting letter, the original not having been preserved 
by General Grant. I give it entire, with the exception of the 
concluding paragraph, which adds nothing to the elucidation 
of General Sherman's views, and contains simply a confidential 
remark, entirely distinct from the remainder of the letter.] 



\ 



GEKEEAL SHERMAN TO COLONEL EAWLINS. 

Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Corps, 

Camp near Vicksburg, Api-U 8, 1863. 
Colonel J. A. Rawi.ins, A. A. G. to General Geant : 

SiE, — I would most respectfully suggest, for reasons which 
I Avill not name, that General Grant call on his corps command- 
ers for their opinions, concise and positive, on the best gen- 
eral plan of campaign. Unless this be done, there are men 
who will, in any result foiling below the popular standard, 
claim thiit their advice was unheeded, and that fatal conse- 
quences resulted therefrom. My own opinions are : 

1. That the Army of the Tennessee is far in advance of the 
other grand armies. 

2, That a cor{)S from Missouri should forthwith be moved 



APPENDIX. 017 

from St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas, sup- 
plies collected while the river is full, and land communication 
with Memphis opened via Des Ark on the White, ajid Madison 
on the St. Francis rivers. 

3. That as much of Yazoo pass, Coldwater, and Talla- 
hatchie rivei's as can be gained and fortified he held, and the 
main army be transported thither by land and water ; that the 
road back to Memphis be secured and reopened ; and as soon 
as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp 
road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry. 

4. That tlie line of the Yallabusha be the base from which 
to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central 
crosses Big Black above Canton, and lastly where the Yicks- 
burg and Jackson railroad crosses the same river. 

The caj^ture of Vicksburg would result. 

5. That a force be left in this vicinity, not to exceed ten 
thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and trans- 
port them to any direct point. This force to be held always 
near enough to act with the gunboats, when the main army is 
known to be near Yicksburg, Haine's bluff, or Yazoo City. 

6. I do doubt the capacity of Willow bayou (which I es- 
timate to be fifty miles long and very tortuous) for a military 
channel, capable of supporting an army large enough to op- 
erate against Jackson, Mississippi, or Black river bridge ; and 
such a channel will be very valuable to a force coming from 
the west, which we must expect. Yet this canal Avill be most 
useful as the way to convey coals and supplies to a fleet that 
should navigate the reach between Vicksburg and Red river. 

7. The chief reason for operating soMi/ by water, was the 
season of the year and high water in Tallahatchie and Yalla- 
busha. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be 
no serious obstacle, save the ambuscades of the forest, and 
whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Gre- 
nada. Korth Mississippi is too valuable to allow them to hold 
and make crops. 

I make these suggestions, with the request that General 
Grant simply read them, and give them, as I know he will, a 
share of his thoughts. I would prefer ho should not answer 
them, but merely give them as much or as little weight as they 
deserve. 

Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from 



618 APPENDIX. 

me the same zealous cooperation and energetic support, as 
though conceived by myself. 

****** 

I am, etc., 

W. T. SHERMAN, Maoor- General. 



Headqttartkrs, Department of the Tennessee, ) 
Milliken's Bend, La., Api-il 20, 1863. f 
Special Orders, No. 110. 

****** 

VIII, The following orders are published for the informa- 
tion and guidance of the " Army in the Field," in its present 
movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the Missis- 
sippi river, from which Vicksburg can be approached by prac- 
ticable roads : 

1. Tlie Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. 
McClernand commanding, will constitute the right wing. 

2. The Fifteenth army corps, IMajor-General W. T. Sher- 
man commanding, will constitute the left wing. 

3. The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James E. 
McPherson commanding, will constitute the centre. 

4. The order of march to New Carthage will be from right 
to left. 

5. Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army 
corps, or an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as ne- 
cessity may require. When the reserve is formed by divisions, 
each division will remain under the immediate command of its 
respective corps commanders, unless otherwise specially or- 
dered, for a particular emergency. 

6. Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities 
can be afforded lor the transportation of camp equipage. 

v. In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to 
each company for the protection of rations from rain ; one wall 
tent for each regimental headquarters ; one wall tent for each 
brigade headquarters, and one wall tent for each division head- 
quarters. Corps commanders having the books and blanks of 
their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to 
take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed 
the number allowed by General Orders, No. 160, A. G. O., 
Series of 1862 



APPENDIX. 01 

8. All the teams of the three army corps, under the imme- 
diate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their re- 
turns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance, 
and the authorized camp equipage of the army, 

9. As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Sev- 
enteenth army corps will take its place ; and it, in turn, will be 
followed in like manner by the Fifteenth army corps. 

10. Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed 
by corps commanders, to guard tlie lines from Richmond to 
New Carthage. 

11. General hospitals will be established, by the medical 
director, between Duckport and Milliken's bend. All sick and 
disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in 
charge of hospitals will report convalescents, as fast as they 
become fit for duty. Each corps commander will detail an in- 
telligent and good drill ofiicer, to remain behind to take charge 
of the convalescents of their respective corps ; officers so de- 
tailed will organize the men under their charge into squads 
and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong 
to ; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers 
to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or 
privates. The force so organized will constitute the guard of 
the line from Duckport to Milliken's bend. They will furnish 
all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and 
with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will fur- 
nish all the details for loading and unloading boats. 

12. The movement of troops from Milliken's bend to Xew 
Carthage will be so conducted as to allow tlie transportation 
of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of 
ordnance requii-ed by previous orders. 

13. Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all 
the beef cattle, corn, and other necessary supplies on the line 
of march ; but wanton destruction of property, taking of arti- 
cles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into 
and searching houses without proper orders from division com- 
manders, are positively prohibited. All such irregularities 
must be summarily punished. 

14. Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to the 
command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the 
line from here to New Carthage. His particular attention is 



620 appejStdix. 

called to General Orders Xo. 69, from Adjutant-General's of- 
fice, Washington, of date March 20, 1863. 
By order of 

Major-Gmeral U. S. GRANT. 
JOnX A. RAWLINS, Assistant-Adjutant General. 



Smith's Plantation, La., April 18, 1863. 
Major- General J. A. MoCleexa>t), 

commanding Tldrteenth Army Corps : 

I -would still repeat former insti'uctions, that possession be 
got of Grand Gulf at the very earliest possible moment. Once 
there, no risk should be taken in following the enemy until our 
forces are concentrated. Troojis first there should intrench 
themselves for safety, and the whole of your corps be concen- 
trated as rapidly as our means of transj^ortation will permit. 
General McPherson will be closing upon you as rapidly as 
your troops can be got away, and rations supp)lied. 

I see that great caution will have to be observed in getting 
barges past the crevasse near Carthage, and I apprehend a loss 
of some artillery may be encountered. 

I M'ill send over at once the pontoon train, with men to lay 
it. It can, at least, be thrown across Bayou Vidal, opposite 
your headquarters, to enable troops and artillery to march a 
good portion of the Avay to Carthage. If it can possibly be 
laid so as to cross the levee crevasse near Carthage, it would 
be of much greater service. Should we succeed in getting 
steamers past Vicksburg, they will bring you a further supply 
of rations. In the mean time, all the wagons, including all the 
regimental trains, should be kej^t constantly on the road be- 
tween here and Milliken's bend. The number of wagons avail- 
able is increasing daily. Troops guarding the different points 
between here and Richmond, should gather all the beef cattle 
and forage within reach of them, and destroy no more than 
they can use. 

I will be over here in a few days again, and hope it will be 
my good fortune to find you in safe possession of Grand Gulf 

You do not want to start, however, without feeling yourself 
secure in the necessary transportation. 

U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 



APPENDIX G21 

In the Field, April 24, 1B63. 
Major- General W. T. Shermax, 

commanding Fifteenth Army Corps: 

In company with Admiral Porter I made to-day a recon- 
noissance of Grand Gulf. My impressions are, that if an at- 
tack can be made within the next two days, the place will 
easily fall. But the difficulties of getting from here (Smith's 
Plantation) to the river are great. 

I foresee great difficulties in our present position, hut it will 
not do to let these retard any movements. In the first place, 
if a battle should take place, we are necessarily very destitute 
of all preparations for taking care of wounded men. All the 
little extras for this purpose were put on board the Tigress, 
the only boat that was lost. The line from here to oNIilliken's 
bend is a long one for the transportation of supplies, and to 
defend, and an impossible one for the transportation of wounded 
men. The water in the bayous is falling very rapidly, out of 
all proportion to the fall in the river, so that it is exceedingly 
doubtful whether they can be made use of for the purposes of 
navigation. One inch fall in the river diminishes the supply 
of water to the bayous to a very great extent, while their 
capacity for carrying it away remains the same. Should the 
river fall sufficiently to draw off all the water on the point 
where you are encamped, our line will have to be by wagons 
across to below the Warrenton batteries. 

Whilst there I wish you would watch matters, and should 
the water fall sufficiently, make the necessary roads for this 
purpose. You need not move any portion of your corps more 
than is necessary for the protection of the road to Richmond 
until ordered. It may possibly happen that the enemy may so 
weaken his forces about Yicksburg and IIainc*s bluff, as to 
make the latter vulnerable, particularly with a i'all of water to 
give an extended landing. I leave the management of affiiirs 
at your end of the line to you. 

I shall send Surgeon Hewitt to the bend to-morrow, to con- 
sult with the medical director about the best policy to pursue 
for caring for our sick and wounded. 

U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 



622 APPENDIX. 



ITeadquaeters, Department of the Tennessee, ) 
In the Field, April 24, 1863. ) 

Meteor- General J. A. McOleenand, 

commanding Thirteenth Army Corps : 

I would like to have General Osterhaiis make a reconnois- 
sance, in person, to a point on the Mississippi, opposite the 
mouth of Bayou Pierre, and a short distance below, to where 
there is a road leading from the river to Grand Gulf. The 
map shows such a road. 

It is desirable to learn if there is a landing at that point, 
and, if it can be done by inquiry, to learn also the condition of 
the road on the opposite side. If a landing cannot be made in 
front at Grand Gulf, it may be necessary to reach there by this 
route. The map shows this road, and also a good road from 
the same point to Port Gibson. 

It is also important to know if there is a road on the west 
bank of the river from here to a point below Grand Gulf. 
Should any of our gunboats get below the Gulf, and not be 
able to return, it could be used in communicating with them. 

U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 



Perkins's Plantation, La., April 27, 1863. 
Major- General J. A. MoOleenani>, 

commanding Thirteenth Army Corps : 

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or 
so much of it as there is transportation for. Have put aboard 
die artillery, and every article authorized in orders limiting 
baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with 
their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning. 

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to re- 
main behind, send to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where 
you will see, by special orders of this date. General McPher- 
son is ordered to send one division. 

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and 
silence all the batteries commanding the river. Your corps 
will be in the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest 
eligible land below the promontory first brought to view pass- 
insj down the river. Once on shore, have each commander in- 



APPENDIX. 623 

structed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will 
admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, 
but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support 
itself. The first object is to get a foothold where our troops 
can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be 
made and troops collected for a forward movement. 

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the posi- 
tion indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with 
them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the 
enemy are silenced. 

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from 
the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable 
to run past Grand Gulf, and land at Rodney. In case this 
should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged, and you duly 
informed, when the transports are to start with this view. Or, 
it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. 
In this case, then, the transports would have to be brought 
back to where the men could land, and move by forced marches 
to below Grand Gulf, reembark rapidly and proceed to the lat- 
ter place. There will be required, then, three signals ; one, to 
indicate that the transports can run down and debark the 
troops at Grand Gulf; one, that the transports can run by 
without the troops ; and the last, that transports can run by 
with the troops on board. 

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery 
will be left to run the blockade. 

If not already directed, require your men to keep three 
days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a 
movement commences. 

U. S. GRANT, Major- General 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII 



[At the risk of some repetition, I have determiued to furnish 
complete copies of all the dispatches that passed between Gen- 
eral Grant and General Halleck, or any member of the Govern- 
ment, during the entire Yicksburg campaign, from the day 
that Grant first visited the fleet at the mouth of the Arkansas, 
to the date of the second capture of Jackson. The only omit- 
ted portions of this correspondence are the dispatches referring 
to mere routine business, and a few extracts having no refer- 
ence whatever to military operations. Whenever a dispatch is 
not given in full, the omission is indicated by points. I have 
not given General Grant's formal report, which is already pub- 
lished, and is for the most part a synopsis or repetition of the 
dispatches that were sent from day to day during the campaign.] 

GENERAL GEANT TO GEXEEAL HALLECK.— (CrPHEK Telegkam.) 

Memphis, Texn., January 16, 1863. 
I Start immediately for the fleet. My design is to get such 
information from them as I find it impossible to get here. I 
I will return here in a few days, and in the mean time reen- 
forcements will be forwarded with all dispatch. 

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 

Napoleon, Ark., Jamiaty 18, 1863. 
General McClernand's command is at this place. Will 
move down the river to-day. Should Banks pass Port Hudson, 
this force will be ready to cooperate on Vicksburg at any time. 



APPENDIX. C25 

What may be necessary to reduce the place I do not yet know, 
but since the late rains I think our troops must get below the 
city, to be used effectively. 

GENEEAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 

Memphis, Jamiary 20, 1863. 
I found the Mississippi expedition at mouth of Arkansas 
river, and started them immediately to Young's point. A ca- 
nal will be at once surveyed and cut. The weather is highly 
unfavorable for operations. Streams are all very high, and it 
is still raining. The work of reducing Yicksburg will take 
time and men, but can be accomplished. Gorman has gone up 
"White river with a great part of his force. So many boats 
being kept there makes it almost impossible to get transporta- 
tion for troops. Both banks of the Mississippi should be under 
one commander, at least during present operations. 



GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL IIALLECK.— (Letter.) 

Memphis, Tknn., January 20, 1863. 

I returned here last night fi'om a visit to the expedition un- 
der General ]McClernand. 

I had a conversation with Admiral Porter, General MoCler- 
nand, and General Sherman. The former and latter, who have 
had the best opportunity of studying the enemy's position and 
plans, agree that the work of reducing Vicksburg is one of 
time, and will require a large force in the final struggle. With 
what troops I have already designated from here, no more 
forces will be required for the present, but I will suggest 
whether it would not be well to know beforehand Avliere they 
are to come from when required, if required at all. 

The enemy have the bluffs from Ilaine's bluff, ou the Yazoo 
(this is where the raft across the river is constructed), to the 
Mississippi, and down until they recede fronx the river, com- 
pletely and thoroughly fortified. 

I propose running a canal tlirough, starting far enough 

above the old one commenced last summer, to receive the 

stream where it impinges agamst the shore with the greatest 

velocity. The old canal left the river in. an. eddy, and in a Une 

40 



626 APPENDIX. 

perpendicular to the stream, and also to the crest of the hills 
opposite with a battery directed against the outlet. This new 
canal \rili debouch beloTT the bluffs on the opposite side of the 
river, and give our gunboats a fair chance against any fortifi- 
cations that may be placed to oppose them. 

But for the intolerable rains that we have had, and which 
have filled the swamps and bayous so that they cannot dry up 
again this winter, a landing might be efiected at Milliken's 
bend ; and roads constructed through to the Yazoo above the 
]-aft or Haine's bluff, and the enemy's works turned from that 
point. Once back of the intrenchments on the crest of the 
bluffs, the enemy would be compelled to come out and give us 
an open field fight, or submit to having all his communications 
cut and be left to starve out. 

I would make no suggestions unasked, if you were here to 
see for yourself, or if I did not know that as much of your 
time is taken up with each of several other departments as 
with this. As, however, I control only the troops in a limited 
department, and can only draw reenforcements from elsewhere 
by making application through Washington, and as a demon- 
stration, made upon any part of the old District of West Ten- 
nessee, might force me to Avithdraw a large pai*t of the force 
from the vicinity of Vicksburg, I would respectfully ask if it 
would not be policy to combine the four departments in the 
West under one commander. As I am the senior department 
commander in the West, I will state that I have no desire what- 
ever for such combined command, but would pi-efer the com- 
mand I now have to any other that can be given. 

I regard it as my duty to state that I found there was not 
sufficient confidence felt in General McClernand as a com- 
mander, either by the army or navy, to insure him siiccess. 
Of course all would cooperate to the best of their ability, but 
still with a distrust. This is a matter I made no inquiries 
about, but it was forced upon me. As it is my intention to 
command in person, unless otherwise directed, there is no spe- 
cial necessity of mentioning this matter ; but I want you to 
know that others besides myself agree in the necessity of the 
course I had already determined upon pursuing. Admiral 
Porter told me he had written freely to the Secretary of the 
Navy, with the request that what he said might be shown to 
the Secretary of War. 



APPENDIX. G27 

General Gorman had gone np "White river, with most of 
his force, taking a great deal of the river transportation witli 
him. I find great difficulty in getting boats to transport the 
troops. With the orders I gave, however, to release boats aa 
fast as they can be dispensed with, I hope to remedy all diffi- 
culty of this kind. 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Letteb.) 

Washington, D. C, January 21, 1863. 

The President has directed that as much of Arkansas as 
you may desire to control, be temporarily attached to your de- 
partment. Tliis will give you control of both banks of the 
river. 

In your operations down the Mississippi, you must not rely 

too confidently upon any direct cooperation of General Banks 

and the lower flotilla, as it is possible that they may not be 

able to pass or reduce Port Hudson. They, however, will do 

every thing in their power to form a junction with you at 

Vicksburg. If they should not be able to effiact this, they will 

at least occupy a portion of the enemy's forces, and prevent 

them from reenforcing Vicksburg. I hope, however, that they 

will do still better, and be able to join you. 

****** 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.-(Telegram.) 

^YAS^INGTON, D. C, January 25, 2.40 p. m. 
Forts Henry and Donelson have been transferred to the 
Department of the Cumberland. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL nALLECK.-{GiPUEB Telegram.) 

ilEXtPHiS, Tenn., January 25, 1863. 

I leave for the fleet at Vicksburg to-morrow. Since leaving 
there (one week ago) I liave not heard one word from them. 
The constant rains and tremendous rise in the river may oper- 
ate a2:ainst us for the time being. 



628 APPENDIX. 



GENEEAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Ciphkk Telegram.) 

Washington, D. C, January 25, 1863, 10.40 p. m. 
Direct your attention particularly to the canal proposed 
across tbe point. The President attaches much importance to 
this. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 

Near Vicksbueg, Miss., January 29, 1863. 
Water in the canal is five feet deep, and river rising. There 
IS no wash, however, and no signs of it enlarging. I will let 
the water in from higher up and try the effect. I have ordered 
troops from Helena, escorted by a gunLoat, the wliole in charge 
of Colonel Wilson, Topographical Engineers, to cut the levee 
across Yazoo pass, and to explore through to Coldwater, if 
possib 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 

Near Vicksbukg, January 31, 1863. 
I am pushing every thing to gain a passage, avoiding Yicks- 
burg. Prospects not flattering by the canal of last summer. 
Other routes are being prospected, and work in the mean time 
progresses in the old canal. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— {Cipher Telegram.) 

Before Vicksburg, Fch-uary 3, 1863. 
One of the rams ran the blockade this morning. This is of 
vast importance, cutting off the enemy's communication with 
the west bank of the river. One steamer lying at Ticksburg 
was run into, but not sunk. AVoik on the canal is i^rogressing 
as rapidly as possible. 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— {Telegea.m.) 

Washington, D. C, February 3, 1863. 
Send any reliable information you may have received in 
regard to the steamer Indianola. Was she sunk or not ? 



APPENDIX. 629 



GEXEEAL .GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (LetteeO 

Before Vicksbcrg, February 4, 18C3. 

Herewith I enclose you reports from Colonel Deitzler and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Duff, from Lake Providence, fifty odd miles 
above here. 

On examining the route of the present canal, I lost all flxith 
in its ever leading to any practical results. The canal is at 
right angles with the thread of the current at both ends, and 
both ends are in an eddy, the lower coming out under bluffs 
completely commanding it. Warrenton, a few miles below, is 
capable of as strong defences as Yicksburg, and the enemy, 
seeing us at work here, have turned their attention to that 
point. Oar labor, however, has had the effect of making the 
enemy divide his forces, and spread their big guns over a great 
deal of country. They are now fortified from Ilaine's bluff to 
Warrenton. 

Taking the views I did, I immediately, on my arrival here, 
commenced or ordered other routes prospected. One of these 
is by the way of Yazoo pass into Coldvvater, the Tallahatchie, 
and Yazoo rivers. This is conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Wilson, from whom no report is yet received. This route, if 
practicable, would enable us to get higher ground above 
Haine's bluff, and would turn all the enemy's river batteries. 
Another is by Lake Providence, and the network of bayous 
connecting it with Pted river. The accompanying reports show 
the feasibility of this route. A third is by the way of Willow 
and Roundaway bayous, leaving the Mississippi at Milliken's 
bend and coming in at Carthage. There is no question but 
this route is much more practicable than the present under- 
taking, and would have been accomplished with much less 
labor^if commenced before the water had got all over the 

country. 

The work on the present canal is being pushed New inlets 
and outlets are being made, so that the water will be received 
where the cxrrrent strikes the shore, and will be carried through 
in a current. 



630 APPENDIX. 



GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (LBrrra. 

Before Yicksbueg, Feh-uary 6, 1863. 

Enclosed I send you report Toy Lieutenant-Colonel Wilsou, 
of the prospect of effecting a safe passage into the Yazoo river 
by the way of Yazoo pass. Admiral Porter "will have this 
pass thoroughly explored by light-draught gunboats, upon 
which I am putting six hundred riflemen from the army. 

It is to be hoped that this expedition will be able to cap- 
tui*e all the transports in the Yazoo and tributaries, and destroy 
two gunboats said to be in course of construction. They will 
also attempt to ascend the Yallabusha to Grenada, and if pos- 
sible destroy the railroad bridges. 

The ram that ran the blockade on the 2d inst. has returned 
to the lower end of the peninsula, opposite Yicksburg. She 
went as far as Red river, and some miles up it, capturing and 
destroying three steamboats loaded with commissary stores, 
and about sixty prisoners. 

I send dispatches every day or two, to be telegraphed from 
Memphis, but as I do not know that they get through, think it 
necessary to notify you of the fact. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegeam.) 

Before Yicksbueg, February 9, 1863. 
The continuous rise in the river has kept the army busy to 
keep out of the water, and much retarded work on the canal. 
I hope to be able to say something definite, in a day or so, of 
the practicability of the other routes mentioned in previous dis- 
patches. 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Telegeam.) 

Wasiiixgtox, D. C, Fchriiary 13, 18G3. 
Cannot dredge-boats be used with advantage in the canal ? 
There are four lying idle at Louisville, belonging to Barton, 
Robinson & Co., canal contractors. 



1 



APPENDIX. 081 

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL nALLECK.-(TELEOB\u.) 

Young's Point, La., Fehruary 17, 1863. 
We have one clredging-machine hei-e, and another ordered. 
More than two could not be advantageously used. 

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL UALLECKL— (Letter.) 

Before Ticksburg, February 18, 18C3. 

The work upon the canal here is progressing as well as 
possible, with the excessively bad weather and high water we 
have had to contend, against. Most of the time that troops 
could be out at all, has been expended in keeping water out of 
our camps. Five good working days would enable the force 
here to complete the canal sixty feet wide, and of sufficient 
depth to admit any vessel here. Judging from the past, it is 
fair to calculate that it will take from ten to twelve days to 
get those iive days. Three more, perhaps, should be allowed, 
from the fact that the work is being done by soldiers, the most 
of whom, under the most favorable circumstances, could not 
come up to the calculations of the engineer officers. 

McPherson* s army corps is at Lake Providence, prosecuting 
the work there. They could not be of any service in helping 
on the work here, because there are already as many men as 
can be employed on it ; and then, he would have to go five or 
six miles above, to find land above water to encamp on. 

I am using a few hundred contrabands on the work here, 
but have been compelled to prohibit any more coming in. 
Humanity dictates this policy. 

Planters have mostly deserted their plantations, taking 
with them all their able-bodied negroes, and leaving the old 
and very young. Here, they could not have shelter, nor means 
of transportation Avhen we leave. 

I have sent a division of troops from Helena to join the 
Yazoo expedition, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson. His last 
report was sent you a few days ago. If successful, they wUI 
destroy the railroad bridges at Grenada, and capture or destroy 
all the transports in the Yazoo and tributaries. 

The health of this command is not what is represented in 
the public journals. It is as good as any previous calculations 



632 APPEISTDIX. 

could have prognosticated. I believe, too, that there is the 
best of feeling and greatest confidence of success amongst 
them. The greatest drawback to the sjDirits of the troops has 
been the great delay in paying them. Many of them have 
families at home, who are no doubt in a suffering condition for 
want of the amount due them, and they are bound for their 
Buppor* 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK— (Cipiiek Telegeasi.) 

Before Vicksburg, February 23, 1863. 
The Queen of the ^Yest is now at Warrenton, with the 
rebel flag flying. Distant firing was heard, lasting from four 
p. M. yesterday until one this morning. It is supposed to have 
been between the Queen and Indianola. Apprehension is felt 
for the safety of the Indianola, 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (CipnES Teleqbam.) 

Young's Point, La., February 27, 1863. 
News is just received that the Queen of the "West and 
Webb attacked the Indianola about thirty-five miles below 
Vicksburg, on the night of the 24th, and, after an engagement 
of about forty minutes, captured her, with the most of her 
crew. It is said the Indianola afterwards sunk. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (CirnEE Teleoram.) 

Before Vicksburg, I/arch 2, 1863. 
I have received no forces from the Department of the Mis- 
som-i, exccjit those at Helena. Are any more to come ? 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.-CCithee Telegeam.) 

Washington, 2 p. m., March 5, 1863. 
It is of great importance to your command that transports 
be returned from you so far as possible, otherwise you will be 
short of supplies. Steam vessels on the upper rivers are very 



APPENDIX 033 

scarce. Vessels in the fleet, between Memphis and Vicksburg, 
should go in fleets, i;nder convoy. Make your requisition on 
Admiral Porter for convoys. The necessary detention of con- 
voy down the Mississippi river is a matter of the most serious 
importance, and requires immediate attention. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipitep. Telegbam.) 

Young's Point, La., March 6, 1863. 
The dredge-boats are here. They work to a charm, doing 
the work of three hundred men per day each hour. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (LettepO 

Before ViCKSBtTRO, March *?, 18C3. 

I telegraphed you yesterday the near approach to comple- 
tion of the canal. The water is extremely high, several feet 
above the highest ground inside the levee. Last night one of 
the dams across the upper end of the canal gave way, filling up 
where men were at work getting out stumps, and thus setting 
back the work for several days. I hope yet, however, to have 
this work completed as early as I could possibly take advan- 
tage of it if it was already done. 

The troops expected from St. Louis are not yet heard from, 
and all that I am bringing from West Tennessee are not yet 
down. 

The work of getting through Lake Providence and Bayou 
Ma9on there is but little possibility of proving successful. If 
the work had been commenced in time, however, there is but 
little question of the success of the enterprise. The land from 
Lake Providence and also from Bayou Ma9on recedes until the 
lowest interval between the two widens out into a cypress 
swamp, where Bayou Baxter, which connects the two, is lost. 
This flat is now filled to the depth of several feet with water, 
making the work of clearing out the timber exceedingly slow, 
and rendering it impracticable to make an artificial channel. 

The Yazoo pass expedition is a much greater success. Ad- 
miral Porter sent in four gunboats, andl sent a fleet of trans- 
ports with about six thousand men. They were to clear the 



634 APPENDIX. 

Yazoo and tributaries of all steamboats and embryo gunboats, 
and if possible destroy the railroad bridge at Grenada. The 
gunboats were to approach as near Haino's bluff as possible, 
and fire signal-guns to warn the squadron in the mouth of the 
Yazoo of their presence. Last night Admiral Porter sent me 
word that the signal agreed upon had been heard. 

I am now sending General McPberson with his army corps, 
and enough other troops to make full twenty-five thousand 
effective men, to effect a lodgment on tlie high ground on the 
east bank of the Yazoo. Once there, he will move down in 
transports and by land to the vicinity of Haine's bluff. Before 
moving down, however, below Yazno City, General McPherson 
will be made acquainted with the full plan of attack that may 
then be determined upon, and the time will be so arranged 
that there will be full cooperation of my entire force. Our 
movements have evidently served to distract the enemy and 
make him scatter his heavy guns. His forces are also scattered, 
but they, with the light artillery, can be got to any one point. 

The health of this command is good, and the greatest confi- 
dence is felt by officers and men. The most ample provision I 
ever saw has been made for the comfort of the sick. 

The dredging-machines, brought here by Colonel G. G. 
Pride, work to a charm. After the accident of last night all 
work would have had to be suspended until there was a fall of 
at least three feet, (the river is yet rising), but for these machines. 
Much credit is due Colonel Pride for his selection of them. 
But for his personal attention, old and worn-out ones would 
have been sent, and the result, probably, w^ould have been that 
they would have given out before their work was half done. 



GENERAL GRANT TO SURGEON-GEXERAL nAMMOXD.-(LETTER.) 

Bkfore Yicksdcrg, 2farch 12, 1863. 
Surgeon J. R, Smith's letter of the 20lh February is just re- 
ceived, inquiring into the sanitary condition of this command, 
and asking for suggestions for its improvement. I know a 
great deal has been said to impress the public generally, and 
all officials particularly, with the idea that this army was in a 
. uffering condition, and mostly from neglect. Tliis is most er- 
roneous. Tlic health of this command will compare favorably 



APPENDIX. G35 

■with that of any army in the field, I venture to say, and every 
preparation is made for the sick that could be desired. I ven- 
ture the assertion that no army ever Avent into the field with 
better arranged preparations for receiving sick and wounded 
soldiers than this. "We have hospital-boats expressly fitted ujj, 
and with the Government and volunteer sanitary supplies, it is 
a great question whether one person in ten can be so well taken 
care of at their homes as the army can here. 

I will refer Surgeon Smith's letter to my medical director 
for a full report of the condition of the medical department 
here. 

GENEEAL GEAiTT TO GEXEEAL HALLECK.— (Lettek.) 

Before Vicksburg, March 17, 1S63. 
Since the giving way of the dam at the upper end of the 
canal, work with the dredges has progressed favorably, but all 
attempts to stop the. rush of water into the canal have proved 
abortive. If required, however, the canal can be made to pass 
boats of ordinary size in a few days. 

The enemy were busily engaged firing from the opposite 
heights yesterday, and last night at the dredge-boat nearest 
the lower end of the canal. Their shots did no damage, though 
many of the large ones reached half way across the poijit. 

Ordinary Ohio river boats can now pass from Lake Provi- 
dence into Bayou Ma5on, and thence by easy navigation to 
the mouth of Red river. I make no calculations upon using 
this route for the present, but it may be turned to practical use 
after efiecting present plans. The same may he said of tha 
canal across the jyoint. 

I learn from Jackson (Mississippi) papers of the 14th, that 
one of our gunboats had run down to Grenada, and exchanged 
a few shots with the fort at that point. Further infonnation 
from the enemy shows that several thousand troops have gone 
from Vicksburg up the Yazoo river. Besides four gunboats 
(one iron-clad), I have a division of troops there now, and 
Quimby's division in the pass, on their way down. One divi- 
sion from Memphis should also be on their v,ay now. The 
great difiiculty of getting small-class steamers, adapted to this 
service, has retarded movements by the way of Yazoo pass 
materially. 



636 APPENDIX. 

To hem in the enemy on the Yazoo, Admiral Porter has 
gone into Deer creek by the way of Steele's bayou and Little 
Black bayou. From there he can get into Yazoo either by 
running up Deer creek to Eolling Fork, thence through the 
fork and down the Big Sunflower, all of which is navigable, or 
down Deer creek to the Yazoo. 

Admiral Porter and myself went up Steele's bayou to 
Little Black bayou on the 15th. With the exception of over- 
hanging trees in some places, the navigation was good for the 
gunboat General Price, I am having those obstructions re- 
moved. We were preceded by four of the old iron-clads that 
found no difficulty in the navigation. I returned in the even- 
ing for the purpose of hurrying up men and means for clearing 
the channel. I also sent Sherman to make a reconnoissance in 
company of the gunboats, with the view of effecting a landing 
with troops on high ground, on the east bank of the Yazoo, 
from which we may act against Haine's bluff". 

Last night I received a dispatch from Admiral Porter, say- 
ing that the iron-clads had pushed into Black bayou, and had 
reached to within a fourth of a mile of Deer creek, where they 
had become entangled in the timber, and could not move until 
it was cut out, and asking me for a force of three thousand 
men to act with him. Fortunately, I had already sent all that 
the boats at hand, siiitable for that navigation, and imme- 
diately available, could carry. I am now sending the remainder 
of Sherman's old division, and will push troops through, if 
Sherman reports faA^orabh'', as fast as our means Avill permit. 
These troops go up the Mississippi river in large transports 
about thirty miles, and to where Steele's Bayou comes within 
one mile of tlie Mississippi. The small-class boats can ferry 
them from that point, and thus save the distance from the 
mouth of the Yazoo to, and also the most difficnilt pai't of the 
navigation in, Steele's bayou. 

There is evident indication of considerable excitement in 
Vicksburg, I think thoy are removing many of their troops, 
but cannot satisfy myself to what points. Some, we know, 
have gone up the Yazoo, and it may be that others are going 
to Port Hudson. I have no means of learning any thing from 
below, excejit M-hat is occasionally learned through Southern 
papers. 



APPENDIX. 037 



GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— {Cipher Teleop.am.) 

Before Yicksdcrg, March 24, 130^. 
At last accounts Yazoo pass expedition was yet at Green- 
wood. Porter and Sherman are attempting to get into the 
Yazoo below Yazoo City. No news from there for several 
days. Admiral Farragut holds the river above Port Hudson. 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Teleokam.) 

Washington, D. C, J/a?-c/j 24, 1863. 
I must again call your attention to the importance of your 
not retaining so many steamers in the Mississippi river. It is 
absolutely necessary that some of those boats be returned. "We 
cannot otherwise supply our armies in Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky. This matter must be attended to at once. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipueb Telegeam.) 

Before Vicksburg, March 25, 18G3. 
Two rams attempted to run the blockade this morning ; 
one succeeded in a damaged condition. They were intended 
to strengthen Admiral Farragut, Admiral Porter is returning. 
Did not succeed in reaching the Yazoo. 



GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Letter.) 

Before Yicksbcrg, March 27, 18G3. 

All work, excepting repairing the crevasse in the canal 
levee, has been suspended for several days, the enemy having 
driven the dredges entirely out. The canal may be useful in 
passing boats through at night, to be used below, but nothing 
further. 

Admiral Porter lias returned from his attempt to reach the 
Yazoo river below Yazoo City. The difficult navigation of the 
bayous from the Yazoo river, through Black bayou and Deer 
creek, caused so much time to be consumed, that the enemy 
got wind of the movement in time to blockade the creek just 



638 APPEISTDIX. 

where the boats Avonld leave it. As the enemy occupied the 
ground in considerable force, where they could prevent the 
clearing out of these obstructions, the admiral was forced to 
desist from further efforts to proceed when within a few hun- 
dred yards of clear sailing to the Yazoo. Rolling Fork and 
Sunflower are navigable, steamers having come by this route 
to within sight of our gunboats whilst they were in Deer 
creek. 

The moment I heard that Admiral Porter had started on 
his return, I sent orders for the return of the Yazoo pass expe- 
dition from Fort Greenwood. From information I have, otlier 
and greater difficulties would be founci in navigating the Yazoo 
below Greenwood. Considerable preparation has been made 
to receive our forces coming by that route. 

I get papers and deserters frequently from Vicksburg, but 
am not able to arrive at any definite conclusion as to their 
numbers. I do not anticipate any trouble, however, if a land- 
ing can be effected. 

On the morning of the 2oth, General Ellet sent two rams, 
the Switzerland and the Lancaster, to join Admiral Farragut. 
The last-named ram received a shot in the boiler long before 
reaching the front of the city. She floated down, however, 
receiving many more shots, but without materially further dis- 
abling her. She will be ready for service before to-morrow 
night, and is a fine vessel. The other boat received a shot, and 
immediately went to pieces. A large part, containing the ma- 
chinery, tipped over, spilling it in the river ; the wreck floated 
down, and lodged at our lower pickets, bottom up. She was 
very rotten and worthless. The shot received would not have 
damaged a sound vessel seriously ; this is what Admiral Farra- 
gut, and army officers who have examined the wreck, report 
to me. Since no casualties occurred, it was fortunate that she 
was lost, for had she not been at this time she might have 
been at some other time, when moi-e valuable vessels might 
have been risked, relying on this boat for assistance. It is 
almost certain that had she made one run into another vessel, 
she would have closed up like a spy-glass, encompassing all on 
board. 

I have just learned from a reliable source, that most of the 
forces from Vicksburg are now up the Yazoo, leaving not to 
exceed ten thousand in the city to-day. The batteries are the 



APPENDIX. 639 

same, however, and would cause the same difficulty in hinding 
that would be experienced against a heavy force. Besides, the 
very cause of the absence of so many troops from Vicksburg, 
our gunboats and troops in and towards the Yazoo, prevents 
our taking advantage of the circumstance. I have no doubt of 
the truth of my information, because it is substantiated by 
Southern papers and by deserters, so far as the sending of a 
large force up the Yazoo is concerned. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Lettbk.) 

Before Ticksburg, March 29, 1863. 

A dispatch to release boats, and letter on the subject of the 
Yazoo expedition, are both just received, the letter also enjoin- 
ing me to keep you constantly informed of the situation by 
telegraph. I have been very particular to Avrite and telegraph 
often, even when there was nothing important to say, knowing 
that you would feel anxious to be constantly posted. The 
letters I suppose reached, but the dispatches in many instances 
have failed. 

In regard to sending back boats from here, I gave and re- 
iterated the order to General McClernand to do so, before leav- 
ing Memphis. On my arrival, however, I found the river rising 
so'i-apidly, that there was no telling at what moment all hands 
might be driven to the boats. As soon as this danger was 
passed so many boats were released, that I could have moved 
but a small force at one time. 

I wrote you fully on the subject of the Yazoo expedition a 

few days ago. 

If you do not receive at least one letter and two dispatches 
per w^eek from me, general, be assured that some of them mis- 
carry. In addition, I will telegraph as often as any thing may 
occur of importance. 

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL Hi.LLECK.-CrELEQEAM.) 

Young's Point, La., ilarch 31, 1863. 
I have ordered the release of all boats that can be spared, 
for General Kosecrans. 



640 APPENDIX. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL IIALLECK.— (Ciphee Telegeam.) 

Young's Point, La., April 2, 1863. 
In two weeks I expect to be able to collect all my forces 
and turn the enemy's left. With present high water the extent 
of ground upon which troops could land at Haine's bluff is so 
limited that the place is impregnable, I reconnoitred the place 
yesterday with Admiral Porter and General Sherman. 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Letter.) 

Washington, D. C, April 2, 1863. 

Your disj)atch of March 17th, and also your telegrams of 
March 24th and 25th, were received yesterday. 

While Avorking upon the canal, the division of your forces 
into several eccentric operations may have been very proper, 
for the purpose of reconnoitring the country; but it is very 
important that, when you strike any blow, you should have 
troops sufficiently concentrated to make that blow effective. 
The division of your army into small expeditions destroys your 
strength, and that, when in the presence of an enemy, is very 
dangerous. 

What is most desired (and your attention is again called to 
this object) is, that your forces and those of General Banks 
should be brought into cooperation as early as possible. If he 
cannot get up to cooperate with you on Vicksburg, cannot you 
get troops down to help him on Port Hudson ? Or at least can 
you not destroy Grand Gulf before it becomes too strong? 

I know that you can judge of these matters there much 
better than I can here ; but as the President, who seems to be 
rather impatient about matters on the Mississippi, has several 
times asked me these questions, I repeat them to you. 

As the season when we can do very little on the lower Mis- 
sissippi is rapidly advancing, I hope you will push matters 
with all possible disj)atci. 



APPEIOHX. 641 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— aFrruR.; 

Before Vicksburo, AprH 4, 18C3. 

From information from the south by way of Corinth, I learn 
that the enemy in front of Rosecrans have been rconforced from 
Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and a few from Vicks- 
burg. They have also collected a cavalry force of twenty thou- 
sand men. All the bridges eastward from Savanna, and north 
from Florence, are being rapidly repaired. Clialmers is put in 
command of north Mississippi, and is collecting all the partisan 
rangers and loose, independent companies of cavalry that have 
been operating in this department. He is now occupying the 
line of the Tallahatchie. This portends preparations to attack 
Rosecrans, and to be able to follow up any success with rapidity. 
Also, to made a simultaneous raid into West Tennessee both 
from north Mississippi and by crossing the Tennessee river. 

To counteract this, Admiral Porter has consented to send 
the marine brigade n\y the Tennessee river, to cooperate with 
General Dodge at Corinth. I have also ordered an additional 
regiment of cavalry from Helena to West Tennessee. 

I enclose with this a letter from Major-General Ilurlbut, 
giving a programme which he wishes to carry out; and so 
much of it as to drive the enemy from the Tallahatchie, and 
cutting the roads where they have been repaired, I think can 
be successfully executed. I will instruct him not to scatter his 
forces so as to risk losing them. 

I have placed one division of troops on Deer creek, with com- 
munication back to the Mississippi river just above Lake Wash- 
ington. The object of this move is to keep the enemy from 
drawing supplies from that rich region (and use them our- 
selves), and to attract the attention of the enemy in that direc- 
tion. The navigation is practicable for our iron-clads and small 
steamers through to the Yazoo river, by the route lately tried 
by Admiral Porter, with the exception of a few hundred yards 
in Deer creek, near Rolling Fork. This was obstructed by the 
enemy, and they are now guarding and fortifying there. This 
move will have a tendency to make them throw in an addition- 
al force there, and move some of their guns. My force had as 
well be there as here, until I want to use them. 

A reconnoissance to Maine's bluflf demonstrates the imprac- 
41 



642 APPENDIX. 

ticability of attacking that place during the present stage of 
water. The west bank of the river is densely wooded and 
under water; the east bank only runs up to the bluff for a 
short distance below the raft, then diverges, leaving a bottom 
widening all the way down, in most parts covered by water 
and next to the bluffs, all of it so covered. The hill-sides are 
lined with rifle-pits, with embrasures here and there for field, 
artillery. To stoi-m this but a small force could be used at the 
outset. "VVilh the present batteries of the enemy, the canal 
across tlie point can be of but little use. There is a system of 
bayous running from Milliken's bend, and also from near the 
river at this point, that are navigable for large and small 
steamers passing around by Richmond to New Carthage. There 
is also a good wagon-road from Milliken's bend to New Carthage. 
The dredges are now engaged cutting a canal from here into 
these bayous. I am having all the empty coal and other barges 
prepared for carrying troops and artillery, and have written to 
Colonel Allen for some more, and also for six tugs to tow these. 
With them it would be easy to carry supplies to New Car- 
thage and any point south of that. 

My expectation is, for some of the naval fleet to run the 
batteries of Vicksburg, whilst the army moves through by this 
new route. Once there, I will move to Warrenton or Grand 
Gulf, probably the latter. From either of these points there 
are good roads to Jackson and the Black River bridge, without 
crossing Black river. 

This is the only move I now see as practicable, and I hope 
it will meet your approval. I will keep my array together, and 
see to it that I am not cut off from my supplies, or beat in any 
other way than a fair fight. The discipline and health of this 
army is now good, and I am satisfied the greatest confidence 
of success prevails. 

I have directed General Webster to commence the recon- 
struction of the railroad between Grand Junction and Corinth. 
The labor will be performed by the engineer regiment and con- 
trabands, thus saving additional expense. The streams will be 
crossed on piles. In this way the work should be done by the 
first of May. 



APPENDIX. G43 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Letter.) 

Washington, D. C, April 9, 1863. 

Yours of March 29th is just received. Your explanation 
in regard to sending back steamers is satisfactory. I hope you 
will keep in mind the great importance of not unnecessarily 
detaining them, on account of the great entanglement it causes 
the quartermaster department in supplying our Western armies. 

In regard to your dispatches, it is very probable that many 
fail to reach here in time. It is exceedingly important that 
General Banks should be kept advised of every thing that is 
done in your vicinity, and the only way he can get this infor- 
mation is through these headquarters. 

You are too well advised of the anxiety of the Government 
for your success, and its disappointment at the delay, to render 
it necessary to urge upon you the importance of early action. 
I am confident that you will do every thing possible to open 
the Mississippi river. In my opinion this is the most impor- 
tant operation of the war, and nothing must be neglected to 
insure success. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphm Telbqbam.) 

Milliken's Bend, La., April 11, 1863. 
The Yazoo expedition has reached the Mississippi. :My 
forces in a few days will be all concentrated here. Grand 
Gulf is the point at which I expect to strike, and send an array 
corps to Port Hudson, to cooperate with Banks. Will reach 
the Mississippi at New Carthage, now in ray possession, with 
wagon road, and canal, and bayous navigable for tugs and 
barges, between here and there 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL nALLECK.-(LETrEK.) 

Milliken's Bend, La., April 12, 1863. 
There is nothing in the way now of my throwing troops into 
Grand Gulf, and destroying the works there, and then sending 
them on to Port Hudson to cooperate with General Banks m 



644 APPENDIX. 

the reduction of tbat place, but the danger of overflowing the 
road from liere to New Carthage, where the water is let into 
the new canal, connecting the river there with the bayous com- 
ing out at Carthage. One division of troops is now at Car- 
thage and another on the way. By turning the water into the 
canal, water communication can be opened between the two 
places in a very few days for barges and tugs. Of the former 
I have but fifteen as yet, and of the latter but three, suitable 
for this navigation. To use this route, therefore, it is abso- 
lutely necessary to keep open the wagon-road to take the artil- 
lery and to march the troops. 

In about three nights from this time Admiral Porter will 
run the Vicksburg batteries, wnth so much of his fleet as he 
desires to take below, and I will send four steamers (the ma- 
chinery protected from shot by hay-bales and sand-bags), to be 
used in transporting troops and in towing barges. 

The wagon-road (this work must now be early completed), 
by filling up the lowest ground, will be about twenty inches 
above the water in the swamps. The river, where it is to be 
let into the canal, is four and eight-tenths feet above the land. 
This, however, is fifteen miles by river below where the dirt- 
road starts out. Had I seen nothing of the effect of crevasses 
in the back country, I should not doubt the effect would be to 
overflow the whole country through which we pass. But there 
has been a large crevasse just below where the canal leaves 
the river for a long time, through which the water has been 
pouring in great volume. I cannot see that this additional cre- 
vasse is going to have much other effect than to increase the 
breaks in the bayou levees, so as to make the discharge equal 
to the supply. 

I will have a map of this section made to send to you by 
next mail, which will make this move intelligible. The embar- 
rassment I have had to contend against, on account of extreme 
high water, cannot be appreciated by any one not present to 
witness it. I think, however, you will receive favorable re- 
ports of the condition and feeling of this army from every im- 
partial judge, and from all who have been sent from Washing- 
ton to look after its welfare. 



APPENDIX. 645 



GENEEAL GEAKT TO GENEEAL HALLECK.- (Lettee.) 

MiLLiKEs's Bekd, La., April 12, 1863. 
Herewith I send you reports of Major-General Sherman, 
and the division and brigade commanders under him, of the 
late reconnoissance through Steele and Black bayous and Deer 
creek, made by them in conjunction with a portion of Admiral 
Porter's fleet, commanded by himself in person. The object 
of the expedition was to find a practicable passage to the 
Yazoo river, without passing the enemy's batteries at Haine's 
bluff; to liberate our fleet and troops then held above Green- 
wood ; and, if found sufficiently practicable, to enable me to 
land most of my forces east of the Yazoo, at some point from 
which Haine's bluff" and Vicksburg could be reached by high 
land. The accompanying reports show the impracticability of 
the route. This expedition, however, was not without its re- 
sult. It carried our troops into the heart of the granary from 
which the Vicksburg forces are now being fed. It caused 
great alarm among the enemy, and led them to move a num- 
ber of their guns from batteries on the river. The citizens 
fled from their plantations, and burnt several thousand bales 
of cotton ; some not burnt was brought away by the gunboats. 
Much of their beef, bacon, and poultry was consumed by our 
troops, and distributed by the negroes. A scow, loaded with 
bacon for the enemy, was destroyed, and probably two hundred 
thousand bushels of corn was burned up. Several hundred 
negroes also returned with the troops. 

The recent expedition of General Steele to the neighbor- 
hood of Rolling Fork, shows that the enemy is still holding 
that position. He also destroyed several hundred thousand 
bushels of corn, and brought off" about a thousand head of 
stock and a number of the laboring class. 



GENERAL GRAXT TO GENERAL BAKKS.-(C!pnER TELEGRiM.) 

Milliken's Bexd, La., April 14. 1S63. 
I am concentrating my forces at Grand Gulf Will send 
an army corps to Bayou Sara by the 25th, to cooperate with 
you on Port Hudson. Can you aid me and send troops after 
the reduction of Port Hudson to assist at Vicksburg ? 



64:6 APPENDIX. 



GENERAL GBA^T TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (TELEGEAii.) 

MiLLiKEJi's Bend, La., April 17, 1863. 
Seven gunboats and three transports ran the Yicksburg 
batteries last night. The crew of steamer Henry Clay, except- 
ing the pilot, deserted soon after getting under lire. The 
boat took fire and burned up ; one other transport slightly 
damaged. One man killed and thx-ee wounded on the Benton. 
No further casualties reported. A number of barges were also 
sent down. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLE CK.—(Cn>HEE Teiegkam.) 

Milliken's Bend, La., April 11, 18G3. 
1 go to Carthage to-day. If it is possible, I will occupy 
Grand Gulf within four days. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL RALLECK.— (Lettee.) 

Millikkn's Bend, La., April 19, 1863. 

I returned last night from New Carthage, at and near which 
place Admiral Porter's fleet is lying (six iron-clads and the 
ram General Price, together with two divisions of General 
McClemand's corps). The whole of his corps is between Rich- 
mond and New Carthage. 

I had all the empty barges here prepared for the transpor- 
tation of troops and artillery, and sent ten of them by the 
Vicksburg batteries with the fleet. Whilst under the guns of 
the enemy's batteries they were cut loose, and I fear that some 
of them have been permitted to run i)ast New Carthage undis- 
covered. They were relied upon to aid in the transportation 
of troops to take Grand Gulf. 

The wagon-road from here to Avithin two miles of New 
Carthage is good for artillery. From that point on the bayou 
the levee is broken in a number of places, making cross-currents 
in the bayou; hence it is difficult to navigate with barges. I 
think, however, steamers will be able to run from where the 
wagon-road ends to the river. By clearing out the bayous 



APPENDIX. G47 

from timber, there will be good navigation from here to New- 
Carthage for tugs and barges, also small stern-wheel steamers. 
This navigation can be kept good, I think, by using our dredges 
constantly, until there is twenty feet fall. On this subject, 
however, I have not taken the opinion of an engineer officer, 
nor have I formed it upon sufficient investigation to warrant 
me in speaking positively. 

Our experiment of running the batteries at Vicksburg, I 
think has demonstrated the entire practicability of doing so 
with but little risk. On this occasion our vessels went down 
even slower than the current, using their wheels principally for 
backing. Two of the steamers were drawn into the eddy, and 
ran over a part of the distance in front of Vicksburg three 
times. I shall send six more steamers by the batteries as soon 
as they can possibly be got ready. 

I sent a dispatch to General Banks that I thought I could 
send an army corps to Bayou Sara, to cooperate with him ou 
Port Hudson by the 25th. This now will be impossible. 
There shall be no unnecessary delay, however, in my move- 
ments. I hope very soon to be able to report our possession 
of Grand Gulf, with a practicable and safe route to furnish 
supplies to the troops. Once there, I do not feel a doubt of 
success in the entire clearing out of the enemy from the banks 
of the river. 

At least three of my army corps commanders take hold of 
the new policy of arming the negroes, and using them against 
the enemy with a will. They at least are so much of soldiers 
as to feel themselves under obligations to carry out a policy 
(which they would not inaugurate), in the same good faith and 
with the same zeal as if it was of their own choosing. You 
may rely on me carrying out any policy ordered by proper 
authority, to the best of my ability. 



GENERAL GEANT TO QENEEAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telkgeau.) 

Before Vicksburg, April 21, 1803. 
I move my headquarters to Carthage to-morrow. Every 
effort will be exerted to get speedy possession of Grand Gulf, 
and from that point to open the Mississippi. 



648 APPEISTDIX 

If I do not underestimate the enemy, my force is abundant, 
with a foothold once obtained, to do the work. Six transports 
will run the Vicksburg batteries to-night. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphee Telegeam.) 

Milliken's Bexd, La., April 23, 1863. 
Six boats and a number of barges ran the Vicksburg bat- 
teries last night. All the boats got by, more or less damaged. 
Tlie Tigress sank at three a. m., and is a total loss — crew all 
saved. The Moderator was much damasfed. Ithinkallthebarsfes 
went through safely. Colonel Lagow, of my staff, was on the 
Tigress, in command of the fleet. Casualties, so far as reported, 
two men mortally wounded, and several (number not known) 
more or less severely wounded. About five hundred shots 
were fired. I look upon this as a great success. At the War- 
renton batteries there was heavy firing, but all the boats were 
sure to go past. What damage was done there is not known. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphee Telegram.) 

Near Grand Gclf, Miss., April 27, 1863. 
Moving troops from Smith's plantation to the Mississippi 
has been a tedious ojieration, more so than it should have 
been. I am noAV embarking troops for the attack on Grand 
Gulf Expect to make it to-morrow. 



GENEEAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipeee Telegbam.) 

Near Grand Gulf, April 29, 1863. 
The gunboats engaged Grand Gulf batteries from eight this 
morning until one p. M., and from dusk till ten. The army 
and transports are now below Grand Gulf A landing will be 
effected on the east bank of the river to-morrow. I feel now 
that the battle is more than half over. 



APPENDIX. 040 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Letter.) 

Grand Gulf, Miss., ^fay 3, ISfiS. 

On the 29th of April, Admiral Porter attacked the fortifica- 
tions at this place with seven iron-clads, commencing at eight 
o'clock A. M., and continuing until half-past one, engaging them 
at very close quarters, many times not being more than one 
hundred yards from the enemy's guns. During this time, I 
had about ten thousand troops on board transports and barges, 
ready to land them, and carry the place by storm the moment 
the batteries bearing upon the river were silenced, so as to 
make the landing practicable. From the great elevation the 
enemy's batteries had, it proved entirely impracticable to 
silence them from the river; and when the gunboats were 
drawn off, I decided immediately upon landing my forces on 
the Louisiana shore, and march them across the point below 
Grand Gulf. 

At night the gunboats made another vigorous attack, and in 
the mean time, the transports safely ran the blockade, and on the 
following day, the whole force with me was transferred to 
Bruinsburg, the first point of land below Grand Gulf from 
where the interior can be reached, and the march immediately 
commenced for Port Gibson. General McClernand was in the 
advance, with the Thirteenth army corps. About two a. h., on 
the 1st of May, when about four miles from Port Gibson, he 
met the enemy. Some little skirmishing took place before day- 
light, but not to any great extent. The Thirteenth corps was 
followed by Logan's division of McPherson's corps, which 
reached the scene of action as soon as the last of the Thirteenth 
corps was out of the road. The fighting continued all day, and 
until after dark, over the most broken country I ever saw. The 
whole country is a series of irregular ridges, divided by deep 
and impracticable ravines, grown up with heavy timber, under- 
growth, and cane. It was impossible to engage any con- 
siderable portion of our force at any one time. The enemy 
were driven, however, from point to point towards Port Gib- 
son, until night closed in, under which, it was evident to me, 
they intended to retreat. The pursuit was continued after 
dark, until the enemy was again met by Logan's division, 
about two miles from Port Gibson. The nature of the country 



650 APPENDIX. 

is such that further pursuit, in the dark, was not deemed pru- 
dent or advisable. On the 2d, our troops moved into the 
town, without finding any enemy except their wounded. The 
bridge across Bayou Pierre, about two miles from Port Gibson, 
on the Grand Gulf road, had been destroyed, and also the 
bridge immediately at Port Gibson, on the Vicksburg road. 
The enemy retreated over botli these routes, leaving a battery 
and several regiments of infantry at the former, to prevent a 
reconstruction of the first bridge. One brigade, under General 
Stevenson, was detached to drive the enemy from this posi- 
tion, or occupy his attention, and a heavy detail set to work, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson and Captain Tresillian, to 
reconstruct the bridge over the other. This work was accom- 
plished, a bridge and roadway (over a hundred and twenty 
feet long) made, and the whole of McPherson's two divisions 
marched over before night. This corps then marched to the 
north fork of Bayou Pierre, rebuilt a bridge over that stream, 
and was on the march by five and a half a. m. to-day. Soon 
after crossing the bayou, our troops were opened on by the en- 
emy's artillery. It was soon demonstrated that this was only 
intended to cover the retreat of the main ai-my. On arriving 
at Willow Springs, General McPherson was directed to hold 
the position from there to the Big Black with one division, and 
General McClernand, on his arrival, to join him in this duty. 
I immediately started for this place with one brigade of Logan's 
division and some cavalry (twenty men). The brigade of in- 
fantry was left about seven miles fi-om here ; contrabands and 
prisoners taken having stated that the last of the retreating 
enemy had passed that point. The woods, between here and 
the crossing of the Big Black, are evidenily filled yet with the 
detachments of the enemy, and some artillery. I am in hopes 
many of them will be picked up by our forces. 

Our loss will not exceed one hundred and fifty killed and 
five hundred wounded. The enemy's loss is probably about 
the same. We have, however, some five hundred of their men 
prisoners, and may pick up many more yet. Many stragglers, 
particularly from the Missouri troops, no doubt have fallen out, 
and will never join their regiments again. 

The move by Bruinsburg undoubtedly took the enemy 
much by surprise. General Bowen's (the rebel commander) 
defence was a good one, and well carried out. My force, how- 



APPENDIX. 651 

ever, was too heavy for his, and composed of well-disciplined 
and hardy men, who know no defeat and are not willing to 
learn what it is. 

This army is in the finest health and spirits. Since leaving 
Milliken's bend they have marched as much by night as by 
day, through mud and rain, without tents or much other bag- 
gage, and on irregular rations, without a complaint, and with 
less straggling than I have ever before witnessed. "Where all 
have done so well, it would be out of place to make invidious 
distinction. 

The country will supply all the forage required for any 
thing like an active campaign, and the necessary fresh beef; 
other supplies will have to be drawn from Milliken's bend. 
This is a long and precarious route, but I have every confidence 
in succeeding in doing it. 

Admiral Porter left here this morning for the mouth of Red 
river. A letter from Admiral Farragut says that Banks has 
defeated Taylor, and captured about two thousand prisoners. 

Colonel Grierson's raid from La Grange through Mississippi 
has been the most successful thing of the kind since the break- 
ing out of the rebellion. He was five miles south of Pontotoc 
on'' the 19th of April. The next place he turned up at was 
Newton, about thirty miles east of Jackson. From there he 
has gone south, touching at Hazlehurst, Bahala, and various 
places. The Southern papers and Southern people regard it as 
one of the most daring exploits of the war. I am told the 
whole state is full of men paroled by Grierson. 



GE>T:EAL GEi^'T TO GEXEEAL nXhLECK,-(Tzi.zai±iL) 

Grand Gulf, Miss, Mat/ 3, 1863. 
We landed at Bruinsburg, April 30th, moved immediately 
on Port Gibson, met the enemy, eleven thousand strong, four 
miles south of Port Gibson at two a. m., and engaged him all 
day, entirely routing him, with the loss of many killed and 
about five hundred prisoners, besides the wounded. Our loss 
about one hundred killed and five hundred wounded The 
enemy retreated towards Vicksburg, destroying the bnagefl 
over the two forks of Bayou Pierre. These were reDuilt, and 
pursuit continued till the present time. Besides the neavj 



652 APPEKDIX. 

artillery at tbis place, four fieldpieces were captured certain, 
Bome stores, and the enemy driven to destroy much more. The 
country is the most broken and difficult to operate in I ever saw. 
Our victory has been most complete, and the enemy thorough- 
ly demoralized. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL L. THOMAS. 

Hankinson's Ferry, Miss., May 5, 1863. 
I have the honor to request that Captain Adam Badeau, 
A. A. D. C, be ordered to report to me for duty on my staff. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipitee Tblegeasi.) 

Hankinson's Ferry, Miss., May 6, 1863. 
Ferrying land transportation and rations to Grand Gulf is 
detaining me on the Black river. I will move as soon as three 
days' rations ai"e secured, and send the wagons back to the Gulf 
for more to follow. Information from the other side leads me 
to believe the enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma. 
Should not Rosecrans at least make a demonstration of advan- 
cing:? 



HON. E. M. STANTON TO C. A. DANA, ESQ.— (CirireR Telegkam.) 

Washington, D. C, May 6, 18G3. 
General Grant has full and absolute authority to enforce 
his own commands, and to remove any person who by igno- 
rance in action or any cause interferes with or delays his opera- 
tions. He has the full confidence of the Government, is ex- 
pected to enforce liis authority, and will be firmly and heartily 
suppoited, but he will be responsible for any failure to exert 
his powers. You may communicate this to him. 



HON. E. M. STANTON TO GENERAL GRANT. 

Washington, D. C, May Y, 18S3. 
The President and general-in-chicf have just returned from 
the Army of the Potomac. The principal operation of General 



APPENDIX. G53 

Hooker failed, but there has "been no serious disaster to the or- 
ganization and efficiency of the army. It is now occupying its 
former position on the Rappahannock, having recrossed the 
river without any loss in the movement. Not more than one- 
third of General Hooker's force was engaged. General Stone- 
man's operations have been a brilliant success. A part of his 
force advanced, to within two miles of Richmond, and the 
enemy's communication has been cut in every direction. The 
Army of the Potomac will very soon resume offensive opera- 
tions. 



GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipheb Teleobam.) 

Rocky Springs, Miss., May 8, 1863. 
Our advance is fifteen miles from Edward's station, on 
Southern railroad. All looks well. Port Hudson is evidently 
evacuated, except by a small garrison and their heavy ar- 
tillery. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (CirnEii Telegbasj.) 

Cayuga, Miss^ May 11, 1863. 
My forces will be this evening as far advanced towards 
Jackson as Fourteen-mile creek, the left near Black river, and 
extending in a line as nearly east and west as they can get with- 
out bringing on a battle. As I shall communicate with Grand 
Gulf no more, except it becomes necessary to send a train with 
heavy escort, you may not hear from me again for several 
days. 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.-(CrrnEE. Teleobam.) 

WAsni.NGTON, D. C, 11 a. m.. May 11, 1863. 
If possible, the forces of yourself and Banks should b<3 
united between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, so as to attack 
these places separately with the combined forces. The same 
thino- has been urged on Banks. Hooker recrossed to the 
north side of the river, but he inflicted a greater loss upon the 
enemy than he received. 



654 APPENDIX. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegeam.) 

Raymond, Miss., May 14, 1863. 

McPherson took this place on the 12th, after a brisk fight 
of more than two hours. Our loss, fifty-one killed, and one 
hundred and eighty wounded ; enemy's loss, seventy-five killed, 
and buried by us. One hundred and eighty-six prisoners, be- 
sides wounded. 

McPherson is now at Clinton, Sherman on the direct Jack- 
son road, and McClernand bringing up the rear. I will attack 
the state capital to-day. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphee Telegram.) 

Jackson, Miss., May 15, 1863. 
This place fell into our hands yesterday after a fight of 
about three hours. Jo. Johnston was in command. The enemy 
retreated north, evidently with the design of joining the Vicks- 
burg force. I am concentrating my force at Bolton to cut 
them ofiTil possible. A dispatch from Banks showed him to be 
off in Louisiana, not to return to Baton Rouge until the 10th 
of May. I could not lose the time. I have taken many pris- 
oners from Port Hudson, who state that it will be evacuated on 
the appearance of a force in the rear. I sent a special messen- 
ger to Banks, giving him the substance of the information I 
had, and asking him to join me as soon as possible. This mes- 
sage was sent on the 10th. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Letter.) 

Near Vicksburg, May 22, 1863. 
Vicksburg is now completely invested. I have possession 
of Maine's bluff and the Yazoo, consequently have supplies. 
To-day an attempt was made to carry tlie city by assault, but 
was not entirely successful. We hold possession, however, of 
two of the enemy's forts, and have skirmishers close under all 
of them. Our loss was not severe. The nature of the ground 
about Vicksburg is such that it can only be taken by a siege. 
It is entirely safe to us in time — I would say one week — if the 



APPENDIX. 655 

enemy do not send a large army upon my rear. With the 
railroad destroyed to beyond Pearl river, I do not see tbc hope 
that the enemy can entertain of such relief. I hear that Davis 
has promised that if the garrison can hold out for fifteen days 
he will send one hundred thousand men, if he has to evacuate 
Tennessee. AVhat shall I do with the prisoners I have? 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL IIALLECK.— (Letter.) 

Near Vicksburo, May 24, 1863. 

My troops are now disposed with the right (Sherman's 
corps) resting on the Mississippi river, where the bluff strikes 
the water, we having the first crest and the upper of the 
enemy's batteries. McClernand is on the left with his corps, 
his right having one brigade north of the railroad, the rest 
south of it. One division occupies the roads leading south and 
southeast from the city. 

The position is as strong by nature as can be possibly con 
eeived of, and is well fortified. The garrison the enemy have 
to defend it I have no means of knowing, but their force is 
variously estimated at from ten to twenty thousand. I at- 
tempted to carry the place by storm on the 22d instant, but 
was unsuccessful. Our troops were not repulsed from any 
point, but simply failed to enter the works of the enemy. At 
several points they got up to the parapets of the enemy's 
works, and planted their flags on the outer slope of the em- 
bankments, where they still have them. The attack was made 
simultaneously by the three army corps at ten a. >r. The loss 
on our side was not very heavy at first, but receiving repeated 
dispatches from Major-General i\IcClernand, saying that he 
was hard pressed on his right and left, and calling for reen- 
forcements, I gave him all of McPherson's corps but four bri- 
gades, and caused Sherman to press the enemy on our right, 
which caused us to double our losses for the day. They will 
probably reach fifteen hundred killed and wounded. General 
McClernand's dispatches misled me as to the facts, and caused 
much of this loss. He is entirely unfit tor tlie position of cor|i3 
commander, both on the march and on the battle-fichl. Look- 
ing ofter his corps gives me more labor and infinitely more un 
easiness than all the remainder of my department. 



656 APPENDIX. 

The enemy are now undoubtedly in our grasp. The fall of 
Vicksburg, and the capture of most of the garrison, can only 
be a question of time. I hear a great deal of the enemy's 
bringing a large force from the East, to effect the raising of the 
siege. They may attempt something of the kind, but I do not 
see how they can do it. 

The railroad is effectually destroyed at Jackson, so that it 
will take thirty days to repair it. This will leave a march of 
fifty miles over which the enemy will have to subsist an army, 
and bring their ordnance stores with teams. My position is so 
strong that I could hold out for several days against a vastly 
superior force. I do not see how the enemy could possibly 
maintain a long attack under these circumstances. I will keep 
a close watch on the enemy, however. 

There is a force now at Calhoun station, on the Mississippi 
Central, about six miles north of Canton. This is the force 
that escaped from Jackson, augmented by a few thousand men 
from the coast cities, intending to reach the latter place before 
the attack, but who failed to reach in time. 

In the various battles, from Port Gibson to Black river 
bridge, we have taken near six thousand prisoners, besides 
killed, wounded, and scattered a much larger number. The 
enemy succeeded in retreating to Vicksburg, with only three 
pieces of artillery. The number captured by us was seventy- 
ibur guns, besides what was found at Ilaine's bluff. 

From Jackson to this place I have had no opportunities of 
communicating with you. Since that, this army fought a heavy 
battle near Baker's creek on the 16th, beating the enemy badly, 
killing and capturing not less than four thousand of the enemy, 
besides capturing most of his artillery. Loring's division was cut 
off from retreat, and dispersed in eveiy direction. On the 17th, 
the battle of Black river bridge was fought, the enemy again 
losing about two thousand prisoners and seventeen pieces of ar- 
tillery, and many killed and wounded. The bridges and ferries 
were destroyed. The march from Edward's station to Black 
river bridge was made, bridges for crossing the army constructed, 
and mueli of it over in twenty-four hours. On the 1 9th, the march 
to this place was made, and the city invested. When I crossed 
the Mississippi river, the means of ferriage were so limited and 
time so important, that I started without teams, and an aver- 
age of two days' rations in haversacks. Our supplies had to be 



APPENDIX. 657 

hauled about sixty miles, from Milliken's bend to opposite 
Grand Gulf, and from there to wherever the army marched. 
We picked up all the teams in the country, and free Africans 
to drive them. Forage and meat were found in great abun. 
dance through the country,, so that, although five days' rations 
were issued in twenty days, yet there was neither sufiering 
nor complaint witnessed in the army. 

As soon as reports can be got from corps commanders, I 
will send in a report, embracing the campaign from Milliken's 
bend to the investment, if not the capture, of Vicksburg. 
When I crossed the Mississippi river, it was my intention to 
detach an army corps, or the necessary force, to cooperate with 
General Banks, to secure the reduction of Port Hudson and the 
union of the two armies. But I received a letter from General 
Banks, stating that he was in Louisiana, and would return to 
Baton Rouge by the 10th inst. By the reduction of Port Hud- 
son, he could add only twelve thousand to my force. I had cer- 
tain information that General Jo. Johnston was on his way to 
Jackson, and that reenforcements were arriving there constantly 
from Port Hudson and the Southern cities. Under this state of 
facts I could not afford to delay ; beating the enemy too, near 
Port Gibson, I followed him to Hankinson's ferry on the Black 
river. This placed my forces fifteen miles on their way from 
Grand Gulf to this place. Black river bridge, or Jackson, which- 
ever 1 might turn my attention to. 

Altogether, I am satisfied that my course was riglit, and 
has given us with comparative ease what would have cost seri- 
ous battle by delay. 

The army is in the finest health and spirits. 



GENERAL IIALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (CiriiEB Telegeam.) 

Washington, D. C, 12.30 p. m., June 2, 1863. 
Tours of 24th is received. I will do all I can to assist you. 
I have sent dispatch after dispatch to Banks to join you. Why 
he does not, I do not understand. His separate operating on 
Port Hudson is in direct violation of his instructions. If possi- 
ble, send him this dispatch. 3Iy last dispatch froni him was 
May 4th. 



42 



658 appejs^dix. 



PRESIDENT A. LINCOLN TO GENERAL GEANT.— <Ciphbr Telegram.) 

Washington, D. C, 6.30 f. m., June 2, 1863. 
Are you in communication with General Banks? Is he 
coming towards you, or going farther oflf? Is there or has 
there been any thing to hinder his coming directly to you by 
water ? 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 

Near ViCKSBxmG, Jtine 3, 1863. 

The approaches are gradually nearing the enemy's fortifica- 
tions. Five days more should plant our batteries on their 
parapets. Johnston is still collecting troops at Canton and 
Jackson. Some are coming over the raili'oad, and all the coun- 
try is joining his standard. The destruction of the enemy's 
artillery and ordnance stores was so complete, that all these 
must be brought in from a distance. I sent a large force up 
between the Yazoo and Black rivers. Forage, beef, and bacon 
was destroyed by our troops, and .the stock brought to camp. 
I am now placing all my spare force on the narrowest part of 
the land between the rivers, about forty-five miles northeast, 
with the cavalry watching all the crossings of Black river. 

We shell the town a little every day, and keep the enemy 
constantly on the alert. We but seldom lose a man now. 
The best of health and spirits prevail among the troops. 



GENERAL GRANT TO A. LINCOLN, PRESIDENT U. S.— (Telegram.) 

Near Vicksburg, June 8, 1863. 
I send by mail letter from General Banks of June 4th. I 
am in communication with him, he having Port Hudson closely 
invested. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK— (Telegram.) 

Near Vicksburg, June 8, 1863. 
It is reported that three divisions have left Bragg's army to 
join Johnston. Breckenridge is knoAvn to have arrived 



APPENDIX. 651» 



GENERAL GKANT TO GENEEAL nALLECK.— (CrrnER Tei.eobam.) 

Near Yicksburg, June 8, 18G3. 
Vicksburg is closely invested. I have a spare force of about 
thirty thousand men with which to repel any thing from the 
rear. This includes all I have ordered from West Tennessee. 
Johnston is concentrating a force at Canton, and now has a 
portion of it west of Big Black. My forces have been north 
as far as Sartartia, and on the ridge back. To that point there 
is no force yet. I will make a waste of all the country I can 
between the two rivers. I am fortifying Ilaine's bluflf, and will 
defend the line from here to there at all hazards. 



GElirEEAI, GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Teleobau.) 

Near Vicksburg, June 11, 1863. 

Reenforcements, other than from my own command, are 
beginning to arrive. There is every indication that they may 
be needed. The enemy occupy Yazoo City and Canton with 
an entire division of cavalry, on the ridge between the two 
rivers. I am fortifying Haine's bluff, and will have a garrison 
there of thirteen thousand men, besides the ability to throw an 
equal amount more there in case of an attack, and still keep up 
the investment of Vicksburg. 

Kirby Smith is showing signs of working to this side of the 
river, either to operate against Banks or myself He may find 
difficulty in crossing the river, but the great number of bayous 
and little lakes wnthin a short distance of shore in this region, 
afford sucb facilities for concealing boats, that the means of 
crossing an army may still be left the rebels ; particularly this 
may be the case about Katchez. I now fear trouble on the, 
other side of the river between Lake Providence and Milliken s 
bend. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL IIALLEdC-KCirmB Telkor-vm.) 

Near Yicksbcro, June 11, 1863. 
I have reliable information from the entire interior of the 
South. Johnston has been reonforced by three thousand men 



G60 APPENDIX. 

tVom Mobile and parts of Georgia ; by McGowan and Brecken- 
ridge's divisions (nine thousand men) ; and four thousand of 
Forrest's cavalry from Bragg's army ; nine thousand men from 
Charleston, and two thousand two hundred from Port Hudson. 
Orders were sent the very day Banks invested Port Hudson, to 
evacuate it. Garrison there now, eight thousand. Lee's army 
has not been reduced. Bragg's force now, forty-six thousand 
infantry and artillery, and fifteen thousand cavalry. Every 
thing not required for daily use has been removed to Atlanta, 
Georgia. His army can fall back to Bristol or Chattanooga at 
a moment's notice, which places, it is thought, he can hold, and 
sjDare twenty-five thousand men. Mobile and Savannah are 
now almost entirely without garrisons, further than men to 
manage large guns. No forces left in the interior to send to 
any place. All further reenforcements will have to come from 
one of the great armies. Thei-e is about thirty-two thousand 
men west of the Mississij^pi river, exclusive of the forces in 
Texas. Orders were sent them one week ago by Johnston, 
The purport of orders not known. Herron has arrived here, 
and troops from Burnside are looked for to-morrow. 



GENERAL GRANT TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL L. THOMAS.— (Leitek.) 

Near Vicksbitrg, June 16, 1863, 
Herewith I have the honor of enclosing Brigadier-General 
E. S. Dennis's report of the battle of Milliken's bend, fought 
on the Vth of June, 1863, together with the list of casualties. 

In this battle most of the troops engaged were Africans, 
who had but little experience in the use of arms. Their con- 
duct is said, however, to have been most gallant, and I doubt 
not but with good officers they will make good troops. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.-<Ciphek Telegram.) 

Near Vicksburg, June 16, 1863, 

Every thing progresses well here. Johnston's force is at 

Yazoo City, Benton, Brownsville, and Clinton. I am fortifying 

at Haine's bluff to make my position certain, but believe I 

could e:o out with force enousfh to drive the rebels from be- 



APPENDIX. GGl 

tweeu the two rivers. Deserters come out daily. AH report 

rations short. We scarcely ever lose a man now. Ileallli and 
condition of troops most excellent. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (TELEaEAM.) 

Near Yicksburg, June 19, 1868. 
I have found it necessary to relieve General McClemand, 
particularly at this time, for his publication of a congratula- 
tory address, calculated to create dissensions and ill-feeling in 
the army. I should have relieved him long since, for general 
unfitness for his position. General Ord is appointed to his 
place, subject to the approval of the President. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (TELECP.AM.^ 

Before Vicksbitrg, June 26, 1863. 

Yesterday a mine was sprung under the enemy's most com- 
manding fort, producing a crater sufficient to hold two regi- 
ments of infantry. Our men took immediate possession and 
still hold it. The fight for it has been incessant, and thus far 
we have not been able to establish batteries in the breach. 
Expect to succeed. 

Johnston has removed east of Black river, Ilis movements 
are mysterious, and may be intended to cover a movement from 
his rear into East or West Tennessee, or upon Banks. I have 
Sherman out near his front on the Black, with a large force, 
watching him. I will use every effort to learn any move John- 
ston may make, and send troops from here to counteract any 
change he may make, if I can. 



GENERAL GRANT TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL L. TU0MA9.— (Lettke.) 

Near Yicksburg, June 26, 1863. • 

Enclosed I respectfully transmit the letters of ^Nlajor-Gencr- 
als W. T. Sherman, commanding the Fifteenth anny corps, and 
James B. McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth anny 
corps, of dates respectively the 17th and ISth inst., relative to 
the congratulatory order of Major-General John A. McCler- 



662 APPENDIX. 

nand to his troops, a copy of which order is also transmitted, 
together with copies of the correspondence relating thereto ; 
and my order relieving General McClernand from the command 
of the Thirteenth army coi'ps, and assigning Major-General E. 
O. C. Ord to the command thereof, subject to the approval of 
the President. 

A disposition and earnest desire on my part to do the most 
I could with the means at my command, without interfering 
with the assignment to command, which the President alone 
was authorized to make, made me tolerate General McClernand 
long after I thought the good of the service demanded his 
removal. It was only when almost the entire army under 
my command seemed to demand it that he was relieved. The 
enclosed letters show the feelings of the army corps serving in 
the field with the Thirteenth. 

The removal of General McClernand from the command of 
the Thirteenth army corps has given general satisfaction, the 
Thirteenth army corps sharing perhaps equally in the feeling 
with other corps of the army. 

My action in the relieving of General McClernand from the 
command of the Thirteenth army corps, and the assignment of 
Major-Geueral E. O. C. Ord to that command, I trust, will meet 
the approval of the President. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Teleqbam.) 

Near Yicksbukg, Jutie 27, 1863. 
Johnston has postponed his attack until he can receive ten 
thousand reenforceraents, now on their way from Bragg's army. 
They are expected next week. I feel strong enough against 
this increase, and I do not despair of having Vicksburg before 
they arrive. This latter, however, I may be disappointed in. 
I may have to abandon protection to the leased plantations 
from here to Lake Providence, to resist a threatened attack 
from Kirby Smith's forces. The location of those leased plan- 
tations was most unfortunate, and against my judgment. I 
wanted them put north of "White river. 



APPENDIX. 0G3 

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAX HALLECK. 

ViCKSBCRO, Juhj 4, 1863. 

The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terras 
allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a 
great advantage to lis at this juncture. It saves probably 
several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports 
ready for immediate service. 

Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on John- 
ston to drive him from the state. I will send troops to the 
relief of Banks, and return the Ninth Army Corps to Burnside. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphxb Telegeam.) 

ViCKSBURG, July 6, 1863. 

The number of prisoners and pieces of artUleiy taken with 
Vicksburg is greater than was at first supposed. The number 
proves to be over thii'ty thousand prisoners, and over one hun- 
dred and seventy pieces of artillery. "We have found consid- 
erable ammunition and about four days' rations of flour and 
bacon, and two hundred and fifty pounds of sugar. The small- 
arms are of good quality and over fifty thousand in number. 

Sherman is after Johnston, but no news from him to-day. 



GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.-(TEtKGnAM.) 

Washington, 4 p. m., July 8, 1803. 
I fear your parolling the prisoners at Vicksburg Avithout ac- 
tual delivery to a proper agent, as required by the seventh 
article of the cartel, may be construed into an alisolute release, 
and that these men will immediately be placed in the ranks of 
the enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these pris- 
oners have not been allowed to depart, you will retain them 
until further orders. 



6G4 APPENDIX. 

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.-(Tbleqbam.) 

VicKSBTTKG, My 10, 1863. 
The following dispatch is just received from General Banks : 

" Before Port Hudson, July 8, 1863. 
" To Major- General U. S. Geant, 

commanding Department Tennessee^ Viclcsburg : 

" Geneeal : The Mississippi is now opened. I have the 
honor to inform you that the garrison of Port Hudson fiurren- 
dered unconditionally this afternoon. We shall take formal 
possession at seven o'clock in the morning." 

GENERAL GRANT TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL L. THOMAS.— (Lettee.) 

ViCKSBiTRG, Miss., July 11, 1863. 
***** 

The long line of plantations from Lake Providence to Mil- 
liken's bend, it has been perfectly impossible to give perfect 
protection to, during the siege of Vicksburg. Besides the gun- 
boats, negro troops, and six regiments of white troops, left 
west of the Mississippi river in consequence of these planta- 
tions being there, I sent an additional brigade from the invest- 
ing army, and that at a time when Government was strain- 
ing every nerve to send me troops to insure the success of the 
enterprise against Vicksburg. All has not been availing. I 
can now clean out the Tensas and Bayou Ma9on country, so 
that there will be but little difficulty in j^rotecting wliat is left 

of the plantations. 

***** 

The capture of Vicksburg has proved a bigger thing than I 
supposed it would. There were over thirty thoiisand rebel 
troops still left when we entered the city. The number of small- 
arms will reach fifty thousand stand, I think, and the amount 
of ordnance and ordnance stores is enormous. Since crossing 
the Mississippi, an army of sixty thousand men has in the va- 
rious battles been killed and wounded, captured and scattered, 
so as to be lost to the Confederacy, and an armament for an 
army of one hundred thousand men has departed from them 
forever 



APPEliTDIX. 665 

My surplus troops were held in a position menacincf John- 
ston, ready to move at a moment's notice when Vicksburr; 
should fall. The moment a surrender was agreed upon, the 
order was given. I hope to hear to-day that Jolinston's forces 
have been broken to pieces, and much of his munitions of war 
abandoned. I have not heard from Sherman since the morn- 
ing of the 9th. He was then near Jackson, skirmishing with 
the cavalry of the enemy. * * » * 

GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— {Cipher Teleoeam.) 

YiCKSBURG, Juhj 11, 1863. 

General Banks writes me that he wants from ten to twelve 
thousand men to enable him to follow up the enemy and to 
move into Texas. Shall I send them? All my spare troops 
are now with Sherman, following Johnston. I have had no 
news since the morning of the 9th. Sherman was then at 
Clinton, his advance skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry. 



GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL H ALLEGE.— (Ciphee Telegeam.) 

YiCKSBURO, July 15, 1863. 

Sherman has Jackson invested from Pearl river, on the 
north, to the river on the south. This has cut off many hun- 
difed cars from the Confcderac3\ Sherman says he has force 
enough, and feels no apprehension of the result. 

Finding Tazoo City was being fortified, I sent Ilerron there 
with his division. He captured several hundred prisoners on 
steamers; five pieces of heavy artillery and all the public 
stores fell into our hands. The enemy bunit three steamboats 
on the approach of the gunboats. The De Kalb was blown, 
up and sunk in fifteen feet of water by the explosion of a tor 
pedo. Finding that the enemy were crossing cattle for the 
rebel array at Xatchez, and were said to have several thousand 
there now, I have sent steamers and troops to collect them, 
and to destroy their boats and all means for making more. 

General Banks has made requisition on me for steamers, 
coal, and forai-e, which I have sent. ShaU 1 send the Ninth 
army corps back to Burnside as soon as Johnston is driven 
from Jackson ? 



666 APPENDIX. 



GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 

ViCKSBURG, July 18, 1863. 

Johnston evacuated Jackson the night of the 16th inst. 
He is now in full retreat east. Sherman says most of his army 
must perish from the heat, lack of water, and general discour- 
agement. The army parolled here has to a great extent de- 
serted, and are scattered over the country in every direction. 
Learning that Yazoo City was being fortified, I sent General 
Herron there. Five gims were captured, many stores and 
about three hundred prisoners. 

General Ransom was sent to Natchez, to stop the crossing 
of cattle for the eastern army. On arrival he found that a 
large number had been driven out of the city, to be pastured. 
Also, that munitions of "war had recently been crossed over to 
the west for Kirby Smith. He mounted about two thousand 
of his men and sent them in both dii-ections. They caj)tured a 
number of prisoners and five thousand head of Texas cattle, 
two thousand head of which were sent to Banks. The balance 
have been and will be brought here. In Louisiana they cap- 
tured more prisoners, and a number of teams loaded with am- 
munition. Over two hundred thousand rounds of musket 
ammunition were brought back to Natchez, with the teams cap- 
tured, and two hundred and sixty-eight thousand rounds, be- 
sides artillery ammunition, destroyed. It seems to me now 
that Mobile should be captured, the expedition starting from 
some point on Lake Pontchartrain. There is much sickness in 
my command now, from long and excessive marching and la- 
bor. I will cooperate with General Schofield as soon as possi- 
ble, so as to give him possession of the line of the Arkansas. 
Sliall I retain or send back the Ninth army corps ? 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 



CONGEATULATOPvT ORDER OF GENERAL McCLEENAND. 

Headquarters, Thirteesth Army Corps, ) 
Battle-Field in rear of Vicksburg, May 30, 18G3. J 

General Orders, Ko. 72. 

Comrades: As your comtnander, I am proud to congrat- 
ulate you upon your constancy, valor, and successes. Ilistory 
affords no more brilliant example of soldierly qualities. Your 
victories have followed in such rapid succession that their 
echoes have not yet reached the country. They will challenge 
its grateful and enthusiastic applause. Yourselves striking out 
a new^ path, your comrades of the Array of the Tennessee fol- 
lowed, and a way was thus opened for them to redeem previous 
disappointments. Your march through Louisiana, from Milli- 
ken's bend to New Carthage and. Perkins's i>lantation, on the 
Mississippi river, is one of the most remarkable on record. 
Bayous and miry roads, threatened with momentary inunda- 
tion, obstructed your progress. All these were overcome by 
unceasing labor and unflagging energy. The two thousand 
feet of bridging which was hastily improvised out of materials 
created on the spot, and over which you passed, must long be 
remembered as a marvel. Descending the ]Mississipi>i slill 
lower, you were the first to cross the river at Bruin's landing, 
and to plant our colors in the state of ^Mississippi below War- 
renton. Resuming the advance the same day, you pushed on 
until you came up to the enejny near Port Gibson, only re- 



668 APPENDIX. 

strained by the dai-kness of night. You hastened to attack him 
on the morning of the 1st of May, and, by vigorously pressing 
him at all points, drove him from his position, taking a large 
number of prisoners and small-arms, and five pieces of cannon. 
General Logan's division came ujj in time to gallantly share in 
consummating the most valuable victory won since the capture 
of Fort Donelson. 

Taking the lead on the morning of the 2d, you were the 
first to enter Port Gibson, and hasten the retreat of the enemy 
from the vicinity of that place. During the ensuing night, as 
a consequence of the victory at Port Gibson, the enemy spiked 
his guns at Grand Gulf, and evacuated that place, retiring upon 
Yicksburg and Edward's station. The fall of Grand Gulf was 
solely the result of the victory achieved by the land forces at 
Port Gibson. The armament and public stores captured there 
are but the just trophies of that victory. 

Hastening to bridge the south branch of Bayou Pierre, at 
Port Gibson, you crossed on the morning of the 3d, and pushed 
on to Willow springs, Big Sandy, and the main crossing of 
Fourteen-mile creek, four miles from Edward's station. A de- 
tachment of the enemy was immediately driven away from the 
crossing, and you advanced, passed over, and rested during 
the night of the 12th, within three miles of the enemy in large 
force at that station. 

On the morning of the 13th, the objective point of the 
army's movement having been changed from Edward's sta- 
tion to Jackson, in pursuance of an order from the commander 
of the department, you moved on the north side of Fourteen- 
mile creek towards Raymond. 

This delicate and hazardous movement was executed by a 
portion of your numbers under cover of Hovey's division, 
which made a feint of attack, in line of battle, upon Edward's 
station. Too late to harm j^ou, the enemy attacked the rear 
of that division, but was promptly and decisively rej^ulsed. 

Resting near Raymond that night, on the morning of the 
14th, you entered that place — one division moving on to Mis- 
sissippi springs, near Jackson, in support of General Sherman, 
another to Clinton, in supj^ort of General McPherson — a third 
remaining at Raymond, and a fourth at Old Auburn, to bring 
up the army-trains. On the 15th, you again led the advance 
towards Edward's station, which once more became the objec- 



APPENDIX. GG9 

tive point. Expelling the enemy's pickets from Bolton the 
same day, you seized and held that important position. 

On the 16th, you led the advance in three columns upon 
three roads, against Edward's station ; meeting the enemy on 
the way in strong force, you heavily engaged him near Cliain- 
pioa hills, and, after a sanguinary and obstinate battle, with 
the assistance of General McPherson's corps, beat and routed 
him, taking many prisoners and small-arms, and several pieces 
of cannon. 

Continuing to lead the advance, you rapidly pursued the 
enemy to Edward's station, capturing that place, a large 
quantity of public stores, and many prisoners. Night only 
stoj)ped you. 

At day-dawn, on the iTth, you resumed the advance, and 
early coming upon the enemy strongly intrenched in elaborate 
works, both before and behind Big Black river, immediately 
opened with artillery upon him, followed by a daring and 
heroic charge at the point of the bayonet, whicli put him to 
rout, leaving eighteen pieces of cannon ajid more than a thou- 
sand prisoners in your hands. 

By an early hoii'r on the morning of the 18tb, you ha 1 con- 
structed a bridge across the Big Black, and had commenced 
the advance upon Vicksburg. 

On the 19th, 20th, and 21st, you continued to reconnoitre 
and skirmish until you had gained a near approach to the ene- 
my's works. 

On the 22d, in pursuance of the order of the commander ot 
the department, you assaulted the enemy's defences in front, at 
ten o'clock a, m., and within thirty minutes had made a lodg 
ment, and planted your colors upon two of his bastions. This 
partial success called into exercise the highest heroism,^ and 
was only gained by a bloody and protracted struggle. Yet it 
was gained, and was the first and largest success achieved any- 
where along the whole line of our army. 

For nearly eight hours, under a scorching sun and destruc- 
tive fire, you firmlv held your footing, and only withdrew 
when the enemy had largely massed their forces an.l concen- 
trated their attack upon you. 

How and whv the general assault faUcd, it would be useless 
now to explain.' The Thirteenth army corps, acknowledging 
the good intention of all, would scorn indulgence in weak re- 



670 



APPEISTDIX. 



grets and idle criminations. According justice to all, it would 
only defend itself. If, while the enemy was massing to crush 
it, assistance was asked for, by a diversion at other points, or 
by reenforcement, it only asked what in one case General 
Grant had specifically and peremptorily ordered, namely, simul- 
taneous and persistent attack all along our lines until the ene- 
my's outer works should be carried ; and what, in the other, by 
massing a strong force in time upon a weakened point, would 
have probably insured success. 

Comrades, you have done much, yet something more re- 
mains to be done. The enemy's odious defences still block 
your access to Vicksburg. Treason still rules that rebellious 
city, and closes the Mississippi river against rightful use by the 
millions who inhabit its sources and the great Northwest. 
Shall not our flag float over Vicksburg ? Shall not the great 
Father of Waters be opened to lawM commerce ? Methinks 
the emphatic response of one and all of you is, " It shall be 
so ! " Then let us rise to the level of a crowning trial ! Let our 
common sufierings and glories, while uniting us as a band of 
brothers, rouse us to new and surpassijig efforts ! Let us re- 
solve upon success, God helping us ! I join with you, com- 
rades, in your sympathy for the wounded and sorrow for the 
dead. May we not trust — nay, is it not so — that History will 
associate the martyrs of this sacred struggle for law and order, 
liberty and justice, with the honored martyrs of Monmouth 
and Bunker Hill ! 

JOHN A. McCLERXAXD, 

Major-General commanding. 



GENERAL SHEEMAN TO COLONEL EAWLINS. 

Hkadqtjakters Fifteenth Army Corps, ) 

Camp ox Walsct Hills, June 17, 1863. ) 
Lieutenant- C'olonelJ. A. Eawlins, 

A. A. General, Department of the Tennessee : 
Sir: On my return last evening from an inspection of the 
new works at Snyder's bluff'. General Blair, who commands 
the second division of my corps, called my attention to the en- 
closed publication in the MemiJhis Evening Bulletin of June 
T3th instant, entitled "Congratulatory Order of General Mc- 
Clernand," with a request that I should notice it, lest the 



APPEITOIX. 071 

statements of facts, and inference contained tlierein, might re- 
ceive credence from an excited public. 

It certainly gives me no pleasure or satisfaction to notice 
such a catalogue of nonsense, such an effusion of vain-glory 
and hypocrisy; nor can I believe General McClernand ever 
published such an order officially to his corps. I know too 
well that the brave and intelligent soldiers and officers who 
compose that corps will not be humbugged by such stuff. 

If the order be a genuine production, and not a forgery, it 
is manifestly addressed, not to an army, but to a constituency 
in Illinois, far distant from the scene of the events attempted 
to be described, who might innocently be induced to think 
General McClernand the sagacious leader and bold hero he so 
complacently paints himself. 

But it is barely possible the order is a genuine one, and was 
actually read to the regiments of the Thirteenth army corps, in 
which case a copy must have been sent to your office for the 
infoi-mation of the commanding general. I beg to call his at- 
tention to the requii-ements of General Orders Xo. 151, of 1862, 
which actually forbids the publication of all official letters and 
reports, and requires the name of the writer to be laid before 
the President of the United States for dismissal. 

The document under question is not technically a letter or 
report, and, though styled an order, is not an order. It orders 
nothing, but is in the nature of an address to soldiers, mani- 
festly designed for publication for ulterior political purposes. 
It perverts the truth, to the ends of flattery and selt-gloritiea- 
tion, and contains many untruths, among which is one of mon- 
strous falsehood. 

It substantially accuses General :McPherson and myself 
with disobeying the orders of General Grant, in not assaultitig 
on the 19th'and 22d of May, and allowing, on the latter day, 
the enemy to mass his forces against the Thirteenth army corps 
alone. General McPherson is fully able to answer f .r himself; 
and for ^he Fifteenth army corps I answer, that on the lOih 
and 22d of May, it attacked furiously at three distinct points 
the enemy's works, at the very hour and minute fixed in Gen- 
eral Grant's written orders; that, on both duys, we j.lanted our 
colors on the exterior slope and kept them there till niglitfail ; 
that from the first hour of the investment of Vicksburg until 
now, my corps has been fiir in advance of General McClcr- 



672 APPENDIX. 

nand ; that tlie general-in-chief, by personal inspection, knows 
this truth ; that tens of thousands of living witnesses beheld 
and participated in the attack ; that General Grant visited 
me during both assaults, and saAV for himself, and is far better 
qualified to judge whether his orders were obeyed than Gen- 
eral McClernand, who was near three miles off; that General 
McCleruand never saw ray lines ; that he then knew, and still 
knows nothing about them, and that from his position he had 
no means of knowing what occurred on this front. 

Not only were the assaults made at the time and place, and 
in the manner prescribed in General Grant's written orders, 
but about three p. m., five hours after the assault on the 22d 
began, when my storraing-party lay against the exterior slope 
of the bastion in my front, and Blair's whole division was de- 
ployed close up to the parapet, ready to spring to the assault, 
and all my field-artillery were in good position for the work. 
General Grant shewed me a note from General McClernand, 
that moment handed him by an orderly, to the effect that " he 
had cariied three of the enemy's forts, and that the flag of the 
Union waved over the stronghold of Vicksburg," asking that 
the enemy should be pressed at all points, lest he should con- 
centrate on him. Not dreaming that a major-general would at 
such a critical moment make a mere buncombe communication, 
I ordered instantly Giles A. Smith and Mower's bi'igades to 
renew the assault, under cover of Blair's division, and the ar- 
tillery deployed as before described, and sent an aide to General 
Steele, about a mile to my right, to convey the same mischiev- 
ous message, whereby we lost needlessly many of our best offi- 
cers and men. 

I would never have revealed so unwelcome a truth had 
General IMcClernand, in his process of self-flattery, confined 
himself to facts in the reach of his own observation, and not 
gone out of his way to charge others for results which he seems 
not to comprehend. 

In cases of repulse and failure, congratulatory addresses by 
subordinate commanders are not common, and are only re- 
sorted to by weak and vain men to shift the burden of respon- 
sibility from tlieir own to the shoulders of others. 

I never make a practice of speaking or writing of others, 
but, during our assault of the 19th, several of my brigade com- 
manders were under the impression that McClernand's corps 



APPENDIX. 073 

did not even attempt an assault. In the congratulatory ordei 
I remark groat silence on that subject. Merely to satisfy in- 
quiring parties, I should like to know if McClcrnand's cor|)S 
did or did not assault at two r. m. of May lOtli, as ordered. I 
don't believe it did, and I tliink General ^IcCk'niand n'Spoii- 
sible. 

With these remarks I leave the matter where it properly 
belongs, in the hands of the commanding general, who knows 
his plans and orders, sees with an eye single to success and his 
country's honor, and not from the narrow and contracted circle 
of a subordinate commander, who exaggerates the importance 
of the events that fall under his immediate notice, and is filled 
with an itching desire for "fame not earned." 
With great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

W. T. SHERMAN, 

Major- General commanding. 



GEKEKAL McPHERSON TO GEXER.VL GUXST. 

Headquarters Setesteesth Army Corps, 

Departmext of the Tennessee, 
Near Yicksburg, Miss., June 18, 1863. 

Major- General Gbant, 

commanding Department of the Tcnneme : 

General : My attention has just been calkd to an article 
published in the Jlissouri Democrat of the 10th instant, pur- 
porting to be a congratulatory order from Major-Goneral John 
A. McClernand to his command. 

The whole tenor of the order is so ungenerous, and the 
insinuations and criminations against the other corps of your 
army are so manifestly at variance with the facts, that a sense 
of duty to my command, as well as the verbal protest of every 
one of my division and brigade couimanders against allowing 
such an order to go forth to the public unanswered, require 
that I should call your attention to it. 

After a careful perusal of the order, I cannot help arriving 

at the conclusion that it was written more to intlueuce public 

sentiment at the Xorth, and impress the pubhc mmd with the 

magnificent strategy, superior tactics, and brilliant deeas of 

43 



674 APPE^SDIX, 

the major-general commancling the Thirteenth army corps, than 
to congratidate his troops upon their well-merited successes. 

There is a vain-gloriousness about the order, an ingenious 
attempt to write himself down the hero, the master-mind, giv- 
ing life and direction to military operations in this quarter, in- 
consistent with the high-toned principle of the soldier sans 
peiir et sans r'eproclie. 

Though " born a warrior," as he himself stated, he has evi- 
dently forgotten one of the most essential qualities, viz., that 
elevated, refined sense of honor, which, while guarding his own 
rights with jealous care, at all times renders justice to others. 

It little becomes Major-General McClernand to complain 
of want of coojjeration on the part of other corps, in the as- 
sault on the enemy's works on the 22d ultimo, when twelve 
hundred and eighteen men of my command were placed hors 
dii combat in their resolute and daring attempt to carry the 
positions assigned to them, and fully one-third of these from 
General Quimby's division, with the gallant and accomplished 
Colonel Boomer at their head, fell in front of his oicn lines, 
where they were left, after being sent two miles to support him, 
to sustain the whole brunt of the battle, from five p. m. until 
after dark, his oicn men being recalled. 

If General McClernand's assaulting columns were not im- 
mediately supported when they moved against the enemy's in- 
trenchments, and few of the men succeeded in getting in, it 
most assuredly was his oion fault, and not the fault of any 
other corps commander. 

Each corps commander had the positions assigned to him 
which he was to attempt to carry, and it remained with him to 
dispose his troops in such a way as to support promptly and 
efiiciently any column which succeeded in getting in. 

The attack Avas ordered by the major-general commanding 
the department to be simultaneous at all the points selected; 
and precisely at the hour, the columns moved, some of them 
taking a little longer than others to reach the enemy's works, 
on account of the natural and artificial obstacles to be over- 
come, but the difterence in time was not great enough to allow 
of any changing or massing of tlie enemy from one part of the 
line to the other. 

The assault failed, not in my opinion from any want of 
cooperation or bravery on the part of our troops, but from the 



APPENDIX. ()(.i 

strength of the works, the difficulty of getting close up to them 
under cover, and the determined character of the assailed. 
Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

JAMES B. McPUERSON, 
Major- General. 



GLOSSARY OF SIEGE TERMS. 

Approach. — A ditch dug by the besiegers in their advances, 
the earth of the ditch being thrown up towards the enemy, 
as a cover. 

Banquette. — A small terrace behind a parapet, on which the 
soldier stands to deliver his fire. 

Bastion. — A projecting part of the main fort, consisting of a 
face and two flanks. 

BoTAU. — A small trench leading direct to a mai^azine, or any 
particular point ; generally, the boyaux run zigzag, and be- 
tween the parallels. 

C0HOKN-31ORTAR. — A small mortar used in sieges ; so small that 
it can be carried by hand. 

CouxTEK-MiNE. — A gallery under ground, by means of which 
the mine of the enemy may be watched and destroye<l. 

CovERED-wAY. — A Toad, or way, covered from the fire or view 
of an enemy, by a parapet. 

Debottche. — To issue from a defile. 

Defile. — To arrange fortifications so as to protect a space on 
the interior from the fire or view of an enemy. 

Defilade. — Same as defile. 

Double-sap. — A sap, protected on both sides by a parapet. 

Embrasure. — An opening in a parapet, througli which cannon 
are pointed and discharged. 

Fascine. — A bundle of twigs closely bound, ten or twenty 
inches in diameter, and from ten to twenty feet long, used 
for revetting, or for filling ditches. 

Feathered-grenade. — A percussion hand-grenade, with paste- 
board wings to keep the point of percussion Ibrcmost. 



616 APPEOT)IX. 

FiBE-BALL, — A ball filled -vritli powder or other combustibles, 
to be thrown at the enemy, to light up his works. 

Gabion. — A basket, cylindrical in form and open at both ends, 
usually about nine feet long by two wide. It is generally 
made of twigs or saplings, and, when filled with earth, used 
to shelter men from an enemy's fire, or in i-evetting. 

Half-parallel. — A parallel covered only towards the enemy, 
and open in rear. 

Hand-grenade. — A small shell, intended to be thrown by hand 
into the head of a sap. 

Head of Sap. — The part of the sap nearest the enemy. 

IMiNE. — A cavity under fortifications, filled with powder, so as 
to explode it when fired. 

Parallel. — A wide trench, for communication between the 
batteries and approaches of the besiegers. 

Parapet. — A wall or rampart, breast-high, covermg soldiers 
from a front attack. 

Place of Arms. — A portion of a work protected from the 
enemy, and suitable for the assembling of troops. 

Platform. — The floor of wood, on which cannon are mounted 
during a siege, to fire on an enemy. 

Profile. — A vertical section of a work, generally at right an- 
gles with the line of the work. 

Reentrant. — Pointing or directing inwards — sometimes used 
as a noun, when it signifies a reentrant angle. 

Revet. — To face or line with masonry or wood, or other ma- 
terial. 

Salient. — A projecting angle of a fort. 

Sap. — A near approach to a fortified place, made by digging 

under cover of gabions and sap-rollers. 
Sapper. — One employed in digging sajos ; the sappers usually 

Avork on their knees. 
Sap-roller. — A large gabion stufled with fascines, and rolled 

forward before the sapper, to protect him at his work. 
Shoulder. — Tlie angle of a bastion between the face and the 

flank. 

Side-cutting. — A road branching out from the main one. 
Sling-cart. — A large cart used to transport cannon short dis- 



APPENDIX. G77 

lances, the cannon being slung or suspended, by a diain at- 
tached to the axle-tree. 

Tamp. — To pack earth or other material in a mine, in order to 
confine the effects of an explosion. 

Trench. — An excavation made in a siege, for the purpose of 
covering troops as they advance. The term includes paral- 
lels and approaches. 

Thexch-guabds. — Soldiers placed in the trenches to guard the 
working-parties. 

"Wattling. — A platting of twigs. 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI. 



mSTEUCTIOXS OF GENERAL BEAGG TO GENERAL LONGSTEEET. 

nEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT TeNXESSEE, ) 

Missionary Ridge, 4th Nov., '63. f 
General : You Avill move with your comiTiaad(McLa"w's and 
Hood's divisions, and Alexanders and Lyden's artillery battal- 
ions), as indicated in our conference yesterday. Major-General 
Wheeler will make the necessary arrangements for the cav- 
alry, and probably accompany it — at least for a time. He is 
thoroughly acquainted with Middle Tennessee, and many of the 
officers with him will know the route there, as well as all parts 
of East Tennessee. Every preparation is ordered to advance 
you as fast as possible, and the success of the plan depends on 
raj^id movements and sudden blows. The country through 
which you move, until you strike the mountains, will subsist 
your command, and forage your animals, besides giving a large 
supply of breadstuffs. Your object should be to drive Burn- 
side out of East Tennessee first ; or, better, to capture or de- 
stroy him. Major-General Samuel Jones will be urged to press 
on him from Northeast Tennessee. 

You will please keep open the telegraphic communication 
with us here, and see to the repair and regular use of railroad 
to Loudon. The latter is of the first importance, as it may be- 
come necessary in an emergency to recall you temporarily. 

I hope to hear from you fully and frequently, general, and 
sincerely wish you the same success which has ever marked 
your brilliant career. 

I am, general. 

Very respectfully and truly yours, 

BKAXTON" BRAGG, General 
General James Loxgstreet, commanding corps. 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XII. 



BKAGGS EEPORT OF BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 

Headqcarters, Army of the Tesxessee, |_ 

Dalton, Ga., Novemhcr 30, 1863. \ 

Sir : On Monday, the 23 J, the enemy advanced in heavy 
force, and drove in our picket line in front of Missionary ridge, 
but made no further effort. On Tuesday morning early, they 
threw over the river a heavy force opposite the north end of 
the ridge, and just below Ihe mouth of the Chickamauga, at 
the same time displaying a heavy force in our immediate front. 

After visiting the right and making dispositions tlierc for 
the new development in that direction, I returned towards the 
left, to find a heavy cannonading going on from the enemy's 
batteries on our forces occupying tlie slope of Lookout moun- 
tain, between the crest and the river. A very heavy force 
soon advanced to the assault, and was met by one brigade only 
— Walthall's, which made a desperate resistance, but was 
finally compelled to yield ground— \vhy this command was not 
sustained is yet unexplained. The commander on that i)art of 
the field, Major-General Stevenson, had six brigades at his dis- 
posal. Upon his urgent ai)peal, another brigade was dis- 
patched in the afternoon to his support, though it appeared his 
own forces had not been brought into action, and I proceeded 
to the scene. 

Arriving just before sunset, I found we had lost all the .ad- 
vantages of the position. Orders were immediately givi'u for 
the ground to be disputed untU we could withdraw our furces 
across Chattanooga creek, and the movement was commenced. 



680 APPENDIX. 

This having been successfully accomplished, our whole forces 
were concentrated on the ridge, and extended to the right to 
meet the movement in that direction. 

On Wednesday, the 25th, I again visited the extreme right, 
now under Lieutenant-General Hardee, and threatened by a 
heavy force, whilst strong columns could be seen marching in 
that direction, A very heavy force in line of battle confronted 
our left and centre. 

On my return to this point, about eleven a. m., the enemy's 
forces were being moved in heavy masses from Lookout, and 
beyond to our front, whilst those in front extended to our 
right. They formed their lines, with great deliberation, just 
beyond the range of our guns, and in plain view of our posi- 
tion. 

Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our 
position, that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold 
it, and every disposition was made for that purpose. 

During this time they had made several attempts on our 
extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed with very 
heavy loss, by Major-General Cleburne's command, under the 
immediate direction of Lieutenant-General Hardee'. 

By the road, cross (sic) the ridge at Rossville, far to our 
left, a route was open to our rear. Major-General Breckin- 
ridge, commanding on the left, had occupied this with two 
regiments, and a battery. It being reported to me that a force 
of the enemy had moved in that direction, the general was 
ordered to have it reconnoitred, and" to make every disposi- 
tion necessary to secure his flank, which he proceeded to do. 

About three and a half p. m., the immense force in the front of 
our left and centre advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy 
skirmishers. Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much 
confusion was produced, before they reached musket range. 

In a short time the war of musketry became very heavy, 
and it was soon apparent the enemy had been repulsed in my 
immediate front. 

Whilst riding along the crest, congratulating the troops, 
intelligence reached me that our line was broken on my right, 
and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was 
promptly dispatched to that point under Brigadier-General 
Bate, who had so successl'ully maintained the ground in my 
fiont, and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally 



APPENDIX. G81 

our retiring troops and return them to the crest to drive the 
enemy back. General Bate found tlic disaster so great, that 
his small force could not repair it. 

About this time I learned that our extreme left had also 
given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. 
Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the 
rear, where by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers 
had been formed upon which to rally. 

Lieutenant-General Hardee, leaving Major-General Cle- 
burne in command on the extreme right, moved towards tlie 
left, when he heard the heavy tiring in that direction. He 
reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it 
had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its left where the 
enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judi- 
cious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham's division 
directly across the ridge, facing the enemy, who was now mov- 
ing a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided 
stand here the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion 
of our force to the right remained intact. 

All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate's division 
was entirely routed, and in rapid flight— nearly all the 
artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry 
support. 

Every effort which could be made by myself and staff, and 
by many other mounted officers, availed but little. A panic, 
which I had never before witnessed, seemed to have seized 
upon ofiicers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for 
his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character. 

In this distressing and alarming state of affairs. General 
Bate was ordered toehold his position, covering the road for 
the retreat of Breckinridge's command; and orders were im- 
mediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breckinridge to retire 
their forces upon the depot at Chickamauga. 

Fortunately, it Avas now near nightfall, and the country 
and roads in our rear were fully known to us, but equally un- 
Known to the enemy. 

The routed left made its way l)ack in great disorder, effect- 
ually covered, however, by Bate's small comman.l, which had 
a sharp conflict with the enemy's advance, driving it back. 
After nii^ht, all being quiet. Bate retired in good ordrr— the 
enemy attempting no pursuit. 



682 APPEKDIX. 

Lieutenant-General Hardee's command, under his judicious 
management, retired in good order and unmolested. 

As soon as all troo2)s had crossed, the bridges over the 
Chickamauga were destroyed to impede the enemy, though the 
stream was fordable at several places. 

Ko satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shame- 
ful conduct of our troops on the left, in allowing their line to 
be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have 
been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting col- 
umn ; and wherever resistance was made, the enemy fled in 
disorder after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the 
ridge, did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physi- 
cal exertion in climbing, which rendered them powerless ; and 
the slightest effort would have destroyed them. 

Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed 
themselves of our panic, and turning our guns upon us, enfila- 
ded the lines both right and left, i-endering them entirely un- 
tenable. 

Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gal- 
lantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged 
us ; and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind, in 
explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops, Avho had 
never before failed in any duty assigned them, however diffi- 
cult and hazardous. 

They had, for two days, confronted the enemy, marshalling 
his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight 
such a superiority in numbers, as may have intimidated weak 
minds and untried soldiers. 

But our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts, 
when the strength of position was against us, and with, perfect 
success, that not a doubt crossed my mind. 

As yet I am not fully informed as to the commands which 
first fled, and brought this great disaster and disgrace upon 
our arms. Investigation will bring out the truth, however, 
and full justice shall be done to the good and the bad. 

x\fter arriving at Chickamauga, and informing myself of 
the full condition of affairs, it was decided to put the army in 
motion for a point further removed from a powerful and vic- 
torious army, that we might have some little time to replenish 
and recuperate for another struggle. The enemy made pui'- 
Buit as far as Ringgold, but was so handsomely checked by 



APPENDIX. G83 

Major-General Cleburne and Brigadier-General Gist, in com- 
mand of their respective divisions, that be gave us but little 
annoyance. 

Lieutenant-General Ilardoe, as usual, is entitled to my 
warmest thanks and high commendation for liis gallant and 
judicious conduct during the whole of tiie trying scenes 
through which we passed. 

Major-General Cleburne, whose command defeated the 
enemy in every assault on the 25th, and who eventually 
charged and routed him on that day, capturing several stands 
of colors and several hundred prisoners, and who afterwards 
brought up our rear with great success, again charging and 
routing the pursuing column at Kinggold, on the 27th, is 
commended to the special notice of the government. 

Briga*dier-Generals Gist and Bate, commanding divisions, 
Cumming, Walthall, and Polk, commanding brigades, were 
distinguished for coolness, gallantry, and successful conduct, 
throughout the engagements, and in the rear-guard on tlu- 

reti'eat. 

To my staff, personal and general, my thanks are specially 
due for their gallant and zealous efforts, under fire, to rally the 
broken troops and restore order; and for their laborious ser- 
vices in conducting successfully the many and arduous duti.s 
of the retreat. 

Our losses are not yet ascertained ; but in killed and wound- 
ed, it is known to have been very small. In prisoners and 
stragglers, I fear it is much larger. 

The chief of artillery reports the loss of forty pieces. 
I am. sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

BRAXTOX BKAGG, General commanding. 

General S. Cooper, 

Adjutant- General, C. S. A., Eiclmond. 






t -; 



COMPLETE IN SIX VOLUMES, OCTAVO. 

HISTORY OF THE 

UNITED STATES, 

From the Discovery of the Continent. By George Banxroft. 

An entirely new edition, partly rewritten and 

thoroughly revised. 



The author has made extensive changes in the text, condensing in places, en- 
larging in others, and cctrefully revising. It is practically a new work, embody- 
ing the results of the latest researches, and enjoying the advantage of the author's 
long and mature experience. 

The original octavo edition 7vas in twelve volumes. The present edition is 
complete in six volumes, octavo, the price being co)-respondingly reduced. 



EXTRACTS FROM REVIEWS. 
" The merits of Bancroft's ' History of the United States ' are so well known that 
little need be said of the new edition, the first volume of which, reaching to 1688, has 
just been pubhshed in very handsome form, except to point out the changes since the 
revision of 1876. One of the most prominent is the introduction of a division into 
three parts, beginning respectively at 1492, 1660, and 1688. With each part begins a 
new numbering of the chapters, and the difference thus created between the editions is 
increased by the frequent separation of one chapter into two or three. Thus what 
was chapter two in 1S76 becomes chapters two, three, and four, in 1883, and what was 
chapter twenty-two becomes chapters twelve, thirteen, and fourteen, of part second. 
In all, instead of twenty-seven chapters there are thirty-eight. The total length is not 
increased, but rather diminished, since there are many omissions, for instance, of Capx- 
tain John Smith's apocrj'^phal adventures in Hungarj', the e\ndence for which, coming 
solely from the hero himself, probably seems weaker than ever to Mr. Bancroft. 
Among passages which will not be missed is this about the Quaker martjTS : ' They 
were Uke those weeds which were unsightly to the eyes, and which only when tram- 
pled give out precious perfumes.' Another expunged remark is that Episcopalianism 
' separating itself from Protestantism could acknowledge no equal except the Orthixlox 
Greek Church and that of Rome.' With these sentences have been rejected many 
whose meaning was given in the context, such curtailment being especially common at 
the beginning and end of chapters. The account of the character of James I is greatly 
abridged, and made somewhat less severe. In the place of the charge that Oliver 
Cromwell's ruling motive was ambition, is the acknowledgment that in his foreign 
pohcy he was most certainly faithful to the interests of England. The notice of 
Luther is rewritten and enlarged, mainly by apt quotations of his own words. There 
has been less change in the accounts of American than of European. matters, but the 
most important addition, anywhere, is that of two pages describing and praising Cop- 
Uin Smith's government of Virginia. Often, when there appears to be an addition or 
omission, there is in reality only a transposition. The whole class of changes may be 
attributed to greater maturity of judgment, rather than to discoveo' of "««• material. 



2 Bancroft's History of the United %ta.tzs.— {Continued.) 

especially as no notice is taken of recent controversies ; for instance, whether Colum- 
bus really lies buried at Havana or San Domingo ; whether the Pilgrims landed ex- 
actly on the day of the winter solstice, as is apparently Bancroft's opinion, and whether 
' The King's Missive ' was ever sent, as told by Whittier. Other changes aim simply 
at improvement of style. The volumes are printed in the stately octavo style of the 
first edition, which seems more appropriate to such a standard work than the cheaper 
form of the other revision." — Boston Advej-tiser. 

"On comparing this work with the corresponding volume of the ' Centenar>' ' 
edition of 1876, one is surprised to see how extensive changes the author has found 
desirable, even after so short an interval. The first thing that strikes one is the in- 
creased number of chapters, resulting from subdivision. The first volume contains 
two volumes of the original, and is divided into thirty-eight chapters instead of eight- 
een. This is in itself an improvement. But the new arrangement is not the result 
merely of subdivision : the matter is rearranged in such a manner as vastly to increase 
the lucidity and continuousness of treatment. In the present edition Mr. Bancroft re- 
turns to the principle of division into periods, abandoned in the ' Centenary ' edition. 
His division is, however, a new one. As the permanent shape taken by a great histor- 
ical work, this new arrangement is certainly an improvement." — The Nation {Ncm 
York). 

" In modifying the narrative, Mr. Bancroft tells us that his chief aims were accuracy 
and lucidity, and that 'no well-founded criticism that has been seen, whether made here 
or abroad, with a good will or a bad one, has been neglected.' Apparently no new 
material of particular moment has been inserted, although several sketches of famous 
characters have been rewritten either entirely or in part. The work as a whole is in 
better shape, and is of course more authoritative than ever before. This last revision 
will be without doubt, both from its desirable form and accurate text, the standard 
one." — Boston Traveller. 

" It has not been granted to many historians to devote half a century to the history 
of a single people, and to live long enough, and, let us add, to be willing and wise 
enough, to revise and rewrite in an honored old age the work of a whole lifetime. 
This good fortune has been granted to Mr. Bancroft, and he has largely profited by it, 
as have also the majority of readers among his own countrymen, who, when American 
history is in question, go at once to his volumes as to an authoritative tribunal, and 
abide by his decisions, which in no case of any consequence, we believe, have ever 
been seriously or for long disturbed." — New York Mail and Express. 

" The extent and thoroughness of this revision would hardly be guessed without 
comparing the editions side by side. The condensation of the text amounts to some- 
thing over one third of the previous edition. There has also been very considerable 
recasting of the text. On the whole, our examination of the first volume leads us to 
believe that the thought of the historian loses nothing by the abbreviation of the text. 
A closer and later approximation to the best results of scholarship and criticism is 
reached. The public gains by its more compact brevity and in amount of matter, and 
in economy of tihie and money."— 77/^ Independent {N'ew York). 

" We have made a comparison of the first volume with the edition of 1S76, and find 
that the work has been largely recast, the arrangement of the chapters and the minor 
divisions has been changed, many portions have been rewritten, and no pains have 
been spared in making necessary corrections as the result of criticism on the work or of 



Bancroft's History of the United States. — {Continued.^ 3 

further investigation. Many who purchased the last edition will regret that they did 
not wait for the author's final revisions ; but we presume that he had no intention at 
the time it was issued of going over his work again, even if he had the hope of living 
so long. It is a matter of general congratulation that his life and vigor have been 
spared, and that he is still engaged with all the energy of youth in his important lit- 
erary works. The octavo volume, just issued, is a fine specimen of book-making, in 
clear type, on good paper, and is neatly bound." — Neiv York Observe?-. 

' ' During the half -century, or almost that time, since the issue of Mr. Bancroft's 
first volume, much new light has been shed upon the characters and events of the 
period covered by the ' History,' and no small proportion of it is due to the con- 
troversies aroused by the volumes as they successively appeared. Mr. Bancroft stood 
stoutly by his original text until the time came for the issue of the revised edition of 
1876, when it was evident that he had carefully studied the criticisms his work had 
received during the preceding forty-two years and had profited by them. Now comes 
the announcement that he is engaged in a thorough and last revision of the whole 
work. The ten volumes of the original edition, and the two volumes issued last year, 
are to be wholly revised, rewritten where necessary, and the twelve volumes of the 
former issues comprised in six handsome octavo volumes. The entire work will thus 
be given at exactly half the price of the original edition, while, judging by the first 
installment, it will certainly lose nothing by comparison so far as appearance goes, and 
will be more valuable as embodying the latest information and containing the last 
touches of the author's hand." — Cleveland (Ohio) Herald. 

" There is nothing to be said at this day of the value of ' Bancroft.' Its authority 
is no longer in dispute, and as a piece of vivid and realistic historical writing it stands 
among the best works of its class. It may be taken for granted that this new edition 
will greatly extend its usefulness." — Philadelphia North American. 

" While it is not quite true that the marks of Mr. Bancroft's revision of his great 
history of the United States are visible on every page, a careful comparison of the 
earlier editions and this shows that the claim to improvement is by no means ill-found- 
ed. Sometimes whole paragraphs have been cut out ; still oftener the extravagances 
of a youthful style have been carefully pruned, and the gain has been manifest in 
sobriety and effect." — Philadelphia Press. 

" The merits of this standard work are too well known to need recapitulation, and 
the present edition will comprise the entire original work, complete in six volumes, 
and published at half the price of the original edition. The type is somewhat smaller, 
but in general style is not inferior. The first volume reaches to 16SS, and the changes 
made by the author are numerous, and some of them important. This volume, for 
instance, is divided into three parts, beginning respectively at 1492, 1660, and 1668, 
and with each part begins a new numbering of chapters. There are many omissions 
in the text — as-of Captain John Smith's adventures in Hungarj'. Some sentences in 
the text have been left out ; the character given to James I toned down, and the notice 
of Luther enlarged, while pages have been added describing Captain Smith's rule in 
Mrginia. Other changes are chiefly improvements of style and the incorporation of 
the dates into the text. On the whole, the work is much improved in its new dress 
and revised form, and will be welcomed by all, for Bancroft's history of our country is 
st\\\ facile princeps among histories of our land." — Chicago Tribune. 

" Mr. Bancroft's first volume appeared in iSj;4, and he has been engaged upon the 



4 Bancroft's History of the United S>ta.t-es.— {Continued.) 

history almost ever since he was a student at Gottingen. The re-issue of the work, so 
that each part should be what his later opinion approved, can hardly be more satis- 
factory to the venerable historian than it is to the generation which first approaches 
his great work in the final forms of its hterary execution. In this final revision Mr. 
Bancroft has not only corrected all mistakes and errors of fact, so far as they have 
been ascertained, but has revised the style, taken the wind out of pompous sentences, 
and brought the whole work within the laws of good writing and within the unity of 
plan with which he had set out at the beginning. Thus far he has removed many of 
the objections which stood against his history as a work of permanent value ; and 
there is a certain solid, thorough, substantial character to his great historj' which gives 
it a permanent weight in the world of letters. The work now takes rank with the 
best histories of the school of philosophical narrative to which the author belongs." — 
Boston Herald. 

" The marvelous industry and the earnest conscientiousness which the venerable 
historian exhibits in revising, recasting, and in part rewriting the great work of his 
life, not only compel respect and admiration on their own account, but they become 
also the strongest guarantees of the accuracy of his scholarship, of his fidelity to truth, 
of the exalted conception which he entertains of his task, and therefore of the sub- 
stantial excellence of his history. The edition of 1876 exhibited no httle pruning and 
correction ; but the author has again gone over the entire field, and, with a care and 
devotion worthy of the theme and of his reputation, has wrought what he says must 
be his last revision. This latest edition will be sought by many who have for years 
been familiar with its predecessors. The publishers deser\-e credit for presenting so 
great a work in such excellent guise, and the author may accept it as a noble monu- 
ment to perpetuate his fame. But may he be spared to add many chapters to his 
history, and bring it down to a later period ! " — Utica {N. Y.) Herald. 



With Portrait of the Author. 



Completi! in six volnmes, octavo, handsomely printed from new type. Clutli, nncuf, witii gilt top, §2.50; 
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